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1 
ABSTRACT 
 
  This thesis contains the findings of an examination of the relationship between internal 
corporate governance structures and the financial performance of South African listed firms. 
Specifically, using a sample of 100 South African listed firms from 2002 to 2006 (a total of 
500 firm-year observations) and corporate governance data collected directly from company 
annual reports, the thesis seeks to ascertain whether better-governed listed firms tend to be 
associated with higher financial returns than their poorly-governed counterparts. Unlike prior 
studies,  the  internal  corporate  governance-financial  performance  nexus  is  investigated  by 
applying both the compliance-index and equilibrium-variable research methodologies. 
  The results based on the compliance-index model suggest that there is a statistically 
significant  and  positive  association  between  the  quality  of  the  sampled  firms’  internal 
corporate  governance  structures  and  their  financial  performance.  This  finding  is  robust 
whether an accounting (return on assets) or a market (Tobin’s Q) based measure of financial 
performance is used. Distinct from prior studies, an analysis of the impact of complying with 
the South African context specific affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance 
provisions on the financial performance of South African listed firms is also investigated. The 
results  indicate  that  compliance  with  the  affirmative  action  and  stakeholder  corporate 
governance provisions impacts positively on the performance of South African listed firms. 
By contrast, the results based on the equilibrium-variable model are generally mixed. 
First, regardless of the financial performance measure used, board diversity, the frequency of 
board  meetings,  and  the  establishment  of  board  committees  except  the  presence  of  a 
nomination committee seem to have no impact on firm financial performance. Second, board 
size  is  statistically  significant  and  positively  associated  with  Tobin’s  Q  (Q-ratio),  but 
statistically insignificant and negatively related to return on assets (ROA). Third, role or CEO 
duality is statistically significant and positively related to ROA, but statistically insignificant 
and  negatively  associated  with  the  Q-ratio.  Director  shareownership  is  statistically 
insignificant  and  positively  related  to  ROA,  but  statistically  significant  and  negatively 
associated with the Q-ratio. Finally, the findings based on both the director shareownership 
squared  and  cubed  do  not  support  the  statistically  significant  non-linear  director 
shareownership-financial performance association reported by Morck et al. (1988). 
The findings from a series of robustness or sensitivity analyses carried out suggest that 
the empirical results reported are generally robust to potential endogeneity problems.  
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DEFINITION OF TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
  Before progressing further, it is deemed appropriate to briefly define and explain some 
key terms and abbreviations that have been used throughout this thesis.  
Corporate governance is a very broad term. As will be explained further in chapter two, 
the study will concentrate only on ‘internal’ or ‘narrow’ corporate governance structures. As a 
result, corporate governance will be defined as “a system by which companies are directed 
and controlled”, (Cadbury Report, 1992, s.2.5). 
The  term  ‘shareholding’  will  refer  to  the  corporate  governance  model  that  is 
predominantly  found  in  Anglo-American  companies  or  firms  that  normally  operate  in 
countries, such as the UK and US with a common-law legal system. It assumes that a firm 
should be run to primarily advance the interests of its shareholders or owners. The terms 
‘shareholding’, ‘shareholder’ and ‘Anglo-American’ will be used interchangeably throughout 
this thesis. 
The  term  ‘stakeholding’  will  refer  to  the  corporate  governance  framework  that  is 
mainly found in Continental European and Asian firms or companies that usually operate in 
countries,  like  France,  German,  and  Japan  with  civil-law  legal  system.  Unlike  the 
‘shareholding’ model, it assumes that the purpose of a firm is to maximise the welfare of a 
number of stakeholders of the firm, including shareholders, employees, and local communities, 
amongst  others.  Interchangeability  between  the  terms  ‘stakeholding’,  ‘stakeholder’  and 
‘Continental European-Asian’ will be assumed throughout this thesis. 
The  term  ‘hybrid’  will  refer  to  the  ‘integrated’  or  ‘inclusive’  form  of  corporate 
governance that has mainly been advanced by the King Reports on Corporate Governance for 
South Africa since 1994. It is described as a ‘hybrid’ because while it remains predominantly 
Anglo-American, substantial affirmative action and stakeholder demands are formally super-
imposed on firms to comply with. This compels listed firms to depict some of the key features 
of  both  the  ‘shareholding’  and  ‘stakeholding’  models  of  corporate  governance.  The  main 
assumption underlying the ‘hybrid’ or ‘inclusive’ corporate governance model is that a firm 
should attempt to recognise the interests of a wider group of stakeholders without subverting 
the primary interests of shareholders as the residual owners of the firm. The terms ‘hybrid’, 
‘inclusive’ and ‘integrated’ will be used interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
  ‘JSE Ltd’ or the ‘JSE’ is the name of the stock exchange in South Africa. It is the only 
stock market in South Africa. The abbreviation ‘SA’ will refer to the country, ‘South Africa’.  
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The term ‘King I’ will  refer to the 1994 King Report on Corporate Governance for 
South Africa, whilst ‘King II’ will refer to the 2002 King Report on Corporate Governance for 
South Africa. 
Finally, in this study, the corporate governance-financial performance relationship will 
be examined via two models: the compliance-index and the equilibrium-variable models.  In 
the  case  of  the  compliance-index  model,  corporate  governance  will  be  proxied  by  a 
compliance index, consisting of 50 corporate governance provisions based on the 2002 King 
Report on Corporate Governance  for South Africa (‘King II’), known as the South African 
Corporate Governance Index (the SACGI).  
The SACGI will further be split into two: the Social-SACGI and the Economic-SACGI. 
The  Social-SACGI  will  contain  9  South  African  context  specific  affirmative  action  and 
stakeholder corporate governance provisions that are imposed on listed firms by King II. The 
Economic-SACGI  will  contain  41  conventional  corporate  governance  provisions  that  are 
imposed on firms by King II. The relationships between the SACGI, the Social-SACGI and 
the Economic-SACGI and firm financial performance will then be investigated. 
With respect to the equilibrium-variable model, corporate governance will be proxied 
by 11 individual corporate governance variables, including board diversity, board size, role or 
CEO duality, the percentage of non-executive directors, the frequency of board meetings, the 
establishment  of  key  board  committees  (namely,  audit,  nomination,  and  remuneration 
committees) and director shareownership. To replicate the statistically significant non-linear 
relationship between director shareownership and financial performance reported by Morck et 
al.  (1988),  director  shareownership  will  further  be  squared  and  cubed.  The  association 
between these 11 single corporate governance mechanisms and firm financial performance 
will then be analysed.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This  thesis  generally  seeks  to  explore  the  relationship  between  internal  corporate 
governance structures and firm financial performance. Specifically, using a sample of 100 
South African listed firms from 2002 to 2006 (a total of 500 firm-year observations), the thesis 
hopes  to  achieve  five  main  objectives.  First,  the  thesis  attempts  to  assess  the  levels  of 
compliance with the corporate governance provisions of the 2002 King Report on Corporate 
Governance for South Africa (‘King II’) among South African listed firms. Second, the study 
seeks to ascertain whether, on average, better-governed South African listed firms tend to be 
associated with higher financial returns than their poorly-governed counterparts. Specifically, 
it  investigates  whether  better-governed  firms  based  on  the  equilibrium-variable  and 
compliance-index  models  will  be  associated  with  higher  financial  performance.  Third,  the 
thesis hopes to investigate the economic consequences of complying with the South African 
context specific affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions for South 
African listed firms. Fourth, the study intends to examine whether methodological choice can 
potentially influence research findings. Finally, the thesis seeks to assess the impact that the 
potential presence of endogeneity problems may have on research findings. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.1 briefly summarises the 
recent corporate governance reforms pursued in SA (South Africa) as a background to the 
study. Section 1.2 sets out the major motivations for the study. Section 1.3 summarises the 
research  questions  and  contributions  of  the  study.  Finally,  section  1.4  presents  how  the 
remaining nine chapters of the thesis are organised, as well as a summary of the content of 
each of the nine chapters.  
 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND: RECENT CORORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN SA 
 
  As will be discussed further in chapter three, South Africa underwent extensive social, 
economic and political reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s. An important part of the 
economic  reform  was  an  attempt  to  improve  the  way  in  which  companies  are  governed. 
Domestic  efforts  at  reforming  corporate  governance  in  South  Africa  also  coincided  with 
international attempts at enhancing the efficacy of corporate governance structures around the  
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world  (e.g.,  Rossouw  et  al.,  2002;  Armstrong  et  al.,  2006;  West,  2006,  2009).  These 
international  attempts  at  reforming  corporate  governance  had  been  preceded  by  well-
publicised cases of major corporate collapse mainly in a number of developed economies in 
the 1980s, especially in the UK and US (Barrier, 2003, p.73; Mallin, 2006, p.4, 2007, p.2). 
There  were  widespread  suspicions  that  poor  corporate  governance  practices  had  played  a 
central role in causing these corporate failures (Cadbury Report, 1992, para. 1.9; Jones and 
Pollitt, 2004). The UK, for example, responded by establishing the Cadbury Committee in 
1991 and the publication of its recommendations of best corporate governance practices for 
UK listed firms in 1992.  
With increasing domestic and international interests in corporate governance, the King 
Committee  on  Corporate  Governance  was  formed  in 1992  as a  voluntary  initiative  at  the 
instigation of the Southern African Institute of Directors (Rossouw et al., 2002, p.296). The 
main purpose of the King Committee (named after its chair, Mervyn King), was to consider 
how to promote the highest standards of corporate governance in South Africa (King Report, 
2002, p.5).  
The King Committee published its final report in November 1994. In general, and as 
will be discussed in detail in chapter three, the 1994 King Report (hereafter also known as 
‘King I’) adopted many of the corporate governance standards and principles that had already 
been advocated in a plethora of national and international codes that were already in existence 
(e.g., Rossouw et al., 2002; Armstrong et al., 2006; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). In 
particular, the recommendations of the report were heavily informed by those of the UK’s 
Cadbury Report of 1992, especially regarding its suggestions on internal corporate governance 
structures  (West,  2006,  p.435,  2009,  p.11).  Principally,  and  in  line  with  the  influential 
Cadbury  Report,  King  I  adopted  an  Anglo-American  style  unitary  board  of  directors, 
consisting  of  executive  and  non-executive  directors,  who  are  primarily  accountable  to 
shareholders. In addition, South African firms were required to split the roles of chairman and 
CEO, set-up audit and remuneration committees, and their boards must at least consist of two 
non-executive directors.  
Unlike the Cadbury Report, however, King I advocated for an ‘integrated’ approach to 
corporate governance (Barrier, 2003, p.69). It also went beyond the Cadbury Report’s main 
principles  of  accountability,  integrity  and  openness  to  include  fairness  and  responsibility, 
giving it a stakeholder rather than a shareholder orientation (e.g., West, 2006, 2009). This 
means  that  firms  should  go  beyond  the  conventional  financial  and  regulatory  aspects  of  
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corporate  governance  to  taking  into  consideration  the  interests  of  a  wider  group  of 
stakeholders (King Report, 2002, para. 5). Crucially, and in line with the Cadbury Report, 
King  I  was  appended  to  the  JSE’s  Listing  Rules  in  which  listed  firms  were  voluntarily 
expected to ‘comply’ with its provisions or ‘explain’ in case(s) of non-compliance (Armstrong 
et al., 2006, p.214).   
As  will  be  evaluated  in  detail  in  chapter  three,  despite  arguably  formally 
institutionalising  corporate  governance  in  South  Africa,  and  being  instrumental  in  raising 
public consciousness about good corporate governance practices (Malherbe and Segal, 2003, 
p.193; Armstrong et al., 2006, p.215), King I was reviewed in 2002 for three main reasons. 
Firstly, King I was criticised for its own apparent weaknesses. For example, it was criticised 
for not enhancing the independence of corporate boards by abandoning the requirement for 
non-executive directors to be independent of management (Malherbe and Segal, 2003, p.193). 
More  importantly,  King  I  was  criticised  for  failing  to  directly  and  firmly  relate  its 
recommendations to the major South African contextual stakeholder issues of HIV/Aids, black 
economic  empowerment,  employment  equity,  and  the  enviroment  (Rossouw  et  al.,  2002, 
p.300; Malherbe and Segal, 2003, p.195). 
Secondly, and domestically, a number of affirmative action and stakeholder laws had 
been passed since 1994, and needed to be incorporated into the governance of mainstream 
corporations  (Kakabadse  and  Korac-Kakabase,  2002,  p.308).  These  included  the  Labour 
Relations  Act  1995,  the  Employment  Equity  Act  1998,  and  the  Black  Economic 
Empowerment Act 2003, amongst others. They had been proposed by King I and were aimed 
at addressing the negative social and economic legacies of Apartheid (Murray, 2000, p.183; 
Swartz and Firer, 2005, pp.147, 158). In addition to legislative developments, South Africa 
had  experienced  a  number  of  high  profile  domestic  corporate  failures  since  1994.  These 
included Macmed, Leisurenet, and Regal Treasury Bank (Sarra, 2004, p.10; Armstrong et al., 
2006, p.215). These corporate failures were mainly attributed to poor corporate governance 
practices among directors and senior management.  
Finally, and internationally, investors had lost billions of dollars during the 1997 and 
1998 Asian economic crisis. The crisis demonstrated that macro-economic difficulties could 
be  worsened  by  systematic  failure  of  corporate  governance  resulting  from  ineffective 
oversight by corporate boards and scant recognition of the rights of minority shareowners 
(King  Report,  2002,  para.  22).  Also,  during  the  intervening  years,  a  number  of  key 
international corporate governance codes had been released. In the UK, the Combined Code  
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had been published in 1998. Similarly, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) that seeks to 
move corporate reporting from a conventional ‘single-bottom line’ (i.e., economic) to a ‘triple 
bottom line’ (i.e., economic, social and environmental) reporting had been published in 2000 
(King Report, 2002, p.275). Ostensibly, King I needed to be reviewed in the light of domestic 
and international developments since 1994. 
In  response  to  these  developments,  and  again  under  the  auspices  of  the  Southern 
African Institute of Directors, a second King Committee on Corporate Governance (hereafter 
also  called  ‘King  II’)  was  formed  in  August  2000.  The  Committee  published  its 
recommendations in March 2002. Unlike King I, King II is comprehensive in the coverage of 
corporate governance issues, including: board and directors; risk management; internal audit; 
integrated sustainability reporting; accounting and auditing; and compliance and enforcement.  
Specifically,  it  builds  on  and  expands  King  I’s  fundamental  corporate  governance 
principles of accountability, fairness, responsibility and transparency to include discipline, 
independence and social responsibility (King Report, 2002, para.18). It also replaces King I’s 
‘integrated’  corporate  governance  approach  with  an  ‘inclusive  or  instrumental’  corporate 
governance approach throughout the report (King Report, 2002, para. 5). As will be discussed 
further in chapter two, the ‘inclusive’ approach to corporate governance attempts to recognise 
the  interests  of  a  wider  range  of  stakeholders  without  subverting  the  primary  interests  of 
shareholders as the residual owners of the firm.  
Specifically, and as will also be explained in detail in chapter three, while King II 
maintains and strengthens the Anglo-American features of King I, it explicitly super-imposes 
substantial affirmative action and stakeholder demands, such as HIV/Aids, black economic 
empowerment, and employment equity on firms to comply with. This compels South African 
firms to depict some of the key features of both the ‘shareholding’ (Anglo-American) and 
‘stakeholding’ (Continental European-Asian) models of corporate governance.  
Arguably,  this  makes  the  South  African  corporate  governance  model  unique  or  a 
‘hybrid’  (Andreasson,  2009,  pp.12,  18-27).  In  fact,  King  II  has  gained  international 
recognition and received several endorsements from leading academics and policy-makers as 
an example of good corporate governance model in the world (e.g., Armstrong et al., 2006; 
Mallin, 2007; Andreasson, 2009; and West, 2006, 2009, amongst others). Mallin (2007, p.248), 
for example, states that “South Africa has a well-developed corporate governance code. In 
fact, its revised Code published in 2002 is the most comprehensive in the world, and leading 
edge in terms of its outlook and recommendations”. In line with Cadbury and King I, King II  
 
18 
has been appended to the JSE’s Listing Rules (JSE Listings Rules, 2007, subsections 3.84, 
7.F.5-6, 8.63). Listed firms are similarly expected to voluntarily ‘comply’ with its provisions 
or ‘explain’ in case(s) of non-compliance. 
 
 
1.2 THE MOTIVATION, PROBLEM AND THE NEED FOR THE STUDY 
 
The current study on South Africa is motivated by three major reasons. Firstly, and as 
has been briefly described above, South Africa arguably offers an interesting research context 
where  the  corporate  governance-financial  performance  association  can  be  empirically 
examined.  Specifically,  the  South  African  corporate  environment  shares  some  level  of 
similarities and differences with the UK corporate context.  
On the one hand, and unlike most African countries, South Africa appears to possess a 
relatively sound financial and corporate regulatory structure reminiscent of that of the UK. For 
example, and like the UK (see Mallin, 2006, pp.3 to 9 for a quick review of how corporate 
governance has evolved in the UK from the 1992 Cadbury Report to the 2005 Company Law 
Reform Bill), corporate governance seems to be fluidly developing. As has been explained 
above, a formal code of corporate governance was first introduced in November 1994 (King I), 
first reviewed in March 2002 (King II), and a second review is expected to be completed in 
July 2010 (King III) (Andreasson, 2009, pp.14, 21; West, 2009, p.10). In fact, according to 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009, pp.379-380), South Africa was the sixth nation in the 
world (coming after the US, 1978; Hong Kong, 1989; Ireland, 1991; UK, 1992; and Canada, 
1993), and the first developing country to issue a code of good corporate governance.  
Similarly, the South African Companies Act 1973 has received several amendments to 
bring it up-to-date with international corporate governance practices (Armstrong et al., 2006, 
p.214).  The  Act  is  also  currently  being  fully  reviewed,  and  is  similarly  expected  to  be 
completed in 2010 to coincide with the publication of King III (Andreasson, 2009, pp.15-16, 
21). To achieve greater supervision and monitoring of insider trading, rigorous insider trading 
law, the Insider Trading Act 1998 has been introduced, and enforcement is being strengthened 
(Malherbe and Segal, 2003, p.199; Armstrong et al., 2006, p.214). The JSE introduced more 
rigorous listing rules in 1995, and has carried out regular reviews in 2000, 2003, 2005 and 
2007 to bring them in line with international standards (Malherbe and Segal, 2003, p.195; 
Armstrong et al., 2006, p.214).   
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Also,  and  unlike  most  African  countries,  South  Africa  has  deep  equity  culture 
comparable with those of other emerging and developed economies (Deutsche Bank, 2002, p.7; 
Malherbe and Segal, 2003, pp.174-180).  For instance, South Africa was ranked as the 6
th 
largest emerging stock market, and 19
th largest in the world by market capitalisation in 2007 
(WFE, 2008). Similarly, market capitalisation to GDP ratio in 2007 for South Africa was 
293%, and this compares with 139% and 113% for the UK and US (WFE, 2008), respectively. 
Arguably, these similarities with the UK offer exciting research context, where the corporate 
governance-financial performance nexus can be empirically investigated. 
On the other hand, and as will be explained further below, the South African corporate 
landscape depicts significant differences with the UK corporate environment. However, and as 
has been briefly discussed above, like most developing Commonwealth countries, corporate 
governance structures and principles have mainly been borrowed from the UK. This brings 
into question as to the applicability of some of these corporate governance mechanisms to the 
South  African  corporate  context.  It  also  implies  that  the  relationship  between  internal 
corporate  governance  structures  and  firm  financial  performance  can  be  expected  to  be 
different from what has been reported for UK listed firms.  
For example, and as has also been briefly explained above, while the South African 
corporate  governance  model  is  predominantly  Anglo-American,  King  II  formally  imposes 
substantial affirmative action and stakeholder demands on listed firms to comply with. This 
raises  an  important  local  policy  question  of  whether  the  current  South  African  corporate 
governance (‘hybrid’) framework is sufficiently robust to effectively pursue the contrasting 
agenda  of  maximising  shareholder  returns  and  providing  a  meaningful  protection  of  the 
interests of a larger stakeholder group (Kakabase and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002, p.313; Spisto, 
2005, p.84; Andreasson, 2009, p.1).  
Similarly, as an emerging market, ownership of firms is relatively concentrated. As 
will be discussed further in chapter seven, block shareownership in this study, for instance, 
ranges from 7% to 99% with an average of 60%. Director shareownership is also between 0% 
and 94% with a mean of 20%. Also, a study by Barr et al. (1995, p.18) indicates that the use of 
complex cross-shareholdings and pyramidical structures are pervasive among South African 
listed firms.  
By contrast, UK firms have relatively dispersed ownership structure. For example, a 
recent  study  by  Florackis  and  Ozkan  (2009,  p.505)  suggests  that  the  average  UK  block 
ownership is 29%, whereas the mean UK director ownership is 9%. This is very similar to the  
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average  block  (29%)  and  director  (3%)  ownership  levels  reported  by  Shabbir  and  Padget 
(2005, p.14) for a sample of UK listed firms. 
As has been suggested by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006, p.1035), this implies that unlike 
the  UK,  the  market  for  corporate  control  and  managerial  labour  through  which  non-
performing companies and managers are expected to be disciplined may not be effective in 
South  Africa.    Further,  and  as  a  developing  country,  South  Africa  has  a  weak  record  of 
implementing and enforcing corporate regulations (Armstrong, 2003, p.2; IIF, 2007, p.7). This 
also  raises  an  important  international  policy  debate  (Aguilera  and  Cuervo-Cazurra,  2009, 
p.376),  as  well  as  serious  doubts  as  to  whether  the  current  UK-style  self-regulation  or 
voluntary compliance regime (‘comply or explain’) rather than the US-style mandatory regime 
(‘comply or else’) will be effective in improving corporate governance standards among South 
African listed firms. 
 Also,  even  though  South  Africa  accounted  for  more  than  80%  of  African  total 
continental stock market capitalisation in 2007 (WFE, 2008), for instance, it is considerably 
smaller  compared  with  the  UK.  Specifically,  it  has  fewer  numbers  of  listed  firms,  lower 
liquidity, and smaller, but concentrated total market capitalisation in relation to the UK. For 
example, there were 411 firms listed on the JSE with a total market capitalisation of about 
$828 billion, and a liquidity ratio of 51% in 2007 (WFE, 2008). By contrast, 3,307 firms were 
listed on the London Stock Exchange with a total market capitalisation of about $4 trillion, 
and  a  liquidity  ratio  of  268%  in  2007  (WFE,  2008).  This  implies  that  the  impact  of 
conventional  UK-style  corporate  governance  mechanisms  on  the  financial  performance  of 
South African listed firms may be different from UK listed firms. 
The second major motivation for the current study on South Africa is that unlike most 
African  countries,  it  is  home  to  some  of  the  world’s  largest  multinationals.  For  example, 
Forbes (2009) ranking of the largest 2000 companies by market value in the world suggests 
that over 30 are based in South Africa. Further, on average, South African companies attract 
over  $6  billion  in  foreign  direct  investments  annually,  mainly  from  large  UK  and  US 
institutional investors and pension funds (Armstrong et al., 2006, p.212). This means that 
unlike  most  African  countries,  any  corporate  governance  failures  may  have  serious 
implications far beyond South Africa and Africa. 
The third and final major motivation for this study is that despite arguably offering 
exciting research context, there is a dearth of rigorous  empirical research that attempts to 
ascertain whether better-governed South African listed firms tend to be associated with higher  
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financial returns than their poorly-governed counterparts (Okeahalam and Akinboade, 2003, 
p.2;  Okeahalam,  2004,  p.360;  Mangena  and  Chamisa,  2008,  pp.28,  42).  The  paucity  of 
rigorous empirical corporate governance studies on South Africa arguably offers opportunities 
to make contributions to the extant literature.  
However, there are a limited number of cross-country studies whose samples include a 
number  of  South  African  listed  firms  that  need  to  be  acknowledged.  These  studies  are: 
Klapper and Love (2004); Durnev and Kim (2005); Chen et al. (2009); and Morey et al. 
(2009). Klapper and Love (2004) and Durnev and Kim (2005) have used Credit Lyonnais 
Securities Asia’s (CLSA) 2000 subjective analysts’ corporate governance ratings to examine 
the corporate governance-financial performance association in a sample of emerging markets 
that  include  South  Africa.  Chen  et  al.  (2009)  have  also  used  the  same  CLSA  subjective 
analysts’  corporate  governance  rankings  to  investigate  the  relationship  between  corporate 
governance and cost of equity capital. Similarly, using a cross country sample that includes 
South Africa, Morey et al. (2009) have analysed the nexus between the AllianceBernstein’s 
subjective analysts’ corporate governance ratings and firm value. The results of these studies 
suggest that, on average, better-governed firms tend to be associated with higher financial 
returns or tend to have significantly lower cost of equity capital than their poorly-governed 
counterparts. 
As  will be  discussed  further  in  chapter  four,  however,  all  four prior  cross-country 
studies arguably suffer from a number of limitations. First, all four prior studies make use of 
subjective analysts’ corporate governance ratings. A major problem with subjective analysts’ 
corporate  governance  rankings  is  that  they  are  based  purely  on  analysts’  perceptions  of 
corporate governance quality rather than on a direct examination of company annual reports 
(Beattie et al. 2004, p.210). Their findings may, therefore, be considered to be of limited 
evidential value. 
Crucially,  prior  research  suggests  that  subjective  analysts’  corporate  governance 
ratings tend to be biased towards large firms (e.g., Botosan, 1997; Hassan and Marston, 2008). 
The CLSA 2000 corporate governance rankings that has mainly been used by prior studies, for 
example, includes only nine of the largest South African listed firms (CLSA, 2000, p.13). 
Arguably, this makes the sample used by prior studies to be less representative, and thus limits 
the generalisation of their findings for South African listed firms.  
Second, and as will be discussed further in chapter two, the extant literature suggests 
that corporate governance structures and systems vary across different countries (West, 2006,  
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p.433;  Aguilera  and  Cuervo-Cazurra,  2009,  p.383;  Filatotchev  and  Boyd,  2009,  p.262). 
However, subjective analysts’ corporate governance rankings are standardised such that they 
are unable to reflect institutional, cultural, and contextual differences in corporate governance 
structures across individual countries and systems. This implies that they are unable to assess 
how compliance with the South African context specific affirmative action and stakeholder 
corporate governance issues impact on the financial performance of South African listed firms. 
Finally, despite  increasing  concerns  that  the  presence  of  endogenous problems  can 
confound research findings (e.g., Himmelberg et al. 1999; Chenhall and Moers, 2007a and b), 
with the exception of Durnev and Kim (2005), prior cross-country studies that include South 
Africa do not explicitly address potential problems that may be caused by the existence of an 
endogenous relationship between corporate governance and financial performance. This also 
brings into doubt the reliability of the results of these prior cross-country studies that include 
South Africa. 
 
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS  
  
Therefore, given the similarities and differences between the South African and UK 
corporate environments as outlined above, but a paucity of empirical studies on South Africa, 
this thesis seeks to empirically answer the following research questions. First, what is the level 
of compliance  with  the  corporate  governance  provisions of  King  II  among  South  African 
listed firms? Second, what is the relationship between internal corporate governance structures 
and  the  financial  performance  of  listed  firms  in  South  Africa?  Specifically,  what  is  the 
relationship between better-governed firms based on the equilibrium-variable and compliance-
index models and the financial performance of listed firms in South Africa? Third, how does 
compliance  with  the  South  African  context  specific  affirmative  action  and  stakeholder 
corporate governance provisions impact on the financial performance of listed firms in South 
Africa? Fourth, what impact does the potential presence of endogeneity problems have on 
research findings? Finally, does the use of the equilibrium-variable model or the compliance-
index model have the potential to influence research findings?  
By addressing the above research questions, this thesis hopes to make several new 
contributions, as well as extensions to the extant corporate governance literature. First, using a 
sample  of  100  South  African  listed  firms  from  2002  to  2006  (a  total  of  500  firm-year 
observations) and corporate governance data collected directly from company annual reports,  
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the study aims to offer for the first time direct evidence on the relationship between internal 
corporate governance structures and firm financial performance in South Africa.  
As  will  be  explained  further  in  chapters  four  and  five,  unlike  prior  cross-country 
studies, the sample will be constructed in such a way that there will be a balance between large 
and  small  firms.  This  may  enhance  the  generalisation  of  the  findings.  Similarly,  the 
compliance-index  that  will  be used -  the  South  African Corporate  Governance  Index  (the 
SACGI) will incorporate conventional, as well as stakeholder corporate governance provisions 
that are unique to the South African corporate context. Consistent with the results of prior 
studies, the findings based on the compliance-index will indicate that there is a statistically 
significant  and  positive  relationship  between  the  quality  of  the  sampled  firms’  corporate 
governance and their financial performance. By contrast, the results based on the equilibrium-
variable model will indicate either a statistically weak or no relationship between the eleven 
single corporate governance structures and firm financial performance.  
Second,  the  study  seeks  to  offer  for  the  first  time  evidence  on  the  economic 
consequences of complying with the affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance 
provisions for South African listed firms. Contrary to theoretical expectations, the findings 
will suggest that compliance with the affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance 
provisions  (the  Social-SACGI)  impact  positively  on  the  financial  returns of  South  African 
listed  firms.  Third,  the  Institute  of  International  Finance  (IIF)  2007  report  on  corporate 
governance practices in South Africa suggests that even though the King Code is voluntary, no 
study has been done to ascertain the levels of compliance among listed firms. Specifically, it 
states “…However, to date, no study has been conducted to assess the level of compliance 
with  corporate  governance-related  requirements  among  listed  companies  or  to  verify  the 
reasons for non-compliance”, (IIF, 2007, p.1). Similar concerns have also been expressed by 
Malherbe and Segal (2003, p.193). 
As  will  be  discussed  further  in  chapter  six,  this  study  aims  to  fill  this  gap  in  the 
existing literature by offering for the first time direct evidence on the levels of compliance 
with  the  corporate  governance  provisions  recommended  by  King  II  among  South  African 
listed  firms.  Specifically,  the  findings  will  show  that  while  compliance  with  the 
recommendations  of  King  II  has  generally  improved,  substantial  variations  in  corporate 
governance standards still exist among South African listed firms. The findings will indicate 
further  that  the  differences  in  the  levels  of  compliance  with  the  corporate  governance  
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provisons of King II among South African listed firms can largely be explained by firm size, 
and moderately by industry. 
Fourth, the study hopes to make for the first time a comparison of research findings 
based  on  estimating  a  compliance-index  (the  Economic-SACGI)  model  and  equilibrium-
variable model. Generally, the results will suggest that methodological choice can potentially 
influence research findings with important implications for future research. Specifically, while 
the results that will be based on the compliance-index (the Economic-SACGI) model will be 
conclusive, those that will be based on the equilibrium-variable model will be conflicting. 
Finally, and unlike most prior studies, problems that the potential presence of endogeneity 
may cause will be comprehensively addressed in chapter nine.  
These  include  estimating:  a  lagged  corporate  governance-financial  performance 
structure; an instrumental variable model; a two-stage least squares  model; and a changes 
model.  This  will  arguably  improve  the  reliability  of  the  findings.  The  results  from  these 
sensitivity analyses that will be discussed in chapter nine will suggest that the findings that 
have been reported in chapter eight are generally robust to potential endogenity problems.   
 
 
1.4 THESIS ORGANISATION 
 
  The rest of the thesis is divided into nine chapters and organised as follows. As has 
been  explained  above,  the  study  focuses  on  the  impact  of  internal  corporate  governance 
structures  on the  financial performance  of South  African  listed  firms.  However,  corporate 
governance  is  broad.  Chapter  two  will,  therefore,  seek  to  offer  a  working  definition  of 
corporate  governance.  As  has  been  briefly  described  above,  the  current  South  African 
corporate governance framework possesses some of the features of both the ‘shareholding’ 
(Anglo-American)  and  ‘stakeholding’  (Continental  European-Asian)  models  of  corporate 
governance.  Therefore,  to  facilitate  a  better  appreciation  of  the  South  African  corporate 
governance model, the chapter will also explore legitimate differences, such as theoretical 
assumptions, major features, and weaknesses between the ‘shareholding’ and ‘stakeholding’ 
corporate governance models. 
  Chapter three will contain a description and where applicable, a review of the South 
African  corporate  governance  framework.  Specifically,  the  external  corporate  governance 
environment and some of the challenges facing the regulatory system  will first be briefly 
presented. The internal corporate governance landscape will then be described in detail. These  
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will include the South African Companies Act 1973, the Insider Trading Act 1998, the JSE’s 
2007  Listings  Rules,  as  well  as  the  1994  (King  I)  and  2002  (King  II)  King  Reports  on 
Corporate  Governance  for  South  Africa.  For  each  of  these  internal  corporate  governance 
legislation  or  code,  and  where  applicable,  its  origins,  corporate  governance  provisions, 
strengths, weaknesses and challenges will be comprehensively discussed. 
  A  review  of  the  theoretical  and  empirical  internal  corporate  governance-financial 
performance relationship literature will be carried out in chapter four. Specifically, the chapter 
will be divided into two main parts. In the first part, a discussion of existing theories that 
attempt to link internal corporate governance structures to firm financial performance will be 
carried  out.  Recognising  the  often  complex  and  multi-disciplinary  nature  of  corporate 
governance (Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009, pp.258-260), a multiple theoretical perspective will 
be adopted in constructing and explaining the complex relationship between internal corporate 
governance structures and firm financial performance. Similarly, much of the prior studies on 
the  internal  corporate  governance-financial  performance  association  have  been  conducted 
around agency theory (Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009, p.258). Agency theory will, therefore, be 
adopted as the main theoretical framework for the study. However, and in line with recent 
calls  (e.g.,  van  Ees  et  al.,  2009;  Filatotchev  and  Boyd,  2009),  where  appropriate,  agency 
theory  will  be  supplemented  with  information  asymmetry  and  managerial  signalling, 
stewardship, organisational, political cost, and resource dependence theories. 
The  second  part  of  chapter  four  will  contain  a  discussion  of  the  extant  empirical 
literature  that  seeks  to  link  internal  corporate  governance  structures  with  firm  financial 
performance. The discussion will centre on two main models: the equilibrium-variable and the 
compliance-index models. Under the equilibrium-variable model, the prior literature on 11 
corporate governance variables, including board diversity, board size, role or CEO duality, the 
percentage of non-executive directors, the frequency of board meetings, the establishment of 
key  board  committees  (namely, audit,  nomination,  and  remuneration  committees),  director 
shareownership,  director  shareownership  squared,  and  cubed  will  be  discussed.  For  each 
variable, the extant theoretical literature will first be discussed, followed by a review of the 
prior empirical literature. Hypotheses will then finally be developed on the basis of the review 
for each variable.  
With  regard  to  the  compliance-index  model,  prior  studies  that  have  examined  the 
corporate governance-financial performance nexus using compliance or composite corporate 
governance indices will be discussed.  The South African Corporate Governance Index (the  
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SACGI) that will be used in this study contains 50 corporate governance provisions from the 
2002 (King II) Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa. Also, on the basis of the 
review, hypothesis eight will be developed for the SACGI. In chapter eight, the SACGI will 
further be split into Social-SACGI and Economic-SACGI. The Social-SACGI will contain 9 
affirmative  action  and  stakeholder  corporate  governance  provisions  that  are  unique  to  the 
South African corporate context, while the Economic-SACGI will be made up 41 conventional 
corporate governance provisions.  
The  review  will  indicate  that  irrespective  of  the  context  or  model,  the  empirical 
literature  is  generally  mixed.  However,  it  will  indicate  that  the  mixed  evidence  is  more 
pronounced with regard to the equilibrium-variable model than the compliance-index model. 
Also, it will show that whereas the compliance-index model literature is quite advanced in the 
US,  the  non-US  evidence  is  very  limited  apparently  due  to  lack  of  sufficient  data.  The 
literature  regarding  South  Africa  and  Africa  is  virtually  non-existent.  It  will,  however,  be 
argued that the dearth of prior empirical studies also offers an opportunity to make substantial 
contributions to the extant literature.  
Chapter  five  will  discuss  the  research  design,  namely  the  sources  of  data  and 
methodology that will be applied in the empirical parts of the thesis. As at 31/12/2006 when 
the data collection began, a total of 402 firms from 10 major industries were officially listed 
on the main board of the JSE. For regulatory and capital structure reasons, financial and utility 
firms will be excluded, leaving a total 291 firms to be sampled from 2002 (when King II first 
became  applicable)  to  2006  (when  data  collection  first  began).  Firm-level  corporate 
governance data will be collected from annual reports. Using the perfect information database 
and direct contacts, complete annual reports will be obtained for 169 firms from 2002 to 2006. 
One hundred (100) firms will be stratify sampled from 2002 to 2006 (a total of 500 firm-year 
observations) based on firm size and industry. Corresponding financial performance data will 
be collected from DataStream. 
Two  models,  the  equilibrium-variable  and  the  compliance-index  models  will  be 
estimated using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression technique. Under the equilibrium-
variable model, the 11 corporate governance variables mentioned above will be estimated 
separately to explain two financial performance proxies, namely Tobin’s Q (a market based 
measure), and return on assets (an accounting based measure). The rationale for using two 
financial  performance  proxies  will  be  to  ascertain  the  robustness  of  the  findings  to  both 
accounting (insiders like managers) and market (outsiders like investors) based measures of  
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financial performance. With respect to the compliance-index model, the SACGI containing 50 
corporate governance provisions (the provision will be binary scored such that the presence of 
an item is assigned a value of ‘1’ or ‘0’ otherwise) will also be estimated to separately explain 
Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio) and return on assets (ROA).  
To control for potential omitted variables bias, eight control variables, including firm 
size, capital structure, sales growth, capital expenditure, audit firm size, dual-listing, industry, 
and  year  dummies  will  be  introduced in  estimating  both  the  equilibrium-variable  and  the 
compliance-index models. The robustness or sensitivity of the results to the potential presence 
of endogeneity problems will be addressed by  estimating:  a lagged corporate  governance-
financial  performance  structure;  an  instrumental  variable  model;  a  two-stage  least  squares 
model; and a changes model. Finally, the chapter will discuss methodological limitations and 
data  collection  difficulties  encountered  in  this  study.  These  limitations  will  be  discussed 
further in chapter 9. 
Chapter six will analyse the levels of compliance with the South African Corporate 
Governance Index (the SACGI) among the sampled firms. For the 50 individual corporate 
governance provisions, it will show that there are variations in the levels of compliance in 48 
(96%) of them. At the aggregate level, it will indicate that the corporate governance scores 
range from a minimum of 3 (6%) to a maximum of 49 (98%) with the average sampled firm 
complying with 30 (60%) of the 50 corporate governance provisions that will be examined. 
Further examination of the corporate governance scores will suggest that the variation in the 
levels  of  compliance  can  largely  be  explained  by  firm  size,  and  moderately  by  industry. 
Analysis of the levels of compliance with the Social-SACGI (the nine South Africa context 
specific affirmative action and stakeholder provisions) will also indicate considerable amount 
of variability in the levels of compliance with the Social-SACGI. The aggregate scores will 
range from 0% (0 out of 9) to a maximum of 100% (9 out of 9) with the average sampled firm 
complying  with  67%  of  the  9  South  African  context  specific  affirmative  action  and 
stakeholder provisions that will be investigated. 
Chapter seven will contain descriptive statistics, as well as test the Ordinary  Least 
Squares (OLS) assumptions. The chapter will be divided into two main parts. The first part of 
the  chapter  will  present  summary  descriptive  statistics  of  the  dependent  (financial 
performance), independent (corporate governance), and other independent (control) variables. 
Since OLS multivariate regression technique is used to test all the hypotheses that will be 
discussed  in  chapters  four  and  five,  the  second  part  of  chapter  seven  will  test  the  OLS  
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assumptions of multicollinearity, autocorrelation, normality, homoscedasticity, and linearity. 
The  analyses  will  generally  indicate  that  there  are  no  serious  violations  of  the  OLS 
assumptions, and thus statistically appropriate to carry out OLS regressions. 
Chapter eight will present the empirical results. The empirical results based on the 
equilibrium-variable model will first be discussed, followed by an analysis of the results based 
on the compliance-index model. For each model, results based on the accounting measure 
(ROA)  of  financial  performance  will  first  be  presented,  followed  by  results  based  on  the 
market  measure  (Q-ratio)  of  performance.  A  comparison  of  the  results  based  on  the 
equilibrium-variable and compliance-index models will then be made. 
The results based on the compliance-index model will indicate that regardless of the 
financial performance measure used, there is a statistically significant and positive relationship 
between the quality of the sampled firms’ internal corporate governance (the SACGI) and their 
financial  performance.  Similarly,  the  results  will  suggest  that  irrespective  of  the  financial 
performance  proxy  used,  compliance  with  the  South  African  context  specific  affirmative 
action  and  stakeholder  provisions  (the  Social-SACGI)  has  a  statistically  significant  and 
positive impact on the financial fortunes of the sampled firms.  
By  contrast,  the  results  based  on  the  equilibrium-variable  model  will  generally  be 
mixed. Regardless of the financial performance measure used, board diversity, the frequency 
of  board  meetings,  and  the  establishment  of  board  committees  except  the  presence  of  a 
nomination committee will seem to have no impact on firm financial performance. Board size 
will  be  statistically  significant  and  positively  associated  with  the  Q-ratio,  but  statistically 
insignificantly and negatively related to ROA. Third, role or CEO duality will be statistically 
significant  and  positively  related  to  ROA,  but  statistically  insignificant  and  negatively 
associated  with  the  Q-ratio.  Director  shareownership  will  be  statistically  insignificant  and 
positively related to ROA, but statistically significant and negatively associated with the Q-
ratio. Finally, the findings based on both the director shareownership squared and cubed will 
not  support  the  statistically  significant  non-linear  director  shareownership-financial 
performance association reported by Morck et al. (1988). 
Chapter  nine  will  report  results  based  on  the  robustness  or  sensitivity  analyses. 
Specifically,  the  robustness  or  sensitivity  of  the  results  to  the  potential  presence  of 
endogeneity  problems  will  be  addressed  by  estimating:  a  lagged  corporate  governance-
financial  performance  structure;  an  instrumental  variable  model;  a  two-stage  least  squares 
(2SLS) model; and a changes model. The results based on a lagged corporate governance- 
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financial  performance  structure  and  an  instrumental  variable  model  will  suggest  that  the 
findings that have been presented in chapter eight are generally robust to the presence of any 
potential  endogeneity  problems.  The  results  based  on  the  two-stage  least  squares  (2SLS) 
model  will  offer  evidence  of  a  statistically significant  interdependences  among  alternative 
corporate governance mechanisms, as well as between the financial performance proxies and 
the corporate governance structures. Finally, the robustness or sensitivity results based on the 
changes  model  will  generally  suggest  that  an  increase  (a  decrease)  in  the  sampled  firms’ 
corporate  governance  standards  will  be  associated  with  a  positive,  but  a  statistically 
insignificant increase (decrease) in their reported financial performance.  
Chapter  ten  will  present  the  conclusions  of  the  thesis.  Specifically,  it  will  offer  a 
summary  of  the  key  research  findings  and  a  discussion  of  the  policy  implications, 
recommendations, contributions, limitations, as well as potential avenues for future research 
and improvements. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
DEFINING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
 
2. INTRODUCTION 
 
  This  chapter  attempts  to  define  corporate  governance.  Its  central  aim  is  to  offer  a 
working  definition  of  corporate  governance  in  addition  to  discussing  the  major  corporate 
governance models found within the extant international governance literature and context. 
The main rationale is to paint the broader international corporate governance picture within 
which the South African corporate governance framework that will subsequently be discussed 
in  chapter  three  can  be  better  appreciated.  The  remainder  of  this  chapter  is  organised  as 
follows. Section 2.1 offers a working definition of corporate governance. Section 2.2 reviews 
the main corporate governance models as found within the international literature and context, 
while section 2.3 summarises the chapter. 
   
 
2.1 DEFINING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
The last three decades has seen the term ‘corporate governance’ emerged clearly as an 
independent  field  of  study  (e.g.,  Keasey  et  al.,  1997;  Denis,  2001).  Its  scope  has  also 
witnessed great expansion such that it is now an amalgam of different disciplines, including 
accounting,  economics,  ethics,  finance,  law,  management,  organisational  behaviour,  and 
politics,  among  others,  with  no  universally  accepted  definition  (Rwegasira,  2000,  p.258; 
Mallin,  2007,  p.11;  Solomon,  2007, p.12).  As  a corollary,  there exists  a  large  number  of 
definitions of corporate governance (e.g., Cadbury Report, 1992; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Denis and McConnell, 2003; OECD, 1999, 2004; and Solomon, 2007, amongst others).  
Despite  the  existence  of  heterogeneous  definitions,  however,  researchers frequently 
classify  the  existing  corporate  governance  definitions  as  either  ‘narrow’  or  ‘broad’.  As  a 
prelude,  the  narrow-broad  dichotomisation  is  based  on  the  extent  to  which  a  corporate 
governance regime essentially focuses on satisfying the parochial interests’ of shareholders 
(Sternberg, 2004, p.28; West, 2006, p.434) or meeting the broader interests of diverse societal 
stakeholder groups (Letza et al., 2004, p.243; Gillan, 2006, p.382). 
For example, corporate governance has narrowly been defined as “…the ways in which 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment”,  
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(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p.737). This view considers a corporation as an extension of its 
owners, with a central aim of providing goods or services to customers, primarily to maximise 
the wealth of its owners (West, 2006, p.433). The Cadbury Report (1992, s.2.5) also narrowly 
defines corporate governance as being concerned with the “system by which companies are 
directed and controlled”. Similarly, it has been defined as “a system whereby directors are 
entrusted with responsibilities and duties in relation to the direction of a company’s affairs”, 
(Sheikh and Chatterjee, 1995, p.5) or “ways of ensuring that corporate actions, agents and 
assets  are  directed  at  achieving  the  corporate  objective  established  by  the  corporation’s 
shareholders”, (Sternberg, 2004, p.28).  
These definitions suggest that in order to maximise the wealth of owners, three key 
corporate governance structures of the corporation emerge, namely; a general assembly of 
shareholders, a board of directors, and an executive management (Letza et al., 2004, p.243; 
West, 2006, p.434). In this case, the corporation is primarily accountable to shareholders, and 
as  such  they  have  the  power  to  appoint  directors  and  to  satisfy  themselves  that  the  right 
governance mechanisms have been instituted (Cadbury Report, 1992, s.2.5; Rossouw et al., 
2002, p.290).  
Also, and at least in theory, the shareholders have the power to reject decisions of the 
board or remove them from office in a general meeting.  By contrast, the board of directors’ 
has the responsibility to ensure that the company is properly governed. These responsibilities 
include  setting  the  company’s  strategic  aims,  appointing  or  firing  the  management  team, 
supervising  the  management  team  and  reporting  to  the  owners  of  the  company  on  their 
stewardship (Cadbury Report, 1992, s.2.5; Rossouw et al., 2002, p.290).  
In  short,  a  governance  structure  of  a  firm  is  considered  as  ‘narrow’  if  it  mainly 
concentrates  on  how  key  internal  governance  mechanisms  interact  to  maximise  its  value 
primarily for the benefit of shareholders instead of enhancing the interests of other potential 
stakeholder, like customers, employees, creditors, suppliers and the local community, amongst 
others.   
Contributing  to  the  foreword  of  the  World  Bank  Report  (1999,  p.vii),  Sir  Adrian 
Cadbury  defines  corporate  governance  broadly  as  being  “…concerned  with  holding  the 
balance between economic and social goals and between individual and communal goals…the 
aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, corporations, and society”. 
Similarly,  the  OECD  (2004,  p.11)  broadly  defines  corporate  governance  as  “…a  set  of 
relationships between a company’s board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. It also  
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provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of 
attaining those objectives, and monitoring performance, are determined” or “…the system of 
checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, which ensures that companies 
discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in 
all areas of their business activity”, (Solomon and Solomon, 2004, p.14).  
These definitions imply that corporate governance goes beyond the immediate internal 
corporate structures to include external corporate governance mechanisms and stakeholders 
(OECD,  2004,  p.12;  Gillan,  2006,  p.382;  Mallin,  2007,  11).  Typically,  and  as  has  been 
explained above, internal corporate governance structures may include the general assembly of 
shareholders, the board of directors, and the executive management. By contrast, the external 
corporate governance mechanisms may consist of the legal system, the market for managerial 
labour  and  corporate  control,  regulators,  local  communities,  cultural,  political,  social  and 
economic policies, and institutions within which corporations operate. 
In this case, the corporation is considered to be a social entity that has accountability 
and responsibility to a variety of stakeholders, encompassing shareowners, creditors, suppliers, 
customers, employees, management, government and the local community (Freeman and Reed, 
1983, p.89; West, 2006, p.434; Mallin, 2007, p.50). The aim of corporate governance is to 
facilitate the efficient use of resources by reducing fraud and mismanagement with the view 
not  only  to  maximise,  but  also  to  align  the  often  conflicting  interests  of  all  stakeholders 
(Cadbury, 1999, p.vii; King Report, 2002, p.5). 
In  brief,  and  in  contrast  to  the  ‘narrow’  characterisation,  a  ‘broad’  corporate 
governance structure’s central pre-occupation is to examine how both external and internal 
governance mechanisms can be run to maximise firm value and/or performance for the mutual 
benefit of shareholders and other potential stakeholders. 
As  a  corollary,  the  extant  literature  has  mainly  theorised  or  described  corporate 
governance in terms of these two presumably diametrically opposing models: the ‘narrow’ 
and ‘broad’ models (e.g., Rossouw et al., 2002; Agle et al., 2008). A ‘narrow’ corporate 
governance  structure  is  also  usually  referred  to  as  ‘shareholding’  because  it  considers 
companies to be primarily responsible and accountable to their shareholders. By contrast, a 
‘broad’  corporate  governance  structure  is  also  normally  called  ‘stakeholding’  because  it 
perceives firms to be responsible and accountable to all stakeholders of whom shareowners are 
merely one.    
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Of crucial note, the models have country and legal origins. Specifically, it has been 
suggested that the ‘shareholding’ model tends to be common in Anglo-American countries, 
such  as  the  UK  and  US  with  common  law  origin,  whilst  the  ‘stakeholding’  corporate 
governance  structure  is  usually  found  in  Continental  Europe  and  Asia,  like  Germany  and 
Japan with civil or Scandinavian law origin (Mallin, 2006, p.2; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2009, p.379). Further, and as will be discussed further below, the extant literature suggests that 
the  two  corporate  governance  models  are  based  on  legitimate  differences  in  theoretical 
assumptions, major features, solutions and weaknesses (e.g., Weimer and Pape, 1999; Letza et 
al., 2004; Andreasson, 2009).  
South Africa arguably presents a unique corporate governance framework. Historically, 
South Africa has an Anglo-American or a common law origin (La Porta et al., 1998, p.1130; 
Mallin,  2007,  p.249),  with  predominantly  ‘shareholding’  corporate  governance  structures 
(Armstrong et al., 2006, p.210; West, 2009, p.11). However, and as will be explained further 
in subsection 3.3.2 of chapter three, recent corporate governance reforms (i.e., the 1994 and 
2002 King Reports) attempt to formally super-impose  a number of affirmative action and 
stakeholder demands on listed firms. This has compelled listed firms to depict almost in equal 
measure,  some  of  the  major  characteristics  of  both  the  ‘shareholding’  and  ‘stakeholding’ 
corporate governance models (e.g., Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002; Spisto, 2005). 
Chapter three will also provide a detailed overview of the South African corporate 
governance framework and context. The subsequent subsections of this chapter will, therefore, 
explore  apparent  legitimate  differences  between  the  ‘shareholding’  and  ‘stakeholding’ 
corporate  governance models. The rationale is to aid a better appreciation of some of the 
specific South African corporate governance provisions, as well as the broader South African 
corporate governance framework that will subsequently be discussed in chapter three. 
 
 
2.2 THE MAIN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODELS 
 
This  section  discusses  the  main  corporate  governance  models  within  the  extant 
literature: the ‘shareholding’ and ‘stakeholding’ models. Specifically, the general theoretical 
assumptions,  characteristics,  solutions  and  weaknesses  of  the  ‘shareholding’  and 
‘stakeholding’ models will be discussed. Table 1 below contains a summary of the theoretical 
assumptions, features and solutions underlying the ‘shareholding’ and ‘stakeholding’ models 
of corporate governance. For brevity and comparability purposes, they have been put together  
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and  so  will  be  referred  to  throughout  the  rest  of  the  chapter.  Subsection  2.2.1  will  first 
examine  the  ‘shareholding’  model,  whilst  subsection  2.2.2  will  present  the  ‘stakeholding’ 
model.    Also,  for  each  model,  the  underlying  theoretical  assumptions,  major  features and 
proposed  solutions  will  first  be  described.  This  will  be  followed  immediately  by  an 
examination of their respective weaknesses as found within the extant literature. 
 
2.2.1 The Shareholding Model of Corporate Governance 
 
2.2.1.1 Theoretical Assumptions, Features, and Solutions of the Shareholding Model 
 
  To begin with, and as Table 1 shows, the shareholding corporate governance model is 
usually  common  in  the  UK,  US  and  other  commonwealth  countries.  Central  to  the 
shareholding corporate governance model is the doctrine of shareholder value and primacy 
(Schwartz, 1983, p.53). It suggests that a firm must be run to primarily advance the interests of 
its owners. This is based on a basic assumption that ownership is separate from control in an 
Anglo-American  model  (see  Table  1;  Berle  and  Means,  1932).  That  is,  in  this  corporate 
governance system, the providers of capital (owners/shareholders) surrender the day-to-day 
management (control) of the business to a group of managers consisting of a ‘unitary’ board of 
directors  and  executive  management,  who  are  frequently  not  owners  of  the  corporation 
themselves. Of close relevance is that through multiplicity of shareholders, ownership in this 
corporate governance model is quite often relatively widely diffused (see Table 1; Berle and 
Means, 1932).  
A major implication from dispersed ownership is that the power of shareholders to 
exercise control over the way their business is run is greatly impaired (see Table 1; Blair, 1995; 
La Porta et al., 1998). This raises serious agency problems (see Table 1; Letza et al., 2004), 
which is the central theoretical framework that underpins this thesis, and will be discussed in 
detail in chapter four. Briefly, however, the agency theory suggests that since shareholders 
(principals) have to delegate the control of their business to a few directors and managers 
(agents)  to  run  the  company  on  their  behalf,  there  is  a  potential  risk  that  directors  and 
managers  will  pursue  their  own  interests  to  the  detriment  of  the  eventual  owners  – 
shareholders (e.g., Smith, 1776; Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This is 
also based on the premise that managers are both opportunistic and rational such that, on 
average, they are more likely to pursue their self-interests than those of shareholders (see 
Table 1; Weimer and Pape, 1999). 
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Table 1: Summary of the Theoretical Assumptions of the Shareholding and  
               Stakeholding Models of Corporate Governance 
Summary  Shareholding Model  Stakeholding Model 
Theoretical Assumptions: 
Purpose of corporation 
 
Problem of governance 
 
Cause of problem 
 
Background 
 
Assumptions about causation 
 
Type of economic organisation 
 
Proposition 
 
Rejection 
 
Source of discipline 
 
Major Features: 
Board structure 
 
 
Major source of finance 
 
Role of capital markets 
 
Role of banks 
 
Ownership concentration 
 
Regulatory orientation 
 
Legal system/origin 
 
 
Time horizon of economic 
benefits 
 
Major Solutions: 
Solution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maximisation of shareholder  
     Value. 
Agency problem. 
 
Shareholders do not have  
     enough control. 
Separation of ownership and  
     control. 
Self-interest human behaviour 
 
Rational economic unit with  
     profit motive. 
Market efficiency of economy. 
 
Any external interventions. 
 
External market forces. 
 
 
One-tier (executive and non- 
     executive board). 
 
Equity from the capital markets. 
 
High.  
 
Low. 
 
Low/Diffused. 
 
Self-regulation. 
 
Common law/Anglo-American: 
     UK, US/Commonwealth. 
 
Short-term 
 
 
 
 
Removing restrictions on  
     markets. Strengthening the   
     incentive system. Introduc- 
     ing a voluntary code of  
     governance. Introduction of  
     a combination of efficient  
     contracts. 
 
Maximisation of all  
     stakeholders' wealth. 
Absence of stakeholders’  
     participation. 
Governance failure to represent  
     stakeholders’ interests. 
Different style of capitalism. 
 
Traditional mentality of private  
     capitalism. 
Social economic unit with   
     stakeholder welfare motive. 
Social efficiency of economy. 
 
The principal-agent model. 
 
Internal social forces. 
 
 
Two-tier (executive and  
     supervisory boards). 
 
Debt from banks. 
 
Low. 
 
High. 
 
High/concentrated. 
 
Statutory regulation. 
 
Civil law/Continental Europe: 
     France, Germany and Japan. 
 
Long-term 
 
 
 
 
Trust and long-term contractual  
     associations between the  
     firm and stakeholders. Inter- 
     firm co-operation. Employee  
     participation. Introducing  
     business ethics. 
Sources: Compiled from Keasey et al., (1997); Weimer and Pape (1999); Letza et al., (2004).  
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In response, the shareholding model offers several solutions to the agency problem. 
Firstly,  it  suggests  that  restrictions  on  factor  markets  must  be  removed  to  encourage 
competition (Letza et al., 2004, p.246). Secondly, it calls for the introduction of a voluntary 
corporate  governance  code  of  ethics  and  conduct,  which  is  usually  underpinned  by  the 
universal  business  principles  of  accountability,  discipline,  fairness,  independence, 
responsibility, and transparency to regulate director and managerial behaviour (see Table 1; 
Cadbury Report, 1992; King Report, 2002). Thirdly, it recommends the strengthening of the 
managerial  incentive  system  by  instituting  performance-linked  executive  compensation 
schemes to help align shareholder-managerial interests (e.g., Weimer and Pape, 1999; King 
Report,  2002).  Finally,  it  calls  for  the  introduction  of  efficient  contracts  to  govern  the 
relationship between owners of capital and labour (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Letza et 
al., 2004).  
By  contrast,  the  shareholding  model  rejects  external  interventions  and  additional 
obligations imposed on corporations by government and central authorities because it may 
distort  free  market  operations  (see  Table  1;  Hart,  1995).  Rather,  it  sees  a  firm’s  existing 
governance  arrangements  as  the  outcome  of  a  bargaining  process,  which  has  been  freely 
entered into by corporate insiders and outsiders (Keasey et al., 1997, p.3). More specifically, 
as a rational economic model, it assumes that factor markets (e.g., capital, managerial labour 
and  corporate  control)  are efficient and subsequently,  self-regulation  backed  by  additional 
voluntary mechanisms, such as a voluntary corporate governance code are more effective in 
reducing divergent activities of managers (see Table 1; Keasey et al., 1997; Letza et al., 2004). 
The  rejection  of  external  interventions  by  central  regulatory  authorities,  but  heavy 
reliance on free market regulation, is also based on a core premise that the major source of 
finance to corporations is equity rather than debt. That is, equity capital is expected to be 
raised mainly from efficiently operated capital markets. In such a market, capital is assumed to 
freely move to investments that offer the highest risk-adjusted returns (see Table 1; Friedman, 
1962, 1970). 
Finally, and as a corollary, equity markets tend to be relatively better developed in 
Anglo-American countries, such as the UK and US than in Continental European countries 
like Germany and France (Weimer and Pape, 1999, p.155). This implies that shareholders can 
easily either transfer their capital from a poorly-governed company to a better-governed one or 
a poorly-governed company may be acquired by a better-governed firm through the inherent 
efficient markets for corporate control. Similarly, and at least in theory, poorly performing  
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managers can easily be fired and replaced with an efficient team, hence, providing the most 
effective restraints on managerial discretion.  
 
2.2.1.2 Major Criticisms of the Shareholding Model 
 
Despite its dominance as a major corporate form worldwide (Keasey et al., 1997, p.3; 
O’Sullivan, 2000, p.52), the shareholding model suffers from several weaknesses (e.g., Blair, 
1995;  Gamble  and  Kelly,  2001;  Vinten,  2001).  These  weaknesses  generally  concern 
shareholder power and democracy, stakeholder interests, social morality and ethics, efficient 
factor markets, and excessive short-termism, amongst others (e.g., Blair, 1995; Letza et al., 
2004; Sternberg, 1997, 2004).  
Firstly,  it  has  been  suggested  that  shareholders  lack  sufficient  power  to  control 
management  and  prevent  misuse  of  corporate  resources  as  purported  by  the  shareholding 
model (Blair, 1995, p.vi). As has been explained above, central to this model is the axiom of 
shareholder primacy, which presupposes that corporations should mainly be managed for the 
welfare of shareholders. Arising out of such a presupposition is that theoretically a residual 
power rests with the shareholders so that they can choose the persons to whom operational 
power is delegated (Schwartz, 1983, p.53; Sheikh and Chatterjee, 1995, p.5). It also entitles 
them to participate in major corporate decisions, including exercising the power of hiring or 
firing the board of directors, usually at an annual general meeting (AGM).  
In  practice,  however,  it  has  been  contended  that  the  ability  of  shareholders  to 
meaningfully exercise such control over the direction of their company is severely limited by 
the very procedures which govern such meetings and corporate officers elections (e.g., Blair, 
1995;  Sternberg,  1997,  2004).  For  example,  it  is  directors  rather  than  shareholders  that 
typically set the agenda of an AGM, and by implication directors determine the issues that 
come up for voting. By contrast, it has been shown that it is either difficult or impossible for 
shareholders to get binding resolutions of their own onto the agenda (Sternberg, 2004, p.82).  
  Secondly,  and  closely  associated  with  the  lack  of  real  shareholder  power,  is  that 
directors, who are expected to be the first line of defence for shareholders, also suffer from 
many defects (e.g., Denis and McConnell, 2003; Brennan, 2006). Sternberg (2004) suggests 
that because executive directors of a corporation are also normally its managers, they are less 
willing  to  recognise,  criticise  or  correct  their  own  mistakes.  Non-executive  directors’ 
accountability  to  shareholders  is  also  usually  impaired  by  the  ways  in  which  they  are 
nominated,  officially  appointed  and  remunerated  (e.g.,  Kakabadse  and  Korac-Kakabadse,  
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2002; Sternberg, 1997, 2004). In an Anglo-American model, the appointment procedure is 
such that most non-executive directors are nominated by the chief executive or by the board 
themselves (e.g., Vinten, 2001; Sternberg, 2004). This makes them insufficiently independent 
of management, and insufficiently accountable to shareholders. 
  It is, however, acknowledged that with the recent increase in the proliferation of codes 
of  good  corporate  governance,  especially  among  Anglo-American  countries  (Aguilera  and 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009, p.378), the procedures for board appointments are gradually improving.  
As  will  be  discussed  in  detail  in  chapter  three,  like  the  UK’s  2006  Combined  Code,  for 
example, King II requires listed firms to establish independent nomination committees. It also 
requires  the  nomination  committees  to  be  constituted  and  chaired  by  independent  non-
executive directors. Requirements of these nature imposed by codes of good governance on 
firms  have  generally  improved  board  accountability,  independence  and  monitoring  of 
company executives and senior management (Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009, p.262). 
Short-termism is a third criticism that has usually been levelled against the Anglo-
American corporate  governance model. Opponents (e.g., Blair, 1995;  Keasey et al., 1997; 
Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002; Letza et al., 2004) of the shareholding model contend 
that it is significantly flawed by its excessive fixation on short-term financial performance – 
short-term  returns  on  investments,  short-term  corporate  profits,  short-term  management 
performance, short-term share prices, and short-term expenditures, amongst others. This arises 
out of the substantial reliance on and the existence of efficient capital markets, which put huge 
pressure on managers.  
In principle, a higher short-term share return, for example, is preferred to a lower one 
in  this  corporate  governance  model.  By  contrast,  a  comparatively  lower  share  price,  for 
instance, makes a firm more vulnerable to receiving takeover bids, including hostile ones. This 
huge  market  pressure  from  investors  and  competitors  leads  to  managerial  preference  for 
investments  with  shorter  payback  period  in  order  to  boost  short-term  profits,  while 
disfavouring long-term capital investments, like research and development expenditure (e.g., 
Blair, 1995; Keasey et al., 1997).  
For example, anecdotal evidence within the popular media (e.g., Keller and Stocker, 
2008; Farrell, 2009; Parker and Thomas, 2009) and by recent reviews (Walker Review, 2009, 
p.8; Turner Review, 2009) suggest that the prevailing financial crisis (i.e., the so-called ‘credit 
crunch’) within the global financial markets has partly been caused by ‘reckless risk-taking  
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behaviour’ associated with pervasive ‘short-term bonus culture’ among senior executives of 
some major financial institutions, especially in the UK and US. 
Finally, and by far the most compelling attack and formidable challenge to the Anglo-
American model has come from stakeholder theorists (e.g., Freeman and Reed, 1983; Freeman, 
1984;  Blair,  1995;  Vinten,  2001;  Kakabadse  and  Korac-Kakabadse,  2002).  Generally, 
stakeholder theorists have criticised the shareholding model on two main grounds that: (1) it 
ignores the social, ethical and moral responsibilities of the corporation as an important societal 
institution; and (2) it offers a narrow definition of the stakeholders of the firm (e.g., Blair, 
1995; Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002).  
Firstly,  the  stakeholder  theorists  (e.g.,  Freeman  and  Reed,  1983;  Hummels,  1998) 
argue that rather than running the firm to primarily maximise the wealth of shareholders (e.g., 
Berle  and  Means,  1932;  Sheikh  and  Chatterjee,  1995),  the  firm  should  equally  serve  the 
interests of a wider stakeholder group. These may include employees, creditors, suppliers, 
customers and local communities that have long-term relationships with the firm, and thus 
affect  its  long-term  success.  As  a  result,  it  has  been  contested  that  the  Anglo-American 
model’s exclusive emphasis on the powers and rights of shareholders results in the negligence 
of the interests of other legitimate stakeholders (Blair, 1995, p.vi).  
It must be pointed out, however, that like their counterparts operating in stakeholding 
countries,  companies  that  operate  in  Anglo-American  countries  also  contribute  to  social 
development.  For  example,  and  in  practice,  firms  that  operate  in  shareholder-oriented 
countries pay corporate taxes and offer employment opportunities to local communities, just 
like their stakeholding counterparts. In fact, according to West (2009, p.15), there has been 
substantial  increase  in  corporate  social  responsibilities,  especially  responsibilities  towards 
employees, customers, local communities, and the environment generally in Anglo-American 
countries over the last decade. Similarly, shareholders are also stakeholders of the firm. It has 
been  argued,  therefore,  that  by  maximising  shareholder  value,  societal  value  is  similarly 
maximised (Mallin, 2007, p.6; Jensen, 2001, 2002). 
Secondly, a close criticism from stakeholding theorists is that the shareholding model 
lacks the capacity to give serious consideration to ethical and moral issues. A popular, but 
sometimes controversial ethical and moral criticism is that the Anglo-American governance 
model  encourages  excessive  or  even  ‘obscene’  executive  remuneration  (Sternberg,  2004,  
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p.68)
1.  It  is  reported,  for  example,  that  the  average  CEO  of  a  medium-sized  American 
corporation earns 531 times as much in pay, bonuses and stock options as the average factory 
worker (Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002, p.314). It has been argued, however, that 
good corporate governance is expected to empower the weaker sections of society (Kakabadse 
and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002, p.305).  
In  this  case,  the  shareholding  governance  model  is  criticised  for  ‘unethically’ 
strengthening  further  the  already  rich  and  powerful  societal  segments  –  shareholders  and 
managers rather than empowering the weaker sections of society – lower level employees, 
local communities, the poor, women and children. Again, the on-going financial crisis within 
the  global  financial  markets  offers  classic  anecdotal  examples.  In  spite  of  receiving 
multibillion-pound British Government bailouts (e.g., Farrell, 2008; Bradley, 2009; Neligan 
and Slater, 2009; Turner Review, 2009), and reported record of multibillion-pound losses at 
some major British Banks, including the Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Banking Group, 
reports within the popular media suggest that senior executives continue to pay themselves 
millions  of  pounds  of  bonuses  (e.g.,  Keller  and  Stocker,  2008;  Farrell,  2009;  Parker  and 
Thomas,  2009;  Walker  Review,  2009).  Arguably,  this  may  further  transfer  wealth  from 
ordinary taxpayers to already rich senior corporate bank executives. 
Due to the above weaknesses, stakeholder governance theorists purport to offer a better 
alternative to the shareholding governance model. The next subsection, therefore, will discuss 
the stakeholding corporate governance concept. Again, the rationale is to facilitate a better 
understanding of the South African governance framework that will subsequently be discussed 
in chapter three. For purposes of comparison, Table 1 will be referred to throughout the next 
subsections. Specifically, subsection 2.2.2.1 will present theoretical assumptions and solutions, 
whilst subsection 2.2.2.2 will examine the major weaknesses of the stakeholding model.                                                         
 
 
 
                                                 
1There may be some problems with this literature that need to be highlighted. First, there may be a problem with 
defining what constitutes ethical or moral behaviour. For example, there may be difficulties with defining what 
constitutes  adequate  or  excessive  executive  compensation.  Second,  the  so-called  excessive  executive 
remuneration  may  not  necessarily  be  limited  to  Anglo-American  countries  alone.  The  2009  Mercer  Global 
Executive  Remuneration  Survey,  for  example,  suggests  that  executive  remuneration  is  not  only  high  in 
conventional shareholding countries, such as the UK and Ireland, but also in traditional stakeholding countries, 
like France and Germany. Similarly, with increased globalisation, greater integration of global stock markets 
through cross-listing, and the proliferation of national and trans-national codes of good governance, convergence 
in corporate governance practices is improving (e.g., Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Filatotchev and Boyd, 
2009; Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009). As will be explained further in subsection 2.2.2, this implies that some of 
the criticisms discussed in this subsection may not necessarily be limited to the shareholding model alone.   
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2.2.2 The Stakeholding Model of Corporate Governance 
 
2.2.2.1 Theoretical Assumptions, Features and Solutions of the Stakeholding Model 
 
To start with, and as Table 1 suggests, the stakeholding model of corporate governance 
is often found in France, Germany, Japan and other European or Asian countries. A central 
underlying assumption of the stakeholding corporate governance model is that the purpose of 
the corporation is to maximise the welfare of a number of stakeholders of the firm rather than 
those of shareholders alone (see Table 1; Blair, 1995). That is, unlike the shareholding model 
that encourages firms to ‘exclusively’ advance the interests of shareholders, it suggests that 
companies should ‘inclusively’ pursue the interests of a group of identifiable stakeholders who 
may either directly or indirectly be affected by or can affect the success of the firm.  
Past  stakeholder  theorists  have  offered  classical  exposition  of  the  ‘inclusive’ 
governance concept (e.g., March and Simons 1958; Hill and Jones, 1992; Jensen, 2001, 2002). 
They  suggest  that  a  firm  consists  of  social  groups  in  which  each  group  can  be  seen  as 
supplying the firm with important resources (contributions) and in return expects its interests 
to be promoted (inducements).  
For example, it is suggested that shareholders supply the firm with capital. In exchange, 
they expect to maximise the risk-adjusted return on their investments. Creditors provide the 
firm with loans. In return, they expect their loans to be repaid on time. Local communities 
supply the firm with location and local infrastructure. In exchange, they expect the firm to 
improve their quality of life. Managers and employees provide the firm with time and skills. In 
return, they expect to receive a sustainable income, and this has been argued to be true for 
every reasonably conceivable constituency of the firm (e.g., Hill and Jones, 1992; Jensen, 
2001, 2002).  
  As a result, and unlike the shareholding model, the stakeholding governance model 
presupposes that the  governance problem arises out of the absence of broader stakeholder 
participation in the running of public corporations (see Table 1; Letza et al., 2004). Like the 
shareholding model, however, it subscribes to the idea that the separation of ownership and 
control in modern public corporations creates a governance problem (see Table 1; Keasey et 
al., 1997). It also concurs with the shareholding model’s assumption that the resulting agency 
conflicts  may  be  reduced  by  the  firm  through  a  nexus  of  contracts  between  the  various 
stakeholders of the firm, and that the firm should be run  rationally in economic terms to 
broadly maximise its wealth (see Table 1; Hill and Jones, 1992).   
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By  contrast,  it  rejects the  assumption  that shareholders  and  managers  are  the  only 
important participants in such a relationship (see Table 1; Blair, 1995). Further, while it shares 
the  assumption  that  markets  can  be  efficient  (see  Table  1;  Fama,  1965,  1970),  it  also 
recognises the existence of short to medium-run market inefficiencies. This implies that there 
may  be  a  need  for  occasional  external  interventions,  including  statutory  legislations  to 
establish equilibrium in order to maximise the broader societal wealth (see Table 1; Hill and 
Jones, 1992; Weimer and Pape, 1999). 
  In response, the stakeholding model offers several solutions. Firstly, it proposes a two-
tier corporate board structure as a way of achieving a broader representation of the interests of 
a larger group of stakeholders of the firm (see Table 1; Schilling, 2001; Mallin, 2007). Thus, 
in a typical stakeholder governance framework, like in Germany, companies will normally 
have  a  dual  board  structure:  (1)  a  supervisory  board,  and  (2)  a  management  one.  The 
supervisory  board  is  usually  constituted  by  many  stakeholders,  including  investors 
(shareholders  and  creditors/banks),  employees  (union  groups),  suppliers,  customers,  and 
government appointees representing broader segments of society (e.g., Schilling, 2001; West, 
2006, 2009). In this case, it mandates the managing board to run the company in the best 
interests of a number of stakeholders. This implies that the interests of shareholders should 
only  be  pursued  to  the  extent  that  they  are  not  detrimental  to  the  interests  of  the  other 
stakeholders of the firm (see Table 1; Schilling, 2001; Mallin, 2007). As will be discussed 
further in chapter three, rather than having a loose definition of stakeholders, King II, for 
instance, requires every firm to explicitly identify its own relevant stakeholders.   
Secondly, it encourages corporate management to focus on building trust and long-
term contractual relationships between the firm and its stakeholders (see Table 1; Letza et al., 
2004).  In  particular,  it  supports  inter-firm  co-operation,  including  cross-shareholdings 
(especially in Japan) and employee participation in decision-making through the supervisory 
board  (particularly  among  German  firms).  Similarly,  it  encourages  closer contact between 
shareholders,  creditors,  managers,  employees  and  suppliers,  as  well  as  the  integration  of 
business ethics as a solution to achieving a balance among the various stakeholder interests 
(see Table 1; Rwegasira, 2000). 
One consequence of the stakeholding model’s insistence on balancing the interests of 
the various stakeholders is that it may render it less appealing to equity investors. As such, 
companies tend to rely heavily on debt rather than equity as a major source of finance (see 
Table 1; Weimer and Pape, 1999). The corollary as Table 1 shows is that equity markets  
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(stock  exchanges)  tend  to  be  underdeveloped  relative  to  the  debt  markets  (banks)  with 
relatively  high  level  involvement  by  credit  granting  banks  in  providing  capital  for  public 
corporations.  
Finally, block shareholdings from the various stakeholders, such as employee unions, 
government and banks, lead to a situation in which ownership is often highly concentrated 
(see Table 1; Rwegasira, 2000). Concentrated ownership and close managerial monitoring, 
especially from the supervisory board reduce agency costs. Concentrated ownership may also 
be  associated  with  weak  investor  protection,  particularly  minority  investors,  which  could 
normally be explained by the legal system of countries often associated with the stakeholder 
governance framework (see Table 1; La Porta et al., 1998).  
Specifically, La Porta et al. (1998) demonstrate that there is a negative relationship 
between ownership concentration and investor protection, which can be explained by legal 
origin. They show that Anglo-American countries (common law family, like the UK and US) 
have dispersed ownership with higher investor protection in comparison with Continental-
European-Asian (civil and Scandinavian law origin, such as  France, Germany, and Japan) 
countries, which tend to have relatively high ownership concentration with weaker investor 
protection. 
As  has  been  briefly  explained  above,  however,  it  should  be  pointed  out  that  it  is 
increasingly becoming difficult in recent times to find a corporate governance system, which 
is purely shareholder-oriented or stakeholder-oriented as have been presented in the preceding 
two main subsections. First, through increased globalisation, greater market liberalisation and 
stock market integration through cross-listing, corporate governance practices are increasingly 
converging  (Filatotchev  and  Boyd,  2009,  p.259).  For  example,  stock  markets  in  Japan,  a 
traditional stakeholder governance model, are well-developed as their counterparts in the UK 
and  US,  which  have  historically  been  based  on  shareholder  governance  framework  (e.g., 
Hawley and Williams, 1997; Weimer and Pape, 1999; WFE, 2008). Second, the emergence of 
powerful international institutional investors, and greater investor activism, seem to have also 
accelerated the convergence of corporate governance systems, especially towards the Anglo-
American model (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009, p.381). 
Third, and as has been mentioned above, the proliferation of national (like the Cadbury 
and King Reports) and trans-national (such as by the OECD, Latin American countries, World 
Bank, and the Global Reporting Initiative) codes of corporate governance appears to have 
improved convergence in corporate governance practices (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009,  
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p.381; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009, p.262). For example, in reviewing 196 distinct codes of 
governance  from  64
2 countries,  Aguilera  and  Cuervo-Cazurra  (2009,  p.377)  identify  six 
recommendations  that  are  common  to  all  countries,  regardless  of  their  shareholding  or 
stakeholding origins.  
These include: (1) a balance of executive and non-executive directors; (2) splitting the 
positions of chairman and CEO; (3) provision  of quality and timely  information to board 
members; (4) following transparent procedures for appointing new directors; (5) objective and 
comprehensible financial reporting; and (6) keeping an effective system of internal controls. 
As has been noted above, increasing similarities and improving convergence of governance 
practices,  imply  that  the  criticisms  of  the  shareholding  model  described  above,  and  the 
weaknesses of the stakeholding model presented below, may not necessarily be limited to the 
shareholding model or the stakeholding model, respectively, alone.   
 
2.2.2.2 Major Criticisms of the Stakeholding Model 
 
The stakeholding governance model has also received several criticisms. These include 
its  incompatibility  with  the  concepts  of  business,  governance  and  private  property  rights, 
among others (e.g., Argenti, 1993; Sternberg, 1997, 2004; O’Sullivan, 2000; Letza et al., 2004; 
Solomon, 2007).  
Firstly,  a  central  criticism  of  the  stakeholder  governance  model  is  that  it  is  not 
compatible with the concept of business (e.g., Sternberg, 1997, 2004; Letza et al., 2004). It 
proposes that corporations must strive to achieve a fair balance in distributing the benefits of 
the firm to a number of stakeholders, and as such prevents the firm from pursuing a single 
objective function that favours particular groups (e.g., Sternberg, 1997; Jensen, 2001; 2002). 
This is, however, not consistent with the notion of business, which involves the investment of 
one’s capital in a commercial firm to primarily maximise its long-term value (e.g., Letza et al., 
2004; Sternberg, 2004). Jensen (2001, 2002) suggests that if a business is prevented from 
operating efficiently by focusing on maximising owners’ profits (purposeful behaviour), it will 
simply collapse in the long-run. This will negatively affect social value and welfare of all 
stakeholders. 
Secondly,  the  definition  of  stakeholders  appears  to  be  vague  sometimes.  Since 
stakeholders are all those who can affect or are affected by the business, the number of people 
                                                 
2This implies that some of the countries examined have more than one distinct code. The UK and US, for 
example, have 25 distinct codes each (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009, pp.378-380).  
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whose benefits need to be taken into account is simply infinite (e.g., Freeman, 1984; Hummels, 
1998; Sternberg, 1997, 2004). This means that stakeholders by definition could be anybody or 
anything from anywhere or everywhere, and as such could range from employees, creditors, 
government  to  terrorists,  corporate  armed-robbers,  and  the  sea,  amongst  others.  Yet,  it 
mandates  that  a  balance  be  struck  in  the  distribution  of  benefits  to  all  stakeholders,  but 
ambiguous stakeholder definition means that balancing divergent stakeholder interests is also 
an unworkable objective (e.g., Sternberg, 1997, 2004; Jensen, 2001, 2002).  
Thirdly,  the  stakeholding  governance  model  is  incompatible  with  the  notion  of 
corporate  governance.  A  key  corporate  governance  concept  is  accountability:  the 
accountability of directors to shareholders; the accountability of managers to directors; and the 
accountability  of  corporate  employees  and  other  corporate  agents  to  shareholders  through 
managers and directors (e.g., Sternberg, 1997; 2004; Rossouw et al., 2002; Solomon, 2007). 
Stakeholding, however, suggests that firms should be accountable to all their stakeholders 
rather than to their shareholders alone (e.g., Friedman and Reed, 1983; Letza et al., 2004). By 
contrast, it has been argued that multiple accountability works if the purpose is unambiguous 
to everyone involved (e.g., Sternberg, 1997, 2004; Gamble and Kelly, 2001). In fact, the 2002 
King  Report  suggests  that  an  organisation  that  is  accountable  to  everyone  is  actually 
accountable  to  no  one.  Thus,  accountability  that  is  diffuse  is  effectively  non-existent  and 
unworkable in governance terms. 
Finally,  an  associated  criticism  is  that  the stakeholder  model  provides  no  effective 
objective standard against which corporate agents can be judged (e.g., Sternberg, 1997, 2004; 
Letza et al., 2004). Corporate agents are mandated to run the business primarily to balance all 
stakeholders’ interests. It is, however, contested that it does not serve as an effective objective 
performance measure because it allows corporate agents responsible for its interpretation and 
implementation, excessive freedom to pursue their own narrow interests, including perquisites 
consumption and other private benefits of control (e.g., Argenti, 1993; Sternberg, 1997, 2004).  
Similarly,  hiding  behind  the  vague  notion  of  maximising  and  balancing  all 
stakeholders’ interests, unruly corporate agents are able to effectively resist takeover bids (i.e., 
the market for managerial and corporate control is usually effectively weakened or even non-
existent)  that  would  benefit  shareholders,  and  often  allows  the  pursuit  of  costly  and 
unprofitable empire-building acquisitions instead (e.g., Preston and Sapienza, 1990; Letza et 
al., 2004).  
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2.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
   
  This chapter has attempted to define corporate governance. The central rationale has 
been  to  paint  the  broader  corporate  governance  picture  within  which  the  South  African 
corporate governance framework and context that is subsequently presented in chapter three 
could easily be understood. This is because while South Africa has historically had an Anglo-
American governance model with predominantly ‘shareholding’ governance features, recent 
governance  reforms  (i.e.,  the  1994  and  2002  King  Reports)  attempt  to  explicitly  impose 
substantial affirmative action and stakeholder demands, forcing firms to depict almost in equal 
measure, some of the key features of both the ‘shareholding’ and ’stakeholding’ corporate 
governance models. Arguably, this makes the South African corporate governance framework 
and environment unique. 
In  this  regard,  the  chapter  began  by  offering  a  working  definition  of  corporate 
governance. While it acknowledged that corporate governance has no universally accepted 
definition, it suggested that the existing numerous definitions can be classified into two groups: 
narrow and broad. At the narrow level, it defined corporate governance as referring to internal 
governance  structures,  such  as  the  executive  management,  the  board  of  directors  and  the 
general assembly of shareholders, by which companies are directed and controlled. At the 
most  expansive  form,  however,  it  contended  that  corporate  governance  goes  beyond 
immediate internal governance mechanisms to include external structures and stakeholders, 
such as the legal system, the efficient factor markets, local communities, the regulatory system, 
as well as the political, cultural and economic institutions within which companies operate.  
Overall, the chapter identified two major types of corporate  governance within the 
international literature and context: the ‘shareholding’ and ‘stakeholding’ models. In simple 
terms, it suggested that the shareholding model refers to the narrow definition of corporate 
governance, in which the interests of shareholders are considered as paramount, and is usually 
found in Anglo-American countries, such as the UK and US. In contrast, the stakeholding 
model refers to the broader definition of corporate governance, which attempts to equally cater 
for the interests of a number of stakeholders of the firm, and is normally predominant in 
Continental European and Asian countries, like Germany and Japan. It also acknowledged, 
however,  that  the  shareholding  and  stakeholding  dichotomisation  of  modern  corporate 
governance  systems  might  be  an  over-simplification.  This  is  because  due  to  increased 
globalisation,  greater  global  stock  market  integration  through  cross-listing,  and  the  
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proliferation of national and trans-national codes of corporate governance, amongst others, 
corporate  governance  practices  are  increasingly  converging  across  different  countries  and 
systems.  
Further, for each corporate governance model, the underlying theoretical assumptions, 
major features and proposed solutions as found within the international corporate governance 
literature were discussed. Of crucial relevance is that the extant literature shows that both 
models suffer from several weaknesses. This raises an important question as to whether it will 
be  valuable  to  formally  combine  some  of  the  main  features  of  the  ‘shareholding’  and 
‘stakeholding’ models to form a ‘hybrid’ corporate governance model that will be capable of 
addressing their current respective weaknesses. 
 In this regard, the South Africa governance framework and recent reforms appear to 
offer  an  interesting,  and  arguably  a  unique  context  in  which  these  issues  can  be  further 
examined. Specifically, and as has been pointed out in chapter one, the corporate governance 
reforms that have been pursued so far in South Africa ostensibly attempt to transform the 
South African  governance framework from a predominantly Anglo-American  model to an 
‘integrated’ or ‘inclusive’ model that explicitly combines the features of the ‘shareholding’ 
and  ‘stakeholding’  models.  However,  and  despite  receiving  several  commendations  as  an 
example  of  a  good  governance  model  in  the  world  (Malherbe  and  Segal,  2003,  p.193; 
Armstrong et al., 2006, p.214; Mallin, 2007, pp.57, 248; Andreasson, 2009, p.10), there is an 
active on-going normative debate and serious reservations among practitioners, policy makers 
and academics (e.g., Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002; Rossouw et al., 2002; Rossouw, 
2005a and b; Spisto, 2005; IIF, 2007; West, 2006, 2009), as to whether it is an appropriate 
corporate governance model for South Africa or will be able to achieve its sharply contrasting 
objectives.  
Therefore, chapter three (the next chapter) will consider the South African corporate 
governance  framework  and  context  –  the  major  legal  frameworks,  its  origins,  its 
internal/narrow and external/broad governance structures, as well as the nature of the major 
governance reforms pursued so far.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
3. INTRODUCTION  
 
  This chapter discusses corporate governance in South Africa.  The main objective is to 
provide a comprehensive description and where applicable, a review of the South African 
corporate governance framework. Specifically, it examines the internal and external corporate 
governance structures in South Africa. The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 
3.1 describes the general South African corporate governance landscape. Section 3.2 discusses 
the  external  South  African  corporate  governance  environment.  Section  3.3  examines  the 
internal South African corporate governance environment, while section 3.4 summarises the 
chapter. 
     
 
3.1 THE SOUTH AFRICAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LANDSCAPE 
 
  Following the two major corporate governance models described in chapter two, the 
current South African corporate governance landscape can similarly be classified into two 
major groups: broad or external and narrow or internal.  
  Briefly, external corporate governance refers to the control that is exercised over 
companies from the outside. In South Africa, this group consists of major financial regulatory 
and enforcement bodies or stakeholders. They are generally charged with the formulation, 
implementation and enforcement of statutory, as well as voluntary corporate policies and laws 
(e.g.,  Rossouw  et  al.,  2002;  FSB,  2008).  These  include  the  Ministry  of  Finance,  the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Registrar of Companies, the Financial Services 
Board (FSB), the JSE Ltd, and the South African Reserve Bank (SARB), amongst others.  
  By  contrast,  internal  corporate  governance  refers  to  the  way  in  which  firms  are 
governed from within. This group consists of statutory and voluntary corporate laws and codes 
of conduct, which South African companies are required to comply with. These include the 
South African Companies Act of 1973, the Insider Trading Act of 1998, the JSE’s Listings 
Rules of 2007, and the 1994 and 2002 King Reports on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa.   
 
49 
  This  study  focuses  on  internal  corporate  governance  structures.  Section  3.3  will 
discuss  in  detail  the  internal  or  narrow  corporate  governance  environment.  However,  to 
facilitate a better appreciation of the broader South African corporate governance landscape, 
section 3.2 will provide a brief overview of the external or broad South African corporate 
governance environment. 
 
 
3.2 THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
      ENVIRONMENT  
 
  This section describes the external corporate governance environment. Specifically, it 
describes  the  main  stakeholders  charged  with  the  responsibility  of  formulating  and 
implementing  policies,  as  well  as  supervising  and  regulating  the  external  governance 
environment. It also points out some of the challenges that the system faces. 
   
3.2.1 Overview of the External Corporate Governance System 
 
Figure 1 below depicts the external corporate governance system (the whole financial 
regulatory system) in South Africa. Generally, it shows three major parts (Rossouw et al., 
2002, p.294). Firstly, it shows the regulation of financial instruments (i.e., stocks, bonds and 
derivatives). Secondly, it depicts the regulation of the markets in which these instruments are 
traded (i.e., the JSE Ltd [JSE], the Bond Exchange of South Africa [BESA] and the South 
African Future Exchange [SAFEX]). Finally, it shows the regulation of the market participants 
(i.e., stock brokers, portfolio or fund managers, companies, banks, insurers and pension funds).  
Figure 1 also shows that the South African Ministry of Finance remains at the apex of 
the broad corporate regulatory structure. It oversees the statutory regulation of all financial 
intermediaries and advisers in South Africa. The ministry has the overall responsibility to 
develop, implement and supervise the corporate and the financial governance superstructure in 
South Africa (e.g., Bamber et al., 2001; Rossouw et al., 2002). It carries out its functions 
through four major statutory bodies: the Financial Services Board (FSB), the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB),  the Registrar of Companies and the South African Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI) (Rossouw, et al., 2002, p.294). 
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Figure 1: The External Corporate Governance Framework of South Africa, Source: Rossouw et al. (2002, p.295). 
 
The Financial Services Board (FSB) has regulatory powers over all non-bank financial 
institutions, as well as acts in an advisory capacity to the Minister of Finance (e.g., Financial 
Services  Board  Act,  1990;  FSB,  2008).  The  FSB  is  also  assisted  by  the  Insider  Trading 
Directorate  (ITD),  the  Advisory  Board  on  financial  markets,  as  well  as  the  Advisory 
Committees on long- and short-term financial instruments (Rossouw, et al., 2002, p.294). In 
contrast, the Appeals Board serves as the official adjudicator of all conflicts emanating from 
the whole financial system: the FSB, the Advisory Committees and the South African Reserve 
Bank (SARB) (e.g., Bamber et al., 2001; Rossouw et al., 2002). 
The  FSB’s  functions  are  further  delegated  to  four  subordinated  statutory  bodies, 
namely: the financial markets, unit trusts, insurers and financial advisors boards (Rossouw, et 
al., 2002, p.294). The Financial Markets Board is responsible for the supervision and issuance 
of licenses for the operation of securities markets, such as stock, bond and financial futures 
markets. The Board has supervisory powers over the JSE Ltd (JSE), the Bond Exchange of 
South Africa (BESA) and the South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX).  
Among them, the JSE is of direct relevance to this study. The JSE is the only formal 
stock market in South Africa. It provides a platform for the listing and trading of all corporate  
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shares (JSE Listings Rules, 2007). It has its own Listings Rules. More importantly, it appends 
the provisions of the 1994 and 2002 King Reports on Corporate Governance to its Listings 
Rules. It expects all listed firms to comply with the provisions of the King Report or explain, 
in case(s) of non compliance. The constructed South African Corporate Governance Index (the 
SACGI)  that  will  subsequently  be  used  in  examining  the  corporate  governance-financial 
performance link is based on the 2002 King Report. These reports will be discussed in detail 
in section 3.3. 
 
3.2.2 Some of the Challenges Facing the South African Regulatory System 
 
The  South  African  financial  regulatory  system  faces  a  number  of  challenges  (e.g., 
Bamber et al., 2001; Rossouw et al., 2002; Armstrong, 2003; CLSA, 2000; IIF, 2007; FSB, 
2008). A  major regulatory  challenge is that the  FSB is financed by the financial services 
industry through levies and fees, with no contributions from central government (e.g., Bamber 
et al., 2001; Rossouw et al., 2002; FSB, 2008). This raises the question of whether the FSB as 
the  main  financial  services  industry  regulator  can  be  truly  independent  of  the  market 
participants  that  it  is  expected  to  regulate.  This  lack  of  independence  creates  serious 
compliance and enforcement problems, especially within a legal framework that heavily relies 
on  self-regulation  (Armstrong,  2003,  p.2).  For  example,  the  Registrar  of  Companies 
responsible for administering and supervising the Companies Act has been shown to have 
limited capacity for enforcement (e.g., Deutsche Bank, 2002; Armstrong, 2003; IIF, 2007).   
Similarly, the financial regulatory system also faces the challenge of keeping up with 
and adapting to the impact of domestic competition and global competitive pressures (e.g., 
Bamber et al., 2001; Rossouw et al., 2002). These include frequent changes in international 
financial regulations  and  standards,  new  technology,  as well  as  the  fast-evolving  strategic 
objectives of financial institutions.  
Finally,  it  has  been  suggested  that  as  an  emerging  economy,  the  South  African 
regulatory  system  is  still  evolving  or  in  a  transitional  stage  (e.g.,  Bamber  et  al.,  2001; 
Rossouw et al., 2002). This sometimes makes it difficult to identify the major changes that 
need to be instituted. For example, there is an on-going debate as to whether South Africa 
should set a super-regulatory body like the Financial Services Authority (FSA) of the UK or 
the  Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  (SEC)  of  the  US  to  be  in  charge  of  the  whole 
financial regulatory system (e.g., Bamber et al., 2001; Armstrong, 2003). 
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3.3 THE SOUTH AFRICAN INTERNAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
      ENVIRONMENT 
 
  This section discusses the South African internal corporate governance environment. 
As  has  been  pointed out  in  section  3.1,  the  internal  corporate  governance  environment  is 
constituted by a group of statutory and voluntary corporate laws and codes of conduct that 
attempt to regulate the internal control of companies. The South African Companies Act of 
1973 and the Insider Trading of 1998 are statutory. By contrast, the JSE’s Listings Rules and 
the 1994 and 2002 King Reports on Corporate Governance for South Africa are voluntary
3. 
In subsection 3.3.1, the various parts of the JSE’s Listings Rules and the Companies 
and Insider Trading Acts that relate to internal corporate governance structures will be briefly 
described. Subsections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 will then discuss in detail the 1994 (‘King I’) and 2002 
(‘King II’) King Reports, respectively. The King Reports will be discussed in detail for two 
reasons. Firstly, they contain all the relevant provisions covered by the JSE’s Listings Rules, 
as well as the Companies and Insider Trading Acts. Secondly, and as has been explained 
above, they represent the main Code of Conduct on which this study is based.   
     
3.3.1 The South African Companies Act, Insider Trading Act, JSE’s Listings  
         Rules and Internal Corporate Governance Structures 
 
  This subsection briefly discusses the relevant internal corporate governance structures 
that are instituted by the South African Companies Act, the JSE’s Listings Rules and the 
Insider  Trading  Act.  Specifically,  subsection  3.3.1.1  will  discuss  the  internal  corporate 
governance structures that are established by the Companies Act, whilst subsection 3.3.1.2 
will describe those instituted by the JSE’s Listings Rules and the Insider Trading Act.  
 
3.3.1.1 The Companies Act and Internal Corporate Governance Structures 
 
The South African Companies Act, no. 61 of 1973 (first enacted in 1861) is the main 
statutory commercial law that controls internal operations of companies in South Africa. It is 
administered  and  supervised  by  the  Department  of  Trade  and  Industry  (DTI)  through  the 
                                                 
3As will be noted further in chapter ten, the JSE’s Listings Rules and the King Reports are voluntary because 
their corporate governance provisions are not enforceable in the law courts. Listed firms that do not comply with 
their provisions may only be suspended or de-listed from the JSE. Listed firms are also not officially punished for 
non-compliance if they are able to offer a reasonable explanation(s) for not complying with a particular corporate 
governance provision or provisions. Non-listed firms are expected to voluntarily comply only with the corporate 
governance provisions of the King Code (King Report, 2002, para. 1.1).   
 
53 
Registrar  of  Companies.  The  Act  sets  out  several  structures  that  govern  the  internal 
relationships between the firm, directors and shareholders. 
  Focusing first on the firm, under schedule 3 of the Act, a firm has the right to appoint 
qualified directors, auditor(s) and a secretary. The company must organise and notify members 
of all meetings, including annual general and extra ordinary meetings (see sections 179-186). 
It  must  also  keep  proper  accounting  records  (see  section  284)  and  comply  with  formal 
financial accounting standards (see section 285A). Finally, under schedule 5.28 of the Act, the 
company must prepare and present its annual report to members and file with the Registrar of 
Companies all annual returns (see section 176). As will be discussed in chapter five, the study 
relies  on  company  annual  reports  as  the  main  source  of  data  for  the  internal  corporate 
governance variables. It will be argued in subsection 5.2.1 of chapter five that the mandatory 
or statutory nature of annual reports makes them a more credible source of data in comparison 
with other sources. 
With regards to directors, under section 208 of the Act, every public company must 
have a unitary board of at least two directors. Board size and the percentage of non-executive 
directors  will  be  used  as  corporate  governance  variables  in  investigating  the  relationship 
between corporate governance and financial performance in chapter five. Schedule 2 of the 
Act grants directors the following powers: direction and control, management, voting, and 
representing  the  firm.  Schedule  2  of  the  Act  also  offers  directors  a  right  to  adequate 
remuneration for services offered. As will be discussed in subsection 3.3.3, the 2002 King 
Report requires directors’ remuneration to be determined by a remuneration committee that 
consists only of independent non-executive directors.  
Also, and as will be described in chapter five, the constructed South African Corporate 
Governance Index (the SACGI) includes whether a remuneration committee is present or not. 
Finally, under section 140A of the Act, directors and officers have a duty to disclose in the 
annual report any direct or indirect beneficial interest in the firm’s securities. In chapter five, 
the  percentage  of  director  ownership  will  be  used  as  one  of  the  internal  governance 
mechanisms in examining the governance-performance link.  
With  respect  to  the  company  secretary,  section  268A  of  the  Act  mandates  public 
companies to appoint a secretary. As will be discussed later, the King Reports also recognise 
company secretary as an important internal corporate governance mechanism. Similarly, and 
as  will  be  specified  in  chapter  five,  the  constructed  South  African  Corporate  Governance 
Index (the SACGI) includes whether a firm has a formally appointed company secretary or not.  
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Under section 268G of the Act, the secretary has a duty to provide directors of a company 
collectively  and  individually  with  guidance  as  to  what  their  duties  are,  as  well  as  their 
responsibilities and powers. More importantly, the secretary must also certify in the annual 
financial  statements  of  the  company  that  the  company  has  lodged  with  the  Registrar  of 
Companies all such returns as are required of a public company and that such returns are true 
and correct. 
Regarding  auditing,  section  269A  of  the  Act  stipulates  that  every  company  must 
appoint an audit committee. It must be composed of at least two independent non-executive 
directors. Similarly, and as will be explained below, the King Reports also consider the audit 
committee  as  an  important  internal  corporate  governance  structure.  Also,  and  as  will  be 
discussed further in chapter five, the constructed South African Corporate Governance Index 
(the SACGI) includes whether an audit committee is present or not. Under section 270A of the 
Act,  the  audit  committee  must  nominate  for  appointment  an  independent  auditor  for  the 
company and determine the fees to be paid to the auditor. Finally, it must handle complaints 
relating to accounting practices, internal audit and the content of its financial statements. 
Focusing  finally  on  shareholders,  they  are  required  to  provide  the  capital  of  the 
company with their liabilities limited to the amount of capital invested (see sections 19; 59-66; 
and 86, amongst others). As residual investors and risk bearers of the firm, the Act grants 
shareholders  several  rights  and  powers.  Sections  219  and  220  of  the  Act  state  that  by  a 
resolution at a general meeting, shareholders have the power to remove directors from office 
before the expiration of their term or can go to court for the enforcement of such a resolution. 
Under sections 146A and 90 of the Act, shareholders are entitled to receive payments in the 
form of dividends or capital redistributions and have pre-emptive right to rights issues. Finally, 
according to sections 179 and 180-186 of the Act, shareholders have the right to call for, to 
receive adequate notice, to attend and to vote at general meetings.  
These sections of the Act are important because they are the distinguishing features 
that underlie any typical ‘shareholding’ or Anglo-American corporate governance model that 
has been discussed in chapter two. They demonstrate further that the interests of shareholders 
within this model are supreme, backed by extensive legal rights and powers. Similarly, it is 
expected that the extensive control powers granted shareholders will ensure that voluntary or 
self-regulation operates effectively without state or external intervention. The Act does not, 
however, explicitly  recognise the interests or rights of any  group of stakeholders, such as 
employees.  By  contrast,  the  ‘stakeholding’  corporate  governance  model  tends  to  formally  
 
55 
recognise  the  rights  of  other  stakeholders.  For  example,  the  right  of  employees  to  be 
represented on the supervisory board of German companies is explicitly enshrined in German 
company law (Mallin, 2007, p.16). 
 
3.3.1.2 The JSE’s Listings Rules, Insider Trading Act and Internal Corporate  
            Governance Structures 
 
  Apart from the Companies Act and the King Reports that will be discussed below, the 
JSE’s  2007  Listings  Rules  and  the  Insider  Trading  Act  of  1998  are  the  other  corporate 
governance reforms that regulate internal corporate governance in South Africa.  
The JSE’s 2007 Listings Rules are important because they append the relevant internal 
governance provisions of the Companies Act, the  Insider Trading  Act  and the 2002 King 
Report to its Listings Rules. Specifically, the Listings Rules are specified in a voluminous 
document consisting of a practice note, 25 schedules and 21 sections dealing with a variety of 
issues  ranging  from  application  for  listing  new  applicant,  corporate  governance,  and  the 
authority of the JSE to issues regarding pyramidical and concentrated ownership structures. 
This subsection, therefore, briefly highlights the relevant internal governance provisions that 
are not covered by the Companies Act or the King Reports. 
The main aim of the JSE’s Listings Rules is to ensure the existence of an efficient 
market for raising and trading of capital with strong emphasis on investor protection (JSE 
Listings Rules, 2007, intro. para.). Under subsection 14.6, the listing of pyramid
4 companies is 
prohibited. The JSE, however, has a discretionary right to allow a pyramid company to list on 
the proviso that it will ‘unbundle’ or engage in an ‘unbundling’ process within an agreed time 
period. This rule is an important corporate governance issue because historically pyramidical 
ownership structures have been pervasive and problematic in South Africa (e.g., Barr et al., 
1995; Malherbe and Segal, 2003; Armstrong et al., 2006). Theoretically, it is expected that a 
reduction in pyramidical and concentrated ownership structures within a relatively developed 
stock market in South Africa, will make voluntary or self-regulation more effective. As will be 
noted further below, Armstrong et al. (2006, p.221) report, for example, that the introduction 
of more rigorous listings rules have caused a marked shrinkage in the number of companies 
listed on the JSE, falling from 668 companies in 1998, for instance, to 426 in January 2004. 
                                                 
4A pyramid company is one which: (1) may exercise, or cause the exercise, of 50% or more of the total voting 
rights of the equity securities of a listed company (“listed controlled company”); and (2) derives 75% or more of 
its total attributable income before tax from such listed controlled company, or the value of its shareholding in the 
listed controlled company represents 50% or more of its gross assets, with both measured, as far as possible, at 
fair value (see subsection 14.4, JSE Listings Rules, 2007).  
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Subsections  3.59-3.84  and  the  whole  of  sections  7  and  10  deal  with  the  duties, 
responsibilities,  powers,  and  rights  of  directors,  shareholders,  the  company  secretary,  and 
auditors as discussed in the Companies Act. Similarly, subsections 3.63-3.74 deal with the 
prohibition of insider trading by directors, officers and employees of listed companies. Insider 
share dealings are also covered by the Insider Trading Act, section 440F of the Companies Act 
and subsection 2.9 of the 2002 King Report. The relevant sections of the Insider Trading Act 
1998 will be briefly discussed below. The whole recommendations of the 2002 King Report 
are also covered under sections 7 and 8.  
However, there are two areas where the Listings Rules differ from the 2002  King 
Report and the Companies Act. Firstly, under subsection 10.23, the Listings Rules suggest that 
every  listed  company’s  board  must  consist  of  at  least  four  directors.  The  Companies  Act 
requires a minimum of two, whilst the 2002 King Report does not specify any number. None 
of  them  sets  a  maximum  number  of  directors.  Secondly,  subsection  10.59  prohibits  life 
directorships, but the 2002 King Report and Companies Act permit a staggered rotation of 
board members to ensure board continuity.   
Finally, under subsections 7.F.5 and 8.63, every listed company is expected to provide 
two statements. Firstly, companies are required to provide a statement of how it has applied 
the principles set out in the 2002 King Code. In particular, they must give explanation(s) that 
enable(s)  its  shareholders  to  evaluate  how  the  principles  have  been  applied.  Secondly,  a 
positive statement that addresses the extent to which the company has complied with the King 
Code and the reason(s) for non-compliance with any of the principles must be provided.  
With respect to the Insider Trading Act of 1998, it prohibits individuals from dealing 
in  such  securities  or  financial  instruments  in  South  Africa  based  on  inside  information
5. 
Specifically, the Act provides criminal and civil law penalties for insider dealing. For example, 
under sections 2 and 5 of the Act, any insider who is convicted of a direct or indirect insider 
trading  is  liable  to  a  criminal  fine  not  exceeding  R2m  or  imprisonment  for  a  period  not 
exceeding 10 years, or both.  
Finally, and more importantly, the Act grants the Financial Services Boards (FSB) a 
wide  range  of  statutory  powers,  including  the  power  to  investigate,  summon,  institute, 
                                                 
5The Act defines ‘inside information’ as specific or precise information which has not been made public and 
which: (a) is obtained or learned as an insider; and (b) if it were made public would likely have a material effect 
on the price or value of any securities or financial instrument. ‘Insider’ is also defined by the Act as an individual 
who has inside information: (a) through being a director, employee or shareholder of an issuer of securities or 
financial instruments to which the inside information relate and through having access to such information by 
virtue of his or her employment, office or profession; and/or (b) where such individual is directly or indirectly 
related to an insider (see section 1, Insider Trading Act, 1998).  
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interrogate  and  prosecute  offenders.  In  this  regard,  and  under  sections  6  and  11-12,  it 
establishes a fully-fledged directorate within the FSB, the Insider Trading Directorate (see 
Figure 1 above) to purely investigate and institute civil proceedings against offenders. The 
constructed South African Corporate Governance index (the SACGI) that will be discussed in 
subsection 5.2 of chapter five, includes the disclosure of a policy that prohibits directors from 
dealing in a firm’s shares within their own clearly pre-specified window, as recommended by 
the 2002 King Report.  
The next subsections will discuss recent corporate governance reforms that have been 
pursued in South Africa. Specifically, subsections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 will examine the origins and 
the internal corporate governance structures imposed by the 1994 and 2002 King Reports on 
Corporate Governance for South Africa, respectively. Also, Table 2 will present the main 
recommendations of the King Reports. To facilitate comparison, the recommendations of the 
now influential 1992 Cadbury Report have also been presented, and so will be referred to 
throughout the next subsections. 
 
3.3.2 The 1994 King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (‘King I’) 
 
3.3.2.1 Origins/Background  
 
As  has  been  noted  above,  legislation  regulating  the  behaviour  of  companies,  their 
directors and officers has existed in South Africa in the form of the 1861 Companies Act, no. 
23  (DTI,  2004,  p.13).  However,  there  is  a  consensus  that,  in  a  narrow  sense,  corporate 
governance in South Africa was formally institutionalised by the publication of the first King 
Report on Corporate Governance (hereafter also known as ‘King I’) in November 1994 (e.g., 
King Report, 2002; Rossouw et al., 2002; Armstrong et al., 2006; and West, 2006, 2009, 
amongst others).  
   The  publication  of  King  I  was  preceded  by  important  domestic  and  international 
developments.  Domestically,  it  coincided  with  an  unprecedented  deep-seated  social  and 
political transformation in South Africa. South Africa was preparing to hold its first multi-
racial  elections  in  1994  following  the  collapse  of  Apartheid.  Internationally,  corporate 
governance had become  an  issue  of  great  international  concern,  preceding  well-publicised 
cases regarding the collapse of major international corporations, such as Bank of Credit and 
Commerce and the Maxwell Communications Corporation, in the UK and elsewhere (e.g., 
Barrier, 2003; Mallin, 2006, 2007; Solomon, 2007).   
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There were widespread suspicions that poor corporate governance practices had played 
a central role in causing these corporate failures (e.g., Cadbury Report, 1992; Jones and Pollitt, 
2004; Solomon, 2007). This ignited major reforms that influenced the way corporations were 
governed  worldwide.  The  UK,  for  example,  responded  by  establishing  a  Corporate 
Governance Committee in 1991 to prepare a Code of Best Corporate Practice for UK listed 
firms. In 1992, the recommendations of the UK Cadbury Report on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate  Governance  were  published.  The  recommendations  focused  on  the  control  and 
division of responsibilities among top management, and on the role of auditors. 
With increasing domestic and international interests in corporate governance, the King 
Committee on Corporate Governance was formed in 1992 as a voluntary and private initiative 
at the instigation of the Southern African Institute of Directors (e.g., Rossouw et al., 2002; 
Armstrong et al., 2006). The main purpose of the King Committee (named after its chair, 
Mervyn King), was to consider how to promote the highest standards of corporate governance 
in South Africa (King Report, 2002, p.5). Specifically, the Committee was required to make 
recommendations on a Code of Practice in terms of the financial, ethical and environmental 
aspects of corporate governance in South Africa (e.g., Malherbe and Segal, 2003; Rossouw et 
al., 2002).  
After extensive deliberations, the Committee published its final report in November 
1994. In general, King I adopted many of the corporate governance standards and principles 
that had already been advocated in a plethora of national and international codes that were 
already in existence (e.g., Rossouw, et al., 2002; Armstrong et al., 2006; Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2009). In particular, the recommendations of the report were heavily informed by that 
of the UK’s Cadbury Report of 1992, especially regarding its suggestions on internal corporate 
governance structures (see Table 2; West, 2006, 2009).  
Unlike  Cadbury,  however,  it  advocated  an  ‘integrated’  approach  to  corporate 
governance. It also went beyond Cadbury’s main principles of accountability, integrity and 
openness to include fairness and responsibility. This gives King I a stakeholder rather than 
shareholder orientation (see Table 2;  West, 2006, 2009). This means that firms should go 
beyond  the  financial  and  regulatory  aspects  of  corporate  governance  to  taking  into 
consideration the interests of a wide range of stakeholders (King Report, 2002, para. 5).   
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Table 2: A Comparison of Internal Corporate Governance Provisions of the Cadbury, King I and II Reports 
Internal Governance Provisions  1992 Cadbury Report  1994 King Report (King I)  2002 King Report (King II) 
Board and Directors: 
Board structure 
     Non-executive directors 
Independent non-exec. directors 
     Role duality 
Chairperson independence 
     Board meetings 
Board committees 
     Director/insider share dealings 
 
Unitary board 
     At least three 
At least two 
     Split chairperson and CEO 
Non-executive director 
     Frequently/Regularly 
Audit, remuneration & nomination 
Not specified  
 
Unitary board 
     At least two 
Not specified 
     Split Chairperson and CEO 
Non-executive director 
     At least once every quarter 
Audit & Remuneration 
     Not specified 
 
Unitary board 
     Majority of board members 
Majority of non-executive directors 
     Split Chairperson and CEO 
Independent non-executive director 
     At least once every quarter 
Audit, remuneration & nomination 
     Prohibits insider trading 
Risk management, internal audit 
and control: 
   Risk management 
        Internal audit 
   Internal control system 
 
 
Not covered 
     Establish internal audit function  
Establish internal control system 
 
 
Not covered 
     Establish internal audit function 
Establish internal control system 
 
 
Risk management/committee 
     Establish internal audit function 
Establish internal control system 
Accounting and Auditing: 
   Auditing 
       Accounting/financial reporting 
 
Audit committee/auditors 
     Accounting standards (GAAP) 
 
Audit committee/auditors 
     Accounting standards (GAAP) 
 
Audit committee/internal auditor 
      Accounting standards/IFRS 
Integrated sustainability Reporting: 
   Ethics 
        Environment 
  Health and safety 
       Affirmative/employment equity 
  Black empowerment 
      HIV/AIDS 
 
Code of ethics 
     Not covered 
Not covered 
     Not covered 
Not covered 
     Not covered 
 
Code of ethics 
     Environment 
Health and safety 
     Affirmative action 
Not covered 
     Not covered 
 
Code of ethics 
     Environment 
Health and safety 
     Employment equity 
Black empowerment 
     HIV 
Compliance and enforcement:  Board, institutional/shareholders   
     and auditors  
Board, institutional/shareholders  
     and Auditors 
Board, institutional/shareholders,  
     auditors, the courts, financial   
press, and peer pressure  
Code Principles:  Openness, integrity and    
     Accountability 
Accountability, fairness,  
     Responsibility and transparency 
Accountability, discipline, fairness,  
     independence, responsibility, 
social responsibility & transparency  
Kind of Corporate Governance:  Financial aspects of governance  Integrated corporate governance  Inclusive corporate governance 
Compliance or Regulation:  Voluntary or self-regulation  Voluntary or self-regulation  Voluntary or self-regulation 
Sources: Compiled from the 1992 Cadbury Report; 1994 and 2002 King Reports.    
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In particular, the code tasked South African companies to take into account the current 
circumstances that existed in South Africa. It urged South African companies to morally and 
ethically recognise the  unique socio-economic  and political context (in an environment of 
mass  unemployment,  AIDS  epidemic  and  stark  poverty),  within  which  they  operate  (e.g., 
Rampersad, 2006; Vaughn and Ryan, 2006). Further, it also proposed that companies should 
consider stakeholder reporting without lowering the quality thereof, while facilitating the entry 
of business leaders from previously disadvantaged communities (e.g., Rossouw et al., 2002; 
West, 2006, 2009). 
In the next subsection, the specific internal corporate governance structures imposed 
by  King I will be discussed. Comparisons will be drawn with the provisions of the 1992 
Cadbury Report.  
 
3.3.2.2 Corporate Governance Structures Imposed on Companies by King I 
 
  This subsection describes the internal corporate governance structures imposed by the 
1994  King  Report  on  Corporate  Governance  for  South  Africa  (King  I).  Specifically,  the 
structures are divided into six main parts. They include board and directors, risk management, 
internal audit and control, accounting  and auditing, integrated sustainability reporting/non-
financial information, and compliance and enforcement. The six structures will subsequently 
be evaluated at subsection 3.3.2.3.   
   
i) Board and Directors 
 
  King  I  recommended  that  every  South  African  company  should  be  headed  by  an 
effective board. Consistent with the Cadbury Report (1992, hereafter also called ‘Cadbury’), it 
advocated an Anglo-American style unitary board of executive and non-executive directors, 
who are primarily responsible for directing and controlling the corporation (see Table 2; King 
Report, 1994, para. 2.1). They are also severally and jointly accountable to shareholders.  
It recognised the key role that company chairpersons play in securing good corporate 
governance. This includes ensuring that non-performing directors are not re-elected and have 
their services terminated (King Report, 1994, para. 4.3). Due to their immense role and in line 
with Cadbury, King I suggested that the positions of chairman and CEO of South African 
companies should be held by different persons (see Table 2; Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 
2002). It argued that such a separation was necessary for the achievement of clear division of 
responsibilities at the head of the company. It will also result in a considerable reduction in the  
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concentration  of  power  and  authority  such  that  no  one  individual  has  unbridled power  in 
company decisions.  
Like  Cadbury,  it  emphasised  the  special  importance  of  non-executive  directors  in 
setting  and  maintaining  high  standards  of  corporate  governance  (see  King  Report,  1994; 
Kakabadse  and  Korac-Kakabadse,  2002).  In  particular,  it  noted  the  independence  and 
experience that non-executive directors bring to issues of strategy, performance, resources, 
major appointments and standards of conduct (King Report, 1994, para. 4.1). Unlike Cadbury, 
but  in  line  with  the South  African  Companies Act,  it  recommended  that  company  boards 
should have at least two rather than three non-executive directors of adequate calibre and 
independence. This will ensure that their opinions will carry weight in board decisions (see 
Table 2; King Report, 1994, para. 2.2). Also, and unlike Cadbury, which specified that at least 
two of the non-executive directors should be independent, King I did not define any number of 
independent non-executive directors. Like Cadbury, however, it did not also specify whether 
the chairman should be independent non-executive director or not. 
With regards to board sub-committees, it recognised the crucial role that they play in 
achieving  efficient  and  effective  corporate boards. Similar  to  the Cadbury  Report,  King  I 
suggested that every board should have remuneration and audit committees (see Table 2; King 
Report, 1994, para. 6.1). Also, and in line with the South African Companies Act, it suggested 
that  the  audit  and  remuneration  committees  must  consist  of  at  least  two  non-executive 
directors, with a majority of its members, including the chairman of the committees, being 
non-executive directors.  
Unlike Cadbury, however, it suggested that the selection and appointment of directors 
should  be  matters  for  the  board  as  a  whole.  As  such,  King  I  did  not  recommend  the 
establishment of nomination committees (see Table 2; King Report, 1994, para. 5.1). Similarly, 
while Cadbury recommended that the majority of the audit committee members should be 
independent non-executive directors, King I did not specify any number. 
Finally,  King  I  expressed  concerns  as  to  whether  there  were  sufficient  pool  of 
candidates in South Africa with the necessary skills and knowledge to fill directors’ positions 
(Rossouw et al., 2002, p.297). As a solution, it proposed that new board appointees go through 
a period of training and induction with regard to the company’s business, resources, systems 
and management structure. It also noted that the existence of pyramidical structures and large 
family controlled companies that were listed on the JSE may also hinder compliance. Overall,  
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King I acknowledged that, because of specific circumstances prevailing in South Africa, some 
of the principles might not be adhered to in some cases (Rossouw et al., 2002, p.297).  
 
ii) Risk Management, Internal Audit and Control 
   
Similar  to  Cadbury,  and  under  section  10,  King  I  placed  emphasis  on  the  need  for 
companies to have a well-resourced internal audit and control units. It pointed out that internal 
auditors are complementary to, but different from, that of the outside auditors. As such, it 
encouraged companies to establish internal audit functions to undertake regular monitoring of 
key controls and procedures. For example, and under paragraph 10.2, King I urged internal 
audit units to undertake investigations on behalf of the audit committee and to follow up any 
suspicion of fraud. Further, to maintain their independence, King I suggested that the heads of 
internal audit should have unfettered access to the chairman of the audit committee. 
With regard to internal controls, King I accepted the principle laid down by Cadbury that 
an  effective  internal  control  system  is  an  essential  part  of  the  efficient  management  of  a 
company. In this case, King I granted directors two mandates. Firstly, and in line with the 
South African Companies Act, it mandated directors to maintain a system of internal control 
over the financial management of the company, including procedures to reduce the incidence 
of fraud. Secondly, and distinct from the South African Companies Act, it mandated directors 
to report on the effectiveness of their system of internal control. External auditors should also 
express  their  ‘true  and  fair’  view  on  the  directors’  statement  in  the  annual  report.  Like 
Cadbury,  King  I  did  not  explicitly  specify  how  issues  of  risks  should  be  addressed  or 
integrated in the company. 
 
iii) Accounting and Auditing 
 
  Similar  to  Cadbury,  and  under  section  10,  King  I  made  several  recommendations 
regarding  accounting  and  auditing  for  South  African  firms  to  follow.  With  reference  to 
accounting, King I suggested that South African firms should prepare their financial reports in 
line with Generally Accepted Accounting Practices as recommended by the JSE’s Listings 
Rules and the South African Accounting Standards Board. In this regard, it placed four main 
responsibilities on directors. Firstly, it mandated directors to prepare financial statements for 
every financial year which give true and fair view of the state affairs of the company (or 
group).   
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Secondly, and similar to the South African Companies Act, directors must maintain 
adequate accounting records. Thirdly, they must confirm that suitable accounting policies and 
standards have been consistently applied in preparing the financial reports. Also, in applying 
accounting standards, substance should always take precedence over form. In particular, it 
must be easily comprehensible, transparent and maintain the integrity of financial reports.  
Finally, directors must express their opinion as to whether the business will continue to 
operate as a ‘going-concern’ for the foreseeable future. In this case, the board is expected to 
fully state the facts and assumptions used in their assessment of the ‘going-concern’ status of 
the company  at  the  end  of a  financial  year.  This  should  also  help  the external  auditor  in 
forming his/her ‘true and fair’ view of the company’s ‘going-concern’ status. This is expected 
to help in generating serious deliberation in board meetings, bearing in mind the liabilities that 
inappropriate assessment or misreporting of the company’s financial position could incur. 
  In this respect, King I suggested that the audit committee must play a critical role in 
ensuring  the  integrity  of  the  financial  reports.  Firstly,  and  as  described  above,  the  audit 
committee must  be  composed  in  a  way  that  enables non-executive  directors  to  contribute 
independent  judgement.  Secondly,  the  committee  must  review  the  financial  statements. 
Thirdly, the finance director and the head of internal audit must attend the audit committee 
meetings to answer questions on any issues of concern that are raised. Finally, the external 
auditor  must  also  have  unrestricted  access  to  the  board  chairman,  management,  the  audit 
committee and the chairman of the audit committee.  
 
iv) Integrated Sustainability Reporting/Non-financial Information 
 
  The  explicit  requirement  for  firms  to  engage  in  stakeholder  reporting  is  what 
distinguishes King I from Cadbury or other Anglo-American corporate governance codes (e.g., 
Armstrong et al., 2006; West, 2006, 2009). Under sections 12 and 13, King I made several 
recommendations  regarding  affirmative  action  and  stakeholder  rights.  Stakeholder  issues 
covered  include  contribution  to  the  community,  health  and  safety,  environment  and  fair 
employment practices (see Table 2; King Report, 1994, para. 12.1). It must be emphasised that 
these  stakeholder  provisions  were  largely  aspirational  with  no  legal  backing.  In  line  with 
Cadbury,  and  under  section  13,  King  I  also  made  recommendations  with  regard  to 
organisational ethics. It did not, however, address black economic empowerment, HIV/Aids, 
and employment equity issues.  
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  With respect to investment in local communities, it tasked firms to assess the peculiar 
needs  of  the  communities  within  which  they  operate.  The  identified  needs  must  then  be 
‘integrated’ into the companies’ policies and goals. These contributions could be in the form 
of improving access to portable water. In consultation with local communities’ leaders, they 
may, for example, decide to construct or renovate local schools and health centres. They may 
also contribute to charitable courses that will benefit local communities. For example, they can 
make donations to local Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) that offer essential services, 
like affordable housing. 
  With reference to fair employment practices, King I suggested that the firms should 
work  towards  addressing  historical  racial  imbalances  in  the  workplace.  These  include 
contributing to employee skills developments and upholding labour and employee rights. In 
particular, they must avoid discrimination and harassment across a range of issues, such as 
ethnicity, religion and gender.  
In relation to health and safety, King I recommended that every company must provide 
safe and healthy working environment. For example, training, tools and protective gadgets 
must  be  provided  to  reduce  workplace  accidents  and  fatalities.  In  connection  with  the 
environment, King I suggested that sustainable development requires a constant awareness and 
respect for the conservation of the environment. In this regard, it suggested that companies 
should carry out regular environmental impact assessments to identify and adequately address 
any negative consequences of their operations. More importantly, King I proposed that the 
government can introduce more detailed legislation with regards to labour relations, health and 
safety, the environment, and issues of transformation that will be legally binding on firms. 
Finally, and with reference to ethics, King I urged every firm to prepare a Code of Ethics 
to guide the dealings of directors, management and all employees. Such a Code should be 
based on the principles of accountability, fairness, responsibility and transparency. Under 
subsection 13.2, King I sets four main criteria to be satisfied. Firstly, the Code must commit 
the firm to the highest standards of behaviour. Secondly, it must be developed in such a way 
as to involve all its stakeholders so that it can be infused into its culture. In this respect, it must 
define its obligations towards employees, owners, creditors, suppliers, customers and local 
communities. Thirdly, the Code must receive total commitment from the board and CEO of 
the company. Finally, it must be sufficiently detailed as to give a clear guide to the expected 
behaviour of all employees.  
    
 
65 
v) Compliance and Enforcement 
 
  Similar to Cadbury, King I also supported the principle of self-regulation or voluntary 
compliance (see Table 2; King Report, 1994, para. 9.2). Specifically, it suggested that the 
responsibility for putting the Code into practice laid directly with boards of directors of listed 
firms, but indirectly with auditors and shareholders. That is, King I charged corporate boards 
with the responsibility of ensuring that their firms comply with all applicable laws, regulations, 
rules, and standards. As has been pointed out above, the Code was appended to the JSE’s 
Listings Rules, which required directors of listed firms to make a positive statement on the 
level of compliance. The board of directors must also identify and explain any areas of non-
compliance. External Auditors are expected to offer their fair view on the extent to which the 
provisions of King I have been applied.  
King I also suggested that shareholders, and especially local and foreign institutional 
shareholders,  as  primary  stakeholders,  should  actively  seek  to  positively  influence  their 
companies to comply with the Code. In this regard, companies are encouraged to enter into a 
sustainable  dialogue,  based  on  constructive  engagement  and  the  mutual  understanding  of 
objectives, with institutional investors. They must also seek to enforce their rights as enshrined 
under  the  South  African  Companies  Act,  such  as  attending,  voting  and  asking  pertinent 
questions at annual general meetings. Finally, to strengthen voluntary compliance, the JSE 
revised its Listings Rules in 1995 and 2000 to encourage diffused ownership of listed firms 
(Malherbe  and  Segal,  2003,  p.195;  Armstrong  et  al.,  2006,  p.214).  This  was  intended  to 
strengthen the markets for corporate control and managerial labour. 
 
3.3.2.3 Evaluation: Major Achievements and Weaknesses of King I 
 
It has been widely acknowledged that King I was instrumental in raising the awareness 
of  what  constitutes  good  corporate  governance  in  South  Africa  (e.g.,  King  Report,  2002; 
Malherbe and 2003; Armstrong et al., 2006). In particular, it has been argued that it offered 
companies,  for  the  first  time,  a  coherent  corporate  governance  framework  that  was 
comparatively relevant to the unique South African context (Armstrong et al., 2006, p.214). 
King I was able to differentiate itself from the existing Anglo-American corporate governance 
codes by going beyond traditional financial aspects of corporate governance to covering non-
financial issues, such as ethics and the environment (King Report, 2002, para. 4; West, 2009, 
p.12). However, and as will be discussed in the next subsection, the non-financial issues were 
covered in far less detail or with less clarity (Malherbe and Segal, 2003, p.193). Despite being  
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less detailed in its coverage of non-financial issues, King I still represented an early attempt to 
explicitly adopt the integrated approach and require firms to engage in stakeholder reporting 
among the Anglo-American countries (Mallin, 2007, p.57). In fact, according to Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra (2009, pp.379-380), King I was the sixth code of corporate governance in the 
world (coming after the US, 1978; Hong Kong, 1989; Ireland, 1991; UK, 1992; and Canada, 
1993), and the first of its kind in the developing world. 
More importantly, and as will also be described in the next subsection, its suggestions 
helped  in  bringing  about  substantial  future  corporate  structural  and  affirmative  action 
legislative  reforms  (e.g.,  King  Report,  2002;  Rossouw  et  al.,  2002).  It  helped  to improve 
standards of corporate governance among South African firms. For example, Credit Lyonnais 
Securities Asia (CLSA) conducted a survey of corporate governance standards of 495 firms in 
25 emerging markets in 2000. The survey ranked South Africa as the fifth emerging market 
with good corporate governance structures (King Report, 2002, para.15; CLSA, 2000, p.69). 
As will be discussed further in subsection 3.3.3.3, it also encouraged the JSE to introduce 
more rigorous Listings Rules, especially regarding director remuneration and ownership of 
listed  firms,  including  the  requirement  for  director  interests,  remuneration,  and 
shareownership  to  be  fully  disclosed  in  the  annual  report  (JSE  Listings  Rules,  2007, 
subsections 3.83, 4.25-8, 7.A.23-7, 7.B.18-21).  
Despite these achievements, King I suffered from several weaknesses and deviations 
from Cadbury. Firstly, and unlike Cadbury, while King I recognised the importance of board 
subcommittees, it failed to recommend for the establishment of a nomination committee (see 
Table  2;  Rossouw  et  al.,  2002,  p.297).  Such  a  committee  would  have  nominated  new 
independent directors for appointment to the board, which would have arguably improved 
board  independence.  This  undermined  board  functions  where  true  independence  from 
management was required (Malherbe and Segal, 2003, p.193).  
Secondly, King I was unable to insist on a truly independent non-executive director to 
chair South African corporate boards (see Table 2; Malherbe and Segal, 2003, p.193).  This 
deviation from Cadbury also impaired board independence and increased potential conflicts of 
interests (Malherbe and Segal, 2003, p.192).  Similarly,  King  I did not address the crucial 
issues of risk management and insider trading among directors and officers. 
Thirdly, while  King I called for the  establishment of a remuneration committee, it 
failed  to  establish  the  economic  rationale  or  specific  rules  that  should  guide  firms  in 
determining the level of their directors’ remuneration. In this case, it failed to sway away the  
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concerns of shareholders and the general public about director and executive remuneration 
(Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002, p.306; Sarra, 2004, pp.8-10).  
Fourthly, while King I recognised the need for effective corporate boards, however, it 
was  unable  to  determine  a  coherent  framework  for  objectively  evaluating,  reporting  and 
improving  the  effectiveness  of  corporate boards  and  their  sub-committees.  Similarly, non-
executive directors are valued for their independence in business judgement and protection of 
shareholder interests (Cadbury Report, 1992, para. 4.12). However, and unlike Cadbury, King 
I neither sets out a test for determining independence nor provides a clear classification of 
non-executive directors. 
Fifthly, King I purported to promote the so-called ‘integrated’ approach to corporate 
governance. However, it could not clearly articulate in philosophical and theoretical terms the 
type of corporate governance model that the ‘integrated’ approach is (e.g., Kakabadse and 
Korac-Kakabadse, 2002; Spisto, 2005). Like Cadbury, King I placed continuous emphasis on 
the  need  for  companies  and  directors  to  be  primarily  accountable  and  responsible  to 
shareholders. Distinct from Cadbury, it also formally encouraged them to be sensitive to the 
interests of wider stakeholder groups, such as employees and local communities. This suggests 
that  King  I  attempted  to  advance  the  ‘instrumental  or  inclusive’  stakeholding  corporate 
governance model as has been described in chapter two.  
The consequence of King I’s inability to clearly articulate that it was promoting the 
‘inclusive’  corporate  governance  model  is  that  it  was  unable  to  directly  relate  its 
recommendations to the South African context as it sought to do. For example, it could not 
firmly  relate  its  recommendations  to  the  major  contextual  issues  of  HIV/AIDS,  black 
economic empowerment, and employment equity (see Table 2; Rossouw et al., 2002). Finally, 
King I was criticised for having extensive non-corporate governance content, and sometimes 
vague stipulations on employee participation, stakeholder engagement, and a code of ethics 
(Malherbe  and  Segal,  2003,  p.193).  According  to  Malherbe  and  Segal  (2003,  p.193),  the 
extensive  non-corporate  governance  content  of  King  I  might  have  resulted  in  the  slow 
adoption of its provisions among listed firms. 
As a result of these limitations and other international and local developments, the 
2002 King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (King II) was introduced as an 
improvement on King I. In the next subsections, the origins and internal corporate governance 
provisions, especially with respect to improvements on King I will be described.   
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3.3.3 The 2002 King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa (‘King II’) 
 
3.3.3.1 Origins/Background 
 
Similar to King I, both domestic and international developments since its release in 
November 1994 prompted the revision of corporate governance in South Africa. The revision 
resulted in the publication of a second King Report (‘King II’) on Corporate Governance for 
South Africa in March 2002. 
 
i) Domestic Developments 
 
Domestically, since 1994, South Africa had experienced a second peaceful election 
and inaugurated its second president with official parliamentary opposition. This showed that 
South Africa had truly embraced a vibrant multiracial and multiparty political democracy (e.g., 
Rossouw et al., 2002; Malherbe and Segal, 2003). Contrary to genuine pre-transition anxieties 
of  corporate  South  Africa  about  the  future  status  of  the  market  economy,  a  free  market 
economic model had been firmly endorsed by the new government through its neo-liberal 
economic policy of encouraging growth, employment, and redistribution (the GEAR strategy) 
(e.g.,  Malherbe  and  Segal,  2003;  Armstrong  et  al.,  2006).  As  the  promotion  of  a  market 
economy  took  centre  stage,  a  new  breed  of  local  shareholders  emerged.  Weaknesses  in 
corporate governance, including visible omissions in King I, were identified and criticised 
(Malherbe and Segal, 2003, p.162).   
Also, a number of affirmative action and stakeholder laws had been introduced. These 
included the Occupational Health and Safety Act 1993, Labour Relations Act 1995, Basic 
Conditions  of  Employment  Act  1997,  National  Environmental  Management  Act  1998, 
Employment Equity Act 1998, and later the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 
2003 (King Report, 2002, para. 10). These had been proposed by King I and were aimed at 
addressing some of the negative social and economic legacies of Apartheid in South Africa.  
As  has  has  been  explained  above,  the  Insider  Trading  Act  of  1998  had  also  been 
introduced to offer a more rigorous regulation of directors’ and officers’ share dealings. These 
legislative changes needed to be incorporated into the governance of mainstream corporations. 
In addition to legislative developments, South Africa had experienced a number of high profile 
domestic corporate failures. These included Macmed, Leisurenet and Regal Treasury Bank 
(e.g., Sarra, 2004; Armstrong et al., 2006). These corporate failures were mainly attributed to 
poor corporate governance practices of directors and senior management.   
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ii) International Developments 
 
Internationally, investors had lost billions of dollars during the 1997 and 1998 Asian 
economic crisis. The crisis demonstrated that macro-economic difficulties could be worsened 
by  systematic  failure  of  corporate  governance  resulting  from  ineffective  oversight  by 
corporate boards and scant recognition of the rights of minority shareowners (King Report, 
2002, para. 22). Similarly, with South Africa’s increasing participation in the global economy, 
international  investors’  returned.  Upon  their  return,  investors  and  especially  foreign 
institutional investors heavily criticised poor corporate governance structures (Malherbe and 
Segal, 2003, p.162). Similarly, in a survey conducted by the Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia, 
South Africa did well in overall corporate governance, but rated poorly in terms of disclosure 
and transparency (King Report, 2002, para.15; CLSA, 2000, p.69). 
Also, during the intervening years, a number of key international corporate governance 
codes had been released. In the UK, the Combined Code was published in 1998. It addressed 
board issues, remuneration, the role of shareholders and financial reporting, but did not cover 
stakeholder issues, such as worker participation and employment equity. The Commonwealth 
Association  for  Corporate  Governance  (CACG)  published  its  Principles  of  Corporate 
Governance in the Commonwealth aimed at facilitating best business practices and behaviour 
(CACG,  1999).  In  the  same  year,  the  Organization  for  Economic  Co-operation  and 
Development (OECD) published its Principles of Corporate Governance.  
Finally, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) also launched an exposure draft of its 
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines in 1999 and the first full version in 2000. The GRI is an 
international reporting guideline that seeks to move corporate reporting from a conventional 
‘single-bottom line’ to a ‘triple bottom line’ reporting (King Report, 2002, p.275). It required 
economic (financial), social and environmental (non-financial) reporting to multi-stakeholders, 
including  shareholders,  employees,  customers,  suppliers,  creditors,  government  and  local 
communities, amongst others.  
 
iii) The King II Committee and Mandate    
 
In  response  to  these  developments,  and  again  under  the  auspices  of  the  Southern 
African Institute of Directors, a second King Committee on Corporate Governance (King II) 
was formed in August 2000. It was also supported by the JSE, the Development Bank of 
Southern Africa and the major  accounting firms, amongst others.  The  Committee’s main  
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mandate was to review corporate governance standards and practices in the light of domestic 
and international developments since 1994 for South Africa. 
Five major specialist task teams, comprising of individuals representing a cross-section 
of South African business and society were established to deal with (1) boards and directors, 
(2) accounting and auditing, (3) internal audit, control and risk management, (4) integrated 
sustainability reporting, and (5) compliance and enforcement (King Report, 2002, para. 30). A 
draft copy was first issued in July 2001 for public debate and consultation. A final copy was 
issued in March 2002. 
 
iv) The General Scope of King II  
 
King  II  is  a  354  page  comprehensive  document  divided  into  six  broad  sections, 
including  board  and  directors,  risk  management,  internal  audit,  integrated  sustainability 
reporting, accounting and auditing, and compliance and enforcement. It builds on and expands 
King  I’s  fundamental  corporate  governance  principles  of  accountability,  fairness, 
responsibility and transparency to include discipline, independence and social responsibility 
(King Report, 2002, para.18).  
It replaces King I’s ‘integrated’ corporate governance approach with an ‘inclusive or 
instrumental’ corporate governance approach throughout the report (King Report, 2002, para. 
5). As has been discussed in chapter two, the inclusive approach to corporate  governance 
attempts to recognise the interests of a wider range of stakeholders without subverting the 
primary interests of shareholders as the residual owners of the firm. In this respect, King II 
tasks company boards to consider not only the regulatory aspects, but also investors, media, 
customers,  suppliers,  consumers,  employees  and  local communities,  amongst others  (King 
Report, 2002, para. 5.2).  
Unlike King I, King II offers a clear guideline as to how the ‘inclusive’ corporate 
governance can be implemented in practice (King Report, 2002, para. 6). Firstly, the purpose 
of the company must be defined. Secondly, the values by which the company will carry out its 
daily  activities  should  be  identified  and  communicated  to  all  stakeholders.  Finally,  the 
stakeholders relevant to the company’s business should also be identified. As a practical guide, 
it appends with permission, the Global Reporting Initiatives (GRI) as a yardstick by which 
companies may measure the extent to which the ‘inclusive’ approach has been applied in their 
operations.   
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Another expansion on King I is that King II encourages South African firms to ensure 
that their governance structures reflect the value system of African societies and personality 
(King  Report,  2002,  para.  38).  As  will  be  noted  further  below,  these  include  spiritual 
collectiveness  over  individualism,  consensus  building  rather  than  dissension,  humility  and 
helpfulness over criticism and the spirit of “ubuntu” (humanity, peaceful co-existence and 
brotherliness),  amongst  others.  King  II  points  out  that  this  is  an  attempt  to  recognise  the 
diversity that exists in South Africa in relation to culture, religion and ethnicity. Companies 
and boards operating in South Africa need to take into account when defining their internal 
and external corporate ethos and conduct.  
 
3.3.3.2 Corporate Governance Structures Imposed on Companies by King II 
 
  This subsection describes the internal corporate governance structures imposed by the 
2002 King Report (King II). Specifically, the structures are divided into six main parts. They 
include  board  and  directors,  risk  management,  internal  audit  and  control,  accounting  and 
auditing,  integrated  sustainability  reporting,  and  compliance  and  enforcement.  Also,  only 
improvements on  King  I  will  be  described.  The challenges  facing  King  II  will  be finally 
discussed in subsection 3.3.3.3.   
 
i) Board and Directors 
 
King II proposes several changes with regards to board composition. Firstly, instead of 
two non-executive directors, King II recommends that the board should preferably consist of a 
majority of non-executive directors. A majority of the non-executive directors should also be 
independent of management so that shareholders interests (including minority interests) can be 
better protected (see Table 2; King Report 2002, para. 2.2). The board must be of sufficient 
size  and  diversity  in  terms  of  skills  (profession,  occupation,  and  experience),  as  well  as 
demographics  (age,  race,  ethnicity,  and  gender)  to  improve  its  effectiveness.  Secondly,  to 
ensure balance of power and authority in company decision-making, the chairman of the board 
should be an independent non-executive director (see Table 2; King Report, 2002, para. 2.3).  
Thirdly, a nomination committee, in addition to remuneration and audit committees, 
must be formed. A related departure from King I is that all three sub-board committees must 
be chaired by independent non-executive directors. Unlike King I, King II recommends that 
the remuneration committee must consist entirely of independent non-executive directors. The 
nomination committee must also consist of a majority of independent non-executive directors.  
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Similar to King I, the board must meet regularly, at least once a quarter. Also, individual 
director’s membership and attendance of all board and subcommittees meetings must be fully 
disclosed in the annual report (King Report, 2002, para. 2.1 and 2.2).  
Fourthly, the chairman, the chief executive officer, the subcommittee chairpersons, as 
well as the individual directors’ performance must be independently assessed on an annual 
basis. Unlike King I, King II offers a clear classification of directors into executive, non-
executive  and  independent  non-executive  directors  with  a  strict  definition
6  of  director 
independence (King Report, 2002, para. 2.4).  
  Fifthly, the remuneration, interests and share options of every director, as well as the 
formal rationale and philosophical basis for director and executive remuneration must be fully 
disclosed.  The general principle is that remuneration levels should be sufficient to attract, 
retain and motivate directors and executives of the quality required by the board. Specifically, 
firms  are  encouraged  to  ensure  that  the  performance-related  elements  of  directors’ 
remuneration constitute a substantial part of their remuneration package. This will help in 
aligning their interests with shareholders.  
Any award of share options to directors, however, must be subject to the approval of 
shareholders  at  an  annual  general  meeting.  Finally,  King  II recommends  that every listed 
company should have a practice of prohibiting dealings in its securities by directors, officers 
and  other  selected  employees.  This  should  be  for  a  designated  period  preceding  the 
announcement of its financial results or any other price sensitive information (see Table 2; 
King Report, 2002, para. 2.9). 
 
ii) Risk Management, Internal Audit and Control 
 
The introduction of risk management represents the main improvement of King II over 
King I under this section. King II offers clear-cut guidelines which place the responsibility for 
the total process of risk management under the remit of the board of directors (see Table 2; 
King Report,  2002,  para.  3.1). The  guidelines  also charge  the  board to  develop  their  risk 
                                                 
6Briefly, an executive director is an individual who is involved in the day-to-day management and/or is in full-
time salaried  employment  of  the  company  or  its subsidiaries.  A  non-executive  director  is  an  individual  not 
involved in the day-to-day management and not full-time salaried employee of the company or its subsidiaries. 
Independent director is a non-executive director who: (1) is not a representative of a shareholder; (2) has not been 
employed in any executive capacity for the preceding three financial years; (3) is not a member of the immediate 
family of an individual who is, or has not been employed by the company in an executive position in the past 
three financial years; (4) is not a professional advisor to the company; (5) is not a significant supplier to or 
customer of the company; (6) has no significant contractual relationship with the company, as well as (7) is free 
from any business or other relationship which could be seen to materially interfere with the individual’s capacity 
to act in an independent manner (King Report, 2002, para. 2.4).  
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strategies  and  policies  in  conjunction  with  executive  directors  and  senior  management.  In 
contrast,  management  is  responsible  for  implementing  and  monitoring  the  process  of  risk 
management and integrating it into the day-to-day activities of the company.  
The board must set out the company’s risk tolerance level, and assesses its current and 
future risks profile on the basis of various categories. These include physical, technology, 
credit, market, operational, human, resources, regulatory and legal risks. A major departure 
from King I is that a risk management committee consisting of executive and non-executive 
directors, and chaired by a non-executive director should be appointed. The committee should 
help the board in reviewing the risk management process and the significant risks facing the 
company. Further, in addition to the company’s other compliance and enforcement activities, 
the board should establish a confidential reporting process (whistle-blowing) covering fraud 
and other risks. Finally, it requires firms to provide a comprehensive disclosure regarding the 
assessment of current and future risks in their annual reports.  
 
iii) Accounting and Auditing 
 
With regard to accounting and auditing, King II recommended three main improvements 
in King I. Firstly, it raised or elevated the profile and the powers of the audit committee 
chairman.  The  chairman  of  the  audit  committee  should  be  an  independent  non-executive 
director. The independent chairman of the audit committee must also not be the chairman of 
the main board. The audit committee must consist of a majority of independent non-executive 
directors.  The  majority  of  the  members  of  the audit  committee should  also  be  financially 
literate.  Like  the  chairpersons  of  the  nomination  and  remuneration  committees,  the  audit 
committee chairman must attend the company’s annual general meeting to answer questions 
from shareholders (King Report, 2002, para. 2.7).  
Secondly, it calls for companies to disclose any non-audit or consulting services rendered 
by its external audit firm, so that it can be examined for any potential conflict of interests 
(King  Report,  2002,  para.  6.1).  Finally,  and  with  regards  to  financial  reporting,  King  II 
suggests that South African firms should prepare towards adopting the International Financial 
Reporting  Standards  (IFRS)  as  may  be  recommended  by  the  JSE’s  Listings  Rules.  South 
Africa and the JSE formally adopted the IFRS framework in 2005 (Armstrong et al., 2006, 
p.219). However, listed firms have up to the end of 2007 financial year to fully adopt the IFRS 
framework (JSE Listings Rules, 2007, subsections 8.3, 8.62, 8.7, 8.10). 
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iv) Integrated Sustainability Reporting 
 
Similar to King I, the requirement for firms to report on an integrated sustainability 
basis  has  been  acknowledged  as  what  truly  distinguishes  King  II  from  similar  Anglo-
American  corporate  governance  codes  (e.g.,  Armstrong,  2006;  Vaughn  and  Ryan,  2006; 
Andreasson, 2009; West, 2006, 2009)
7.  King II suggests several important improvements on 
King I in terms integrated sustainability reporting (see Table 2; King Report, 2002, para. 5).  
Firstly, in addition to health and safety, the environment and ethics, King II recommends that 
every firm must report on the nature and extent of progress made on employment equity, 
HIV/AIDS,  social  investment  and  transformation  (black  economic  empowerment)  (King 
Report, 2002, para. 5).  
Secondly, and unlike King I which did not specify any time-frame for reporting, King 
II suggests that reporting must be done at least once a year. In this respect, King II sets three 
levels of reporting in the annual report by directors. First, directors must disclose the policies 
and practices they have in place. Second, they must disclose how they are implementing the 
disclosed policies and practices. Finally, the disclosure must demonstrate the resultant changes 
and benefits to their stakeholders.  
Thirdly, apart from setting out the general framework for reporting on each stakeholder 
issue, King II requires companies to refer to the relevant stakeholder and affirmative action 
legislation for detailed guidelines. With respect to employment equity, King II mandates every 
firm to invest in human capital. This must be targeted at achieving equity and diversity in 
terms of staff numbers, training, age, ethnicity and gender (King Report, 2002, para. 5.1.4). In 
particular, every company should address issues that create conditions and opportunities for 
previously  disadvantaged  individuals  (especially  women)  an  equal  opportunity  to  reach 
executive levels in the company.  
In this case,  every  firm  is  required  to  comply  with provisions  of  the  Employment 
Equity Act 1998. Generally, the Act aims to identify and eliminate all employment barriers, 
including  unfair  discrimination,  which  adversely  affect  people  from  designated  groups
8. 
Specifically,  the  Act  prohibits  direct  or  indirect  unfair  discrimination  on  any  grounds, 
                                                 
7Despite  the  evidence  that  reporting  on  corporate  social  responsibilities  in  Anglo-American  countries  has 
experienced a substantial increase over the past decade (West, 2009, p.15), the London Stock Exchange, for 
example, has strongly opposed requiring UK listed firms to formally report on corporate social responsibility 
(LSE, 2007, pp.98-99). The LSE has argued that making corporate social responsibility reporting mandatory will 
be an excessive cost burden for listed firms. 
8The Act defines designated groups as black people, women and people with disabilities. ‘Black people’ is a 
generic term which means Africans, Coloureds and Indians. A designated employer is a person or an organisation 
that employs 50 or more employees (see section 1, Employment Equity Act, 1998).  
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including race, sex, HIV status, religion, disability, pregnancy and language, amongst many 
others.  
The Act also allows firms to distinguish, exclude or prefer any person on the basis of 
an inherent requirement of a job. For example, under section 15, every designated employer 
must work towards achieving a balance between their non-white and white workforce across 
all levels of the organisational hierarchy. Crucially, the Act requires designated employers to 
submit progress reports annually to the Department of Labour. A firm can be subjected to 
criminal prosecution if it breaches the Act. 
In connection with transformation, the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment 
Act 2003 proposes seven ways by which economic transformation can be achieved. These 
include  equity  ownership,  management  control,  employment  equity,  skills  development, 
preferential  procurement,  enterprise  development  and  social  investment.  Firstly,  the  Act 
requires firms to encourage blacks or designated blacks to directly or indirectly acquire equity 
ownership. A general target for firms is that 25% of their equity should be held by designated 
black groups. However, targets differ on industrial basis. Currently, mining, media, forestry 
and  construction  have  developed  their  own  empowerment  charters  and  scorecards  (JSE 
Listings Rules, 2007, subsection 8.63, 12). Secondly, to address the low participation of blacks 
in executive management, the Act encourages firms to appoint qualified blacks into positions 
of influence.  
Thirdly,  the  Act  empowers  firms  to  engage  in  preferential  procurement  of  raw 
materials and inputs from black enterprises
9. They are allowed to acquire raw material from 
black enterprises even at higher costs than they may be acquired from white run enterprises. 
Finally, the Act encourages companies to directly invest in black enterprises and communities. 
They should also invest in skills development of their black employees by creating special 
training and mentoring opportunities. Similarly, every firm is required to submit an annual 
progress report to the Department of Trade and Industry. Unlike the Employment Equity Act, 
a firm  cannot be prosecuted if it breaches the  Act. This  makes the provisions of the Act 
aspirational or voluntary rather than mandatory for companies to comply with.  
With  regard  to  HIV/AIDS,  there  is  no  formal  legislation.  However,  King  II 
recommends that every firm should adopt plans and policies to explicitly address the potential 
impact of HIV/AIDS on its activities (King Report, 2002, para. 5.1.4). This may take the form 
                                                 
9The Act defines black enterprise as an enterprise that is at least 50.1% beneficially owned by Black People and 
which Black People have substantial management control. Such beneficial ownership may be held directly or 
indirectly through other black enterprises (see section 1, Black Economic Empowerment Act, 2003).   
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of encouraging voluntary staff testing to ascertain the prevalence rate among their workforce. 
It can also take the form of on-site health clinics to offer medical and psychological support, 
as well as educational campaigns to improve awareness. 
With  respect  to  the  environment  and  health  and  safety,  King  I  mandates  firms  to 
comply  with  provisions  of  the  National  Environmental  Management  Act  1998  and 
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1993, respectively. The Occupational Health and Safety 
Act requires firms to reduce workplace accidents and fatalities. They must set safety targets 
and  work  consistently  towards  reducing  health  and  safety  incidents.  The  National 
Environmental Management Act 1998 sets out good environmental standards and practices 
that firms are encouraged to comply with. In particular, the Act requires firms to conduct 
environmental impact assessment where potential negative consequences can be identified and 
addressed. Finally, and with regards to organisational ethics, King II did not make any visible 
changes over King I.  
Unlike King I, and as has been pointed out above, King II urges companies to report 
along the lines of the Global Reporting Initiative’s (GRI) triple-bottom reporting as a practical 
guide as to how the ‘inclusive’ stakeholder corporate governance can be implemented. 
 
v) Compliance and Enforcement 
 
Consistent with King I, King II also shares the Cadbury Report’s principle-based and 
qualitative approach to achieving compliance and enforcement of its corporate governance 
provisions (King Report, 2002, para. 2.2).  
In this regard, King II expands the compliance and enforcement stakeholders from the 
board of directors, auditors and shareholders to include the financial media, peer pressure and 
the existing legal system (King Report, 2002, para. 6). It calls on the investigative media, and 
in particular the financial press, to actively encourage compliance through constant monitoring 
of corporate conduct. This can be done through the revelation of corporate fraud, corruption 
and cronyism. They can also help in “naming and shaming” consistent violators of the Code. 
Companies are expected to contribute to the development of financial journalism, such as 
supporting training workshops and conferences for financial journalists. The Standard Bank of 
South Africa  Ltd,  for  example,  has  been  lauded by  King  II  for  running courses  aimed at 
educating journalists in financial matters.  
Peer pressure can also  be exerted from organised business in conjunction with the 
financial  press  against  delinquent  directors  and  managers  as  way  a  of  promoting  high  
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corporate governance standards. In fact, King II is meant to supplement rather than substitute 
the existing legal framework. In this regard, King II expects the existing legal and regulatory 
system to encourage compliance with the code. It calls on the conventional courts to enforce 
existing remedies for breaches of statutory laws, such as the Companies Act by delinquent 
directors and officers. Consistent with King I, King II was appended as part of the JSE’s 
Listings Rules for which all listed firms are expected to voluntarily comply or explain, in case 
of non-compliance (JSE Listings Rules, 2007, subsections, 3.84, 7.F.5-6; 8.63).  
 
3.3.3.3 Evaluation: Challenges of King II and the Shareholder Value Debate 
 
Despite gaining global recognition and receiving several endorsements from leading 
academics and policy-makers as an example of good corporate governance model in the world 
(e.g., Malherbe and Segal, 2003; Armstrong et al., 2006; Mallin, 2007; Andreasson, 2009), 
King II has been criticised. Most prominently, critics of King II argue that its insistence on 
South African companies to adopt the Anglo-American model, but equally tasking boards with 
meeting  demanding  stakeholder  requirements,  raises  serious  challenges  (Kakabadse  and 
Korac-Kakabadse, 2002, p.312; Spisto, 2005; West, 2006, 2009). At the centre of this local 
policy debate is whether this so-called hybrid
10 corporate governance model is sufficiently 
robust  to  effectively  pursue  the  contrasting  agenda  of  maximising  shareholder  value  and 
providing a meaningful protection of the interests of a larger stakeholder group (Kakabadse 
and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002, p.313; Spisto, 2005; Andreasson, 2009).  
For example, it has been suggested that the stakeholders’ requirements that King II 
imposes on firms, such as the promotion of black empowerment and employment equity can 
be  more  easily  accommodated  by  a  continental  European-Asian  model  of  corporate 
governance (Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002, p.312). As has been discussed in chapter 
two,  in  a  typical  continental  Europian-Asian  corporate  governance  model,  business  and 
organisational  issues  are  the  remit  of  the  executive  board,  while  the  broader  stakeholder 
interests  fall  under  the  umbrella  of  the  supervisory  board.  Spisto  (2005)  has  also  offered 
similar criticisms of King II. These criticisms may, however, be legitimate. This is because 
with  increasing  voluntary  corporate  social  responsibilities  reporting  in  Anglo-American 
                                                 
10It  is  described  as  a  ‘hybrid’  corporate  governance  model  because  while  it  remains  predominantly  Anglo-
American, King II imposes substantial social, environmental, and ethical demands, compelling firms to depict 
some of the features of both the ‘stakeholding’ and ‘shareholding’ corporate governance models (e.g., Kakabadse 
and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002; Spisto, 2005; Andreasson, 2009; West, 2006, 2009).  
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countries, South Africa is likely to loose its uniqueness unless it adopts stakeholder corporate 
board structures (West, 2009, p.15). 
There are also serious concerns as to whether corporate and ownership structures are 
diffused  enough  to  permit  effective  and  efficient  operation  of  factor  markets  in  order  to 
achieve  voluntary  compliance  or  self-regulation.  Okeahalam  (2004,  p.7)  points  out,  for 
example, that as a result of rigorous listings requirements
11, ownership is now more dispersed. 
However, control of companies still remains fairly concentrated in the hands of the traditional 
founding  families  of  Oppenheimer,  Rupert  Gordon,  and  Mennel  and  Hersov  of  large 
companies. 
  In addition to challenges regarding its effectiveness given the South African corporate 
context, King II has also received further criticisms. It has been criticised for inconsistencies 
and ambiguities in some aspects of its corporate governance proposals (e.g., Sarra, 2004; West, 
2006). Given its core objective of promoting the highest international corporate governance 
standards in South Africa (King Report, 2002, p.5), it is still unclear why King II calls for the 
exposition of African values and personality
12, most of which are neither compatible with 
international  corporate  governance  standards  nor  with  the  Anglo-American  model  (King 
Report, 2002, para. 18; Sarra, 2004; West, 2006). West (2006, p.441) argues, for example, that 
the African value of collectiveness and communal rights conflicts with the individual right to 
private property that is fundamental in a typical Anglo-American model. Similarly, the value 
of  consensus  building  in  decision-making  also  conflicts  with  corporate  structures  where 
directors are  appointed  by only one party (shareholders) and whose interests are typically 
elevated above those of other stakeholders (West, 2006, p.441).  
Recent empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that concerns raised by critics of 
King II, especially regarding its effectiveness in achieving some of the stakeholder objectives 
it  sets  out,  may  be  right.  In  the  case  of  black  economic  empowerment,  for  example,  an 
emerging consensus is that it is not working as originally expected (e.g., Murray, 2000; Sarra, 
2004; Russell, 2007). Anecdotal evidence (e.g., Sarra, 2004; Russel, 2007) suggests that while 
                                                 
11As has been noted above, more rigorous listings requirements (there has been revisions in 1995, 2000, 2003, 
2005, and 2007) and corporate governance rules have caused a marked shrinkage in the number of companies 
listed on the JSE, falling from 668 companies in 1998, for example, to 426 in January 2004 (Armstrong et al., 
2006, p.221).  
12As  has  been  explained  above,  these  African  values  include:  spiritual  collectiveness  over  individualism; 
consensus  building  rather  than  dissension;  humility  and  helpfulness  over  criticisms;  the  spirit  of  ‘ubuntu’ 
(humanity, peaceful co-existence, and brotherliness); hierarchical political structure based on an inclusive system 
of consultation and respect for authority at various levels; and perpetual optimism due to the strong belief in a 
superior being in the form of the creator of mankind, and inherent trust and belief in fairness over discrimination 
and prejudice; amongst others (King Report, 2002, para. 38.1).  
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black empowerment has helped in creating a coterie of “rich black elite” usually with good 
connections to the ruling African National Congress, it has not addressed in any meaningful 
way the welfare of the vast majority of black people in South Africa. Similarly, in a study of 
three large black economic empowerment companies and five top South African companies, 
Murray (2000) reports that top business remains predominantly white, with few signs of black 
integration into top management or ownerships.  
Overall, the major challenge or weakness of King II is its proposition of a corporate 
governance model, in which companies need to satisfy shareholders’ demands by their ability 
to harness market forces, while by social and political dictates, require them to satisfy the 
interests of a wider stakeholder group (Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002, p.312; Spisto, 
2005; West, 2006). While critics have called for a fundamental change, King II insists good 
corporate  governance  embraces  both  performance  and  conformance.  It  suggests  that  the 
challenge for South African companies is to seek the appropriate balance between the results 
of good entrepreneurship and enterprise (performance – corporate profitability) and constraints 
on corporate activity (conformance – corporate governance rules), which takes into account 
the expectations of shareholders and legitimate stakeholders alike (King Report, 2002, para. 
7.2).  
However,  notwithstanding  the  South  African  context  and  given  that  King  II  is 
predominantly  Anglo-American  with  emphasis  on  shareholder  primacy,  the  a  priori 
theoretical expectation will be that ‘better-governed’ firms should be associated with higher 
financial value than their ‘poorly-governed’ counterparts (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Black et al., 2006a). This is the central thesis underlying this study. It seeks to empirically 
ascertain  whether  South  African  listed  firms  that  comply  better  with  King  II  tend  to  be 
associated with higher financial performance than those that do not. 
 
 
3.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
  This  chapter  has  focused  on  corporate  governance  in  South  Africa.  The  central 
objective has been to provide a comprehensive description of the South African corporate 
governance framework. Following existing literature, it classified the South African corporate 
governance landscape into two: external and internal. The external corporate governance is 
made up of major financial regulatory and enforcement bodies which are generally charged 
with the formulation, implementation and enforcement of statutory and voluntary corporate  
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laws.  These  include  the  Ministry  of  Finance,  the  Department  of  Trade  and  Industry,  the 
Registrar of Companies, the Financial Services Board, the JSE Ltd, and the South African 
Reserve Bank.  
By  contrast,  the  internal  corporate  governance  environment  consists  of  statutory 
corporate laws and voluntary corporate Codes of conduct that govern firms from within. These 
include  the  South  African  Companies Act  1973,  the  Insider  Trading  Act  1998,  the  JSE’s 
Listings Rules 2007 and the 1994 and 2002 King Reports on Corporate Governance for South 
Africa.  For  each  of  these  internal  corporate  governance  legislation  or  Code,  and  where 
applicable, its origins, provisions, strengths, challenges and weaknesses were comprehensively 
discussed. 
  The overall picture that emerged is that corporate governance is fluidly developing 
within the South African context. In this regard, the King Reports have played a significant 
role in formally institutionalising corporate governance in South Africa. They have helped in 
raising the awareness of what constitutes good corporate practice both among listed and non-
listed firms. More importantly, they have helped in promoting a unique corporate governance 
model,  which  takes  into  account  the  interests  of  a  wider  stakeholder  group,  but  equally 
recognises that it is important for firms to be economically profitable.  
However, it also raises serious problems. This is because, while South Africa appears 
to  have  a  well-established  financial  regulatory  structure,  it  faces  significant  operational, 
enforcement  and  financial  challenges.  Crucially,  the  South  African  corporate  governance 
model is predominantly Anglo-American. Critics suggest, however, that super-imposing social 
and environmental demands onto a corporate governance model that is predominantly Anglo-
American, raises substantial room for conflicts.  
It is suggested, however, that ignoring the South African context and given that King II 
is  predominantly  Anglo-American  with  emphasis  on  shareholder  primacy,  the  a  priori 
theoretical expectation will be that ‘better-governed’ firms tend to be associated with higher 
financial value than their ‘poorly-governed’ counterparts. This is the central thesis underlying 
this study. It seeks to empirically ascertain whether South African listed firms that comply 
better with King II tend to be associated with higher financial performance than those that do 
not. 
Therefore, in the next chapter, the theoretical and empirical literature that attempts to 
link  internal  corporate  governance  structures  with  firm  financial  performance  will  be 
discussed.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
4. INTRODUCTION 
This  chapter  discusses  the  extant  theoretical  and  empirical  literature  on  internal 
corporate governance. Specifically, it seeks to achieve two main overarching goals. Firstly, it 
attempts  to  offer  a  review  of  the  existing  theoretical  literature  that  tries  to  link  internal 
corporate governance structures to firm financial performance. The central aim is to describe 
the theoretical blocks on which the study is based. The second objective of this chapter is to 
carry out a comprehensive review of the empirical literature on internal corporate governance 
structures and firm financial performance. Specifically, it traces the extant internal corporate 
governance-financial  performance  relationship  literature  to  develop  hypotheses  among  the 
variables examined in this study. The rest of this chapter is divided into three sections. Section 
4.1  reviews  the  theoretical  literature  on  internal  corporate  governance  structures  and  firm 
financial  performance.  Section  4.2  looks  at  the  empirical  literature  on  internal  corporate 
governance  structures  and  firm  financial  performance,  while  section  4.3  summarises  the 
chapter. 
 
 
4.1 A REVIEW OF THE THEORTICAL LITERATURE ON INTERNAL  
  CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
  This  section  discusses  the  relevant  extant  theories  that  attempt  to  link  internal 
corporate governance structures and firm financial performance. As has been explained in 
chapter two, theories underlying corporate governance have been drawn from a variety of 
disciplines, such as accounting, economics, finance, and law, amongst others (e.g., Rwegasira 
2000; Mallin, 2007; Solomon, 2007; Durisin and Puzone, 2009). As a result, past studies have 
adopted  several  theoretical  perspectives.  Common  among  them  include  agency,  resource 
dependence,  managerial  signalling,  legitimacy,  organisational,  political  costs,  stakeholder, 
stewardship and transaction cost economies theories. Clarke (2004) offers a detailed overview 
of most of these corporate governance theories. 
  In this study, and as in many others that will be reviewed in section 4.2, corporate 
governance  is  approached  from  a  finance  perspective,  using  a  quantitative  research  
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methodology. Central to corporate governance reforms pursued in South Africa and discussed 
in  chapter  three  is  an  attempt  to  improve  the  agency  relationship  between  managers  and 
owners of firms (King Reports, 1994, 2002; Armstrong et al., 2006). In fact, much of the prior 
research on corporate governance has been carried out based on agency theory (Filatotchev 
and Boyd, 2009, pp.258, 260). Agency theory is, therefore, adopted as the principal underlying 
theory. However, given the complex nature of corporate governance, and in line with both 
prior studies (e.g., Nicholson and Kiel, 2003; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), as well as recent 
calls for the adoption of multiple-theoretical approach to corporate governance research (van 
Ees et al., 2009, pp.307-310; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009, p.259), where applicable, agency 
theory  is  complemented  with  information  asymmetry  and  managerial  signalling, 
organisational, political costs, stewardship, and resource dependence theories. This gives the 
study a multiple-theoretical orientation. 
  In  the  next  subsection,  agency  theory  will  be  discussed  in  detail.  Specifically,  the 
general  principal-agent  construct  will  be  first  presented  in  subsection  4.1.1.1.  Subsection 
4.1.1.2 will describe its direct application to the shareholder-manager relationship in modern 
corporations.  Finally,  the  supporting  theories  of  information  asymmetry  and  managerial 
signalling, stewardship, and resource dependence will be briefly described in subsection 4.1.2. 
 
4.1.1 Agency Theory 
4.1.1.1 The General Principal-Agent Construct 
An  agency  relationship  is  defined  as  “one  in  which  one  or  more  persons  (the 
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, 
p.308). This relationship is shown to be bedeviled with two major interdependent problems: (1) 
information  asymmetry  between  the  principal  and  the  agent,  which  will  be  dealt  with  in 
subsection 4.1.2.1; and (2) the possibility of conflicts or divergence of interests between the 
principal and the agent (Hill and Jones, 1992, p.132). 
 The latter agency problem arises out of three major assumptions. Firstly, it is assumed 
that the principal and the agent may have different attitudes toward risk-bearing (Eisenhardt, 
1989, p.58). Secondly, the principal and the agent may intrinsically have different goals and 
interests (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.58). Finally, both parties to the relationship are assumed to be 
utility maximisers (opportunistic) to the extent that even if their goals or risk preferences were 
not to inherently differ, ceteris paribus, there would be a compelling reason to believe that a  
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rational agent would not always act in the best interests of the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976, p.308).  
Agency  theory  is  generally  concerned  with  aligning  the  conflicting  interests  of 
principals and agents (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980). Specifically, it suggests 
that  the  principal  can  limit  divergences  from  his/her  interests  by  establishing  appropriate 
incentives or control mechanisms to limit the incidence of opportunistic action by the agent 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p.308). Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that establishing 
these control mechanisms unavoidably generates three major costs. Firstly, the principal can 
expend resources to design a  monitoring system (monitoring costs) aimed at reducing the 
aberrant activities of the agent. This may include efforts on the part of the principal to control 
the  behaviour  of  the  agent  through  contractual  agreements  regarding  budget  restrictions, 
compensation policies, and operating rules, amongst others.  
Secondly, the principal may require the agent to spend resources (bonding costs) to 
guarantee that he/she will not take certain actions that would harm the principal. That is, the 
agent may ex-ante incur bonding costs in order to win the right to manage the resources of the 
principal (Hill and Jones, 1992, p.132). Finally, despite instituting monitoring and bonding 
mechanisms (governance structures), there will still be some divergence between the agent’s 
decisions and those decisions which will maximise the welfare of the principal, defined as 
residual loss. In short, the sum of the principal’s monitoring expenditures, the agent’s bonding 
expenditures, and any remaining residual loss is known as agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976, p.308). 
The next subsection will examine how this general principal-agent construct directly 
applies to the shareholder-manager relationship within modern corporations. 
   
4.1.1.2 The Shareholder-Manager Relationship in Modern Corporations 
The  recognition  of  the  shareowner-managerial  conflicts  arising  from  the  internal 
organisation  of  modern  corporations  in  which  ownership  and  control  is  separate,  by 
economists, dates as far back as the eighteen century (see Smith, 1776). Smith (1776, p.700) 
notes, for example, that “the directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the 
managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that 
they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private 
copartnery  frequently  watch  over  their  own.  …Negligence  and  profusion,  therefore,  must  
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always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company”, cited in 
Jensen and Meckling (1976, p.305).  
In response, Jensen and Meckling (1976) formally developed agency theory aimed at 
bringing the interests of managers (agents) of modern corporations into alignment with those 
of shareholders (principals). They identify four major ways by which utility or self-interests 
maximising managers can incur costs that may minimise the wealth of shareholders. Firstly, 
managers  may  expropriate  corporate  resources  by  awarding  themselves  overgenerous 
remuneration (pecuniary) packages (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p.312). Secondly, they may 
expropriate corporate wealth by electing to consume more perquisites (non-pecuniary), which 
maximise their own utility (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, pp.312, 314).  
Thirdly, managers may choose to invest excess cash flows (the free cash flow problem) 
over  paying dividends  even  in the  absence of  profitable investment opportunities  (Jensen, 
1986, p.323). Finally, managers may either choose to devote less time, effort, personal skill 
and/or ingenuity to value-maximising activities, such as looking for new profitable investment 
opportunities (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p.313). 
To limit divergence of managerial interests from shareholders and reduce the above 
agency costs, agency theory suggests the establishment of internal and external mechanisms 
through what is known recently as corporate governance (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, p.1034). 
Internally and by incurring monitoring costs, agency theory recommends the institution of 
several internal corporate governance structures via a set of legal contracts by shareholders to 
monitor managers. As will be discussed further below, these internal corporate governance 
structures may either be behaviour-oriented (i.e., board and auditing structures) or outcome-
oriented (i.e., salaries, stock options, and shareholding) (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.58). 
Firstly,  shareholders  can  institute  a  set  of  hierarchical  board  structure  variables  to 
monitor the behaviour of managers (Fama, 1980, p.293). Secondly, shareholders can impose 
formal internal control systems, like auditing and budget restrictions to control managerial 
misbehaviour  (Jensen  and  Meckling,  1976,  p.308).  Thirdly,  shareholders  can  also  design 
incentive remuneration systems which serve to more closely align managers’ interests with 
theirs, including rewarding managers on the basis of their performance (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976, p.308).  
Finally,  by  incurring  bonding  costs,  managers  can  be  urged  to  sign  contractual 
guarantees that insure shareholders against malfeasance on their part (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976, p.308). These may include: (1) having the financial accounts audited by independent  
 
85 
public auditors; (2) appointing independent non-executive directors to monitor managers; and 
(3) imposing minimum managerial shareholding to align interests with shareholders (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976, pp.323, 325). For greater effectiveness, shareholders must achieve an 
optimal  balance  between  instituting  behaviour-oriented  internal  structures  (i.e.,  board  and 
auditing  structures)  and  outcome-oriented  contracts  (i.e.,  salaries,  stock  options,  and 
shareholding) (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.58).  
Internally,  agency  theory  focuses  on  writing  efficient  contracts  and  implementing 
effective monitoring and bonding to secure shareholders’ interests (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.58). 
Externally, it relies on efficient factor markets (i.e., corporate control and managerial labour) 
to govern or discipline internal managerial misbehaviour (Fama, 1980, p.294). Firstly, there 
exists  efficient  internal  and  external  managerial  labour  markets,  which  exert  pressures  on 
firms to rank and remunerate managers according to their performance (Fama, 1980, p.294). 
Fama (1980, p.293) contends that internally there is usually competition among top managers 
to  become  ‘boss  of  bosses’.  There  is  also  competition  between  top  managers  and  lower 
managers who think they can gain by replacing shirking or less competent managers above 
them.  This  creates  intrinsic  vertical  and  horizontal  monitoring  of  managers  by  managers 
themselves.  
Externally, each manager’s current and future outside opportunity wage is determined 
by the current and future successes or failures of the managerial team (Fama, 1980, p.292). 
This means that each manager has an interest in the performance of the manager above and 
below him/her. As a consequence, each manager undertakes some amount of monitoring in 
both directions. This serves as a restraint on managers who may have incentive to expropriate 
shareholders wealth (Fama, 1980, p.293). Secondly, and as has been explained in chapter two, 
there  exists  efficient  market  for  trading  capital  and  corporate  control.  This  means  poorly 
performing firms may be easily acquired by their better-governed counterparts. Crucially, it 
offers owners of capital (shareholders) the opportunity to hedge against the failings of any 
particular firm by diversifying their holdings across different firms. This makes the separation 
of ownership and control in modern corporations an efficient form of economic organisation
13 
(Fama, 1980, p.291). 
                                                 
13Denis and McConnell (2003, p.1) argue that there are benefits to separating ownership and control; otherwise 
such economic structure is highly unlikely to have persisted as it has. This is because it is extremely difficult to 
find individuals who are endowed with both managerial talent and financial capital. Therefore, the ability to 
separate ownership and control enables the holder of either type of endowment to earn a return on it. Also, the 
ability to raise capital from outside investors allows firms to take advantage of the benefits of size, despite 
managerial wealth constraints or managerial risk aversion.  
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To sum up, agency theory posits that a net reduction in agency costs (i.e., monitoring, 
bonding, and residual loss) arising from the institution of these internal corporate governance 
structures should help increase firm value and/or improve financial performance (Shabbir and 
Padget, 2005, p.3). This is the overriding theory underlying the recommendations of a raft of 
corporate governance reports in many countries (e.g., Cadbury, 1992; OECD Principles, 1999; 
King Reports, 1994, 2002). It has also been the major motivation behind an established body 
of empirical research that attempts to link internal corporate governance structures with firm 
financial performance either through the use of empirical econometric models based on some 
equilibrium assumptions (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Yermack, 1996; Weir et al., 2002; 
Haniffa  and  Hudaib,  2006;  and  Guest,  2009,  amongst  others)  or  recently  through  the 
construction of composite corporate governance indices (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Beiner et 
al., 2006; Black et al., 2006a; Henry, 2008; and Chen et al., 2009, amongst others).  
In  the  next  subsection,  and  given  the  complex  nature  of  corporate  governance, 
information  asymmetry  and  managerial  signaling,  stewardship,  and  resource  dependence 
theories  will  be  briefly  discussed  as  supporting  theories  to  agency  theory.  Firstly,  these 
theories are selected because they are closely related to agency theory. This means that they 
may  help  in  shedding  more  theoretical  insights  into  the  agency  relationship  between 
shareholders and managers of firms. Secondly, and as will be discussed below, past studies 
(e.g., Donaldson and Davis, 1991, 1994; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) 
that  have  positively  approached  the  subject  of  corporate  governance  from  a  finance 
perspective have also relied on these theories
14 as complementary to agency theory.  
 
4.1.2 Internal corporate governance and financial performance: Supporting Theories 
4.1.2.1 Information Asymmetry and Managerial Signalling Theory 
Prior studies have relied on information asymmetry and managerial signalling  as a 
supporting theory to explain the link between shareholders (principals) and managers (agents) 
in modern corporation (e.g., Shabbir and Padget, 2005; Black et al., 2006a). It suggests that 
managers as insiders typically have much more information, including private information, 
                                                 
14The discussions on the three supporting theories below will be relatively brief. At this stage, they are meant to 
give brief insights on their core arguments with regards to the shareholder-managerial relationship within modern 
firms. In reviewing the empirical literature in section 4.2, these supporting theories will further be fully integrated 
into the central arguments. Also, political costs and organisational theories will be explained and incorporated 
into the discussion in section 4.2.   
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about their companies than shareholders or prospective shareholders (e.g., Healy and Palepu, 
2001; Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007).  
In this regard, and in making portfolio decisions, prospective shareholders in particular 
face two problems. Firstly, potential investors face the problem of selecting firms with the 
most capable management (adverse selection) (Rhee and Lee, 2008). Secondly, and just as it 
is with agency theory, they are confronted with the problem of ensuring that managers do not 
use their superior information to extract excessive perquisites or invest in unprofitable projects 
(moral hazard) (Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007). Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Mishkin 
(1997)  suggest  that  faced  with  asymmetric  information  and  market  uncertainty,  rational 
prospective shareholders have two possible options. Firstly, they may either choose to take 
into  consideration  the  potential  costs  of  adverse  selection  and  moral  hazard  in  pricing  a 
security of a firm. Secondly, they may also choose not to make the investment altogether.  
In  this  case,  whichever  option  prospective  shareholders  choose  is  likely  to  have  a 
negative impact on the cost of outside equity capital for firms. To minimise the selection 
dilemma facing investors, better-governed firms (i.e., firms with the least adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems) will have to find ways by which they can credibly signal their 
quality to prospective shareholders
15. A major way by which firms can creditably signal their 
quality to the market or prospective shareholders is to adopt good corporate governance rules.  
In theory, by electing to comply with the recommendations of a code of good corporate 
practices,  a  firm will  essentially  be  signalling  to  investors  that  it  is  better-governed.  This 
suggests  insiders  will  behave  well  with  their  investment,  and  by  implication  work  in  the 
interest of shareholders. As a corollary, investors will bid-up share prices because with better 
corporate governance, they are likely to receive a greater portion of their firms’ profits as 
opposed to being expropriated by managers (e.g., La Porta et al., 2002; Beiner et al., 2006). 
As equity values appreciate, the cost of outside equity capital can be expected to fall (e.g., 
Shabbir and Padget, 2005; Black et al., 2006a; Chen et al., 2009).  
For example, by appointing independent non-executive directors to the board, a firm 
signals to potential investors of its intentions of treating them fairly, and for that matter the 
safety  of  their  investment.  In  this  regard,  by  signalling  (disclosing)  its  better  governance 
qualities  to  investors,  a  firm  reduces  information  asymmetry.  This  is  likely  to  lead  to  an 
                                                 
15To be able to signal their quality, better-governed firms will have to incur signaling costs (i.e., agency costs) 
(e.g.,  Spence,  1973;  Core,  2001).  These  include  information  production  and  dissemination  costs  of  hiring 
professional accountants, auditors, and lawyers (Hassan and Marston, 2008, p.5). They also include potential 
exposure to litigation and competition, incentive for private information, and proprietary costs that are typically 
associated with increased disclosure (Lang and Lundholm, 1993, p.247; Core, 2001, p.443).  
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increase in share price and firm value for existing shareholders due to the potential increase in 
the  demand  for  its  shares  (e.g.,  Deutsche  Bank,  2002,  p.5;  Black  et  al.,  2006a  and  b). 
Equivalently, an increase in a firm’s share price should, ceteris paribus, results in a reduction 
in the cost of outside equity capital (e.g., Botosan, 1997; CLSA, 2000, p.1). 
 
4.1.2.2 Stewardship theory 
Contrary to agency, information asymmetry and signaling theories that place emphasis 
on managerial opportunism and monitoring, stewardship theory posits that executive managers 
are intrinsically trustworthy individuals (Nicholson and Kiel, 2003, p.588). As such, managers 
should be fully  empowered to run firms because they are good stewards of the resources 
entrusted  to  them  (Letza  et  al.,  2004,  p.244).  Further,  stewardship  theory  makes  several 
assumptions  about  the  behaviour  of  senior  managers.  Firstly,  it  assumes  that  since  top 
managers usually spend their entire working lives in the company they govern, they are more 
likely to understand the businesses better than outside directors and so can make superior 
decisions (Donaldson and Davis, 1991, p.52). Secondly, executive managers possess superior 
formal and informal information and knowledge about the firm they manage, which can aid 
better  decision-making  (Donaldson  and  Davis,  1994).  Finally,  competitive  internal  and 
external market discipline and the fear of damaging their future managerial capital ensure that 
agency  costs  are  minimised  (e.g.,  Fama,  1980;  Fama  and  Jensen,  1983a).  As  a  result, 
proponents of stewardship theory contend that better financial performance are likely to be 
associated with internal corporate governance practices that grant managers greater powers, 
such as combining the positions of company chairman and CEO (Donaldson and Davis, 1991, 
1994).  
 
4.1.2.3 Resource Dependence Theory  
Resource dependence theory is the final supporting theory of corporate governance 
that  this  study  relies  on.  It  suggests  that  the  institution  of  internal  corporate  governance 
structures, such as board of directors is not only necessary for ensuring that managers are 
effectively monitored, but also they serve as an essential link between the firm and the critical 
resources that it needs to maximise financial performance (Pfeffer, 1973, p.350). Firstly, the 
board and non-executive directors in particular can offer essential resources, such as expert 
advice,  experience,  independence,  and  knowledge  (Haniffa  and  Cooke,  2002,  p.319). 
Secondly, they can bring to the firm reputation and critical business contacts (Haniffa and  
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Hudaib,  2006,  p.1039).  Thirdly,  the  board  can  facilitate  access  to  business/political  elite, 
information  and  capital  (Nicholson  and  Kiel,  2003,  p.589).  Finally,  the  board  provides  a 
critical link to a firm’s external environment and significant stakeholders, such as creditors, 
suppliers, customers, and competitors. As a result, it has been argued that greater level of links 
to the external environment is associated with better access to resources (Nicholson and Kiel, 
2003, p.589). This can impact positively on firm financial performance. 
 To summarise, this section has attempted to describe the theoretical motivations of the 
study.  Following  prior  studies  and  suggestions,  as  well  as  given  the  complex  nature  of 
corporate  governance,  the  study  adopts  a  multiple-theoretical  perspective.  These  theories 
include agency, information asymmetry and managerial signaling, stewardship, and resource 
dependence.  Positively  approaching  the  subject  of  corporate  governance  from  a  finance 
viewpoint, these theories are relevant and closely related. As will be discussed in section 4.2, 
together, they will help in explaining the often complex agency relationship between owners 
and managers in modern firms. 
Briefly, agency theory suggests that due to the separation of ownership and control in 
modern firms, rational managers are less likely to always work in the interests of owners. To 
limit divergence of managerial interests, shareholders will have to institute internal corporate 
governance mechanisms to monitor managers. This will result in agency costs being incurred, 
including monitoring, bonding and residual loss. All else equal, the institution of effective 
corporate governance structures will reduce agency costs. This is likely to increase firm value 
and/or financial performance. Information asymmetry and managerial signaling theory takes 
similar view to agency theory. It suggests that by incurring signaling costs, better-governed 
firms can increase their value by signaling their better quality to prospective investors. By 
contrast, stewardship theory suggests that due to their information and knowledge advantages, 
better financial performance is likely to be associated with greater managerial trust and powers. 
Finally, resource dependence theory indicates that internal corporate governance structures 
like the board of directors help to link the firm to critical business inputs needed for higher 
financial performance. 
The  next  section  of  this  chapter  will  review  the  empirical  literature  on  internal 
corporate governance and firm financial performance. In reviewing the empirical literature, 
and as has already been pointed out, the theories discussed above will be fully integrated into 
the central arguments.  
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4.2 A REVIEW OF THE PRIOR EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON INTERNAL 
      CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
  Following the implications of agency theory, prior literature has attempted to establish 
an empirical association between internal corporate governance structures and firm financial 
performance.  This  has  been  done  mainly  through  two  major  competing  models:  an 
equilibrium-variable model and a compliance-index model. The next subsection will briefly 
set out the central theoretical arguments underlying both models. At this stage, the rationale 
will be to help guide the review of the empirical literature and hypotheses development. In 
subsection 5.2 of chapter five, the underlying theories and potential weaknesses of the two 
models will be described in detail. 
 
4.2.1 The Equilibrium-Variable Model versus the Compliance-Index Model 
The  equilibrium-variable  model  assumes  that  there  is  an  endogenous  relationship 
between  the  institution  of  internal  corporate  governance  structures  and  firm  financial 
performance (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; John and Senbet, 1998). That is, it assumes 
that every firm has its own optimal governance structure, and as such each firm should have 
the freedom to make its own governance choices without any external interference (i.e., a 
firm’s governance structure is internally determined) (Danielson and Karpoff, 1998, p.348). 
As a result, a firm will continue to establish governance structures to the point where the cost 
of instituting an additional governance structure is at least equal to the marginal increase in its 
financial performance or to the point where the firm is in equilibrium
16 with respect to its 
governance choices (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Himmelberg et al., 1999).  
In this regard, while the presence of a nomination committee, for example, may be 
effective  in  helping  one  firm  to  reduce  agency  costs  and  increase  its  value,  it  may  not 
necessarily be effective for another firm due to differences in ownership, size, and industry, 
amongst other firm-level characteristics. It is the oldest approach within the literature (e.g., 
Baysinger  and  Butler,  1985;  Demsetz  and  Lehn,  1985),  and  was  popularised  before  the 
worldwide proliferation of good corporate governance codes in the 1990s (e.g., Danielson and 
Karpoff, 1998; Black et al., 2006a; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). 
                                                 
16As will be clarified further in subsection 5.2 of chapter five, while it may be theoretically possible for a firm to 
be in equilibrium with respect to its governance choices, it is extremely difficult to achieve that in practice. 
Arguably, this makes the equilibrium assumption unrealistic.  
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  By  contrast,  the  compliance-index  approach  explicitly  appeared  in  the  corporate 
governance literature after the diffusion of corporate governance codes around the world in the 
early 2000s (e.g., Black, 2001; Gompers et al., 2003; Morey at al., 2009). This approach 
assumes that a company’s governance mechanisms are externally imposed, and as such firms 
tend to choose governance structures as a set (e.g., Danielson and Karpoff, 1998; Shabbir and 
Padget, 2005). Specifically, it posits that a company’s financial performance is likely to be 
influenced  by  a  number  of  agency  mechanisms  with  potential  interactive  effects  in  an 
integrated  framework  rather  than  as  independent  structures.  As  a  consequence,  instead  of 
looking at one single corporate governance mechanism in isolation, this model recommends 
the  construction  of  a  compliance  or  composite  governance  index,  encapsulating  a 
comprehensive set of corporate governance provisions to examine the corporate governance-
performance link (e.g., Beiner et al., 2006; Bebchuk et al., 2009).  
As will be discussed in detail in subsection 5.2 of chapter five, prior studies have 
mostly used one model or discounted the other purely on the basis of perceived theoretical 
strengths or weaknesses (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Beiner at al., 2006). However, it is 
contended that such a crucial methodological choice ought to be based on their respective 
theoretical  and  empirical  validity  rather  than  on  their  theoretical  appropriateness  alone. 
Therefore, using the same dataset and research context, both models will be estimated in this 
study. The empirical rationale is to ascertain whether different research conclusions may be 
reached depending on the model used. This may inform  methodological choices of future 
researchers.  
In the following two subsections, the extant literature regarding these two competing 
models will be reviewed. Specifically, the first subsection will draw on the extant literature to 
develop  hypotheses  of  the  relationship  between  firm  financial  performance  and  specific 
internal corporate governance structures as found both in the prior literature and King II.  
The second subsection will review prior studies that focus on the construction of a 
compliance or composite corporate governance index and firm financial performance. Also, 
due to the fact that the African corporate governance and performance literature is still in its 
infancy  (Okeahalam  and  Akinboade,  2003,  p.2;  Okeahalam,  2004,  p.360;  Mangena  and 
Chamisa, 2008, p.28), a separate subsection will not be devoted to prior South African or 
African  studies.  Instead,  where  applicable,  the  limited  available  South  African  or  African 
corporate  governance  studies  will  be  reviewed  as  part  of  the  mainstream  international 
corporate governance literature.   
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4.2.2 Internal Corporate Governance Structures and Firm Financial Performance: 
         The Equilibrium-Variable Model  
 
4.2.2.1 Board Structure Variables 
 
As has been discussed above, a theoretical consensus is that good internal corporate 
governance  structures,  such  as  board  of  directors  and  internal  controls  help  in  aligning 
managerial interests with those of shareholders by reducing agency costs (e.g., Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Netter et al., 2009). Of these, corporate board of directors is 
seen as a central part or the ‘apex’ of any internal corporate governance structure (e.g., Lipton 
and Lorsch, 1992; John and Senbet, 1998; Fillatotchev and Boyd, 2009). The board’s main 
role  is  to  ensure  conformance  and  performance  of  the  firm’s  management.  This  normally 
implies five functions: direction (advice), executive action (strategy),  service  and resource 
support (resource dependence), supervision (monitoring), and accountability (Rossouw et al., 
2002, p.289; Brennan, 2006, p.580).  
However,  it  has  been  suggested  that  to  be  able  to  protect  shareholders’  interests, 
corporate boards must be effective and efficient in performing their functions (e.g., Jensen, 
1993; Brennan, 2006). Past evidence suggests that effective and efficient board performance is 
influenced by several factors, such as board diversity, composition, and size, amongst others 
(e.g., Yermack, 1996; Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009).  
Therefore, following prior literature and the provisions of King II, the next subsections 
will review studies on a set of 11 internal corporate board structure variables that have been 
found to influence financial performance of firms. These include board diversity, corporate 
board size, role or CEO duality, the percentage of non-executive directors, the frequency of 
board meetings, the presence of key internal board committees (namely, audit, nomination, 
and remuneration committees), director shareownership, director shareownership squared, and 
director shareownership cubed
17. 
For each of the 11
18 board structure variables, the review will be divided into four parts. 
First, the prior theoretical links between a particular board structure variable and firm financial 
                                                 
17Subsection 5.2 of chapter five and Appendix 4 will set out in detail the way each of these board structure 
variables will be operationalised in this study. Also, Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio) and return on assets (ROA) will be used 
as proxies for firm financial performance in this study. Similarly, subsection 5.2 discusses the rationale for their 
selection and how they will be measured in this study.  
18The  prior  literature  relating  to  the  presence  of  the  three  key  board  committees  (audit,  nomination,  and 
remuneration  committees),  and  director  shareownership  variables  (director  shareownership,  director 
shareownership squared, and director shareownership squared) will be reviewed together, respectively. This will 
mean that seven main hypotheses will be developed and tested for the equilibrium-variable model.   
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performance will be presented. Second, the corresponding prior empirical evidence regarding 
the  variable  will  be  reviewed.  Third,  the  provisions  of  King  II  and  other  relevant  South 
African corporate governance rules relating to the variable will be described. Finally, and on 
the basis of the review, research hypotheses will be then developed for the variable. 
 
4.2.2.2 Board Diversity 
 
i) The Theoretical Link between Board Diversity and Financial Performance 
 
One  of  the  most  significant  internal  corporate  governance  issues  currently  facing 
companies in South Africa is board diversity and its impact on corporate performance. Board 
diversity has broadly been defined as the various attributes that may be represented among 
directors in the boardroom in relation to board process and decision-making, including age, 
gender,  ethnicity,  culture,  religion,  constituency  representation,  independence,  knowledge, 
educational  and  professional  background,  technical  skills  and  expertise,  commercial  and 
industry experience, career and life experience (Van der Walt and Ingley, 2003, p.219). There 
are mixed theoretical propositions as to the impact of board diversity on shareholder value: 
those who argue for more diversity in boardrooms and those who are in favour of corporate 
monoculture and boardroom uniformity. 
Proponents  of  diversity  in  corporate  boardrooms  usually  base  their  arguments  on 
agency,  resource  dependence,  signalling, and stakeholding theories  (e.g.,  Goodstein  et  al., 
1994; Carter et al., 2003). Firstly, agency theory suggests that boards of diverse backgrounds 
rather  than  homogenous  elite  groups  with  similar  socio-economic  backgrounds,  increases 
board  independence  and  improves  executive  monitoring  (Van  der  Walt  and  Ingley,  2003, 
p.219).  Secondly,  it  brings  diversity  in  ideas,  perspectives,  experience,  and  business 
knowledge  to  the  decision-making  process  in  boardrooms  (Baranchuk  and  Dybvig,  2009, 
p.715).  This  can  aid  better  appreciation  of  the  complexities  of  the  corporate  external 
environment and marketplace. It can also increase creativity and innovation in boardrooms 
due  to  diversity  in  cognitive  abilities,  which  can  also  facilitate  effective  decision-making 
(Carter et al., 2003, p.36) 
Thirdly, resource dependence theory indicates that board diversity helps to link a firm 
to its external environment and secure critical resources, including skills, business contacts, 
prestige and legitimacy (Goodstein et al., 1994, p.241). Fourthly, Rose (2007, p.405) argues 
that  a  higher  degree  of  board  diversity  may  serve  as  a  positive  signal  to  potential  job 
applicants. This will help to attract well qualified persons outside the circles where board  
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candidates are usually recruited from. This can also generate healthy competition within the 
firm’s internal labour market. This is because women and ethnic minorities, for example, will 
realise that they are not excluded from the highest positions within the firm.  
Finally,  corporate  boards  of  qualified  individuals  of  diverse  backgrounds  and 
constituencies can help provide a better link with a firm’s stakeholders, such as consumers and 
the  local  community.  This  can  improve  a  firm’s  reputation  and  commercial  opportunities 
(Shrader et al., 1997, p.355). Carter et al. (2003, p.36) suggest, for example, that by matching 
the diversity  of a  company’s  board  to  the  diversity  of  its customers  and suppliers,  it  can 
significantly increase its ability to penetrate competitive markets.  
However, relying on agency and organisation theories, opponents contend that board 
diversity can impact negatively on firm performance. Firstly, it has been suggested that a more 
diverse board may not necessarily result in more effective monitoring and decision-making. 
This is because diverse board members may be appointed as a sign of tokenism, and as such 
their contributions may be marginalised (Rose, 2007, p.406). Secondly, organisation theory 
indicates that diversity within the board may significantly constrain its efforts to take decisive 
action and initiate strategic changes, especially in times of poor corporate performance and 
environmental turbulence (Goodstein, et al., 1994, p.243).  
Thirdly,  diverse  board  members  may  bring  their  individual  and  constituencies’ 
interests and commitments to the board (Baysinger and Butler, 1985, p.110). The greater the 
diversity  of  these  interests,  the  greater  the  potential  for  conflicts  and  factions  to  emerge 
(Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009, p.725). This can inhibit boardroom cohesion and performance 
(Goodstein, et al., 1994, p.243). Finally, Rose (2007, p.405) argues that the suggestion that 
company boards should be constituted to necessarily reflect all their important stakeholders 
and society as a whole is incompatible with the notion of business. This is because if board 
members are not appointed on the basis of merit or their ability to contribute meaningfully to 
the decision-making process in the boardroom, ceteris paribus, will result in the creation of 
diverse  but  comparatively  ineffective  larger  boards.  This  can  impact  negatively  on  firm 
financial performance.  
 
ii) The Empirical Literature on Board Diversity and Financial Performance 
Board diversity is one of the under researched board structure variables (Carter et al., 
2003). Also, the limited extant literature mainly focuses on American firms with conflicting 
results (e.g., Carter et al., 2003; Shrader et al., 1997; Francoeur et al., 2008). This makes it a  
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fertile area for further research, especially in South Africa where there is a dearth of board 
diversity studies. 
  Using a small sample of 25 American Fortune 500 firms, Adler (2001) finds a positive 
correlation between firms that employ higher percentage of women in top management and a 
raft of accounting measures of performance, including ROA, ROE, ROI and ROS. Adler’s 
study has received criticisms for its small sample, focusing mainly on large firms, as well as 
for using only accounting measures of performance (see Francoeur et al., 2008). Carter et al. 
(2003) also report a positive relationship between board diversity (measured by gender and 
ethnicity) and market measure of performance (proxied by Tobin’s Q) using a larger sample of 
638 American Fortune 1000 firms in 1997. This suggests that US firms with higher proportion 
of women and ethic minorities on their boards generate higher financial performance. They 
demonstrate further, through the use of two stage least squares, that the positive association 
persists after controlling for endogenity and firm specific characteristics.  
Consistent  with  prior  evidence,  Francoeur  et  al.  (2008)  examine  whether  the 
participation  of  women  in  a  firm’s  board  and  senior  management  enhances  financial 
performance in a sample of 230 of the 500 largest Canadian listed firms from 2001 to 2004. 
Applying Fama and French three factor model, they report that firms operating in complex 
environments do generate positive and significant abnormal returns when they have a higher 
proportion of women officers.  
Of direct relevance to this study, and using a  cross-sectional sample of 117 South 
African listed firms in 2003, Swartz  and  Firer (2005) report a statistically significant and 
positive  association  between  the  percentage  of  ethnic  members  (non-whites)  on  corporate 
boards’  and  intellectual  capital  performance.  In  this  study,  board  diversity  is  defined  in 
broader terms to cover gender and ethnicity with different performance proxies: Tobin’s Q and 
ROA. It is argued that if diverse boards perform better than their non-diverse counterparts, it 
should  ultimately  reflect  in  their  financial  bottom  line.  To  capture  the  impact  of  possible 
changes in board diversity over time, the sample period used in this study is also longer: 2002-
2006. The analysis in this study may provide new valuable insights into the board diversity 
and financial performance relationship literature.  
  In contrast, but consistent with the conflicting nature of prior board diversity theory, 
the  findings  of  other  researchers  report  that  board  diversity  rather  impacts  negatively  on 
financial performance. Goodstein et al. (1994) investigate the impact of board diversity on a 
firm’s ability to initiate strategic changes in a total of 335 American firms from 1980 to 1985.  
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They find that firms with diverse boards are less likely to initiate strategic changes than those 
with homogenous boards. This suggests that board diversity generates conflicts, which limit 
the board’s ability to initiate timely strategic changes.  
Shrader et al. (1997) examine the association between the percentage of female board 
members  and  two  accounting  measures  of  financial  performance  (ROA  and  ROE)  for  a 
sample  of  200  American  Fortune  500  firms  in  1992.  Their  results  suggest  a  statistically 
significant and negative relationship between the percentage of women on the board and firm 
performance. They explain the negative relationship by the theory of social margianalisation 
and exclusion. Specifically, Shrader et al. (1997) argue that while the views of women on the 
board may be marginalised, their presence may also have financial costs implications to the 
firm. This means that while they will presumably not be making any meaning contributions to 
corporate board decisions, they will still be paid their financial emoluments. This may impact 
negatively on firm financial performance, and thus helps in explaining the negativer female 
board members-financial performance link. 
  In a departure, using a sample of 95 American listed firms, Zahra and Stanton (1988) 
find no significant relationship between the percentage of ethnic minority directors and several 
accounting  measures  of  performance,  including  ROE  and  EPS.  Similarly,  Rose  (2007) 
investigates whether female board representation influence firm performance using a sample 
of Danish listed firms over the period 1998-2001. Consistent with the evidence of Zahra and 
Stanton (1988), he finds no significant link between firm performance as measured by Tobin’s 
Q and female board representation. 
  To  sum  up,  and  consistent  with  the  mixed  nature  of  the  extant  board  diversity 
theoretical literature, the prior empirical evidence is equally conflicting. Specifically, and as 
has been discussed above, there are three strands of empirical evidence. These studies include 
those  that  report:  (1)  significant  positive;  (2)  significant  negative;  and  (3)  no  significant 
relationships  between  board  diversity  and  firm  performance.  The  conflicting  international 
evidence may partly be explained by the fact that prior studies use different board diversity 
and performance proxies, sample periods and estimation techniques. However, it may also be 
explained by country and contextual differences.  
In this regard, South Africa offers an interesting research context to explore the impact 
of board diversity on firm performance. It has ethnically diverse populace (i.e., made up of 
people  from  almost  every  part  of  the  world,  including  European  Whites  or  Caucasians, 
Chinese, Indians, Mixed Race and Black Africans).  As has been discussed in chapter three,  
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affirmative  action  laws  meant  to  address  the  negative  social  and  economic  legacies  of 
Apartheid have been introduced since 1994. Central to the affirmative action legislation is 
ensuring that  non-whites,  especially  black  men  and  women,  are  appointed  to  positions  of 
significance in South African companies. Examining board diversity under this context can 
arguably bring new insights that may enrich the board diversity-performance literature. 
 
iii) Recommendations of King II, Employment Equity Act and the JSE’s Listings Rules 
With  respect  to  this  study,  board  diversity  is  defined  on  the  basis  of  gender  and 
ethnicity. Specifically, and as will be discussed in chapter five, board diversity is measured by 
a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one if a board consists of a white, a black, a 
male and a female, zero otherwise
19. As has been discussed in chapter three, the South African 
Employment Equity Act 1998 stipulates that every firm with more than 100 employees should 
ensure that its labour force, including top management is constituted by a balance between 
non-whites and whites. Among the non-whites, black men and women are expected to be 
given special preference.  
By contrast, King II and the JSE’s Listings Rules do not set any specific targets for 
firms. However, they suggest that every company should consider whether its board is diverse 
enough in terms of skills (profession and experience) and demographics (age, ethnicity and 
gender). This is expected to ensure that the composition of South African corporate boards 
reflect the diverse South African context, as well as make them effective. They also encourage 
firms to comply with the provisions of the Employment Equity Act. This indicates that King II 
expects board diversity to have positive impact on the financial performance of firms.  
Swartz and Firer (2005) report that South African listed firms significantly enhance 
their intellectual capital performance by having ethnically diverse board of directors. If diverse 
boards perform better than homogenous boards, then they are likely to generate significantly 
higher financial performance. However, given the mixed prior international evidence, both the 
null  and  alternate  hypotheses  are  tested.  Thus,  the  respective  first  null  (1)  and  alternate 
hypotheses to be tested in this study are that: 
                                                 
19As will be explained further in chapter eight, defining board diversity separately on the basis of gender or 
ethnicity does not lead to any significant difference in the research results. Board diversity could also have been 
measured in percentages rather as dummy variable. However, and as will be discussed further in subsection 6.6 of 
chapter six (see Tables 4 and 11), board members from diverse backgrounds (gender and ethnicity) is very small 
and unevenly distributed among the sampled firms. To avoid having a lot zero observations or small percentages, 
board  diversity  will  be  measured  as  a  dummy  variable  rather  than  as  a  continuous  variable.  This  will  be 
acknowledged as a weakness of this study in section 10.4 of chapter ten, and will also be identified as an avenue 
for improvement for future research in chapter ten.   
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  : 0 H   There is a statistically significant positive relationship between board diversity 
and firm financial performance, as measured by both ROA and the Q-ratio. 
  : 1 H   There  is  no  statistically  significant  positive  relationship  between  board 
diversity and firm financial performance, as proxied by both ROA and the Q-
ratio. 
 
4.2.2.3 Corporate Board Size 
i) The Theoretical link between Board Size and Financial Performance 
Corporate board size is considered to be one of the most important board structure 
variables. As a corollary, the extant literature has sought to provide a theoretical and empirical 
nexus between corporate board size and firm financial performance with mixed results (e.g., 
Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 1996).  
One theoretical (agency theory) proposition is that larger boards are bad, while smaller 
boards are good and effective at improving financial performance (e.g., Lipton and Lorch, 
1992; Sonnenfeld 2002, p.108). Firstly, this is because while they plan, organise, direct and 
control the business of the organisation, the size of the board has also got financial costs 
implications.  That  is,  ‘ceteris  paribus’  larger  boards  consume  more  pecuniary  and  non-
pecuniary company resources in the form of remuneration and perquisites than smaller boards. 
Secondly, Jensen (1993, p.865) argues that when a board gets too big, it does not only become 
difficult to co-ordinate, but also comparatively easier to control by a dominant CEO due to 
associated director shirking and free-riding.  
More specifically, Lipton and Lorsch (1992, p.67) suggest that corporate board size 
must preferably fall between eight and nine directors. They argue that as corporate board size 
goes beyond a maximum number of ten directors, additional costs of having larger boards 
typically  associated  with  slow  decision-making  are  higher  than  any  marginal  gains  from 
intense monitoring of management’s activities. Thirdly, it is contended that smaller boards are 
more  likely  to  be  cohesive,  and  to  have  more  effective  discussions.  This  is  because  all 
directors are able to candidly contribute and express their ideas and opinions within the limited 
time available (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992, p.68)
20. Finally, Yawson (2006, p.77) argues that 
                                                 
20It is worth reminding that the proponents of smaller corporate boards (e.g., Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 
1993; Yermack, 1996), mainly draw their inspiration from organisational theory, which posits that as groups 
increase in size they become less effective because the associated coordination problems tend to outweigh the 
benefits gained from having a larger pool of talented individuals to draw from (e.g., Steiner, 1972; Pfeffer, 1973; 
Hackman, 1990).  
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larger boards suffer from higher agency problems and are far less effective than smaller boards. 
Thus, limiting corporate board size may improve efficiency. 
A contrary theoretical view (agency and resource dependence) is that larger boards 
may  possibly  be  better  for  corporate  financial  performance  (e.g.,  John  and  Senbet,  1998; 
Yawson, 2006). Firstly, larger boards are associated with diversity in skills, business contacts, 
and experience that smaller boards may not have, which offers greater opportunity to secure 
critical resources (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, p.1038). Similarly, larger boards offer greater 
access to their firm’s external environment, which reduces uncertainties and also facilitates 
securing  critical  resources,  such  as  finance,  raw  materials,  and  contracts  (e.g.,  Pearce and 
Zahra, 1992; Goodstein et al., 1994). Secondly, larger boards enhance the knowledge base on 
which business advice can be sought, which increases managerial ability to make important 
and better business decisions (Yawson, 2006, p.76). Finally, a corporate board’s monitoring 
capacity is demonstrated to be positively related with board size  (John and Senbet, 1998, 
p.385). This is because a larger number of people with varied expertise will be better placed to 
subject managerial decisions to greater scrutiny and monitoring (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003, 
p.194).  This will help balance the power of otherwise a dominant CEO.  
 
ii) The Empirical Evidence on Board Size and Financial Performance 
Empirically,  the  evidence  regarding  the  association  between  board  size  and  firm 
financial performance is conflicting (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Adams and Mehran, 2005; Beiner 
et al., 2006; Henry, 2008; Guest, 2009). Yermack (1996) is one of the first to investigate the 
relationship  between  board  size  and  financial  performance  in  a  sample  of  452  large  US 
industrial corporations between 1984 and 1991. Generally, he reports an inverse relationship 
between corporate board size and performance (Tobin’s Q). He demonstrates that his evidence 
is robust to firm specific characteristics like size, growth potential, board composition (% of 
outside directors), director ownership and industry. Specifically, Yermack’s results show that 
investors valuation of companies’ declines steadily over a range of board sizes between 4 and 
10.  Beyond  a  board  size  of  10,  he  finds  no  relationship  between  board  size  and  market 
valuation. Yermack’s results support prior theoretical suggestions (e.g., Lipton and Lorsch, 
1992; Jensen, 1993).  
Recent US evidence (e.g., Vefeas, 1999a and b; Cheng, 2008; Cheng et al., 2008; 
Coles et al., 2008) and non-US evidence (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1998; Bozec, 2005; Guest, 
2009) are largely consistent with those of Yermack that, on average, smaller boards tend to  
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perform better than larger ones. Eisenberg et al. (1998, p.35) criticise Yermack (1996) for 
focusing purely on large firms, and as such his results cannot be extended to smaller firms, as 
well as firms operating in different legal and cultural environments. On this basis, Eisenberg et 
al. (1998) examine the association between board size and performance in a sample of 879 
small and medium size Finnish firms from 1992 to 1994. Consistent with Yermack (1996), 
they report a negative correlation between firms’ profitability, measured by industry-adjusted 
return on assets (ROA) and board size.  
Also, Dahya et al. (2002) find a negative relationship between performance-related 
top-management turnover and board size in a sample of 460 UK listed firms from 1988 to 
1996. Similarly, using a large sample of 2,746 UK listed firms from 1981 to 2002, Guest 
(2009)  report  a  statistically  significant  and  negative  relationship  between  board  size  and 
performance, as proxied by Tobin’s Q, ROA, and share returns. The findings of these studies 
generally offer empirical support to the theory that smaller boards are more likely to permit: 
candid  evaluation  of  managerial  performance;  effective  managerial  monitoring;  and  faster 
decision-making (e.g., Lipton and Lorch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). Finally, Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006)  report  a  negative  relationship  between  board  size  and  financial  performance,  as 
measured by Tobin’s Q, in a sample of 347 Malaysian listed firms. This also offers empirical 
support  to  the  conclusions  of  prior  studies  that  larger  boards  are  not  only  perceived  by 
investors as ineffective at monitoring managers, but also consume more managerial perquisites 
than smaller ones (e.g., Yermack 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998).  
 By contrast, using a sample of 35 US listed Banking firms from 1959 to 1995, Adams 
and Mehran (2005) report a statistically significant and positive relationship between board 
size and Tobin’s Q. They demonstrate that the positive relationship remain unchanged after 
accounting for potential endogeneities between board size and the Q-ratio. Beiner et al. (2006) 
and Henry (2008) have independently reported similar statistically significant and positive 
relationship between board size and the Q-ratio for a sample of Swiss and Australian listed 
firms, respectively.  
Also,  Sanda  et  al.  (2005)  find  a  positive  correlation  between  board  size  and 
profitability, as proxied by return on equity (ROE), in a sample of 93 Nigerian listed firms 
from 1996 to 1999. This is in line with the theory that larger boards offer greater access to 
their firm’s external environment, which reduces uncertainties and also facilitates securing 
critical resources, such as finance, raw materials, and contracts (e.g., Pearce and Zahra, 1992; 
Goodstein  et  al.,  1994).  Similarly,  Haniffa  and  Hudaib  (2006),  employing  an  accounting  
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measure of performance, as proxied by ROA, find a positive relationship between board size 
and performance. This was in contrast with the negative relationship that they found between 
board  size  and  Tobin’s  Q.  This  suggests  that  differences  exist  between  investors  and 
companies in their perception of the relevance of larger boards.  
Theoretically,  the finding of  Haniffa  and  Hudaib  (2006)  implies  that  larger  boards 
enhance  the  knowledge  base  on  which  business  advice  can  be  sought,  which  increases 
managerial  ability  to  make  important  and  better  business decisions (Yawson,  2006,  p.76). 
Further, Kiel and Nicholson (2003), Beiner et al. (2006), and Coles et al. (2008) offer recent 
evidence for Australian, Swiss, and US listed firms, respectively, which is entirely in line with 
those of Haniffa and Hudaib (2006).  
Using  a  sample  of  72  Zimbabwean  listed  firms  from  2002  to  2004,  Mangena  and 
Tauringana (2008) also report a positive nexus between board size and performance in an 
environment of severe political and economic uncertainty. Mangena and Tauringana (2008) 
demonstrate that the tenor of their results remain unchanged whether historical or inflation 
adjusted data is used. This implies that the market perceives larger boards as providing more 
effective  monitoring  and  wider  contacts  in  a  period  of  severe  political  and  economic 
uncertainty.  
Of direct importance to this study, and using a sample of 84 South African listed firms 
in 1998, Ho and Williams (2003)
21 report no significant link between the efficiency of value 
added by a firm’s physical and intellectual capital and board size. Similarly, Mangena and 
Chamisa (2008) examine the relationship between board size and the incidences of listing 
suspensions by the JSE Ltd. Using a sample of 81 South African listed firms from 1999 to 
2005,  they  document  no  significant  link  between  board  size  and  incidences  of  listing 
suspension by the JSE.  
                                                 
21This study differs from prior South African studies of Ho and Williams (2003) and Mangena and Chamisa 
(2008) in several important respects. As has been explained above, Ho and Williams’ (2003) study focuses on 
ascertaining the association between internal corporate governance structures, such as board size and a firm’s 
physical and intellectual capital performance, using a cross-sectional sample of 84 South African firms in 1998. 
However, given that South African firms predominantly have shareholding-orientation (see section 2.1 of chapter 
two and subsection 3.3.3.3 of chapter three), it is persuasive to argue that they are likely to be more concerned 
with  their  overall  long-term  financial  performance  than  physical  and  intellectual  capital  performance  alone. 
Moreover, if better-governed South African firms tend to be associated higher intellectual capital performance, it 
can  be  expected  to  ultimately  reflect  in  higher  financial  performance.  Therefore,  conventional  financial 
performance proxies, namely, Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA) are used in this study. Also, since the effects 
of better corporate governance practices can be expected to change over time, the sample period examined in this 
study  is  longer:  2002-2006.  These  improvements  may  uncover  new  insights  that  can  potentially  enrich  the 
internal corporate governance-performance literature. With regard to Mangena and Chamisa (2008), the focus of 
their study is entirely different from this study. While they examine whether South African firms that are better-
governed  are less likely  to be  suspended  from  the JSE  Ltd, this study  sets  out to  ascertain  whether  better-
governed South African firms are more likely to be associated with higher financial performance.  
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iii) Recommendations of the Companies Act, the JSE’s Listings Rules and King II 
According to the South African Companies Act 1973, all pubic companies must have a 
minimum of two directors, while the JSE’s Listings Rules mandate listed firms to have a 
minimum of four directors. None of them sets a maximum board size.  
King II also does not specify the exact number of directors that should form a board. 
However, it sets out a general principle that every board must consider whether its size makes 
it effective. This suggests that even though King II admits that a company’s board size may 
probably affect its performance, it leaves the option of determining the actual board size for 
the companies themselves to decide. A plausible explanation for not prescribing a specific 
board number is to avoid a tacit conclusion that it is possible to adopt a “one size fits all” 
approach to corporate management (MacNeil and Xiao, 2006, p.486).  
As has been discussed above, the results of Ho and Williams (2003) find no significant 
relationship between a firm’s physical and intellectual capital performance and board size in a 
sample of 84 South African listed firms. Similarly, and using a sample of 81 South African 
firms,  Mangena  and  Chamisa  (2008)  report  no  significant  link  between  the  incidences  of 
listing suspensions by the JSE and board size. Together, they suggest that board size may not 
be an important driver of financial performance in South African listed companies. However, 
given  the  mixed  international  evidence,  both  the  null  and  alternate  hypotheses  are  tested. 
Hence, the respective second (2) null and alternate hypotheses to be tested in this study are 
that: 
: 0 H   There is a statistically significant positive relationship between board size  
  and firm  financial performance, as proxied by both ROA and the Q-ratio. 
: 1 H   There is no statistically significant positive relationship between board  
  size and firm financial performance, as measured by both ROA and the Q-ratio. 
 
4.2.2.4 Role or CEO Duality 
i) The Theoretical Link between Role or CEO Duality and Financial Performance 
Another board structure variable that has the potential of increasing or reducing the 
agency problem is role or CEO duality. It refers to a board leadership structure in which one 
person undertakes the combined roles of chief executive officer (CEO – management) and 
chairman (control) of the board. The chairman of the board is responsible for managing the  
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board.  These  may  typically  include  nominating  new  board  members,  reviewing  the 
performance of senior management, setting agenda for board meetings, and settling conflicts 
which may arise within the board (Laing and Weir, 1999, p.458). In contrast, the CEO is 
responsible for the day-to-day management of the company, including implementing board 
decisions.  
There are three theoretical propositions regarding role or CEO duality: stewardship, 
resource  dependence,  and  agency  theories.  Stewardship  and  resource  dependence  theories 
suggest that role duality can have a positive impact on firm financial performance. Firstly, 
Weir et al. (2002, p.585) contend that as an insider, the CEO tend to have greater knowledge, 
understanding  and  experience  of  the  strategic  challenges  and  opportunities,  which  the 
company faces, than a non-executive chairman.  
Secondly, it has been argued that role duality grants a charismatic CEO the opportunity 
to have a sharper focus on firm objectives (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, p.1040).  This implies a 
visionary CEO will have the chance to shape the long-term fortunes of a firm with minimum 
board interference (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, p.321). This may lead to improved performance 
due  to  the  rapid management  decision-making  that arises  from  the provision  of  clear and 
unambiguous corporate leadership (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, p.1040). Thirdly, Vafeas and 
Theodorou (1998, p.389) suggest that role duality avoids extra compensation to the chairman, 
which can results in a reduction in managerial remuneration. Finally, Bozec (2005, p.1927) 
argues  that  unified  firm  leadership  associated  with  role  duality  improves  managerial 
accountability as it makes it easier to charge the blame for poor performance.  
Another stream of the theoretical (agency) literature suggests that role or CEO duality 
can impact negatively on firm performance (e.g., Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). 
According to Jensen (1993, p.866) the function of the chairman is to run board meetings and 
oversee the process of hiring, firing, evaluating and remunerating the CEO. Due to this, Jensen 
(1993) contends that role or CEO duality increases agency problems by compromising the 
board’s  effectiveness  in  monitoring  the  CEO.  As  a  corollary,  agency  theorists  argue  that 
separating the two roles will help increase board independence by providing effective checks 
and balances over managerial behaviour (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992, p.72; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002, p.321). It has been suggested, for example, that separating the two roles will make it 
easier  for  the  board  to  remove  a  non-performing  CEO  (Jensen,  1993,  p.866;  Monks  and 
Minow, 2001, p.208). This can help in preventing managers from pursuing goals that advance 
their self-interests to the disadvantage of shareholders.   
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ii) The Empirical Evidence on the Role or CEO Duality and Firm Financial Performance 
Empirically, the evidence regarding the relationship between role or CEO duality and 
firm financial performance is mixed (e.g., Rechner and Dalton 1991; Brickley et al., 1997; 
Weir et al., 2002). Rechner and Dalton (1991) investigate the relationship between role or 
CEO  duality  and  three  accounting  measures  of  financial  performance  (ROE,  return  on 
investment and profit margin) of 141 large American corporations (Fortune 500 firms) from 
1978  to  1983.  They  report  that  companies  with  separate  board  chairpersons  consistently 
outperformed those with role or CEO duality.  
However, the results of Rechner and Dalton (1991) have been criticised on several 
grounds. Firstly, they focus purely on large American firms. Secondly, they rely purely on 
accounting-based  performance  measures.  Thirdly,  they  fail  to  control  for  firm  specific 
characteristics, such as firm size and industry (Donaldson and Davis, 1991, p.53). As result, 
using a sample of UK listed firms, Dahya et al. (1996) investigate whether the stock market 
prefers companies to combine or split the roles of company chairman and CEO. Consistent 
with the evidence of Rechner and Dalton (1991), their results suggest that the market responds 
favourably to the separation of the two roles and unfavourably to their fusion.  
Of particular interest to this study, and using a sample of 84 South African listed firms, 
Ho and Williams (2003) report a statistically significant and negative link between a firm’s 
physical and intellectual capital performance and role or CEO duality. This indicates that the 
role or CEO duality-financial performance nexus is also likely to be negative among South 
African listed firms. Similarly, in a sample of 347 Malaysian listed firms, Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006) report that firms that separated the two roles performed financially (ROA) better than 
those that vested the two roles in one person. This indicates that monitoring by the board 
improves when the roles of CEO and chairman are split. Finally, Chahine and Tohmé (2009) 
investigate  the  relationship  between  role  or  CEO  duality  and  initial  underpricing  using  a 
sample of 127 initial price offerings (IPOs) firms’ from 12 Middle East and North African 
countries
22. They report that underpricing is significantly higher in firms that have role or 
CEO  duality.  This  suggests  the  market  perceives  role  or  CEO  duality  as  an  undesirable 
development. 
                                                 
22These countries are: Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 
Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates.   
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By contrast, a group of researchers report that role or CEO duality impacts positively 
on  firm  financial  performance  (e.g.,  Donaldson  and  Davis,  1991;  Boyd,  1995;  Kiel  and 
Nicholson, 2003). Firstly, Donaldson and Davis (1991) examine the effects of role or CEO 
duality on shareholder returns in a sample of 321 US firms from 1985 to 1987. They report 
that companies with role or CEO duality have superior financial performance to those that 
separate the two roles. Unlike Rechner and Dalton (1991), they demonstrate that the tenor of 
their results remain unchanged after controlling for firm-specific features, such as firm size 
and industry.  
Similarly, Boyd (1995) investigates the association between role or CEO duality and 
financial  performance,  as  proxied  by  five  year  average  returns  on  investment  (ROI)  in  a 
sample of 192 American firms selected from 12 industries from 1980 to 1984. Consistent with 
the evidence of Donaldson and Davis (1991), he reports that firms with role or CEO duality 
consistently outperformed their counterparts with independent board leadership structure. This 
is consistent with the view that role or CEO duality enhances decision-making by permitting a 
sharper focus on company objectives. Finally, using a sample of 348 of Australia’s largest 
publicly listed firms in 1996, Kiel and Nicholson (2003) investigate the role or CEO duality-
performance  relationship.  They  report  that  role  or  CEO  duality  impacts  positively  on  the 
financial performance (Tobin’s Q) of Australian listed firms. 
A third stream of empirical papers suggests that role or CEO duality has no impact on 
financial performance. Using a small sample of 25 Canadian firms from 1976 to 2000, Bozec 
(2005) reports that role or CEO duality has no impact on return on sales, sales efficiency and 
assets  turnover.  Similarly,  Haniffa  and  Hudaib  (2006)  report  a  statistically  insignificant 
relationship between Tobin’s Q and role duality in a sample of 347 Malaysian listed firms. 
This is consistent with the results of previous studies (e.g., Baliga et al., 1996; Brickley et al., 
1997; Rhoades et al., 2001; Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Laing and Weir, 1999; Weir and 
Laing, 2000; Sanda et al., 2005), which suggest that role or CEO duality has no impact on 
financial  performance.  Of  close  relevance  to  this  study,  Mangena  and  Chamisa  (2008) 
investigate the relationship between role or CEO duality and the suspension of listed firms by 
the JSE Ltd. Using a sample of 81 South African listed firms from 1999 to 2005, they find no 
significant link between role duality and incidences of listing suspension by the JSE.  
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iii) Recommendations of King II and the JSE’s Listings Rules  
King II and JSE Listings Rules state explicitly that the positions of the chairman and 
the CEO should not be held by the same individual. Also, it states that the chairman must be 
independent as defined  in subsection 3.3.3.2 of chapter three by the Code, who bears the 
responsibility for the running of the board, while the CEO is responsible for the day-to-day 
running of the company’s business. This suggests that King II recognises role or CEO duality 
as an undesirable development, while role separation is seen as good corporate governance 
practice.  
However, the prior South African evidence is mixed. Ho and Williams (2003) report a 
statistically  significant  and  negative  role  or  CEO  duality-performance  link.  In  contrast, 
Mangena and Chamisa (2008) find no significant association between role or CEO duality and 
incidences of listings suspension by the JSE. Given the mixed evidence, both the null and 
alternate  hypotheses  are  tested.  Therefore,  the  respective  third  (3)  null  and  alternate 
hypotheses to be tested in this study are that: 
: 0 H   There is a statistically significant negative relationship between role or CEO 
duality and firm financial performance, as proxied by both ROA and the Q-
ratio. 
: 1 H   There is no statistically significant negative relationship between role or CEO 
duality and firm financial performance, as measured by both ROA and the Q-
ratio. 
 
4.2.2.5 Percentage of Non-Executive Directors (NEDs) 
i) The Theoretical Link between the Percentage of NEDs and Financial Performance 
One of the internal corporate governance mechanisms that the theoretical literature 
suggests can be used in reducing agency and information asymmetry problems in modern 
corporations is the appointment of non-executive directors (NEDs) (e.g., Fama 1980; Lipton 
and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). In this study, NEDs refer to the ratio of the number of non-
executive directors to the total number of directors of a firm and expressed as a percentage. 
There are two theoretical views with regards to NEDs: those who are in favour of more NEDs 
on corporate boards and those who prefer more executive directors.  
Those who support more NEDs on the board usually base their arguments on three 
theories:  agency,  resource  independence,  and  information  asymmetry  &  signalling.  
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Conventional agency theory suggests that boards dominated by executive directors (insiders) 
are less accountable (Fama, 1980, p.293; Sonnenfeld, 2002, p.108). In contrast, NEDs possess 
three main features. First, they bring independent judgment to board decisions (e.g., Cadbury 
Report, 1992; Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009). Second, they offer the firm resources in the 
form of experience, expertise, business contacts and reputation (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, 
p.1039; Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009, p.715). 
Third, the existence of competitive and efficient managerial labour markets both within 
and outside the firm ensures that NEDs perform their monitoring function effectively (Fama, 
1980, pp.292-294; Fama and Jensen, 1983a, p.315). Fama (1980, p.293) and Fama and Jensen 
(1983a, p.313) argue that once top internal management gains control of the corporate board, 
they are more likely to connive and collude among themselves to expropriate shareholders’ 
wealth. It also reduces healthy competition among managers for improved performance.   
In line with the above view, Fama (1980, p.293) suggests that the possibility of such 
internal managerial connivance might be reduced, and the viability of the board as a market-
induced mechanism for low-cost transfer of control might be enhanced, by the addition of 
NEDs. Jensen (1993, p.863) suggests that their independence help NEDs to avoid politeness 
and  courtesy  at  the  expense  of  truth,  frankness,  and  constructive  criticisms  of  executive 
management in the boardroom without fear of victimisation.  
Finally,  it  has  been  argued  that  the  appointment  of  independent  NEDs  helps  in 
reducing  information  asymmetry  by  credibly  signalling  insiders’  intent  to  treat  outside  or 
potential shareholders fairly, and by implication, the safety of their investment (Black et al., 
2006a, p.184). It also signals to the market insiders’ intent to rely on decision experts, as well 
as their appreciation of the importance of separating the decision-making and control functions 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983a, p.315). As a result, proponents of this view believe that a higher 
percentage of NEDs on corporate boards will improve financial performance.  
However,  relying  on  stewardship  theory,  opponents  argue  that  corporate  boards 
dominated by NEDs may impact negatively on performance (Baysinger and Hookisson, 1990, 
p.74;  Weir  and  Laing,  2000, p.267; Bozec,  2005,  p.1927).  Weir  and  Laing  (2000, p.267) 
contend that NEDs often command less knowledge about the business and find it too difficult 
to understand the complexities of the company. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that 
outside directors are usually part-timers who normally also sit on boards of other companies 
(Bozec, 2005, p.1927; Jiraporn et al., 2009, p.819). This leaves them with too little time to 
devote to their monitoring and advisory duties.  
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By contrast, high levels of executive directorships are associated with high access to 
information, which leads to high quality decision-making (Nicholson and Kiel, 2003, p.588). 
This  can  impact  positively  on  financial  performance.  Crucially,  outside  directors  would 
usually not have the same access to informal sources of information and knowledge within the 
firm. As a result, decisions made by a board dominated by NEDs would be of a lower quality, 
and this would in turn lead to low firm performance.  Further, it has been argued that corporate 
boards dominated by outside directors tend to stifle managerial initiative and strategic actions, 
which arise from excessive managerial supervision (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, p.1039).  
 
ii) The Empirical Evidence on the Percentage of NEDs and Financial Performance 
 
Consistent  with  the  conflicting  nature  of  the  theoretical  literature  on  NEDs,  prior 
empirical  evidence  regarding  the  relationship  between  the  percentage  of  NEDs  and  firm 
financial  performance  is  mixed.  A  strand  of  the  empirical  literature  reports  that  boards 
dominated by NEDs deliver higher performance. Using a sample of 311 UK listed firms from 
1994 to 1996,  Weir et al. (2002) report a positive relationship between the percentage of 
NEDs and performance (Tobin’s Q). Gupta and Fields (2009) examine a US sample of 744 
independent NED resignations from 1990 to 2003 to ascertain the value that the market places 
on board independence. They report that, on average, the announcement of independent NED 
resignations result in 1.22% loss in a firm’s market value. This suggests that investors value 
board  independence  as  independent  boards  are  associated  with  greater  monitoring  of 
managerial behaviour.  
Of  close  importance  to  this  study,  Ho  and  Williams  (2003)  find  a  statistically 
significant and positive link between the percentage of outside directors and a firm’s physical 
and intellectual capital performance in 84 South African listed firms in 1998. Consistent with 
the evidence of Ho and Williams (2003), Mangena and Chamisa (2008) report a negative 
association between the percentage of NEDs and the incidences of firm suspensions from the 
JSE in a sample of 81 firms from 1999 to 2005. This suggests that South African listed firms 
with a higher percentage of NEDs are less likely to be suspended from the stock exchange. 
Recently, El Mhendi (2007) and Mangena and Tauringana (2008) report evidence, which is 
entirely consistent with prior research that boards dominated by NEDs perform better for a 
sample of Tunisian and Zimbabwean listed firms, respectively. 
By contrast, a group of researchers reports that the percentage of NEDs is negatively 
correlated with performance (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Laing and  
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Weir, 1999; Bozec, 2005). In a sample of 25 Canadian firms from 1976 to 2005, Bozec (2005) 
finds  that  the  relationship  between  the  percentage  of  NEDs  and  performance  is  negative. 
Similarly, Sanda et al. (2005) report that Nigerian firms with a low percentage of outside 
directors performed better than those with more NEDs. This suggests that whilst NEDs can 
bring independence, objectivity and experience to bear upon board decisions, the may also 
stifle managerial initiative through excessive monitoring. 
A third stream of empirical papers (e.g., Vefeas and Theodorou 1998; Weir and Laing, 
2000;  Haniffa  and  Hudaib, 2006), indicates  that the  presence of  NEDs  has  no  impact  on 
performance.  For  example,  Hermalin  and  Weisbach  (1991)  report  no  link  between  board 
composition and performance for a sample of 142 US listed firms. UK studies by Vafeas and 
Theodorou (1998) and Weir and Laing (2000) find that the wealth effects of outside directors 
are  statistically  insignificant.  Further,  Haniffa  and  Hudaib  (2006)  report  a  statistically 
insignificant relationship between the percentage of NEDs and performance for a sample of 
347 Malaysian listed firms.   
 
iii) Recommendations of South African Companies Act, King II and the JSE’s Listings Rules 
 
Section  269A  of  the  South  African  Companies  Act  1973  requires  every  public 
company to appoint at least two independent NEDs. King II and the JSE Listings Rules also 
require South African corporate boards of directors to consist of a majority of NEDs. King II 
further requires that the majority of the NEDs be independent of management to ensure that 
minority interests are adequately protected. This suggests that King II expects firms with more 
NEDs on their boards to perform financially better than those with less NEDs.  
As has been discussed above, the past South African evidence also indicates that a 
greater  percentage  of  NEDs  on  corporate  boards  may  be  associated  with  higher  financial 
performance. Ho and Williams (2003) find a statistically significant and positive association 
between the percentage of NEDs and intellectual capital performance. Mangena and Chamisa 
(2008) report that the incidence of listing suspensions from the JSE significantly reduces with 
an increase in the number of NEDs. However, given the mixed international evidence, both 
the  null  and  alternate  hypotheses  are  tested.  Therefore,  the  fourth  (4)  respective  null  and 
alternate hypotheses to be tested in this study are that: 
: 0 H  There is a statistically significant positive relationship between the percentage of 
NEDs and firm financial performance, as measured by both ROA and the Q-
ratio.  
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: 1 H  There is no statistically significant positive relationship between the percentage 
of NEDs and firm financial performance, as proxied by both ROA and the Q-
ratio. 
 
4.2.2.6 Frequency of Board Meetings (FBMs) 
i) The Theoretical Link between the Frequency of Board Meetings and Performance 
The  association  between  the  frequency  of  board  meetings  and  firm  financial 
performance  is  another  internal  corporate  governance  issue  that  gives  rise  to  concern  for 
policy-makers and researchers. There are two theoretical views on this issue: those who are in 
favour of higher frequency of board meetings and those who are not (e.g., Lipton and Lorsch, 
1992; Jensen, 1993). 
One  theoretical  proposition  is  that  the  frequency  of  board  meetings  measures  the 
intensity of a board’s activities, and the quality or effectiveness of its monitoring (Vefeas, 
1999a, p.116; Conger et al., 1998, p.142). All else equal, a higher frequency of board meetings 
will  result  in  a  higher  quality  of  managerial  monitoring,  which  can  impact  positively  on 
financial performance. It has been contended that regular meetings allow directors more time 
to confer, set strategy, and to appraise managerial performance (Vafeas 1999a, p.118). It can 
help directors to remain informed and knowledgeable about important developments within 
the firm. This will place the directors in a better position to timely address emerging critical 
problems (Mangena and Tauringana, 2006, p.12). In fact, Sonnenfeld (2002, p.107) suggests 
that regular meeting attendance is considered a hallmark of the conscientious director. Also, 
frequent meetings intermingled with informal sideline interactions can create and strengthen 
cohesive bonds among directors (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992, p.69).  
An opposing theoretical view is that board meetings are not necessarily beneficial to 
shareholders. Firstly, Vefeas (1999a, p.114) argues that normally the limited time directors 
spend together is not used for the meaningful exchange of ideas among themselves. Instead, 
routine tasks, such as presentation of management reports and various formalities absorb much 
of  the  meetings.  This  reduces  the  amount  of  time  that  outside  directors  would  have  to 
effectively monitor management (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992, p.64). Secondly, board meetings 
are costly in the form of managerial time, travel expenses, refreshments and directors’ meeting 
fees (Vafeas 1999a, p.118).  
In  fact,  Jensen  (1993,  p.866)  contends  that  boards  in  well-functioning  companies 
should  be  relatively  inactive  and  exhibit  little  conflicts.  He  suggests  that  rather  than  
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necessarily organising frequent board meetings, it will be more profitable for corporate boards 
to establish a system that is responsive to their specific challenges. For example, directors can 
increase the frequency of meetings during crisis or when shareholders’ interests are visibly in 
danger,  such  as  when  replacing  the  CEO  or  fighting  hostile  takeovers.  Consistent  with 
Jensen’s (1993) suggestions, Vafeas (1999a, p.118) argues that companies that are efficient in 
setting the right frequency of board meetings, depending on its operating context, will enjoy 
economies of scale in agency costs.  
 
ii) The Empirical Evidence on the Frequency of Board Meetings and Performance 
Firstly, there is limited evidence on the relationship between the frequency of board 
meetings and firm financial performance. Secondly, the limited evidence is also conflicting, 
which makes the frequency of board meetings-financial performance assciation a ripe area for 
further research.  
For  307  US  listed  firms  over  the  1990-1994  period,  Vafeas  (1999a)  reports  a 
statistically significant and negative association between the frequency of board meetings and 
financial  performance,  as  proxied  by  Tobin’s  Q.  By  contrast,  he  finds  that  operating 
performance significantly improves following a year of abnormal board activity. This suggests 
that while directors who confer more regularly can make better decisions and engage in active 
monitoring, the potential benefits of such intense monitoring are expected to reflect in future 
years’ performance. That is, board decisions may have gestation period within which their full 
benefits may be realised. This may also suggests the presence of endogeneity problems in the 
association  between  the  frequency of  board  meetings  and  firm  financial  performance.  For 
example,  it  is  possible  for  firm  financial  performance  to  improve,  following  increased 
frequency of board meetings, but such increased board activity might have been triggered by 
poor firm financial performance. As will be indicated below, section 5.3 of chapter five and 
the whole of chapter nine will address potential endogeneity problems in this research. 
Similarly, using a sample of 258 of the Fortune 1000 companies, Carcello et al. (2002) 
establish a positive relationship between the amount of audit fees paid and the frequency of 
audit committee meetings. This means that audit committees that meet more frequently pay 
higher audit fees, which reduces financial performance
23. Recently, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) 
                                                 
23It is also possible for a firm to incur higher auditing costs as a result of increased monitoring of management by 
the audit committee. This can potentially introduce endogenity problems into the frequency of board meetings-
performance nexus. As has been indicated above, subsection 5.3 of chapter five and chapter nine will discuss how 
issues of endogenity have been addressed in this study.   
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offer evidence, which is in line with the results of prior research that boards that meet more 
frequently are valued less by the market in a sample of 508 US listed firms from 1989 to 1995.  
On the contrary, using a sample of 275 US listed firms from 1995 to 2000, Karamanou 
and  Vafeas  (2005)  find  a  positive  association  between  board  meeting  frequency  and  the 
accuracy of management earnings forecasts. Also, Mangena and Tauringana (2006) report a 
positive relationship between the frequency of board meetings and firm performance for a 
sample of 157 Zimbabwean listed firms over the period 2001-2003. Their results support the 
proposition that monitoring becomes more intense in periods of crisis, and companies whose 
board  meet  more  frequently  perform  better.  In  contrast,  El  Mehdi  (2007)  finds  that  the 
frequency of board meetings has no association with economic performance in a small sample 
of 24 Tunisian listed firms from 2000 to 2005. He suggests that financial performance, which 
is tied most closely to the quality of the day-to-day management of the company, is likely to 
be less affected by the frequency of board meetings. 
 
iii) Recommendations of King II and the JSE’s Listings Rules 
King II and the JSE’s Listings Rules task South African listed firms to establish a 
policy for the frequency, purpose, conduct and duration of their boards of directors and board 
subcommittees’ meetings. Specifically, King II recommends that all corporate boards should 
meet regularly, at least once a quarter, which must be disclosed in their annual reports.  This 
implies that King II expects a higher frequency of board meetings to impact positively on firm 
financial performance. However, given the conflicting international empirical evidence, both 
the null and alternate hypotheses are tested. Hence, the respective fifth (5) null and alternate 
hypotheses to be tested in this study are that: 
  : 0 H   There  is  a  statistically  significant  positive  relationship  between  the      
frequency of board meetings and firm financial performance, as measured by 
both ROA and the Q-ratio. 
  : 1 H   There  is  no  statistically  significant  positive  relationship  between  the      
frequency of board meetings and  firm financial performance, as proxied by 
both ROA and the Q-ratio. 
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4.2.2.7 Presence of Key Internal Board Committees 
i) The Theoretical Link between Board Committees and Financial Performance 
Prior  literature  suggests  that  board  committees  help  improve  the  effectiveness  and 
efficiency of corporate boards (Jiraporn et al., 2009, p.820). According to Harrison (1987, 
p.109)  there  are  two  generic  types  of  board  committees:  monitoring  or  oversight  and 
management supporting or operating. Operating board committees advise management and 
the board on major business decision. Their monitoring counterparts are intended to protect 
shareholder interests by providing objective, independent review of corporate executives and 
affairs. Agency theory suggests that a central monitoring function of the board is to ensure that 
corporate activities are properly audited, (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen 
1983a).  It  also  includes  ensuring  that  directors  and  senior  management  are  adequately 
remunerated, and to nominate qualified individuals for appointment to fill director and top 
management positions (e.g., Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2009; Jiraporn et al., 2009). 
As  a corollary,  there has  been a  dramatic increase in  the  use  of  monitoring  board 
committees over the last three decades (Harrison, 1987, p.109). Key among them are auditing, 
remuneration or compensation and nomination committees. In fact, almost every corporate 
governance code of the modern era has called for the institution of these board committees 
(see Cadbury Report, 1992; UK Combined Code, 1998, 2006; King Reports, 1994, 2002; and 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002, amongst others). 
Despite  their  increasing  popularity,  however,  there  are  still  conflicting  theoretical 
propositions as to the nexus between monitoring board committees and financial performance. 
One line of the theoretical literature suggests that the establishment of these committees can 
impact positively on performance (e.g., Harrison, 1987; Wild, 1994; Sun and Cahan, 2009). 
Firstly, unlike the main board or operating committees (e.g., finance/executive), monitoring 
board committees
24 are usually entirely composed of independent NEDs, making them better 
placed to protect shareholders’ interests by effectively scrutinising managerial actions (e.g., 
Klein, 1998; Vefeas, 1999b). 
 Secondly,  by  their  relative  small  size,  board  committees  are  able  to  meet  more 
frequently. This provides sufficient time for meaningful dialogue and in reaching consensus 
                                                 
24As has been discussed in chapter three, King II recommends, for example, that the remuneration committee 
should be formed entirely by independent NEDs. Audit and nomination committees should be constituted by a 
majority of independent non-executive directors. All three board committees must also be chaired by independent 
NEDs.  
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decisions  quicker  (Karamanou  and  Vefeas,  2005,  p.458).  Thirdly,  by  their  composition
25, 
board committees help in bringing individual director’s specialist knowledge and expertise to 
bear on the board decision-making process (Harrison, 1987, p.111). This also allows the main 
board to devote attention to specific areas of strategic interests and responsibility.  
Finally, board committees enhance corporate accountability, legitimacy and credibility 
by performing specialist functions (Weir et al., 2002, p.585). The principal function of the 
audit  committee,  for  example,  is  to  meet  regularly  with  the  firm’s  external  and  internal 
auditors to review the company’s financial statements, audit process and internal accounting 
controls. This helps reduce agency costs and information asymmetry by facilitating timely 
release of unbiased accounting information by managers to shareholders (Klein, 1998, p.279). 
Also, effective monitoring by the audit committee may help minimise  financial fraud and 
increase firm value.  
The remuneration  committee  determines  and  reviews  the  nature  and  amount  of  all 
compensation for directors and senior officers of the firm. This also helps in reducing the 
agency  problem  by  constructing  and  implementing  remuneration  schemes  and  incentives 
designed to better align the interests of managers and shareholders (Klein, 1998, p.279; Weir 
and Laing, 2000, p.268). The nomination committee is responsible for nominating candidates 
for  appointment  to  the  board.  This  minimises  the  agency  conflict  by  improving  board 
independence and the quality of appointed directors (Vefeas and Theodorou, 1998, p.390; 
Vefeas, 1999b, p.199).  
By contrast, others suggest board committees can impact negatively on performance. 
Firstly, the establishment of board committees imposes extra costs in terms of managerial time, 
travel  expenses  and  additional  remuneration  for  the  members  of  the  committees  (Vefeas, 
1999a, p.118). Secondly, it can result in excessive managerial supervision, which can inhibit 
executive initiative  and vision  (e.g., Goodstein,  et al.,  1994;  Conger  et  al.,  1998;  Vefeas, 
1999a  and  b).  Thirdly,  it  may  also  result  in  duplicating  corporate  board  duties  and 
responsibilities. This will have additional costs implications for firms. Finally, by creating 
generalists  and  specialists  among  board  members,  board committees  have  the  potential  of 
generating conflicts in ideas and impairing boardroom cohesion. 
 
                                                 
25Unlike the main board, directors with specialist knowledge and expertise normally constitute board committees. 
King II suggests, for example, that a majority of the audit committee members must be financially literate and 
preferably with practical financial management experience.   
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ii) The Empirical Literature on Board Committees and Financial Performance 
  The  empirical  literature  regarding  the  association  between  the  presence  of  board 
committees and financial performance is still at its embryonic stage (Dalton et al., 1998; Laing 
and  Weir,  1999,  p.460).  The  little  available  evidence  also  largely  focuses  on  developed 
markets, such as the UK and the US. This makes generalisation difficult. Further, the limited 
evidence also offers contradictory results. This makes board committee structures a fertile area 
for  further  research,  especially  within  a  developing  country  context.  It  may  help  shed 
additional insights on the board committees-performance relationship. The results can also be 
compared with previous international studies on board committees.  
In line with the theoretical literature, a strand of the empirical literature suggests a 
positive  board  committees-performance  relationship  (e.g.,  Wild,  1994;  Chhaochharia  and 
Grinstein, 2009; Sun and Cahan, 2009). Wild (1994) examines market reaction before and 
after the establishment of audit committees by a sample of 260 US firms from 1966 to 1980. 
He reports a statistically significant improvement in share returns following the establishment 
of  audit  committees,  which  suggests  that  the  presence  of  audit  committees  can  enhance 
managerial accountability to shareholders. Recent evidence by Vefeas and Karamanous (2005) 
in  275  Fortune  500  firms  is  consistent  with  prior  research  that  the  presence  of  audit 
committees is positively associated with firm financial performance. 
Using a sample of 606 large US listed firms, Vefeas (1999b) documents a positive 
relationship  between  the  establishment  of  nomination  committees  and  the  quality  of  new 
director appointments
26. This implies that nomination committees can improve board quality, 
which  may  ultimately  improve  the  effectiveness  with  which  the  board  carries  out  its 
monitoring  and  advisory  roles.  In  separate  studies,  but  using  samples  of  US  listed  firms, 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) and Sun and Cahan (2009) report a significant decrease in 
CEO compensation for US firms with independent compensation committees compared with 
those without compensation committees. This suggests that the establishment of independent 
compensation committees is associated with better monitoring of managerial compensation.  
Of special interest to this study, Mangena and Chamisa (2008) find in a sample of 81 
South African listed firms that the presence of an audit committee significantly reduces the 
possibility of a firm being suspended from the stock exchange. This indicates that the presence 
                                                 
26According to Vefeas (1999a), the quality of a director is defined by his or her independence from the appointing 
body. In this case, an independent non-executive director as has been defined in chapter three by King II, for 
example, is considered to be of a higher quality in comparison to a non-executive director.  
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of  audit  committees  improve  internal  monitoring,  reduce  internal  fraud  and  enhance 
compliance with corporate regulations.  
  By contrast, others have offered evidence, which shows that the presence of board 
committees impact negatively on performance (e.g., Main and Johnston, 1993; Vefeas, 1999a). 
In a sample of 220 large British listed firms, Main and Johnston (1993) examine the role of 
remuneration  committees  in  British  boardrooms.  They  report  that  the  presence  of  a 
remuneration committee is associated with higher executive pay, which reduces shareholder 
value.  Similarly,  using  307  US  listed  firms  from  1990  to1994,  Vefeas  (1999a)  reports  a 
negative  relationship  between  the  establishment  of  board  committees  (namely,  audit, 
remuneration, and nomination) and firm value.  
  A third stream of papers suggest no empirical relationship between board committees 
and performance (e.g., Klein, 1998; Vefeas and Theodorou, 1998; Laing and Weir, 1999). 
Using  a  sample  of  486  US  firms  over  the  period  1992-1993,  Klein  (1998)  examines  the 
association  between  the  presence  of  audit,  compensation,  and  nomination  committees  and 
financial  performance,  but  finds  no  statistically  significant  relationship.  Further,  she 
demonstrates that her result is robust irrespective of the changes in the composition of the 
committees’  membership.  Vafeas  and  Theodorou  (1998)  investigate  the  impact  of  audit, 
remuneration and nomination committees on the performance of 250 UK listed firms in 1994. 
They find no evidence in favour of the idea that the existence of the three board committees 
significantly affected firm financial performance. Recently, Weir and Laing (2000), Weir et al. 
(2002), Dulewicz and Herbert (2004), and Bozec (2005) provide evidence, which shows that 
the  establishment  of  the  three  board  committees  has  no  significant  impact  on  financial 
performance. 
 
iii) Recommendations of the Companies Act, King II and the JSE’s Listings Requirements 
  Section  269A  of  the  South  African  Companies  Act  1973  requires  every  public 
company to establish an audit committee, which must consist of at least two independent 
NEDs. Similarly, King II and the JSE’s Listings Rules require South African listed firms to 
institute audit, remuneration, and nomination committees. They specify that each committee 
should be chaired by an independent NED. They must also be composed either entirely of 
independent  NEDs  (in  the  case  of  the  remuneration  committee)  or  by  a  majority  of 
independent  NEDs  (in  the  case  of  audit  and  nomination  committees).  Further,  the  audit 
committee members must be financially literate and should be chaired by a person other than  
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the chairman of the board. This suggests that King II expects that the establishment of board 
committees may directly or indirectly impact positively on firm financial performance.  
As has been discussed above, Mangena and Chamisa (2008) report that South African 
listed firms with audit committees are less likely to be suspended from the JSE than those 
without audit committees. This suggests that the presence of audit committees can improve 
managerial  monitoring.  This  can  also  impact  positively  on  firm  financial  performance. 
However,  given  the  mixed  board  committees-performance  evidence,  both  the  null  and 
alternate  hypotheses  are  tested.  Therefore,  the  respective  sixth  (6)  null  and  alternate 
hypotheses to be tested in this study are that: 
  : 0 H   There is a statistically significant positive relationship between the presence of 
audit,  remuneration  and  nomination  committees  and  firm  financial 
performance, as proxied by both ROA and the Q-ratio. 
  : 1 H   There is no statistically significant positive relationship between the presence 
of  audit,  remuneration  and  nomination  committees  and  firm  financial 
performance, as measured by both ROA and the Q-ratio. 
 
4.2.2.8 Director Shareownership 
 
iii) The Theoretical Link between Director Shareownership and Financial Performance 
Director  ownership  of  shares  is  another  important  internal  corporate  governance 
mechanism that has been proposed as a possible solution to the agency problem. There are two 
contrasting theoretical propositions: convergence-of-interests and entrenchment. 
Agency theory suggests that director shareownership helps in reducing the conflicts of 
interest that exist between shareholders and managers (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 
1980; Jensen, 1993). This convergence-of-interests model maintains that as the proportion of 
equity owned by directors increases, their interests and those of shareholders become more 
aligned and the incentive to indulge in opportunistic behaviour diminishes. This is because the 
greater their financial stake in the form of shareownership, the greater the costs they will incur 
for not maximising shareholders wealth. Consequently, directors who own large blocks of 
shares have additional incentive to actively monitor managerial actions that can help reduce 
agency costs and increase firm financial performance. 
However, another strand of the theoretical literature suggests director entrenchment as 
an alternative hypothesis to convergence-of-interests (e.g., Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and  
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Servaes, 1990; Short and Keasey, 1999). The entrenchment hypothesis proposes that at low 
levels  of  director  shareownership,  the  competitive  internal  and  external  market  forces 
(discipline) can help align the interests of directors with those of shareholders. However, it 
contends that at high levels of shareholding, directors may hold sufficient voting power to 
protect themselves against such disciplinary forces, and as such directors will prefer to pursue 
non-wealth maximising goals. This is because the private benefits in the form of perquisites 
consumption, such as  guaranteed employment with an attractive salary that will accrue to 
directors are greater than the utility that they will obtain from pursuing optimal projects that 
will increase the wealth of all shareholders. This results in director entrenchment in which 
other shareholders are unable to remove or influence the actions of the managing directors, 
even  in the  face  of  serious  under  performance  or  misbehaviour.  In  this  case,  the  director 
shareownership-performance relationship is expected to be negative. 
Further, the theoretical literature suggests that combining the convergence-of-interests 
hypothesis  with  the  entrenchment  hypothesis  gives  rise  to  a  non-linear  director 
shareownership-performance relationship (e.g., Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 
1990). This means that at low levels of director shareownership, interests’ alignment may help 
increase  firm  financial  performance.  However,  at  high  levels  of  director  shareownership, 
director entrenchment impedes beneficial takeovers, and thus decreases firm value. 
 
ii) The Empirical Literature on Director Shareownership and Financial Performance 
  Consistent  with  the  conflicting  nature  of  the  theoretical  literature,  the  empirical 
evidence on director shareownership-performance relationship is mixed. Specifically, a group 
of researchers reports positive relationship, another documents negative association, while a 
third  group  finds  a  non-linear  relationship  between  director  shareownership  and  financial 
performance. 
  Morck et al. (1988) investigate the relationship between director shareownership and 
firm value, as proxied by Tobin’s Q using a cross-sectional sample of 371 Fortune 500 US 
firms in 1980. They report a non-monotonic relationship between director shareownership and 
firm value. This suggests market value of firms’ first increases, then declines, and finally 
increases  slightly,  as  ownership  by  directors  increases.  Specifically,  Morck  et  al.  (1988) 
document a statistically significant and positive director ownership-performance link at lower 
levels (0% to 5% - interests convergence), a statistically significant and negative relationship  
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at moderate levels (5% to 25% - entrenchment), and additionally a statistically significant and 
positive association at higher levels (above 25% - interests convergence) of director ownership.  
Their evidence suggests that at low levels of director ownership, interests alignment 
help  increase  firm  value,  while  at  high  levels,  director  entrenchment  negatively  affects 
financial  performance.  Recent  US  and  UK  studies  by  McConnell  and  Servaes  (1990), 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Short and Keasey (1999), Weir and Laing (2000), and Davies 
et  al.  (2005)  have  supported  the  non-monotonic  director  shareownership-performance 
relationship. 
  By contrast, using a sample of 49 listed Zimbabwean firms in 1994, Owusu-Ansah 
(1998) report  that  director  shareownership  impacts  positively  on  mandatory  disclosure. 
Consistent  with  the  evidence  of  Owusu-Ansah  (1998),  Mangena  and  Tauringana  (2008) 
document a positive association between director shareownership and financial performance, 
as measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA in a sample of 72 Zimbabwean listed firms over the 
period 2002-2004. This suggests that the market perceives director shareownership serving as 
an extra incentive to enhance shareholder value. The results of recent studies by Krivogorsky 
(2006), and Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) have supported the positive relationship for a 
sample of 87 European and 175 Greek listed firms, respectively. 
  In contrast, but of particular importance to this study, Ho and Williams (2003) find that 
director  ownership  is  negatively  related  to  a  firm’s  physical  and  intellectual  capital 
performance  in  a  sample  of  84  South  African  listed  firms.  This  implies  that  the  director 
shareownership-financial performance relationship can also be expected to be negative for 
South African listed firms. Sanda et al. (2005) report an inverse relationship between director 
shareownership and a raft of financial performance measures, including ROA, ROE, Tobin’s 
Q and P/E ratio in a sample of 93 Nigerian listed firms from 1996 to 1999. The negative 
relationship  between  director  shareownership  and  financial  performance  has  also  been 
supported by the findings of Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) in a sample of 347 Malaysian listed 
firms over the period 1996-2000.  
A  fourth  stream  of  empirical  papers  documents  no  relationship  between  director 
shareownership and performance. For example, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) report no cross-
sectional relationship between accounting rates of return and insider shareholding for 511 US 
listed firms from 1984 to 1989. Re-examining previous US evidence using a sample of 600 
listed  firms  from  1984  to  1992,  Himmelberg  et  al.  (1999)  report  a  spurious  correlation 
between director shareownership and Tobin’s Q. They find that a large fraction of the cross- 
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sectional variation in managerial ownership is explained by firm-level characteristics like size, 
cash  flow,  capital,  and  advertising  intensity,  amongst  others.  They  suggest  that  director 
shareownership is rather endogenous in performance regressions, casting serious doubts on 
prior  US  evidence  that  indicates  that  managerial  ownership  is  exogenously  related  to 
performance.  
Similarly, and of close relevance to this study, Mangena and Chamisa (2008) report a 
positive, but statistically insignificant relationship between director shareownership and the 
incidences of listing suspension from the South African stock exchange in a sample of 81 
South  African  listed  firms.  This  suggests  that  director  ownership  has  no  impact  on  the 
likelihood  that  a  firm  will  be  suspended  from  the  JSE.  In  separate  studies,  Vefeas  and 
Theodorou (1998) and El Mehdi (2007) provide evidence which is consistent with the view 
that director shareownership has no impact on firm financial performance in samples of 250 
UK and 24 Tunisian listed firms, respectively. 
 
iii) Recommendations of the Companies Act, King II and the JSE’s Listings Rules 
  The South African Companies Act 1973 requires every director to hold a symbolic one 
share of the company for which he or she is a director. King II and the JSE’s Listings Rules do 
not  set  any  ownership  requirements  for  directors.  However,  King  II  suggests  that  the 
performance-related  elements  of  directors’  remuneration,  such  as  stock  options  should 
constitute  a  substantial  portion  of  their  total  remuneration  package  in  order  to  align  their 
interests  with  those  of  shareholders.  It  should  also  be  designed  to  provide  incentives  to 
directors  to  perform  at  the  highest  operational  levels.  This  indicates  that  King  II  expects 
director shareownership to have a positive impact on firm financial performance.  
However, and as has been discussed above, prior South African studies report mixed 
results.  Ho  and  Williams  (2003)  find  a  statistically  significant  and  negative  link  between 
director ownership and a firm’s physical and intellectual capital performance. By contrast, 
Mangena  and  Chamisa  (2008)  report  a  positive,  but  statistically  insignificant  relationship 
between director shareownership and the incidences of listing suspensions on the JSE. Given 
the  mixed  prior  evidence,  both  the  null  and  alternate  hypotheses  are  tested.  Hence,  the 
respective seventh (7) null and alternate hypotheses
27 to be tested in this study are as follows: 
                                                 
27As will be discussed in chapters seven and eight, to replicate the results of Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell 
and Servaes (1990), director shareownership will be squared and cubed to test for the existence of non-linear 
director shareownership-performance relationships.  
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  : 0 H   There  is  a  statistically  significant  positive  relationship  between  director 
shareownership and firm financial performance, as proxied by both ROA and 
the Q-ratio. 
: 1 H   There  is  no  statistically  significant  positive  relationship  between  director 
shareownership and firm financial performance, as measured by both ROA and 
the Q-ratio. 
 
4.2.3 Internal Corporate Governance Structures and Firm Financial Performance: 
         The Compliance-Index Model 
 
  In a significant departure from the equilibrium-variable model that has been discussed 
above, a different line of corporate governance-financial performance research has recently 
emerged. This new line of corporate governance research contends that a company’s financial 
performance is likely to be influenced by  a number of  agency  mechanisms with potential 
interactive  effects  in  an  integrated  framework  rather  than  as  independent  structures  (e.g., 
Shabbir and Padget, 2005; Beiner at al., 2006). As a consequence, instead of looking at one 
single corporate governance mechanism in isolation, this model recommends the construction 
of a compliance or composite corporate governance index, encapsulating a comprehensive set 
of  corporate  governance  provisions  to  investigate  the  corporate  governance-performance 
nexus.  
  This  subsection  will  discuss  the  limited  empirical  evidence  in  this  new  line  of 
corporate governance research that focuses on both developed and emerging markets. Also, 
while the limited African studies focus on corporate governance and disclosure, they will be 
briefly discussed for their contextual and methodological relevance.  
 
4.2.3.1 Compliance Governance Indices, Financial Performance, and Developed Markets 
 
  Gompers et al. (2003) are among the pioneers to investigate the corporate governance-
financial  performance  link  using  a  compliance  or  composite  corporate  governance  index. 
Specifically,  Gompers  et  al.  examine  how  shareholder  rights  vary  across  firms  and  their 
impact on financial performance. Using the incidence of 24
28 corporate governance rules, they 
                                                 
28They divided the 24 corporate governance rules into four main subgroups: delay, protection, voting, and other. 
The delay subgroup is made up of blank check,  classified board, special meeting, and written consent. The 
protection subgroup consists of compensation plans, contracts, golden parachutes, indemnification, liability, and 
severance. The voting subgroup comprises of bylaws, charter, cumulative voting, secret ballot, supermajority, and 
unequal  voting.  The  other subgroup  includes  antigreenmail, directors’ duties,  fair price,  pension  parachutes, 
poison pill, and silver parachute. They constructed a non-compliance corporate governance index. That is, for  
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construct a non-compliance composite index to proxy for the level of shareholder rights for 
1,500 large US listed firms over the period 1990-1998. They report that an investment strategy 
that buys firms in the lowest decile of the index (strongest rights) and sells firms in the highest 
decile of the index (weakest rights) can earn a statistically significant abnormal returns of 8.5 
percent per year during the sample period. They also find that firms with stronger shareholder 
rights  have  higher  firm  value,  as  measured  by  Tobin’s  Q  and  higher  accounting  profits. 
Further, they report that firms with stronger shareholder rights also have higher sales growth, 
lower capital expenditures, and make fewer corporate acquisitions.  
Using Gompers et al.’s non-compliance corporate governance index, Cremers and Nair 
(2005) provide evidence which is in line with the results of Gompers et al. that US firms with 
better  corporate  governance  generate  superior  share  returns  and  are  valued  higher  by  the 
market.  Similarly,  Bebchuk  et  al.  (2009)  investigate  the  relative  importance  of  the  24 
corporate governance provisions followed by Gompers et al. (2003) by extending the data 
from 1990 to 2003. They report that increases in their non-compliance corporate governance 
index level are associated with economically significant reductions in firm value, as measured 
by Tobin’s Q, as well as large negative abnormal stock returns. Recent US and cross-country 
studies  by Gillan  et al. (2003),  Larcker  et  al.  (2005),  Aggarwal  et  al.  (2007),  Bruno and 
Claessens (2007), and  Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) have provided further empirical 
support for the results of Gompers et al. (2003) and Cremers and Nair (2005).  
By contrast, Core et al. (2006), and Bhagat and Bolton (2008) have cast serious doubts 
on the validity of prior US evidence that establishes a positive link between better composite 
corporate governance indices and financial performance. Core et al. (2006) extends Gompers 
et al.’s (2003) corporate governance index to 1999 to re-examine the finding that firms with 
weak shareholder rights exhibit significant stock market underperformance. After controlling 
for takeover activity, their results reject the hypothesis that weak corporate governance causes 
poor stock returns. Consistent with Core et al. and after taking into account the potential 
endogenous link between corporate governance and performance, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) 
find  no  significant  correlation  between  Gompers  et  al.’s  (2003)  composite  corporate 
governance index and market performance. 
  In the UK and the larger continental Europe, due to limited availability of sufficient 
data, very little research has been done that examines the relationship between a compliance or 
                                                                                                                                                         
every firm they award one point for the presence of any of these 24 corporate governance provisions that restricts 
shareholder rights, zero otherwise.  
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composite corporate governance index and financial performance. Baur at al. (2004), Drobetz 
at al. (2004), Shabbir and Padget (2005), Beiner et al. (2006), and Arcot and Bruno (2007) are 
rare exceptions. Shabbir and Padget (2005) use 12
29 corporate governance provisions from the 
1998 UK Combined Code to develop a non-compliance corporate governance index for a 
sample  of  122  FTSE  350  firms  over  the  period  2000-2003  to  investigate  the  corporate 
governance-performance relationship. Consistent with the US evidence, they report that their 
non-compliance corporate governance index is inversely related to total shareholder return, 
(TSR), return on assets (ROA), and return on equity (ROE). This implies that more compliant 
UK listed firms enjoy higher TSR, ROA and ROE over the sample period.  
Beiner  et al. (2006)  construct  a  compliance composite  corporate  governance index 
based on 38 provisions from the Swiss Code of Best Practice in a 2002 cross-sectional sample 
of 109 Swiss listed firms to examine the corporate governance-performance link. They divided 
38  corporate  governance  provisions  into  five  main  subgroups.  These  are:  corporate 
governance commitment, shareholders’ rights, transparency, board of directors and executive 
management,  and  reporting  and  auditing.  In  constructing  their  compliance  composite 
corporate governance index, every firm is awarded a point for the presence of any of the 38 
good corporate  governance practices, zero otherwise. Consistent with  Shabbir and Padget, 
they find a positive relationship between the quality of corporate governance and firm value, 
as measured by Tobin’s Q.   
Arcot and Bruno (2007) also use 8
30 corporate governance provisions from the 1998 
UK Combined Code to construct a non-compliance composite corporate governance index for 
a  larger  sample  of  245  UK  listed  firms  from  1998  to  2003  to  examine  the  link  between 
corporate  governance  and  financial  performance.  In  contrast  to  Shabbir  and  Padget,  they 
report that adherence to best practice does not always lead to superior financial performance, 
as measured by ROA.  
 
                                                 
29The 12 corporate governance provisions include independent NED chairperson, a senior independent NED 
other than the chair, one third of the board members are NEDs, majority of the NEDs are independent, the board 
has audit, nomination, and remuneration committees, each board committee is chaired by an independent NED, 
the remuneration committee is composed entirely of independent NEDs, the audit committee is composed of 
NEDs only with a majority independent NEDs, and the nomination committee is chaired by an independent NED. 
Similar to Gompers et al (2003), they construct a non-compliance corporate governance index, in which the 
presence of any of the 12 provisions is awarded a value of one, zero otherwise. 
30 The  8  corporate  governance  provisions  they  examined  include  separation  of  chairperson  and  CEO, 
identification of a senior NED, the number of NEDs, the proportion of independent NEDs, director service 
contracts’ notice period, audit, nomination, and remuneration committees. Each of the eight corporate governance 
provisions was binary scored. That is, the presence of any of the eight provisions was awarded a value of one, 
zero otherwise.   
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4.2.3.2 Compliance Governance Indices, Financial Performance, and Emerging Markets  
In  contrast  to  the  mixed  findings  observed  in  developed  markets,  there  is  more 
consistent evidence of a positive and statistically significant relationship between compliance 
or  composite  corporate  governance  indices  and  firm  financial  performance  in  emerging 
markets. Black (2001) is among the first to examine the correlation between the level of a 
compliance or composite governance index and financial performance in an emerging market 
context. Using a corporate governance ranking developed by a Russian Investment Bank for 
21  Russian  listed  firms  in  1999,  he  finds  a  strong  and  statistically  significant  positive 
correlation between good corporate governance and firm value.  
Henry (2008) uses eight
31 corporate governance provisions from the 2003 Australian 
Stock Exchange corporate governance rules to construct a compliance composite corporate 
governance index for a sample of 116 Australian listed firms from 1992 to 2002 to examine 
the corporate governance-performance link. Consistent with the results of Black (2001), he 
reports a statistically significant and positive link between the constructed good composite 
corporate governance index and firm value, as measured by Tobin’s Q. Recent studies by 
Baek et al. (2004), Black et al. (2006a and b), Cheung et al. (2007), Cui et al. (2008), and 
Garay  and  González  (2008)  for  South  Korea,  Russia,  Taiwan,  Hong  Kong,  Australia  and 
Venezuela, respectively, have corroborated the results of prior emerging markets research that 
better-governed  firms  tend  to  be  associated  with  higher  financial  performance  than  their 
poorly-governed counterparts. 
 As has been explained in section 1.2 of chapter one, of close interest to this study, 
however, are four major cross-country studies conducted by Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev 
and Kim (2005), Chen et al. (2009) and Morey et al. (2009) in emerging markets. Klapper and 
Love  (2004) use subjective analysts’ corporate  governance rankings constructed by Credit 
Lyonnais  Securities  Asia  (CLSA)
32 for  a  cross-sectional  sample  of  374  companies  in  14 
emerging countries, including South Africa in 2000 to investigate the link between firm-level 
                                                 
31The 8 corporate governance provisions are: board dependence, CEO-chairperson duality, board size, board 
remuneration,  options  issued  to  executive  directors,  the  existence  of  audit,  nomination,  and  remuneration 
committees. Each of the eight corporate governance provisions was binary scored. That is, the presence of any of 
the eight provisions was awarded a value of one, zero otherwise.  
32The CLSA corporate governance index that Klapper and Love used is based on a questionnaire of 57 qualitative 
corporate governance provisions or questions. The provisions are divided into seven broad subcategories. These 
are: management discipline with 9 provisions, transparency with 14 questions, independence with 12 provisions, 
accountability with 6 provisions, responsibility with 5 questions, fairness with 7 provisions, and social awareness 
with 4 questions. The questionnaire was completed by CLSA analysts in each of the 25 emerging countries for 
the 495 companies covered. CLSA asked its analysts to award a binary number of one for the presence of each of 
the 57 provisions, zero otherwise. Each firm’s total score is then expressed as a percentage of the possible 57.   
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corporate governance and financial performance. They report that the sampled firms’ quality 
of corporate governance is positively correlated with better operating performance, as proxied 
by ROA, and market valuation, as measured by Tobin’s Q. Further, the positive relationship is 
stronger in countries with weaker legal environments. This suggests that corporate governance 
matters more in countries with poor legal regimes and weaker investor protection. 
Similarly, using a combined corporate governance rankings developed by CLSA and 
S&P
33 for a larger cross-sectional sample of 1,067 firms from 27 countries, including South 
Africa, Durnev and Kim (2005) report that firms with better corporate governance structures 
receive higher market valuation, as measured by Tobin’s Q. Similarly, they also report that the 
corporate  governance-performance  relationship  is  more  pronounced  in  countries  with poor 
legal standards. Chen et al. (2009) have also used the same CLSA 2000 subjective analysts’ 
governance  rankings  used  by  Klapper  and  Love  (2004)  and  Durnev  and  Kim  (2005)  to 
examine the nexus between corporate governance and the cost of equity capital. They report a 
statistically significant and negative relationship between the quality of a firm’s corporate 
governance and its cost of equity capital. 
Finally, Morey et al. (2009) investigate the corporate governance-performance link 
using  the  AllianceBerstein  composite  index
34 for  200  firms  from  21  emerging  markets, 
including South Africa from 2001 to 2006. Consistent with the results of Klapper and Love 
(2004)  and  Durnev  and  Kim  (2005),  they  report  that  there  is  generally  a  positive  and 
significant relationship  between corporate  governance  and  firm  valuation,  as  measured  by 
Tobin’s Q and the price per share to book value per share ratio.  
Arguably, and as has been discussed in section 1.2 of chapter one, all four prior studies 
seem to suffer from several limitations. Firstly, a major problem with all cross-country studies 
is that they appear to suffer from sample selection bias. This is because all four studies use 
sample firms rated by analysts. However, and as will be discussed in detail in chapter five, 
prior literature suggests that analysts corporate governance ratings tend to be biased towards 
                                                 
33The combined CLSA/S&P corporate governance rankings used by Durnev and Kim are based on the same 57 
provisions and seven broad subcategories used by Klapper and Love (2004). The questions were also filled in by 
analysts by awarding a binary number of one if any of the 57 provisions is present, zero otherwise. The main 
difference between the two studies is that Durnev and Kim (2005) examine a larger number of countries (27) and 
companies (1,027). 
34AllianceBernstein corporate governance index used by Morey et al. is based on a questionnaire of 60 corporate 
governance questions. The questions are divided into seven subcategories. These are: information disclosure with 
8 questions, management access and fair disclosure with 5 questions, representation of data with 10, value 
creation  with  9  questions,  board  and  shareholder  structure  with  12  questions,  capital  management  with  7 
questions, and social responsibility with 9 questions. The questions were answered by analysts by awarding a 
value of 5 for the presence of any of the 60 corporate governance questions, zero otherwise.  
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larger  firms  (CLSA,  2000,  p.1;  Botosan,  1997;  Hassan  and  Marston,  2008).  The  CLSA 
corporate governance index used by Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev and Kim (2005) and 
Chen et al. (2009) for example, includes only the largest
35 9 South African listed firms
36. This 
means that the sample firms used by previous studies are less representative of the population 
of South African listed firms than the sample used in this study. This raises questions with 
respect to the generalisation of the findings of prior research for South African listed firms.  
Secondly,  the  extant  literature  suggests  that  corporate  governance  structures  and 
systems vary across different countries (West, 2006, p.433, 2009, p.10; Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra,  2009,  p.383;  Filatotchev  and  Boyd,  2009,  p.262).  However,  subjective  analysts’ 
corporate  governance  rankings  are  standardised  such  that  they  are  unable  to  reflect 
institutional,  cultural,  and  contextual  differences  in  corporate  governance  structures  across 
individual countries and systems. This implies that they are unable to assess how compliance 
with South African context specific affirmative action and stakeholder provisions impact on 
the financial performance of South African listed firms. 
Thirdly,  despite  the  increasing  concerns  that  the  presence  of endogenous problems 
could confound research findings (e.g., Himmelberg et al. 1999; Chenhall and Moers, 2007a 
and b), with the exception of Durnev and Kim (2005)
37, none of them attempt to directly 
address problems that may be caused by the existence of an endogenous relationship between 
corporate  governance  and  performance.  This  also  raises  questions  with  respect  to  the 
reliability of the results of prior studies. Finally, with the exception of Morey et al. (2009), all 
the prior studies use only cross-sectional data. This means they are unable to ascertain whether 
the observed cross-sectional corporate governance-performance relationship holds over time. 
The  current  study  on  South  Africa  overcomes  these  limitations  in  prior  studies  in 
several ways. Firstly, and as will be discussed in detail in chapter five, to reduce potential 
sample selection bias and achieve sufficient cross-sectional variation in the sample firms, the 
                                                 
35Specifically, the average firm in the CLSA 2000 sample was 9.4 billion US dollars (CLSA, 2000, p.9). 
36These firms are: Anglo American, De Beers, Dimension Data, First Rand, M-Cell, NEDCOR, Old Mutual, 
South African Brewery, and Standard Bank Investment (CLSA, 2000, p.63). Further, four out of these 9 firms 
included in the CLSA 2000 subjective analysts’ governance rankings, namely Old Mutual, First Rand, NEDCOR 
and Standard Bank Investment are financial institutions (CLSA, 2000, p.13). As will be discussed further in 
chapter five, due to regulatory and capital structure reasons, and in line with much of the prior literature (e.g., 
Yermack, 1996; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Chen et al., 2008; Guest, 2009), financial and utility firms will be 
excluded from the sample.  
37Durnev and Kim (2005) explicitly attempt to address problems that may be caused by the existence of an 
endogenous nexus between corporate governance and performance. However, Black et al. (2006a, p.369) suggest 
that the industry instruments that they used in addressing potential endogeneity problems are somewhat suspect. 
This  is  because  Durnev  and  Kim  (2005,  p.1484)  assume  that  industry  does  not  affect  a  firm’s  corporate 
governance choices. Separate research conducted by Gillan et al. (2003) and Black et al. (2006a), however, 
indicates that industry does influence a firm’s corporate governance choices.  
 
127 
sample will be constructed in such a way that there will be a balance between large and small 
firms. Secondly, and unlike prior studies, the sample size used in this study will be reasonably 
large, consisting of 50 large and 50 small firms. This can arguably enhance generalisation of 
the results. 
 Thirdly, and as will be discussed in detail in chapters five and nine, problems that may 
be posed by the potential existence of endogeneities will be directly addressed in this study. 
Fourthly,  the  corporate  governance  index  used  in  this  study  is  a  researcher-constructed 
instrument. Unlike subjective analysts’ rankings, it has the advantage of ensuring that unique 
and pressing South African contextual corporate governance provisions, such as employment 
equity, black economic empowerment, and HIV/Aids are incorporated into the methodology. 
Finally, since the quality of a firm’s corporate governance structures may arguably change 
over time, this study will examine the corporate governance-performance link using a five-
year panel data with both cross-sectional and time series properties. This may ensure that the 
effects  of  both  cross-sectional  and  time  changes  in  corporate  governance  on  financial 
performance may be appropriately captured in this study. Arguably, these improvements are 
likely  to  provide  new  insights,  which  may  enrich  the  corporate  governance-performance 
literature.  
 
4.2.3.3 Compliance Governance Indices, Company Disclosure, and African Markets 
  Apart from Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev and Kim (2005), Chen et al. (2009), and 
Morey et al. (2009)  whose cross-country samples include South Africa, very little is known 
about the empirical relationship between a compliance or composite corporate governance 
index and financial performance among African listed firms. However, a limited number of 
papers, including Firer and Meth (1986), Wallace (1988), Owusu-Ansah (1998), April et al. 
(2003), Barako et al. (2006a and b), and Mangena and Tauringana (2007), have examined the 
nexus  between  a  constructed  corporate  governance  index  and  the  degree  of  company 
disclosure. 
  Firer  and  Meth  (1986)  examine  the  information  requirements  of  South  African 
investment analysts and compare them with their UK counterparts. Using a disclosure index of 
49 voluntary items for 36 listed South African firms from 1979 to 1983, they report low levels 
of voluntary disclosure among South African firms in comparison with their UK counterparts. 
Owusu-Ansah  (1998)  investigates  the  quality  of  corporate  governance  and  mandatory 
disclosure for 49 Zimbabwean listed firms in 1994. Using a disclosure index of 214 mandatory  
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items, he reports that company size, ownership structure, and profitability have a statistically 
significant and positive effect on mandatory company disclosure. 
   Barako  et  al.  (2006a  and  b)  both  examine  factors  influencing  voluntary  corporate 
disclosure by 43 Kenyan listed companies using 47 voluntary disclosure items over the period 
1992-2001. Consistent with the results of Owusu-Ansah, they report that corporate governance 
attributes, such as ownership structure, the presence of audit committee and foreign ownership 
have  a  positive  impact  on  voluntary  disclosure.  Finally,  Mangena  and  Tauringana  (2007) 
construct a voluntary disclosure index using 87 items for 67 Zimbabwean listed firms from 
2003  to  2004  to  investigate  the  relationship  between  voluntary  disclosure  and  foreign 
shareownership.  Consistent  with  prior  African  evidence,  they  report  that  the  quality  of 
voluntary disclosure, proportion of NEDs, institutional shareownership, and the independence 
of audit committees are all positively associated with foreign shareownership.   
 
4.2.3.4 Recommendations of King II and the JSE’s Listings Rules 
  As has already been discussed in chapter three, King II and the JSE’s Listings Rules 
set  out  six  broad  areas  of  good  corporate  governance  practices,  including  the  board  and 
directors,  accounting  and  auditing,  internal  audit,  control  and  risk  management,  integrated 
sustainability reporting, and compliance and enforcement that South African listed firms are 
expected to comply with or identify and explain any areas of non-compliance. The constructed 
South African Corporate Governance Index (SACGI) contains 50 provisions, which cover all 
six aspects of King II.  
Briefly,  and  as  has  been  discussed  in  section  4.1,  agency  theory  indicates  that 
compliance with good corporate governance practices can reduce agency costs and increase 
shareholder returns. Information asymmetry and managerial signalling theory suggests that 
compliance with codes of good corporate governance standards is essentially a major way by 
which a firm can signal that it is better-governed. By revealing its better governance qualities, 
a firm may increase demand for its shares (increase firm value), but can reduce its cost of 
equity capital. Also, political costs theory indicates that the political system has the power (i.e., 
through taxation, regulations, nationalisation, expropriations, and break-ups) to redistribute 
wealth between various societal groups (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, p.115; Andreasson, 
2009, p.22). In this regard, companies, especially large corporations, are particularly suscetiple 
to wealth redistributions.  
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 This implies that compliance with good corporate governance practices, especially the 
South African context specific affirmative action and stakeholder provisions may not only be a 
major way by which listed firms can decrease political costs, but also an opportunity for them 
to  gain  greater  access  to  resources  (resource  dependence  theory),  such  as  tax  holidays, 
subsidies,  and  government  contracts.  Therefore,  in  theory,  South  African  listed  firms  that 
comply more with the provisions of King II can be expected to be associated with higher 
financial performance than those that do not, ceteris paribus.  
Similarly, and as has been discussed above, prior cross-country studies whose sample 
include a number of South African listed firms by Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev and Kim 
(2005),  and  Morey  et  al.  (2009)  suggest  a  significant  positive  relationship  between  good 
corporate  governance  practices  and  firm  financial  performance.  Further,  opinion-based 
surveys  conducted  by  CLSA  (2000),  McKinsey  &  Co.  (2002),  and  Deutshe  Bank  (2002) 
among global institutional investors, including South African institutional investors, indicate 
that investors are willing to pay a higher premium for shares in firms with good corporate 
governance practices than their counterparts with poor corporate governance practices. This 
also suggests a positive relationship between good corporate governance and financial returns. 
Therefore, the respective final (8) null and alternate hypotheses to be tested in this study are 
that:  
  : 0 H   There  is  a  statistically  significant  positive  relationship  between  the  South 
African Corporate Governance Index (SACGI) and firm financial performance, 
as measured by both ROA and the Q-ratio. 
  : 1 H   There  is  no  statistically  significant  positive  relationship  between  the  South 
African Corporate Governance Index (SACGI) and firm financial performance, 
proxied by both ROA and the Q-ratio. 
 
   
4.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This  chapter  has  focused  on  the extant  theoretical  and  empirical  internal  corporate 
governance-financial  performance  relationship  literature.  Its  objective  has  been  twofold. 
Firstly, it sought to review existing theories that attempt to link internal corporate governance 
structures with firm financial performance. Recognising the complex and multi-disciplinary 
nature of corporate governance, and also in line with the prior literature, multiple-theoretical  
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perspectives  is  adopted  in  constructing  and  explaining  the  complex  relationship  between 
internal corporate governance structures and firm financial performance.  
In  line  with  this  view,  the  agency  problem  is  identified  as  the  main  theoretical 
framework  for  the  study,  while  information  asymmetry  and  managerial  signalling, 
stewardship,  resource  dependence,  political  cost,  and  organisational  theories  of  corporate 
governance  are  relied  on  by  this  study  as  providing  additional  theoretical  insights  into 
developing the often complex nexus between certain specific internal corporate governance 
structures and firm financial performance. For each internal corporate governance mechanism 
examined in this study, and also in line with previous studies, the existing positive theoretical 
link(s) is(are) sharply juxtaposed with a competing theoretical view(s), further signifying and 
corroborating  the  conflicting,  as  well  as  the  complex  nature  of  the  internal  corporate 
governance structures-firm financial performance relationship. 
  With regard to the agency theory, it is argued that the agency problem is general and 
that agency costs unavoidably arise in any situation involving cooperative effort by two or 
more people in which the principal-agent relationship can be invoked even if not explicitly 
defined.  Applying  the  classical  principal-agent  construct  to  the  shareholder-manager 
relationship that arises as a result of the internal organisation of modern corporations in which 
ownership is separate from control, it is pointed out that the main concern has been about how 
shareholders  (owners)  of  the  firm  could  reduce  agency  costs  and  any  additional  potential 
divergences of managerial interests from theirs through the establishment of the appropriate 
monitoring  and  bonding  framework  (internal  corporate  governance  structures)  so  as  to 
improve firm financial performance.  
Also, as a result of information asymmetry between shareholders and managers, the 
latter may need to signal their intentions in order to reduce the adverse selection and moral 
hazards problems that shareholders face by instituting certain internal corporate governance 
structures.  Further,  resource  dependence  theory  contended  that  the  institution  of  such 
corporate  governance  structures,  as  the  board  of  directors  is  not  only  meant  to  monitor 
managers, but also help in securing critical resources for the firm. In contrast, stewardship 
theory  assumed  a  different  nature  of  managerial  behaviour  and  argued  that  managers  are 
trustworthy and so should be fully empowered to run the affairs of the firm with less external 
monitoring.  
  The second major objective of the chapter has been to review the extant empirical 
literature  on  the  link  between  internal  corporate  governance  structures  and  firm  financial  
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performance. In this regard, two main empirical models were identified within the literature: 
the equilibrium-variable and the compliance-index approaches. As will be discussed in detail 
in chapter five, prior studies have so far only used one model or discounted the other purely on 
the basis of perceived theoretical strengths or weaknesses. However, it is contended that such 
a crucial methodological choice ought to be based on their respective theoretical and empirical 
validity rather than on their theoretical appropriateness alone. Therefore, focusing on both 
empirical models within the same study and context, offers a unique opportunity to provide 
first time comparative evidence as to their respective empirical strengths, which may inform 
methodological choices of future researchers.  
  In line with the theoretical literature, irrespective of the context or model reviewed, the 
empirical literature is generally mixed. However, the mixed evidence is more pronounced with 
regard  to  the  equilibrium-variable  model  than  the  compliance-index  approach.  Also,  even 
though  the  evidence  regarding  the  compliance-index  is  conflicting  within  the  context  of 
developed markets, it is more conclusive with regard to emerging markets. Further, whilst the 
compliance-index model literature is quite advanced in the US, due to the lack of sufficient 
data, the non-US evidence is very limited. Finally, and as has been discussed in chapter three, 
while some African countries, such as South Africa offer an interesting research context for 
corporate  governance,  the  dearth  of  empirical  evidence  on  emerging  African  markets  is 
evident  throughout  the  review.  Arguably,  this  offers  an  opportunity  to  make  substantial 
contributions to the extant literature. 
  In the next chapter, the research design will be set out. Specifically, it will describe 
how the sample and data were collected, the research methodology used, and the extent to 
which  the  obtained  empirical  results  are robust  or  sensitive  to  alternative  estimations and 
explanations.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
5. INTRODUCTION 
 
  This chapter discusses the research design. It hopes to achieve four main interrelated 
objectives. Firstly, it attempts to provide a comprehensive description of the data and research 
methodology  used  in  this  study.  The  significance  is  that  every  scientific  work  has  to  be 
replicable,  and  this  can  easily  be  achieved  if  the  researcher  provides  a  clearly  laid  down 
procedure as to how the study is carried out (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). The second objective 
of  the  chapter  is  to  clearly  explain  the  rationale  for  the  various  data  and  methodological 
choices made at every stage of the study. The third aim of the chapter is to point out the 
strengths and weaknesses of the various data and methodological choices that have been made 
throughout the study. Finally, it aims to provide an explicit indication of how sensitive or 
robust the obtained empirical results from the various data and methodological choices that 
have been made are to alternative estimations and explanations. The remainder of this chapter 
is organised as follows. Section 5.1 describes the sample selection procedure and the data. 
Section  5.2  discusses  the  research  methodology.  Section  5.3  examines  at  a  variety  of 
robustness or sensitivity analyses, while section 5.4 summarises the chapter. 
 
 
5.1 SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA 
 
  This section describes the sample selection procedure, the types of data used, and the 
sources of the data used in carrying out this study. Specifically, the section is divided into four 
subsections. Subsection 5.1.1 will describe the sample selection procedure, subsection 5.1.2 
will present the types and sources of data used. Subsection 5.1.3 will describe the criteria for 
selecting the final sample, whilst subsection 5.1.4 will discuss the reasons for selecting the 
final stratified sample of 100 companies. 
 
5.1.1 Sample Selection 
 
The  sample  firms  used  in  examining  the  internal  corporate  governance-financial 
performance link were drawn from companies listed on the JSE Ltd, South Africa. As at 31 
December 2006, a total of 402 companies were officially listed on the main board of the JSE.  
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Firms listed on the Alternative Exchange (AltX) were not considered because they are subject 
to different listings, financial reporting, and corporate governance requirements. The official 
list  of  all  the  main  board  listed  firms  with  their  respective  industrial  classifications  was 
obtained directly from the Market Information Department of the JSE. The list was also cross-
checked  against  the  list  provided  on  the  JSE’s  official  website,  which  is  available  at: 
http://www.jse.co.za, accessed in December 2006. 
In total,  there are  ten  major  industries,  including basic  materials,  consumer  goods, 
consumer  services,  financials,  health  care,  industrials,  oil  and  gas,  technology, 
telecommunications,  and  utilities.  Table  3  presents  a  summary  of  the  sample  selection 
procedure. Panel A of Table 3 shows the industrial composition of all companies that were 
listed on the main board of the JSE as at 31 December 2006. Panels B, C, and D present the 
industrial composition of listed firms available to be sampled, sampled firms with full data, 
and the final 100 stratify sampled firms, respectively. Panel A indicates that the market is 
dominated  by  financials,  industrials,  basic  materials,  and  consumer  services  industries. 
Together, the four industries account for approximately 79% of the entire JSE population of 
listed firms.   
To begin with, the financials industry with 109 firms, and utilities industry with 2 firms, 
which together accounts for approximately 28% of the entire population were excluded from 
being sampled for three well-known reasons. Firstly, financial and utility firms are heavily 
regulated,  which  may  impact  differently  on  their  governance  structures  and  financial 
performance  (Yermack,  1996,  p.189;  Cheng  et  al.,  2008,  p.126;  Guest,  2009,  p.390).  For 
example, section 3 of the South African Companies Act 1973 states that the provisions of the 
Act do not apply to financial firms, such as banks, insurance companies, and pension funds, 
which  are  governed  by  special  statutory  legislations.  Banks  are,  for  instance,  specially 
governed by the Banks Act (No. 94 of 1990) in addition to regulations from the South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB). 
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Table 3: Summary of the Sample Selection Procedure 
 
Panel A: Industrial Composition of all      No. in each     Percentage(%)  
    Listed firms on the JSE as at 31/12/2006    Industry  of population 
 
Financials                   109     27.1 
Industrials                     81     20.1   
Basic Materials                   67     16.7 
Consumer Services                   62     15.4 
Consumer Goods                   36       9.0 
Technology                     31       7.7 
Health Care                       7       1.7 
Telecommunications                     4       1.0 
Oil and Gas                       3       0.8 
Utilities                       2       0.5 
Total population                 402             100.0 
  Less: Financials, and           109 
           U  tilities                 2        111     27.6   
Total sampled firms                 291     72.4   
 
Panel B: Industrial composition of        No. in each       Percentage 
   Firms available to be sampled      Industry         of sample  
 
Industrials                     81     27.8 
Basic Materials                   67     23.0 
Consumer Services                   62     21.3   
Consumer Goods                   36     12.4   
Technology                     31     10.7   
Health Care                       7       2.4         
Telecommunications                     4       1.4  
Oil and Gas                       3       1.0 
Total Firms Available to be sampled            291                   100.0 
       Less:  Firms with no year’s data available        28       
                 Firms with some years’ data missing      94       122     41.9   
Total sampled firms with full data             169     58.1 
 
Panel C: Industrial composition of        No. in each       Percentage  
  Sampled firms with full data       Industry       of sample   
 
Industrials (2 email and 2 postal copies of annual reports)         51     30.2 
Consumer Services                   35     20.7 
Basic Materials (2 website copies of annual reports)          33     19.5   
Consumer Goods                   24     14.2   
Technology (2 website and 1 email copies of annual reports)      19     11.2   
Health Care                       3       1.8         
Telecommunications (1 postal copy of annual report)           3       1.8  
Oil and Gas                       1       0.6 
Total Sampled Firms with full data             169                       100.0 
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Continuation: Table 3 
 
Panel D: The final 100      No. in each    Final no. of      Percentage of         Percent. of 
     Stratified       Industry    Stratified     the final Indus-        Industrial 
     Sampled firms        Sample     trial sample(169)    Sample(291) 
 
Industrials               51           20                39.2                      24.7 
Consumer Serv./Health Care           38           20                52.6                      29.0 
Basic Materials/Oil and Gas           34           20                58.8                      28.6 
Consumer Goods               24           20                83.3                      55.6 
Technology/Telecoms.           22           20                90.9                      57.1 
Total sample                       169         100                59.2                      34.4 
 
Sources: The JSE Ltd – Panel A; Author’s Compilation – Panels B, C and D. In total, full five years (2002 - 2006) 
annual reports totalling 845 were collected for the final 169 firms in Panel C. 835 (98.8%) of the annual reports 
were collected from Perfect information. As Panel C indicates, the remaining 10 (1.2%) annual reports were 
collected as follows: 3 postal copies, 3 email copies, and four company website copies. 
 
 
Secondly, financial firms have unique capital structure (i.e., highly geared), which can 
impact on financial performance differently (Lim et al., 2007, p.562)
38. Finally, excluding 
financial and utility companies can help facilitate comparisons with prior studies (e.g., Ho and 
Williams, 2003; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008), who also exclude 
such firms. All the remaining 291 firms constituting 72.4% of the entire JSE population were 
then sampled for possible inclusion. Panel B of Table 3 presents the industrial composition of 
the remaining 8 industries that were sampled as at 31 December 2006. 
The remainder of this section is divided into three. The next subsection will describe 
the types and sources of data used in this study, while subsections 5.1.3, and 5.1.4 will present 
the criteria, and reasons for selecting the final 100 stratify sampled firms used in this study, 
respectively. 
 
5.1.2 Data and Sources 
Two  main  types  of  data  are  used  in  examining  the  relationship  between  internal 
corporate governance structures and financial performance of South African listed firms. The 
first category consists of internal corporate governance variables. All the internal corporate 
governance  variables  were  manually  extracted  from  the  annual  reports  of  the  sampled 
companies. The annual reports were mainly obtained from the Rest of the World Filings of the 
Perfect Information Database in electronic format. Considerable amount of efforts were put in 
                                                 
38The recent globall financial crisis in which banks and other financial institutions (BOFIs) have particularly been 
affected  negatively  worldwide  offers  anecdotal support  to  this  argument  (see  Turner Review,  2009;  Walker 
Review, 2009).  
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to maximise the sample size, as much as possible. As a result, for companies with a particular 
year’s annual report missing or not available in Perfect Information, they were either directly 
contacted via telephone or e-mail or their websites were scanned if they had websites for hard 
or electronic copies.  
As Panel C of Table 3 indicates, and as will be further explained below, in total, ten 
company annual reports that were not found in Perfect Information forming approximately 
1.2% of the total 845 annual reports obtained (i.e., 169 firms over five firm years each) were 
received as follows: three postal copies, three e-mail electronic versions, and four reports were 
obtained from company websites. The remaining 835 (i.e., 98.8%) company annual reports 
were  all  obtained  from  Perfect  Information.  Company  annual  stock  market  and  financial 
accounting performance variables constitute the second type of data used in this study. These 
were all collected from DataStream. 
 
5.1.3 The Criteria for Selecting the Final Sample 
To be included in the final sample, a firm has to meet the following two criteria: (1) a 
company’s full five-year annual reports from 2002 to 2006 inclusive must be available either 
in Perfect Information or via other media used, such as e-mail, company official website and 
postal  delivery,  as  described  above;  and  (2)  its  corresponding  five-year  stock  market  and 
financial accounting information must also be available in DataStream. These criteria were 
imposed for several reasons.  
Firstly,  the  criteria  helped  in  meeting  the  requirements  for  a  balanced  panel  data 
analysis, which favours, including only firms with several consecutive years of data (Yermack, 
1996,  p.189;  Cheng  et  al.,  2008,  p.126).  There  are  advantages  for  using  panel  data.  By 
combining time series of cross-sectional observations, balanced panel data provides: (i) more 
degrees of freedom; (ii) less collinearity among variables; (iii) more cross-sectional and time 
series variability; (iv) more asymptotic efficiency; (v) more informative data; and (vi) account 
more for observable and unobservable firm-level heterogeneity in individual-specific variables 
(Gujarati, 2003, p.637).  
It  is  also  a  timely  response  to  recent  calls  for  the  use  of  panel  data  in  corporate 
governance research as a way of minimising inherent statistical problems, such as endogeneity 
(Börsch-Supan  and  Köke,  2002,  p.301;  Larcker  and  Rusticus,  2007,  p.208).  A  potential 
weakness is that it introduces survivorship bias into the sample selection process. However, 
and as will be discussed further below, the criteria generated comparatively larger sample size  
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in relation to those of prior South African studies to the extent that the generalisability of the 
research  results  may  not  be  substantially  impaired.  Secondly,  it  is  in  line  with  previous 
corporate governance researchers who have used panel data (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Gompers et 
al., 2003; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008), and specifically five-year balanced panel (e.g., Boyd, 
1995; Gani and Jermias, 2006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Thirdly, using a five-year data is 
also generally in line with conventional capital markets-based research (Fama, 1965; Strong, 
1992, p.538; Kothari, 2001, p.186).  
Fourthly, contrary to much of the existing literature that uses one year cross-sectional 
data, analysis of five-year data with both cross-sectional and time series properties may help in 
ascertaining whether the observed cross-sectional internal corporate  governance structures-
performance link also holds over time. Fifthly, and as will be discussed further in subsection 
5.3,  the  five-year  panel  ensured  that  sufficient  series  are  obtained  to  permit  carrying  out 
proposed statistical and  robustness analyses, such as endogeneity test.  Sixthly, the sample 
begins from the 2002 financial year because it is the year King II came into force in which JSE 
listed  firms  were  required  to  comply  with  its  provisions  or  explain  in  the  case  of  non-
compliance (King Report, 2002, pp.20-21, 41). Finally, the sample ends in 2006 because it is 
the most recent year for which data was available at the time of data collection.  
Using the above criteria, and as Panel B of Table 3 shows, the full data required is 
obtained for a total of 169 (58.1%) out of the 291 firms constituting  the remaining  eight 
industries. For 94 of the remaining 122 firms, two or more years of financial performance data 
and/or annual reports could not be found in DataStream and Perfect information, respectively 
or via other media, such as company websites, and direct e-mail or telephone contacts. For the 
remaining 28 firms, neither financial performance data nor full annual reports are available in 
DataStream and Perfect Information, respectively or the other media used.  
The sample of 169 firms is still large when compared with previous South African 
studies (e.g., Firer and Meth, 1986; April et al., 2003; Ho and Williams, 2003; Mangena and 
Chamisa, 2008). For example, in investigating corporate governance and incidences of listing 
suspension by the JSE, Mangena and Chamisa (2008) obtained full annual reports data on 81 
out of a possible 538 suspended firms identified over the period 1999-2005. Similarly, using 
various techniques – direct contact, database, and websites searches, Ho and Williams (2003) 
were able to obtain a useable cross-sectional sample of 84 annual reports for South African 
listed firms for the 1998 financial year to examine the association between board structure and 
the efficiency of value added by a firm’s physical and intellectual capital resources. Firer and  
 
138 
Meth  (1986)  obtained  only  36  annual  reports  for  studying  information  requirements  of 
investment analysts in South Africa, while April et al. (2003) received only 20 annual reports 
for examining intellectual capital disclosures among South African mining firms. 
Panel C of Table 3 contains the industrial composition of the 169 firms for which a full 
five-year data is available. The industrials/manufacturing sector remains the largest with 51 
firms out of the total 169 firms, accounting for 30.2%. By contrast, health care, oil and gas, 
and  telecommunications  industries  together  accounts  for  a  meagre  4.1%  of  the  total  169 
sampled firms. This is consistent with the composition of the natural population. Due to the 
small  number  of  observations  in  three  industries,  namely;  health  care,  oil  and  gas,  and 
telecommunications with three, one, and three listed firms, respectively, were merged with the 
closest remaining five major industries. As a result (see Panel D of Table 3), the three health 
care companies were included in the consumer services industry; the one oil and gas firm was 
added to the basic materials industry, while the three telecommunications companies were 
also shared out to the technology industry. 
 Finally, and the rationale for which will be explained in subsection 5.1.4, a stratified 
sample of 100 firms out of the total 169 companies, consisting of 20 firms each from the five 
main remaining industries were taken. This is achieved by first ranking all the firms in each 
industry by their five-year average (i.e., from 2002 to 2006 inclusive) market capitalization, as 
a proxy for size
39. Using the five-year average market value in ranking the firms is in line with 
prior research (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985, p.1164).  Crucially, it is found to be more powerful 
in capturing the actual size of the firms over the five-year period than using the market value 
of a single financial year for example. In each industry, the largest
40  10 ranked companies and 
smallest 10 ranked firms are then selected to form a group of 20 firms in each industry.  
Panel D of Table 3 contains the breakdown of the remaining five industries, as well as 
the final 100 stratified sample firms. As can be observed from Panel A of Table 3, a notable 
limitation of selecting equal number of firms from each industry is that the composition of the 
final sample will not be representative of the natural JSE population of 402 or the possible JSE 
                                                 
39With the recent significant increase in the value of corporate intangibles, especially among telecommunications 
and technology firms (Brand Finance, 2006, pp.6-8; Holland, 2006, pp.281-282; Ghosh and Wu, 2007, pp.216-
218), market value is considered to be a more germane and objective size measure. Also, experiments with other 
potential  size  measures,  such  as  total  assets  and  sales  yielded  similar  results.  For  example,  the  correlation 
between market value and total assets is 0.948, while the correlation between market value and total sales is 
0.896.  
40For  five  companies,  one  from  the  basic  materials, three  from the industrials,  and one  from the  consumer 
services, they were large instead of the largest ranked companies. These five firms were used in conducting the 
initial pilot test for the study and have been retained in the final sample.  
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sample of 291. However, as Panel D shows, with the exception of the industrials sector, the 
final stratified sample of 20 firms in each industry forms more than 50% of the final useable 
industrial sample. Also, the total selected 100 firms from the five industries accounts for close 
to 60% of the useable sample of 169 (i.e., firms with full data available). Similarly, apart from 
the industrials, the final stratified sample of 20 companies in each industry constitutes more 
than 25% of the original industrial population. In total, the final 100 stratified sample for the 
five  industries  also  forms  close  to  25%  of  the  entire  JSE  population  of  402  listed  firms. 
Appendix 1 contains a list of the names and industries of the sample of 100 firms used in this 
study. 
 
5.1.4 Reasons for Selecting the Final 100 Stratified Sample  
         Several theoretical, empirical, and practical reasons motivated the selection of the 100 
firms on the basis of size and industry. Firstly, a considerable and well-established theoretical 
and empirical accounting disclosure literature exists, which suggests that company size and 
industry  matter  (e.g.,  Cerf,  1961;  Verrecchia,  2001;  Beattie  et  al.,  2004;  and  Hassan  and 
Marston, 2008, amongst others). Specifically, Lang and Lundholm (1993, p.246) provide US 
evidence, which suggests that accounting disclosure is positively correlated with firm size.  
The  positive  relationship  between  size  and  disclosure  can  be  explained  by  several 
factors.  Firstly,  accounting  compliance  and  disclosure  have  cost  implications  that  smaller 
firms may struggle to afford in comparison with their larger counterparts (Lang and Lundholm, 
1993,  p.252).  Secondly,  larger  firms  are  exposed  to  greater  public  scrutiny,  analysts  and 
financial press following, which compels them to disclose more (Lang and Lundholm, 1993, 
pp.249-251).  Thirdly,  larger  firms  are  more  complex  with  respect  to  the  scope  of  their 
business  operations,  segments,  products,  markets  and  geographical  locations  (Marston and 
Shrives, 1991, p.205), and therefore have more to disclose. For example, it can be argued that 
a multinational multi-product company would have more to disclose than a small locally listed 
company.  
Fourthly, larger firms are more likely to be cross-listed
41 (Marston and Shrives, 1991, 
p.206;  Melvin  and  Valero,  2009,  p.66)  and  be  subject  to  additional  corporate  governance 
disclosure requirements (CLSA, 2000, p.1; Deutsche Bank, 2002, pp.9-10, 30). Fifthly, prior 
literature suggests that the political costs of stringent regulations, nationalisation, taxation, and 
break-ups, amongst others, are positively associated with firm size (Watts and Zimmerman, 
                                                 
41As will be discussed in subsection 5.2, cross-listing will be used as one of the control variables in this study.  
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1978, p.115; Andreasson, 2009, p.22). As a result, larger firms have additional incentives of 
reducing political costs of strict central regulation or even nationalisation through increased 
disclosure,  especially  with  respect  to  affirmative  action  and  social  disclosures  (Watts  and 
Zimmerman, 1978, p.115; Marston and Shrives, 1991, p.205). Finally, prior literature suggests 
that  larger  firms have  greater  agency  problems  and  a  higher  need  to  attract  new  external 
capital (Jensen, 1986, p.323; Core, 2001, p.443; Beiner et al., 2006, pp.250, 253).  This means 
that  larger  firms  may  have  to  disclose  more  in  order  to  reduce  the  twin  information 
asymmetric problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Recent studies by Botosan (1997), Clarkson and Satterly (1997), Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002), Jiang and Kim (2004), and Mangena and Tauringana (2007), amongst others, offer 
evidence, which shows that, on average, larger firms tend to disclose more than smaller firms. 
As a corollary, the top and the bottom ten firms in each industry ranked by their five-year 
average market capitalisations are sampled. The rationale is to achieve a fair balance between 
larger and smaller firms. As has been discussed in chapter four, unlike previous studies, this 
will help to achieve sufficient cross-sectional variation in corporate  governance disclosure 
levels, and improve generalisation of the research results. 
Secondly, the same accounting disclosure literature indicates that different industries 
depict different patterns of corporate governance disclosure (Botosan, 1997, p.327; Deutsche 
Bank, 2002, p.6; Gillan et al., 2003, pp.1-2). Lang and Lundholm (1993, p.251) suggest, for 
example, that biotechnology firms appear to disclose more voluntary information because of 
the  severe  information  asymmetry  between  managers  and  investors.  In  contrast,  Botosan 
(1997, p.327) reports that pharmaceutical firms tend to disclose more about their research and 
development activities than do firms in other industries.  
Of particular interest to this study, opinion-based surveys conducted by CLSA (2000) 
and  Deutsche  Bank  (2002)  in  emerging  markets,  including  South  Africa  indicate  that 
corporate governance standards vary across different industries. The results of the Deutsche 
Bank  (2002,  p.6)  survey,  for  example,  suggests  that  corporate  governance  standards  were 
highest among energy or consumer services firms, whilst good corporate governance practices 
were weakest among technology firms. As a result, to prevent one industry from dominating 
the sample, and crucially, to maximise the generalisability of the results, equal number of 20 
firms from each of the five major remaining industries is sampled.  
Thirdly, the final 100 stratified sampled firms, which generated a total of 500 firm-year 
observations, form a significant percentage of the total possible sample, as well as the JSE  
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population. It constitutes approximately 60% and 34% of the useable final sample of 169 and 
the possible JSE sample of 291 firms, respectively, which statistical sampling (central limit 
theorem)  theory  suggests  is  a sufficiently  large sample  (Whatsham,  and Parramore,  1997, 
pp.136-140;  Anderson  et  al.,  2007,  pp.239-241).  Finally,  for  practical  considerations,  the 
sample was restricted to 100 companies. In particular, the corporate governance variables were 
manually extracted, which is a highly labour-intensive activity (Hussainey et al., 2003, p.276; 
Beattie et al., 2004, pp.232-233). As a result, practical limitations of time, effort and finance 
meant that the sample had to be reduced to a number that is statistically large enough to make 
a significant contribution, while at the same time ensuring that the study is completed within 
the scheduled time-frame of a PhD. 
 
 
5.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This section considers the research methodology. Specifically, subsection 5.2.1 will 
attempt to explain the theoretical underpinnings, potential weaknesses and the rationale for 
examining the two major competing positive corporate governance models within the extant 
literature in the current study. Subsection 5.2.2 will discuss the compliance-index model. The 
issues that will be covered include how the South African corporate governance index (the 
SACGI) (i.e., the main independent variable with regard to the compliance-index model) is 
constructed, and proxies that will be used as control, and financial performance (dependent) 
variables. Finally, subsection 5.2.3 will discuss the equilibrium-variable model. The issues 
that will be covered include proxies that will be used as independent, control and dependent 
variables.  
   
5.2.1 The Equilibrium-Variable and the Compliance-Index Models and their 
         Theoretical Underpinnings  
 
As has briefly been explained in chapter four, there are two major competing positive 
theoretical  and  empirical  internal  corporate  governance  models  (positive  methodologies
42) 
within  the  extant  corporate  governance  literature:  the  equilibrium-variable  and  the 
compliance-index. While some researchers have examined the internal corporate governance-
                                                 
42A third strain of the positive corporate governance literature adopts conventional event study methodology to 
estimate the stock market reaction to the adoption of certain corporate governance structures by publicly traded 
firms (e.g., DeAngelo and Rice, 1983; Lambert and Larcker, 1985; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Wild, 1994; Fox 
and Opong, 1999; Black et al., 2007; and Huang et al., 2008, amongst others). The event study methodology is 
not adopted or considered in this study because firm-level data of corporate governance adoption dates are not 
available.  
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performance link by following the equilibrium-variable model (e.g., Demtz and Lehn, 1985; 
Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; and Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; amongst others), others have 
done so using the compliance-index approach (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Shabbir and Padget, 
2005; and Cheung et al., 2007, amongst others).  
An important  methodological  issue,  however,  is  that  the  two  models  are based  on 
contrasting theoretical assumptions (e.g., Demtz and Lehn, 1985; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, 
Beiner et al., 2006; Black et al., 2006c). The equilibrium-variable model, for example, is 
based on distinct assumptions. Firstly, it assumes that the extent to which individual internal 
corporate governance mechanisms, such as director shareownership and the proportion of non-
executive  board  members  are  used,  is  mainly  determined  within  the  firm  (Agrawal  and 
Knoeber, 1996, p.378). Secondly, it assumes that some corporate governance mechanisms are 
more important than others (e.g., Barako et al., 2006a and b; Hassan and Marston, 2008). 
Thirdly,  there  are  no  mandatory  or  statutory  corporate  governance  provisions
43 for 
firms to comply with (Danielson and Karpoff, 1998, pp.348, 355-356), which was largely the 
case  before  the  worldwide  proliferation  of  corporate  governance  codes  in  the  late  1980s 
(Black et al., 2006a, p.367). As a result, a firm’s internal governance choices are assumed to 
be  an  endogenous  response  to:  (1)  specific  firm  needs  or  business  purposes,  including 
preventing  hostile  takeovers,  the  desire  to  attract  qualified  independent  directors,  and 
shareholder pressure; (2) important court rulings or decisions; (3) professional business and 
legal advice; (4) peer behaviour in which a firm copies provisions used by competitors or 
common provisions within the industry; and (5) its investment opportunities, information, and 
regulatory environment (Danielson and Karpoff, 1998, pp.355-356; Gillan et al., 2003, p.1-2).  
Fourthly,  it  assumes  that  agency  problems  vary  across  firms  due  to  differences  in 
ownership,  size,  complexity  of  operations,  and  industry,  amongst other  firm-level  features 
(Marston and Shrives, 1991, pp.196-197; Gillan et al., 2003, pp.1-2). Fifthly, firms’ external 
corporate  governance  mechanisms,  such  as  the  market  for  corporate  control,  investor 
monitoring, legal, and regulatory rules are exogenously determined, in which variations across 
firms’ external environments may either help maximise or destroy firm value (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996, p.379; Gillan et al., 2003, p.1).  
                                                 
43This is still partially true for South Africa and all countries that follow UK’s principle of encouraging listed 
firms to qualitatively comply with corporate governance codes by ‘complying’ or ‘explaining’ themselves in case 
of non-compliance with the provisions. This is because while compliance with corporate governance codes in 
such countries is voluntary, they are usually appended to Stock Exchange listings rules for which consistent non-
compliant listed firms may face serious sanctions, such as suspension or de-listing (e.g., Malherbe and Segal. 
2003; Armstrong et al., 2006; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008).   
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Finally, it assumes that the use of individual internal corporate governance structures 
are not necessarily complementary such that where one corporate governance mechanism is 
used  more,  others  may  be  used  less,  leading  to  equally  good  performance  (Agrawal  and 
Knoeber, 1996, p.378; Danielson and Karpoff, 1998, pp.347, 368). This suggests that there is 
an optimal relationship between the use of corporate governance mechanisms and financial 
performance in which a firm will continue to institute governance structures until marginal 
costs are equal to marginal gains (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985, p.1155; Core, 2001, p.442-444).  
As a result, an equilibrium-variable model researcher will typically search in a cross-
sectional  sample of  listed  firms  for  links between performance  and  greater  use  of  one  or 
several  corporate  governance  mechanisms  on  the  basis  of  some  endogenous  assumptions 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, p.378; Shabbir and Padget, 2005, p.6)
44. A major theoretical 
implication is that if all firms are in equilibrium with respect to their governance choices, then 
a carefully specified cross-sectional regression should find no link between performance and 
the use  of  those internal  corporate  governance  mechanisms  (Agrawal  and  Knoeber,  1996, 
pp.381-382; Shabbir and Padget, 2005, pp.5-6). If this equilibrium assumption were to be 
realistic, then that in itself could technically introduce the problem of endogeneity
45 into the 
specified structural equations (Black et al., 2006a, p.367; Chenhall and Moers, 2007a, p.183). 
By contrast, the compliance-index model assumes that internal corporate governance 
mechanisms are externally imposed, and so firms tend to choose governance structures as a set 
(Danielson and Karpoff, 1998, p.367-368; Shabbir and Padget, 2005, p.7). This is particularly 
true for listed firms in the US where compliance with corporate governance rules, such as 
those of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, are backed by statutory legislation. Specifically, it 
assumes that a firm’s financial performance is likely to be influenced by a number of agency 
mechanisms with possible interactive effects in an integrated framework (Gillan et al., 2003, 
p.1; Beiner et al., 2006, p.249).  
Also, due to the existence of alternative corporate governance mechanisms, there may 
be possibilities of interdependence among the variables (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, p.378). 
As a result, instead of looking at single corporate governance mechanisms in isolation, this 
model calls for the construction of a compliance-index, containing a comprehensive set of 
                                                 
44As will be pointed out below, the equilibrium assumption is highly unrealistic. For example, one possible way 
of  achieving  equilibrium  is if  every  firm  in a sample  were  to  make  use  of the same  corporate  governance 
mechanisms. Arguably, this is highly unlikely in practice.  
45Potential econometric problems of endogeneity in this study will be addressed in subsection 5.3.1.  
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corporate  governance  provisions  for  the  empirical  investigation  of  the  internal  corporate 
governance-performance link (Gillan et al., 2003, p.4; Shabbir and Padget, 2005, p.7). 
 
5.2.1.1 The Potential Weaknesses of the Two Competing Methodologies  
To date, no researcher has used both competing corporate governance models within 
the same study and context. However, from a methodological perspective, serious empirical 
questions remain unanswered in relation to the two models. With regard to the equilibrium-
variable  model,  a  theoretical  argument  is  that  the  existence  of  alternative  corporate 
governance  mechanisms  and  their  possible  interdependence  renders  OLS  regressions  that 
attempt to link the use of any single mechanism to firm performance difficult to interpret 
(Agrawal and Knoeber 1996, p.378; Beiner et al., 2006, p.252). That is, the results from such 
regressions may be spurious because they ignore possible interactions among the corporate 
governance mechanisms 
Also, the potential presence of omitted variable bias suggests that cross-sectional OLS 
regressions  of  firm  performance  on  single  corporate  governance  structures  may  result  in 
misleading regression coefficients (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, p.377; Black et al., 2006a, 
p.367). Additionally, it has been contended that while it is theoretically possible for a firm to 
determine its optimal governance structure
46, in practice, it is extremely difficult to unravel 
(Karpoff, 1998, p.352). In fact, and as has been reviewed in subsection 4.2 of chapter four, a 
considerable number of studies document significant impact of internal corporate governance 
structures on performance using cross-sectional samples. This demonstrates that, in practice, 
sufficient  variations  in  wealth  effects  of  corporate  governance  structures  may  exist  across 
firms
47. 
In the case of the compliance-index, Gillan et al. (2003, p.3) suggest that it is possible 
for  a  constructed  compliance-index  to  loose  some  of  its  explanatory  power  through  the 
aggregation process. By contrast, Core (2001, p.452) suggests that aggregating the corporate 
governance  proxies  into  a  single  measure  may  enhance  explanatory  power.  Also,  if  this 
model’s contention that firms’ internal governance structures are largely a function of external 
forces, such as the regulatory environment, is allowed to hold, then it will fail to provide 
                                                 
46It should also be noted that while a firm can theoretically determine its optimal internal governance structure, it 
has no control over its external governance mechanisms whose effects may maximise or destroy firm value 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, p.379). Arguably, this can potentially still push a firm which is presumably in 
equilibrium with respect to its internal governance structure into disequilibrium. This makes the equilibrium 
assumption very unrealistic in practice (Chenhall and Moers, 2007a, p.184). 
47At least, if potential data and methodological weaknesses within prior studies are assumed away.  
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compelling explanations for the cross-sectional differences in the use of corporate governance 
mechanisms among firms’ that are observed in practice (Core, 2001, p.444). Crucially, and as 
has  been  discussed  in  subsection  5.1.4,  compliance-index  construction
48 has  been  widely 
acknowledged to be costly in terms of time and labour involved (Beattie et al. 2007, p.140; 
Core, 2001, p.452). This places limitations on the sample size used by prior studies and the 
generalisability of their research results. 
 As a consequence, a critical methodological question is that – does the use of the 
equilibrium-variable model or the compliance-index model have the potential to influence the 
interpretation of the resulting empirical analyses? Another methodological issue of concern, 
for example, is that if applying the equilibrium-variable model leads to essentially similar 
results as the compliance-index model, then is it valuable to construct a compliance-index 
given that it has been shown to be expensive and labour-intensive to the extent that it is only 
feasible in relatively small samples? Crucially, and as has been discussed in chapter four, 
much of the existing literature has produced conflicting results regarding the impact of internal 
corporate  governance  mechanisms  on  financial  performance.  To  what  extent  can  this  be 
explained by the methodological choices of researchers? 
While these are largely empirical issues, however, prior research has not examined 
their comparative empirical validity and explanatory powers. Danielson and Karpoff (1998, 
p.368) discuss most of the theoretical and methodological issues raised above, but fail to offer 
empirical support. Similarly, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996, p.377) provide empirical evidence 
of  interdependence  among  alternative  corporate  governance  mechanisms,  but  they  do  not 
construct a compliance or composite index to examine their respective empirical robustness.  
This has left previous researchers to either arbitrarily choose one methodology (e.g., Yermack, 
1996; Gompers et al., 2003; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) or select the other based on some of 
the theoretical and methodological arguments that have been pointed out above alone (Gillan 
et al., 2003; Black et al., 2006a; Beiner et al., 2006).  
However, it is contended that such a crucial methodological choice ought to be based 
on both their respective theoretical and empirical validity if the resulting empirical evidence is 
to  be  robust.  Hence,  consistent  with  prior  research,  the  equilibrium-variable  and  the 
compliance-index models are independently estimated. In this case, the relationship between a 
                                                 
48This is particularly crucial for non-US studies where researchers usually have to resort to manual collection of 
corporate  governance  data  because  firm-level  corporate  governance  data  is  not  readily  available  from 
independent  professional  corporate  governance  research  and  ratings  organisations,  such  as  Insititutional 
Shareholder Services and Standards & Poors.   
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constructed comprehensive corporate governance index for South African listed firms (the 
SACGI) and financial performance is first examined, while the second model investigates the 
same relationship by using single corporate governance provisions in isolation. Distinct from 
previous  studies,  however,  their  comparative  empirical  validity  and  powers  are  further 
investigated within the same study and context. As has already been pointed out in subsection 
4.2.1 of chapter four, the central rationale is to ascertain whether different research results will 
be obtained depending on the model used. This may help inform methodological choices of 
future researchers. 
The next subsection will describe the independent, control and dependent variables, 
and  how  they  are  measured  in  each  model.  Specifically,  subsection  5.2.2  will  provide  a 
comprehensive description of the compliance-index model – how the SACGI was constructed, 
the control, as well as the dependent variables. This will be followed by a similar description 
of the independent, control and dependent variables for the equilibrium-variable  model at 
subsection 5.2.3. Also, the rationale, the limitations, the strengths and where applicable, the 
theoretical  links  relating  to  the  selected  proxies  for  independent,  control  and  dependent 
variables  of  each  model  will  be  discussed.  Finally,  methodological  issues  of  replicability, 
reliability and validity will also be addressed. 
 
5.2.2 The Compliance-Index Model 
 
5.2.2.1 The Main Independent Variable: The South African Corporate Governance Index  
           (the SACGI) 
 
With regards to the compliance-index model, the constructed South African Corporate 
Governance  Index  (hereafter,  the  “SACGI”)  is  the  main  independent  variable  used  in 
examining  the  relationship  between  internal  corporate  governance  structures  and  financial 
performance. The SACGI is an aggregation of 50 comprehensive set of corporate governance 
provisions contained in the 2002 King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 
(henceforth, “King II”). As has been discussed in chapter three, the SACGI is constructed 
based  on  the  six  broad  sections  of  King  II  covering:  (1)  boards  and  directors;  (2)  risk 
management;  (3)  internal  audit;  (4)  integrated  sustainability  reporting  (non-financial 
information); (5) accounting and auditing; and (6) compliance and enforcement. As has been 
explained in chapter three, South African companies listed on the JSE are required to comply 
with these corporate governance provisons or give reasons in the case of non-compliance.   
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This is generally in line with prior studies that have relied on either national (e.g., 
Cadbury  Report,  1992;  Combined  Code  1998;  Swiss  Code  of  Best  Practice,  2002)  or 
international codes of corporate governance (e.g., OECD Principles, 1999; Commonwealth 
Principles, 1999; Global Reporting Initiative, 2000), in constructing their composite corporate 
governance indices (e.g., Shabbir and Padget, 2005; Beiner et al., 2006; Cheung et al., 2007). 
Appendix 2 contains the six broad sections and the various variables that make-up the SACGI. 
It also provides explicit definitions of the coding instruments and how the variables have been 
measured. 
  The SACGI is distinct from those of prior research in three main aspects. Firstly, unlike 
previous  studies  that  focus  on  specific  aspects  of  corporate  governance  in  isolation,  for 
instance,  shareholder  rights  (Gompers  et  al.,  2003;  Cremers  and  Nair,  2005),  board  size 
(Yermack, 1996), blockholding (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), role duality (Baliga et al., 1996), 
director ownership (Morck et al., 1988), and frequency of board meetings (Vefeas, 1999a), 
amongst others, it covers all aspects of internal corporate governance. This allows for the 
existence  of  potential  interactions  and  interdependences  among  alternative  corporate 
governance mechanisms. Secondly, in line with prior studies (e.g., Beiner et al., 2006; Black 
et al., 2006a and b; Cheung et al., 2007), the SACGI covers conventional internal corporate 
governance issues, such as the board and directors, and internal audit (see sections 1 to 4 of 
Appendix  2).  By  contrast,  it  is  distinct  in  its  coverage  of  South  African  context  specific 
affirmative  action  and  stakeholder  corporate  governance  provisions  under  the  integrated 
sustainability reporting (see section 5 of Appendix 2).  
These  affirmative  action  and  stakeholder  corporate  governance  issues,  include 
employment equity, HIV/Aids, occupational health and safety, ethics, board diversity, black 
economic empowerment, social, and environmental reporting. Section 5 of Appendix 2 shows 
how these unique contextual corporate governance issues are measured and incorporated into 
the  methodology.  As  has  been  discussed  in  chapter  three,  these  affirmative  action  and 
stakeholder issues are extremely crucial within the South African corporate context for two 
reasons.  
Firstly, and as has been discussed in subsection 3.3.3.3 of chapter three, there is an on-
going local policy debate as to whether the current ‘hybrid’ or Anglo-American corporate 
governance  model  is  appropriate  for  South  Africa  given  its  unique  political,  social,  and 
economic challenges (e.g., Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002; Spisto, 2005; West, 2006, 
2009). Secondly, South African listed firms are required to comply with stakeholder issues,  
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such  as  black  economic  empowerment.  Prior  literature  suggests  that  compliance  with 
stakeholder issues has additional financial costs implications for listed firms (e.g., Kakabadse 
and  Korac-Kakabadse,  2002;  LSE,  2007).  However,  it  is  still  empirically  unknown  how 
compliance with these South African context specific affirmative action and stakeholder issues 
will impact on the economic fortunes of listed firms. Therefore, by incorporating these South 
African context specific affirmative action and stakeholder issues in the SACGI, the economic 
consequences of complying with these stakeholder issues for South African listed firms can be 
empirically quantified.  
As  will  be  discussed  further  in  chapters  six  and  seven,  the  SACGI  containing  50 
corporate governance provisons will be split into two: Social-SACGI and Economic-SACGI. 
The  Social-SACGI  will  contain  9  South  African  context  specific  affirmative  action  and 
stakeholder provisions, such as employment equity and black economic empowerment (see 
section  5  of  Appendix  2).  The  relationship  between  the  Social-SACGI  and  firm  financial 
performance, as proxied by return on assets (an accounting based performance measure) and 
Tobin’s Q (a market based performance measure) will be examined. As has been explained 
above, the rationale is to ascertain the economic impact of complying with these affirmative 
action  and  stakeholder  issues  on  South  African  listed  firms.  The  Economic-SACGI  will 
contain 41 conventional corporate governance provisions, such as role or CEO duality (see 
section 1 to 4 of Appendix 2). The association between the Economic-SACGI and the two 
financial  performance  proxies  will  also  be  examined.  Therefore,  the  analysis  of  the 
relationship  between  the  Economic-SACGI  and  the  two  performance  measures  can  be 
considered to be more comparable with prior studies. 
A potential line of criticism is that by covering distinctively South African context 
specific affirmative action and stakeholder  corporate  governance issues in the SACGI, the 
ability to make direct comparisons with prior studies may be impeded. However, and as can be 
observed from Appendix 2, distinctively South African contextual issues account for less than 
20% (9 out of 50) of the SACGI. In this case, and in line with prior studies, the SACGI is 
dominated by conventional internal corporate governance issues. Distinct from prior studies, 
however,  it  attempts  to  incorporate  South  African  context  specific  affirmative  action  and 
stakeholder corporate governance issues. Arguably, this has the potential of uncovering new 
valuable insights that may enrich the internal corporate governance-performance relationship 
literature.  
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The  next  six  subsections  will  discuss  how  the  SACGI  is  constructed.  Specifically, 
subsection (i) will explain the rationale and source of the corporate governance information. 
Subsection (ii) will discuss the rationale for using a researcher-constructed index. Subsection 
(iii) will describe how the internal corporate governance provisions were scored. Subsection 
(iv) will examine the rationale for the coding scheme used in this study. Subsection (v) will 
address the reliability and validity of the SACGI, whilst subsection (vi) will discuss the general 
sampling and index construction limitations. 
 
i) The Source of the Corporate Governance Information: Company Annual Reports 
  Despite  the  existence  of  other  means
49 by  which  companies  can  disclose  timely 
corporate governance information (Hassan and Marston, 2008, p.5), the SACGI is solely based 
on corporate governance information that firms provide in their annual reports for several 
reasons. Firstly, and as has been discussed in subsection 3.3.1 of chapter three, unlike other 
media, the Companies Act and the JSE Listings Rules mandate listed firms to issue annual 
reports. It has been argued that the mandatory nature of annual reports makes them a regular 
and reliable source of corporate  governance information (e.g.,  Lang and Lundholm, 1993; 
Botosan, 1997). This is because a firm can be sued for providing misleading information. 
Secondly, prior evidence suggests that annual report disclosure levels are positively correlated 
with the amount of disclosure provided via other media (Lang and Lundholm, 1993, p.258; 
Botosan, 1997, p.329)
50.  
Thirdly, the weights applied to annual report disclosures by the major independent 
professional corporate governance research and ratings organisations, such as AIMR/AFAF, 
                                                 
49Accounting  disclosure media  have  been  classified into  three  major  categories:  annual  published  and  other 
required information; quarterly or interim and other published information not required; and other aspects or 
investor  relations  (Lang  and  Lundholm,  1993,  pp.253-254;  Botosan  and  Plumlee,  2002.  pp.29-30).  Interim 
reports cover quarterly reports to shareholders, proxy statements, annual meeting reports, management forecasts, 
fact books, press releases, and newsletters. Other aspects cover senior management presentations to analysts and 
investors, press conferences, company-sponsored field trips, interviews, and company websites (Botosan and 
Plumlee, 2002, p.30). While the corporate governance information provided in company annual reports can be 
expected to be adequate, these other information media are being explicitly acknowledged as potential sources of 
corporate governance information. 
50Lang and Lundholm (1993, p.258) find that the correlation between annual report disclosures and quarterly or 
other report  disclosures is .62,  while  the  correlation  between  annual report  disclosures  and  other  aspects or 
investor relations is .41. Similarly, Botosan and Plumlee (2002, p.33) report that: the correlation between annual 
report  disclosures  and  interim  or  other  report  disclosures  is  .634;  the  correlation  between  annual  report 
disclosures and other aspects or investor relations’ disclosures is .499; and the correlation between annual report 
disclosures and total disclosures (i.e., including annual reports, interim or other reports, and other aspects or 
investor relations) is .824.   
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CLSA, GMI, HCGR, ISS, SEC and S&P
51 range between 40-50% of the overall disclosure 
scores  (Botosan  and  Plumlee,  2002,  p.30;  Hassan  and  Marston,  2008,  p.6).  By  contrast, 
quarterly and other published information carries a weight that ranges between 30-40%, while 
other aspects or investor relations carry a weight that ranges between 20-30% (Botosan and 
Plumlee, 2002, p.30). Botosan and Plumlee (2002, p.30) argue that the weight attached to 
annual reports suggests that annual reports are viewed as one of the most important sources of 
corporate information 
Fourthly, Botosan (1997, p.331) suggests that the annual report is a major corporate 
reporting  document,  and  every  other  financial  report  is  in  some  respect  subsidiary  or 
supplementary  to  it.  Fifthly,  practically  only  company  annual  reports  were  consistently 
available in Perfect Information where the annual reports were mainly collected from. Finally, 
using company annual reports is also in line with prior studies, which can facilitate direct 
comparison with their results (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Shabbir and Padget, 2005; Cheung et al., 
2007).  
 
ii) Subjective Analysts’ Rankings versus Researcher-Constructed Indices: Their   
Strengths and Weaknesses 
 
  To  date,  the  extant  literature  has  employed  two  major  ways  of  measuring  internal 
corporate  governance  disclosures  (Beattie  et  al.,  2004,  pp.207-211).  The  first  approach 
involves  the  use  of  subjective  analysts’  corporate  governance  quality  disclosure  rankings 
based on analysts’ perception (survey) of corporate governance disclosure quality of firms 
usually  conducted  by  independent  professional  corporate  governance  research  and  ratings 
organisations, such as those of AIMR/AFAF, and S&P. The second approach, which is more 
popular, has been the use of researcher-constructed quality indices in which the amount of 
disclosure is directly measured via a disclosure vehicle, such as annual reports, and used as a 
proxy  for  disclosure  quality  (Beattie  et  al.,  2004,  p.207).  Both  approaches  have  some 
advantages and disadvantages.  
Researcher-constructed quality indices have been criticised on several grounds. Firstly, 
unlike  subjective  analysts’  rankings,  which  cover  all  types  of  disclosure  media  by  firms, 
                                                 
51For brevity, these abbreviations will be referred to in this subsection. They stand for: The Association of 
Investment  Management  and  Research  (AIMR)  (formerly  the  Financial  Analysts  Federation  (AFAF)) 
headquartered  in  the  US;  Credit  Lyonnais  Securities  Asia  (CLSA)  headquartered  in  Hong  Kong; 
GovernanceMetric International (GMI) headquartered in the US; Horwath Corporate Governance Report (HCGR) 
headquartered in Australia;  Institutional  Shareholder  Services  (ISS)  headquartered in the  US;  Securities  and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) headquartered in the US; and Standard & Poor’s (S&P) headquartered in the US.  
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including annual reports, interim reports, and investor relations, they are less comprehensive 
with regard to the number of disclosure media and items included in the index (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993, p.247). Secondly, Hassan and Marston (2008, p.10) suggest that corporate 
governance ratings provided by leading financial analysts could be more reliable than those 
constructed by researchers because of their professional experience and superior specialist 
knowledge. Thirdly, researcher-constructed indices are vulnerable to researcher judgemental 
errors and bias (Core, 2001, p.452).  
Fourthly, and as has been discussed in subsection 5.1.4, they are more labour intensive, 
and as such tend to be available for a smaller sample of firms, and of lower frequency than 
subjective  analysts’  indices  (Hassan  and  Marston,  2008,  pp.10,  16).  Finally,  Marston  and 
Shrives  (1991,  p.198)  suggest  that  using  an  existing  index  is  advantageous  in  that  direct 
comparisons with previous studies can easily be drawn. 
Despite these limitations, this study adopts a researcher-constructed quality index for 
the following reasons. Firstly, analysts’ corporate governance ratings are normally country 
specific (the majority of them rate only US firms), and as such the criteria used in rating firms 
may  not  be  easily  applicable  to  all  countries  due  to  differences  in  corporate  governance 
systems and practices, as has been discussed in chapter two
52. The CLSA (2000) subjective 
analysts’  corporate  governance  rankings  that  have  been  used  widely  by  prior  studies,  for 
example, are standardised for firms from all countries included. This implies that the rankings 
are unable to reflect institutional, cultural and contextual differences in corporate governance 
practices across different countries.   
Secondly, most of the subjective analysts’ corporate governance rankings have been 
either out of date or discontinued
53 (Hassan and Marston, 2008, p.10). In this case, there are no 
comparable corporate governance rankings or proxies for South African listed firms
54.  
                                                 
52For  example,  AIMR/AFAF/ISS/SEC  and  HCGR  provide  corporate  governance  rankings  only  for  US  and 
Australian firms, respectively. 
53AIMR/AFAF rankings were discontinued in 1997, while CLSA has not updated its emerging markets survey 
since 2001. According to Durnev and Kim (2005, p.1469), available anecdotal evidence suggests that CLSA 
stopped compiling the corporate governance scores because it lost a considerable number of corporate finance 
business it had with companies that were awarded the worst corporate governance scores. 
54A considerable amount of effort was made to obtain subjective analysts’ corporate governance rankings for 
South African listed firms from independent professional corporate governance research and rankings firms. 
Most of them do not rate South African firms. GMI was the only one that confirmed to ranking some of the 
largest South African firms, but could not release the scores because of ‘confidential and commercial’ reasons.  
S&P and Moody’s were also contacted for credit ratings for South African firms to be used as a proxy for 
corporate governance quality. S&P confirmed that they rate only the largest South African commercial banks, 
while Moody’s does not rate South African firms, although both expressed willingness to rate South African 
listed firms of choice at commercial rates.    
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Thirdly, Botosan (1997, p.326-327) suggests that analysts’ ratings tend to be limited to 
the largest firms that are heavily followed in an industry, and as such are unlikely to show 
sufficient cross-sectional variation in corporate governance disclosure levels. As such, using a 
researcher-constructed index ensured that sufficient cross-sectional variation was achieved in 
the sample, and thus avoided the possibility of sample bias that is normally associated with 
subjective  analysts’  corporate  governance  rankings.  Fourthly,  unlike  subjective  analysts’ 
rankings, it has the advantage of ensuring that unique and pressing South African contextual 
corporate governance issues of relevance, such as employment equity and black economic 
empowerment, are incorporated into the methodology. 
Fifthly,  despite  manually  constructing  the  index,  and  unlike  much  of  the  existing 
corporate  governance literature, the SACGI is relatively  comprehensive with regard to the 
scope of coverage of internal corporate governance disclosure items (50 provisions), sample 
size  (100 firms)  and  frequency  (over  five  firm  years).  Sixthly,  unlike  subjective  analysts’ 
rankings  that  are  based  on  mere  analysts’  perceptions  of  corporate  governance  disclosure 
quality,  the  SACGI  is  a  direct  measure  of  actual  corporate  governance  disclosures  in  the 
sampled  firms’  annual  reports,  making  it  much  more  reliable  and  accurate  (Lang  and 
Lundholm, 1993, p.247).  
Finally, subjective analysts’ rankings has also been criticised for the potential biases 
that analysts bring to the corporate governance ratings (Beattie et al., 2004, p.210; Chen et al., 
2009, p.286). Specifically, it has been suggested that as an opinion-based research, subjective 
analysts’ rankings rely on circumstantial and subjective data (Hermes, 2005, p.1). Arguably, 
any research findings based on subjective rankings can be considered to be of little evidential 
value.  
 
iii) The SACGI: How the Internal Corporate Governance Provisions were Scored  
 
  Following  a  well-established  line  of  scoring  corporate  governance  disclosures  in 
annual reports (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Shabbir and Padget, 2005; Black et al., 2006a; 
Arcot  and  Bruno,  2007;  Henry,  2008;  and  Morey  et  al.,  2009;  amongst  others),  a  binary 
coding scheme is adopted. This  method of scoring involves awarding  a value of “1” if a 
particular internal corporate  governance provision is disclosed in the annual report or  “0” 
otherwise. All the corporate governance provisions included in the SACGI (compliance-index) 
are based on the corporate governance provisions of King II. It covers all six broad areas of  
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best corporate governance practices that listed firms are required to ‘comply’ or ‘explain’ in 
the case of non-compliance.  
To  capture  the  intensity  of  internal  corporate  governance  practices,  the  six  broad 
sections  are  further  disaggregated  into  50  provisions.  Specifically,  the  scoring  process 
involved manually reading each firm’s annual report and awarding one point if a particular 
corporate governance provision is disclosed or zero if not. For each of the five firm years, the 
individual corporate governance provision by corporate governance provision scores for each 
of the 100 firms were then aggregated and expressed as a percentage of the total possible score 
of  50  to  constitute  an  overall  compliance-index,  the  SACGI.  With  this  scoring  scheme,  a 
company’s total score in a particular firm year can vary between zero (0%) to fifty (100%), 
with 0% indicating perfect non-compliance and 100% indicating complete compliance. 
Appendix 2 shows the six broad sections and the various subsections that constitute the 
SACGI.  The  six  subsections  include:  (1)  boards  and  directors;  (2)  risk  management;  (3) 
internal  audit;  (4)  integrated  sustainability  reporting  (non-financial  information);  (5) 
accounting and auditing; and (6) compliance and enforcement. Appendix 2 further provides 
explicit definitions of the coding instruments and how the variables are measured.  
The components of the SACGI are more comprehensive in relation to much of the prior 
literature, helping to tease out actual inherent differences in internal corporate governance 
quality among the sampled firms. For example, and as has been discussed in subsection 4.2 of 
chapter four, Shabbir and Padget (2005, pp.9-10) construct a binary compliance-index based 
on only 12 provisions from the ‘board and directors’ section of the 1998 UK Combined Code, 
completely ignoring other sections, such as accounting and auditing, internal audit, and risk 
management. Similarly, Henry (2008, pp.918-921, 931) constructs a binary composite-index 
based on only 8 provisions from the 2003 Australian Stock Exchange’s Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations, arguing that the other sections 
may not be value relevant. 
 A limitation that can be observed from Appendix 2, though, is that the SACGI is not 
equally distributed across the six sections, with the ‘board and directors’ section accounting 
for  approximately  54%  of  the  total  50  best  corporate  governance  practices.  However,  it 
suggests that King II recognises corporate ‘board and directors’ as an important part of the 
internal  corporate  governance  structure,  a  view  that  is  consistent  with  theory  (Lipton  and 
Lorsch, 1992; John and Senbet, 1998). Practically, the distribution of the variables across the 
six sections reflects the original composition of King II as a document.  
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iv) Coding and Weighting Schemes: Their Strengths and Weaknesses 
There  are  two  important  methodological  issues  that  need  to  be  addressed  when  it 
comes to scoring corporate governance disclosures in corporate annual reports: coding and 
weighting schemes to be used.  
With  regard  to  the  coding  scheme,  there  are  two  main  options  that  are  open  to 
researchers. The first option is to use a simple binary coding scheme, which measures the 
absence or presence of an item (0 or 1). The second choice is to use a complex ordinal coding 
scheme,  which  attempts  to  capture  the  degree  of  detail  and  specificity  of  the  disclosed 
information by using a graduated scale (“not limited to but frequently three levels – 0, 1 and 
2”) (Beattie et al., 2004, p.210). For example, if no information is disclosed on an item, a 
sample firm receives “0” point, if only qualitative information is disclosed, the firm gets “1” 
point, while if the disclosed information is quantified, the firm receives the maximum value of 
“2”.  
  To  begin  with,  both  binary  and  ordinal  coding  schemes  have  their  strengths  and 
shortcomings. A major criticism of binary coding scheme is that it fails to allow the quality of 
specific corporate governance disclosures to be measured (Beattie et al., 2004, p.210). It also 
fails to reflect the relative impacts of different corporate governance provisions (Gompers et 
al., 2003, p.114). Despite these weaknesses, a binary rather than ordinal coding scheme is 
adopted for four main reasons.  
Firstly, ordinal coding is appropriate when measuring voluntary disclosures in which 
reasonable  differences  in  the  degree  of  disclosures  can  be  expected  (e.g.,  Botosan,  1997; 
Hassan and Marston, 2008). As can be seen from Appendix 2, with the exceptions of the 
South  African  context  specific  issues  of  employment  equity  (PEQ),  black  economic 
empowerment (BEE), HIV/Aids (HIV), health and occupational safety (PHS), code of ethics 
(DCE), environmental practices (PEP), and corporate social investment (CSI) where some 
level of judgement is involved, the remaining provisions involve a straightforward present or 
absent disclosures.  
For example, the board chairperson (BCP) is either independent (“1”) or not (“0”), a 
firm has split the positions of chairperson and CEO (DUAL1) (“1”) or not (“0”), and so on. 
This  leaves  no  avenues  to  qualitatively  discriminate  among  disclosure  levels,  such  as 
meaningfully differentiating between firms that provide a quantification of the information 
disclosed or not, and thus using ordinal coding will be inappropriate. Appendix 3a contains a  
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spreadsheet of the first eleven coded corporate governance variables for the first six sampled 
firms
55 in  alphabetical  order.  This  is  a  sample  that  shows  how  carefully  the  corporate 
governance information collected from company annual reports were coded. Similar coding 
was undertaken for all the 500 firm-year observations.  
Secondly, distinct from much of the existing literature, the coding instrument has been 
designed in such a way that it is inherently self-discriminating in order to tease out qualitative 
differences in corporate governance disclosures across firms. In this case, the existence of a 
nomination committee (NCOM1), for example, attracts only a point, and if it is well-composed 
(COM2), receives a point. Further, if the chairman of the nomination comittee is independent 
(NCCP), attracts another point, while if membership of the nomination committee (DM1) and 
individual members meeting attendance (INCMMA) are disclosed, attract a point each. This 
compels firms to comply with both the ‘letter and spirit’ of the code rather than engage in 
mere box-ticking.       
  Thirdly,  unlike  ordinal coding,  it  requires  no  or  very  limited  researcher  judgement 
about the degree of specificity of internal corporate governance provisions disclosure levels 
(Gompers et al., 2003, p.144). This makes it relatively objective, simple and easy to replicate. 
It also has the advantage of minimising researcher bias, which enhances transparency and 
reliability  of  the  constructed  index  (Milne  and  Adler,  1999,  p.242).  Finally,  it  has  been 
demonstrated  that  ‘quantity  and  quality’  are  positively  correlated  (Botosan,  1997,  p.329; 
Beattie et al., 2004, p.210). This suggests that, on average, firms that disclose more tend to 
show higher quality attributes. 
The second critical issue is whether to construct a weighted or an unweighted index 
(Barako  et  al.,  2006b,  p.8;  Hassan  and  Marston,  2008,  p.23).  Similarly,  weighted  or 
unweighted indices have their own limitations and strengths. The use of an unweighted index 
has been criticised for its fundamental assumption that every internal corporate governance 
provision in the index is of equal importance, a view which is inconsistent with theory and 
practice (Barako et al., 2006a, p.115). However, in this study, an equally weighted index (the 
SACGI) is constructed due to the following reasons. 
Firstly, there is a general lack of a rigorously developed theoretical basis on which 
weights could be accurately assigned to the various corporate governance provisions (Black et 
al., 2006a, p.375). In this case, the use of an unweighted index avoids the necessity of making 
                                                 
55The six firms are Amalgamated Appliance Holdings Ltd (AAH), Anglogold Ashanti Ltd (AAS), AECI Ltd 
(ACI), Advtech Ltd (ADV), Allied Electronics Corporation Ltd (AEC), and Afrgri Ltd (AFI).   
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subjective  value  judgements  as  to  the  relative  importance  or  efficacy  of  each  corporate 
governance provision (Owusu-Ansah, 1998, p.609). Secondly, an associated advantage of an 
unweighted index is that it does not involve arbitrarily or subjectively assigning weights. This 
obviates creating a situation whereby the constructed index is unnecessarily dominated by or 
biased towards a particular set of corporate governance provisions. 
Thirdly,  rigorously  established  empirical  evidence  from  the  accounting  disclosure 
literature suggests that the use of weighted and unweighted indices tend to give the same 
results, especially where the number of corporate governance provisions is relatively large 
(e.g.,  Robbins  and  Austin,  1986;  Chow  and  Wong-Boren, 1987;  Beattie et  al.,  2004; and 
Barako et al., 2006a and b, amongst others). Finally, in line with much of the prior corporate 
governance-performance relationship literature (Gompers et al., 2003; Black et al., 2006a; 
Henry, 2008; and Morey et al., 2009, amongst others), an unweighted index is constructed, 
which will make it easier for direct comparisons to be drawn with their results. 
   
v) Addressing the Reliability and Validity of the Constructed Index, the ‘SACGI’ 
 
There are two additional set of critical methodological issues that need to be addressed 
when it comes to using researcher-constructed quality composite indices (Marston and Shrives, 
1991, pp.197-199). These are the reliability and validity of the constructed compliance-index, 
the SACGI.  
Generally, reliability refers to “the extent to which a measuring procedure yields the 
same  results  on  repeated  trials”  (Hassan  and  Marston,  2008,  p.27).  When  it  comes  to 
compliance-index construction, there are two reliability issues that must be addressed: stability 
and reproducibility. The constructed index is reliable if it can be easily replicated by the same 
researcher  over  time  (stability),  as  well  as  by  another  researcher  (reproducibility),  when 
coding the same content with higher levels of accuracy (Beattie et al., 2004, p.214; Beattie and 
Thompson, 2007, p.139).  
With regard to stability, each annual report was coded twice over a 14-month period – 
with the first round of coding taking 8 months (from February 2007 to September 2007), and 
the second  round lasting  a  period  of 6  months  (from October  2007  to  March  2008).  The 
second  round  of  coding,  which  was  meant  to  cross-check  the  accuracy  of  the  first  round 
coding, involved weekly meetings with supervisors where the coded materials, the coding 
instrument, and categories were critically discussed. Informed by these critical comments, and 
as suggested by Milne and Adler (1999, p.239) and Beattie and Thompson (2007, p.139), the  
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coding rules and categories were made much more explicit, refined, and in some cases, such as 
board  diversity  on  the  basis  of  ethnicity  and  gender  (BDIVE1,  BDIVG1),  the  coding 
instrument was expanded. Also, mistakes or inconsistencies identified in the first round of 
coding were corrected during the second round of coding
56. 
  In connection with reproducibility, Beattie and Thompson (2007, p.140) suggest that 
prior studies are generally “silent or vague” as to the specific parts of the annual report that 
were examined. This issue is addressed in two ways in this study. Firstly, even though the 
study focuses exclusively on internal corporate  governance, all parts of the annual report, 
including the integrated sustainability report were analysed. For eight
57 companies which had 
separate  annual  and  integrated  sustainability  reports,  all  parts  of  the  two  documents  were 
separately analysed. With the exception of disclosure of company risks (DCR), which was 
normally found in the chairman and/or the CEO statement of the annual reports, most of the 
corporate  governance  disclosures  (approximately  90  to  96%)  appeared  in  the  corporate 
governance reports. However, most of the corporate governance disclosures were frequently 
repeated
58 throughout the annual reports.  
Also,  for  each  company,  the  whole  of  its  five-year  period  annual  reports  were 
consecutively coded. This was found to be a very useful approach because: (a) on average, the 
structure of presenting data in the annual reports did not differ substantially across firms from 
one  year  to  another;  and  (b) it  ensured  that  experience  and  learning  gained  from  reading 
previous year’s annual report were easily transferred to the coding of subsequent year’s annual 
report.  Secondly,  for  each  corporate  governance  provision  and  annual  report,  a  detailed 
spreadsheet containing the page number(s) of what was coded, where it was coded from, and 
where applicable, why it was coded in that way, was developed to accompany the coding 
scheme. This makes the constructed index easy and simple to replicate. Appendix 3b contains 
the  spreadsheet  of  five  coded  corporate  governance  variables  with  data  sources  and  page 
                                                 
56The mistakes or inconsistencies identified between the first and second rounds of coding were not many.  The 
levels of stability between the two rounds of coding were generally high, both with respect to the individual 
corporate governance variables and the overall SACGI scores. For example, the stability between the first round 
SACGI and the second round SACGI is .8948. For the individual corporate governance provisions, the stability 
between the first and second round of coding ranges between .7614 in the case of board composition (COM1) 
to .9056 with respect to the disclosure of individual directors’ attendance of board meetings (IDMA). Beattie and 
Thompson (2007, p.220) suggest that the cut-off level for acceptability ranges from .70 to .80. Thus, the levels of 
stability achieved were generally highly satisfactory.  
57These companies are African and Overseas Enterprises Ltd (AOE), Anglo Platinum Ltd (APL), Bidvest Group 
Ltd (BGR), Gijima AST Group Ltd (GAG), Gold Fields Ltd (GFI), Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd (HGM), 
Sabmiller Plc (SAB), and Sasol Ltd (SAS). 
58Beattie and Thompson (2007, p.141) suggest that repetition is a communication strategy that management may 
adopt  to  achieve  emphasis  and  reinforcement.  It  may  also  signal  the  importance  that  a  firm’s  management 
attaches to particular messages.  
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numbers for the first six sampled firms in alphabetical order. This is a sample that shows how 
carefully  the  corporate  governance  data  were  collected  from  the  company  annual  reports. 
Similar detailed spreadsheet was prepared for all the 500 firm-year observations. 
The second critical issue that is addressed is the validity of the constructed index. 
Hassan  and  Marston  (2008,  p.30)  define  validity  as  “the  extent  to  which  any  measuring 
instrument measures what it is intended to measure”. This includes investigating how well the 
coding instrument performs against others (criterion validity), seeking subjective judgements 
from experts and non-experts as to how well the instrument measures what it is intended to 
measure (content validity), as well as the generalisability of the results (external and construct 
validity).  
Firstly, constructive criticisms and suggestions by supervisors, leading academics and 
experienced researchers at numerous Doctoral Colloquia
59 helped in significantly improving 
criterion and content validity of the coding instrument. Secondly, with the exception of the 
South  African  context  specific  issues,  and  as  suggested  by  Beattie  et  al.  (2004,  p.220), 
construct and external validity is achieved through the use of conventional internal corporate 
governance provisions covered in King II that are rigorously grounded in empirical research
60. 
These  conventional  corporate  governance  issues  have  become  widely  accepted  and  have 
extensively  been  used  in  previous  corporate  governance  studies  that  construct  composite 
indices (Shabbir and Padget, 2005; Beiner et al., 2006; Cheung et al., 2007; Henry, 2008; and 
Morey et al., 2009, amongst others). Finally, the sample construction process was structured in 
such a way that sufficient variations between large and small firms, as well as the various 
industries were achieved in the sample. This may also help in improving the generalisation of 
the results. 
 
vi) General Sampling and Index Construction Limitations 
  All research methods often suffer from some limitations, and with regard to the sample 
and  index  construction,  five  potential  limitations  can  be identified.  Firstly,  even  though  a 
sample of 100 firms is relatively large, the generalisation of the results would have been much 
improved if all 169 companies with full data could have been used. However, and as has been 
                                                 
59This work was presented at the Institute of Chartered Accountants Scotland (ICAS) conference for  young 
researchers in 2007, the Scottish Doctoral Colloquium 2007, 2008 and 2009, as well as the British Accounting 
Association’s Doctoral colloquium 2007 and 2008 at different stages of its development, where useful comments 
were received from leading academics and experienced researchers. 
60In preparing King II, the King Committee referred to 120 legal documents, international corporate governance 
codes, theoretical, and empirical papers in addition to 49 useful websites on corporate governance.   
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pointed out, due the expensive and labour-intensive nature of manual coding, this could not be 
done.  
Secondly,  other  sources  of  corporate  information  media,  such  as  websites,  interim 
reports, and company management (via a survey or meetings) could have been additionally 
consulted to at least cross-check the collected data rather than relying solely on annual reports. 
It is admitted that it is possible for a firm to have a particular corporate governance structure, 
which it might not have disclosed in its annual report that other methods, like face-to-face 
interviews would have revealed. Similarly, time and financial constraints did not permit this to 
be done.  
Thirdly, the reliability and validity of the results could have been improved if their 
robustness to a weighted index has been examined by either subjectively applying weights or 
contacting  independent  professional  expert(s)  to  apply  weights  to  the  various  corporate 
governance provisions. Similarly, and as suggested by Milne and Adler (1999) and Beattie et 
al.  (2004),  the  reliability  and  validity  of  the  constructed  index  (SACGI)  could  have  been 
improved if the data had been coded by different individuals so that inter-coder consistency, 
accuracy and reliability could have been measured.   
Fourthly,  the  index  may  not  be  able  to  capture  informal  or  personal  interactions 
(interpersonal relationships) among board members, and between the board and management, 
employees,  analysts  or  investors,  for  example,  that  may  also  affect  corporate  governance 
standards  and  financial  performance.  Finally,  despite  the  rigorous  reliability  and  validity 
processes that were meticulously followed, every coding scheme involves some amount of 
inherent  subjectivity  (Beattie  et  al.,  2004,  p.233).  This  is  due  to  differences  in  cognitive 
abilities, experience, and conception of reality, which need to be acknowledged and taken into 
account when interpreting the results. 
  The next subsection will describe the control variables used in the study. It will also 
develop their theoretical associations with internal corporate governance structures and firm 
financial performance. 
 
5.2.2.2 The Control/Omitted Variables 
 
  Any  study  that  omits  relevant  economic  variable(s)  that  predict(s)  financial 
performance and corporate governance could result in wrong conclusions (Black et al., 2006a, 
p.367; Chenhall and Moers, 2007a, p.180). Also, in theory and as discussed in subsection 5.2.1, 
the use of a comprehensive set of control variables has the potential of:  (a) preventing firms  
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from theoretically reaching “equilibrium” or “optimal differences endogeneity”
61, which is a 
situation whereby different firms optimally choose different corporate governance structures 
(Black et al., 2006a, pp.379, 384); and (b) preventing omitted variable(s) endogeneity (Larker 
and  Rusticus,  2008,  pp.3,  26).  As  a  result,  to  reduce  potential  omitted  variable  bias  and 
endogeneity,  a  number  of  control  variables,  including  growth  prospects  (SGRWOTH), 
innovative potential (CAPEX), capital structure (GEAR), firm size (LNTA), foreign/dual-listing 
(DUALIST), audit firm size (BIG4), industry (INDUST), and year dummies (YD) are included 
in the regression in addition to the SACGI, the main variable of focus in this model.  
Section 6 of Appendix 4 contains all the control variables used in this study and how 
they were operationalised. The rationale for selecting these variables is also explained below. 
Further, it should be noted that while these control variables have been chosen on the basis of 
theory and prior evidence, like every other positive accounting research, they are inevitably 
limited to the extent that they may not be exhaustive (e.g., Chenhall and Moers, 2007a and b; 
van Lent, 2007; Larker and Rusticus, 2008). It is admitted that there may be other variables 
that  can  potentially  affect  financial  performance  and  corporate  governance,  which  due  to 
reasons,  such  as  data  unavailability  and  lack  of  appropriate  theoretical  links  cannot  be 
included in the model (Chenhall and Moers, 2007a, p.187)
62.  
 
i) Growth Prospects (SGROWTH) and Innovative Potential (CAPEX) 
Firstly,  firms  with  higher  investment  opportunities  tend  to  grow  relatively  faster 
(Durnev  and  Kim,  2005,  p.1473).  Theoretically,  faster  growing  firms  may  receive  higher 
valuation, as they are expected to have better future performance (Klapper and Love, 2004, 
p.712). Also, firms with greater growth opportunities will need to raise external capital, and 
may need to adopt better corporate governance to attract capital and reduce its cost (Beiner et 
al., 2006, p.254). Following prior literature (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Drobetz et al., 2004; 
                                                 
61According to Black et al. (2006a) if sample firms were to be in equilibrium with respect to their corporate 
governance choices or variables as discussed in subsection 5.2.1, then the introduction of control or omitted 
variables  that  are  statistically  significant  could  potentially  prevent  the  structural  equation  from  reaching 
equilibrium.  This  also  implies  that  the  introduction  of  control  variables  could  potentially  result  in  model 
misspecifications. 
62For  example,  and  as  will  be  discussed  further  in  subsection  5.3.1,  managers  may  adopt  good  corporate 
governance rules just to signal their quality to investors (Black et al., 2006a, p.384). However, it is the signal that 
is sent to investors rather than the good corporate governance practices that affect firm value. For instance, firms 
may appoint independent non-executive directors to signal ‘managers’ intent’ of treating shareholders fairly, even 
though in practice independent non-executive directors may not substantially affect the behaviour of managers. In 
this case, corporate governance may be highly correlated with firm value, but with no actual causal association. 
Instead,  corporate  governance  will  proxy  for  an  omitted  variable  ‘managers’  intent’,  but  ‘managers’  intent’ 
cannot be included in the structural model because it is difficult to measure.     
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Cui et al., 2008; Henry, 2008), a positive relationship between financial performance and 
growth opportunities, as proxied by year-on-year sales growth (SGROWTH) is hypothesised.  
Secondly, firms with higher investment in innovation and technology should in theory 
gain competitive advantage through launching new processes, products, and services (Jermias, 
2007, p.828; Brown et al., 2009, p.151). This allows them to receive premium prices and 
generate higher long-term performance by creating quasi-monopolies and barriers to entry for 
rivals (Jermias, 2007, p.829). By contrast, innovation is capital intensive, with potential future 
returns (Weir et al., 2002, p.589), and as such may impact negatively on current performance. 
Also, firms with greater investment in technology and innovation (intangibles) will need to 
adopt a stronger governance regime (stricter monitoring) as it is easier to steal intangibles 
(“soft”) assets than fixed (“hard”) assets (Durnev and Kim, 2005, p.1474). Following prior 
research (e.g., Durnev and Kim, 2005; Black et al., 2006b; Brown et al., 2009), investment 
opportunities and innovative potential of firms, as proxied by the ratio of capital expenditure 
to total assets (CAPEX) is expected to be negatively correlated with performance. 
  
ii) Capital Structure (GEAR) 
 
By  relaxing  Modigliani  and  Miller’s  (1958)  irrelevance  of  capital  structure 
assumptions, an extensive theoretical and empirical literature has emerged, which strongly 
suggests that in the real world, a firm’s capital structure can have an impact on its value or 
profitability (e.g., Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Myers, 1977, 1984; and Rajan and Zingales, 
1995, amongst others). Specifically, and consistent with Rajan and Zingales (1995), Bevan 
and  Danbolt  (2002,  2004)  report  a  significant  negative  relationship  between  gearing  and 
profitability using a sample of UK firms. This can be explained from two major theoretical 
perspectives: tax and agency
63.  
                                                 
63It is acknowledged that capital structure can also be explained by the perking order theory developed by Myers 
and Majluf (1984). The theory suggests that companies tend to prioritise their sources of financing, normally 
starting with internal to external sources. In this case, firms will usually consider internal sources of financing, 
such as retained earnings as their first option. One reason for this preference is that it costs (e.g., issue cost) less 
to raise internal funding. This means that all internal sources of financing will be used up before external funding 
will be sought. When it comes to external financing, companies will normally issue the safest security first. In 
this regard, the issue of debt will be preferred to equity. According to Myers and Majluf (1984), this is because: 
(1) it costs less to issue debt than equity; and (2) debt issue sends a positive signal to the stock market, whilst 
equity issue sends a negative signal to the stock market. Equity will then be issued as a last resort or when it does 
no longer make economic sense to issue additional debt. Perking order theory can, therefore, also explain why 
there may still be a negative relationship between profitability and gearing, even if earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation  and  amortization  (EBITDA)  is  used  as  a  proxy  for  accounting  profitability  to  be  able  to  take 
advantage of potential tax savings.    
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From a capital structure perspective, interest payments are tax deductible (Modigliani 
and Miller, 1963, p.438), and as such, all else equal, highly geared firms should be able to 
generate higher financial performance. By contrast, the costs of financial distress, such as 
bankruptcy and credit risks that are usually  associated with higher levels of  gearing, may 
inhibit a firm’s ability to pursue profitable investment opportunities (Myers, 1977, p.148). In 
fact, recent evidence by Brav (2009) suggests that the use of private debt (private equity) by 
private firms to finance growth in the UK is more costly when compared with public firms that 
rely on public equity. 
From  an  agency  perspective,  Jensen  (1986,  p.323)  suggests  that  higher  levels  of 
gearing can increase performance by reducing agency conflicts associated with having ‘free 
cash  flows’  by  opportunistic  managers.  Also,  the  use  of  debt  financing  can  improve 
performance by inducing extra monitoring by lenders (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, p.377). In 
line with prior corporate governance studies (e.g., Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001; Weir et al., 
2002; Klapper and Love, 2004; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008), capital structure is controlled for. 
Given the mixed theoretical and empirical evidence, however, it is hypothesised that gearing 
(GEAR), as proxied by the ratio of total debt to equity will be significantly correlated with 
financial performance, without specifying the direction of the coefficient. 
 
iii) Firm Size (LNTA) 
 
As has been discussed in subsection 5.1.4, due to the costs implications of compliance, 
complexity  of  operations,  analysts  following  and  public  scrutiny,  higher  political  and 
regulatory  costs,  as  well  as  greater  agency  problems,  firm  size  is  likely  to  be  positively 
correlated with better corporate governance regime (e.g., Jensen, 1986; Himmelberg et al., 
1999; Beiner et al., 2006).  This means that larger firms may receive higher market valuation 
and/or enjoy lower cost of external capital (Botosan, 1997). By contrast, Klapper and Love 
(2004, p.713) suggest that smaller firms tend to have better growth opportunities, and as such 
they will have greater need for external financing. This means that smaller firms may have to 
maintain a better corporate governance regime to be able to attract capital at a cheaper cost 
and  increase  financial  profitability.  Faster  growth  is  also  more  likely  to  be  positively 
correlated with financial performance, especially Tobin’s Q (Black et al., 2006a, p.401). This 
is because Tobin’s Q reflects future growth opportunities available to a firm (Young et al., 
2008, p.1116).  
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Empirically, the relationship between performance and size is ambiguous (Himmelberg 
et  al.,  1999,  p.364).  Agrawal  and  Knoeber  (1996)  and  Durnev  and  Kim  (2005)  report  a 
negative relationship between firm size and Tobin’s Q, while Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) find 
that return on assets (ROA) is positively correlated with firm size. Therefore, it is hypothesised 
that there is a negative relationship between firm size, as proxied by naturally logged total 
assets (LNTA) and Tobin’s Q, but a positive relationship with ROA.  
 
iv) Foreign-Listing/Dual-listing (DUALLIST) 
 
As has been pointed out in subsection 5.1.4, firms that maintain secondary listing on 
foreign stock markets are more likely to have better corporate governance structures, because 
they  are  more  likely  to  be  subjected  to  additional  accounting,  governance  and  disclosure 
requirements of the foreign stock exchanges that they are cross-listed to (Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002, p.329; Black et al., 2006a, p.403). Also, firms that seek foreign-listing are more likely to 
have higher  growth opportunities and increased need for external capital. Together, cross-
listed firms can be expected to want to signal their quality through the adoption of better 
governance, disclosure and transparency (Klapper and Love, 2004, p.713).  
Lower agency costs that are usually associated with better corporate governance means 
that dual-listed firms are more likely to be exposed to increased and more diverse sources of 
financing  (Doidge  et  al.,  2009,  p.425;  Melvin  and  Valero,  2009,  p.66).  Better  access  to 
external finance also indicates that cross-listed firms may be better able to exploit growth 
opportunities than their non cross-listed counterparts. The prior empirical evidence is in line 
with  theoretical  expectations.  Opinion-based  surveys  conducted  by  CLSA  (2000)  and 
Deutsche Bank (2002) in emerging markets, including South Africa suggest that dual-listed 
firms tend to have better corporate governance standards than their non-dualisted counterparts. 
Similarly, using a cross-country sample that include 8 South African listed firms, Charitou and 
Louca (2009) report that firms that are cross-listed to the US generate significantly higher 
operating returns than their non-dual-listed counterparts.   
 Overall, this suggests that cross-listed firms may generate higher financial returns than 
their domestic listed counterparts. Thus, it is hypothesised that there is a positive relationship 
between dual-listing (DUALLIST), as proxied by a dummy variable that takes a value of one if  
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a  firm  is  cross-listed  to  a  UK/US
64  stock  exchange  or  zero  otherwise,  and  financial 
performance.      
 
v) Audit Firm Size (BIG4) 
 
As will be explained further in section 6.2 of chapter six, the prior auditing literature 
suggests that the size of the audit firm matters (e.g., Shockley, 1981; Palmrose, 1986; Sori et 
al., 2006). Specifically, it suggests that the levels of auditor independence and audit quality are 
positively associated with audit firm size (e.g., Pearson, 1980; DeAngelo, 1981). A major 
implication  of  this  is  that,  on  average,  larger  audit  firms  may  be  better  able  to  resist 
management pressure in conflict situations. This is mainly due to the reputation, resources (i.e., 
financial, human, information and knowledge), and independence advantages that larger audit 
firms enjoy over their smaller couterparts (Sori et al., 2006, p.2; Young et al., 2008, p.1108).  
As has been explained in chapter three, an important feature of the South African corporate 
governance system is that King II recognises external auditors as one of the key stakeholders 
in ensuring that firms voluntarily comply with the corporate governance provisions of the 
Code. 
However, the literature also suggests that audit fees are positively associated with audit 
firm size (e.g., Palmrose, 1986; Gul, 1991). This means that larger firms are more likely to 
make use of the services of larger audit firms as they can be expected to better afford the 
associated higher costs of auditing (higher auditing fees). This implies that, on average, larger 
firms are more likely to have better corporate governance standards and receive higher market 
valuation (Q-ratio) than their smaller counterparts.  
By contrast, since it costs more to hire a larger audit firm (e.g., Pearson, 1980; Sori et 
al., 2006), it is likely to impact negatively on a firm’s accounting returns (ROA). As a result, it 
is hypothesised that audit firm size (BIG4) will be positively associated with the Q-ratio, but 
negatively related to ROA. Audit firm size will be measured by a dummy variable that takes a 
value of one if a firm is audited by any of the big four auditing firms (i.e., Deloitte & Touche, 
Ernst & Young, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers), zero otherwise.  
 
 
                                                 
64This is because there is evidence which suggests that the UK and US have stronger corporate governance and 
investor protection regimes (La Porta et al., 1998; Klapper and Love, 2004, p.713; Black et al., 2006, p.403). As 
will be discussed further in subsection 6.1.2 of chapter six, in total 26 of the sampled firms (26%) are cross-listed. 
Seven firms are cross-listed to both the UK and US, whilst 8 and 11 firms are cross-listed to the UK and US 
alone, respectively.  
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vi) Industry Dummies (INDUST) 
 
  As has been discussed in subsection 5.1.4, due to differences in the complexity of 
operations,  lines  of  business, capital  structure  and ownership  levels,  corporate  governance 
practices may vary between industries (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, p.328; Lim et al., 2007, 
p.568).  Also,  economic  and  global  developments  may  impact  differently  on  different 
industries.  For  example,  while  increases  in  the  prices  of  petroleum  products  may  have  a 
positive  impact  on  the  financial  performance  of  Oil  and  Gas  firms,  the  profitability  of 
manufacturing/industrial  firms,  which  rely  heavily  on  energy  for  production,  may  be 
negatively affected.  
As has also been discussed in subsection 5.1.4, opinion-based surveys conducted by 
CLSA  (2000)  and  Deutsche  Bank  (2002)  in  emerging  markets,  including  South  Africa, 
indicate that corporate governance standards vary across different industries. Thus, to capture 
these  potential  unobserved  industry-level  heterogeneity,  and  in  line  with  prior  corporate 
governance studies (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004; Beiner et al., 2006; Black et al., 2006a; and 
Henry,  2008,  amongst  others),  industry  dummies,  including  basic  materials  (BMAT), 
consumer goods (CGOODS), consumer services (CSERVICES), industrials (INDUSTRIALS), 
and technology (TECHN) are included as controls for these five
65 major industries. To avoid 
the dummy-variable trap, only four industry dummies are included in estimating any single 
equation. 
 
vii) Year Dummies (YD)  
  
  Finally,  evidence  suggests  that  corporate  governance  practices  across  firms  change 
over time (Shabbir and Padget, 2005, p.10; Henry, 2008, p.933). For example, using a sample 
of 122 FTSE 350 UK listed firms from 2000 to 2003, Shabbir and Padget (2005) report a 
positive relationship between compliance with corporate governance rules (governance quality) 
and time (year). This positive relationship has  recently been supported by the findings of 
Henry  (2008)  in  a  sample  of  116  Australian  listed  firms  from  1992  to  2002.  Secondly, 
different economic states and environment may impact on a firm’s profitability differently. On 
average,  firms  tend  to  perform  financially  better  during  periods  of  economic  boom,  for 
example, than when there is economic recession. The current global economic downturn offers 
a classic anecdotal example (e.g., Turner Review, 2009; Walker Review, 2009). 
                                                 
65As has been explained in subsection 5.1.1, the industrial groups were obtained directly from the Information 
Department of the JSE.  
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Similarly,  changes  in  the  macro  environment,  such  as  government  regulations,  tax 
policies  and  technology  may  impact  differently  on  financial  performance  and  corporate 
governance  structures  over  time.  This  means  firm  financial  performance,  as  proxied  by 
Tobin’s Q and ROA are more likely to vary over times. Finally, prior corporate governance 
studies have also controlled for year (e.g., Shabbir and Padget, 2005; Guest, 2008; and Henry, 
2008,  amongst others),  which can  facilitate  drawing  direct  comparisons  with  their  results. 
Thus, to control for possible unobserved firm level heterogeneity over the five-year period, 
five dummies (one each for the five years of 2002 to 2006 inclusive) are also included in the 
model. Similarly, to avoid the dummy-variable trap, only four year dummies are included in 
estimating any single equation. 
The next subsection will describe the proxies for financial performance (dependent 
variables) used in estimating the compliance-index model. It will also develop their theoretical 
associations with internal corporate governance structures, as well as their potential strengths 
and limitations. 
 
5.2.2.3 The Dependent Variable: Firm Financial Performance (FP) 
 
  The dependent variable in this study is firm financial performance (FP). Distinct from 
much of the prior literature (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Yermack, 1996; Beiner et al., 
2006; Black et al., 2006a; and Henry, 2008, amongst others), but in line with Gompers et al. 
(2003),  Klapper  and  Love  (2004),  Haniffa  and  Hudaib  (2006),  and  Guest  (2009),  two 
measurements, namely return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio) are used as proxies for 
accounting and market based measures of financial performance, respectively. Section 1 of 
Appendix 4 contains further information on the two measures used, as proxies for financial 
performance, as well as detailed information on how they were measured. 
  The decision to use the two measures of financial performance is underpinned by two 
main  reasons.  Firstly,  prior  evidence  suggests  that  insiders  and  outsiders  value  corporate 
governance differently (Black et al., 2006a, p.370). As such, the accounting based measure of 
performance  (ROA)  attempts  to  capture  the  wealth  effects  of  corporate  governance 
mechanisms from the perspective of company management (insiders), while the market based 
measure  (Q-ratio)  represents  financial  valuation  of  corporate  governance  structures  by 
investors (outsiders).  Secondly, and as will be discussed further below, each measure has its 
own strengths and weaknesses with no consensus within the literature on a particular measure 
as being the ‘best’ proxy for financial performance (Haniffa and Hudaib 2006, p.1045). Hence,  
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using the two measures represent an attempt to examine the robustness of the results against 
both accounting and market based measures of financial performance. 
  ROA is defined in this study as the book value of operating profit at the end of a 
financial year divided by the book value of total assets at the end of a financial year (Yermack, 
1996, p.192; Beiner et al., 2006, p.260; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006, p.703). It measures how 
efficiently and effectively a firm manages its operations and uses its assets to generate profits 
(Ross et al., 1998, p.62). On average, higher ROA suggests effective and efficient use of a 
firm’s assets in maximising the value of its shareholders’ investments by management (i.e., 
internal  corporate  governance  structures).  ROA  is  an  effective  measure  of  performance 
because it eliminates the problem of size which makes it easier for comparisons to be drawn 
across firms (Lev and Sunder, 1979, p.187). Demsetz and Lehn (1985, p.1160) suggest that as 
accounting profit, ROA may reflect year-to-year fluctuations in underlying business conditions 
better than stock market rates of return. This is because stock market rates of return reflect 
expected future developments that may mask current fluctuations in business conditions. It has 
also  been  used  widely  by  prior  corporate  governance  studies  (e.g.,  Shrader  et  al.,  1997; 
Gompers et al., 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004; Core et al., 2006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; 
and Cui et al. 2008, amongst others). 
  However, the use of ROA has been criticised on several grounds. Firstly, ROA is a 
historical measure, but past profits can be a poor reflection of true future profitability (Ross et 
al., 2002, p.36). A closely related weakness is that because ROA is based on historical cost 
accounting, it is unable to directly reflect current changes in valuation by the equity markets 
(Krivogorsky, 2006, p.185). Secondly, through changes in accounting policies, methods and 
techniques,  ROA  is  suggested  to  be  susceptible  to  all  kinds  of  managerial  manipulations 
(Alexander et al., 2007, p.867; Mangena and Tauringana, 2008, p.14). A third criticism is that 
as an accounting-based measure of profitability, ROA ignores risk, but it would be wrong to 
conclude, for example, that two firms with identical current profits are equally profitable if the 
risk level of one is higher than the other (Ross et al., 2002, p.36).  
Finally, ROA has been criticised for its inability to reflect industry and environmental 
differences, non-financial performance factors, such as customer and employee satisfaction, 
short-term fluctuations in business fortunes, and changes in the value of money as a result of 
inflation and fluctuations in exchange rates  (Alexander et al., 2007, p.867). However, the 
impact of these weaknesses have been minimised through the inclusion of extensive control  
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variables, which takes into account how time, credit risks, industry, and size, for example, 
affect a firm’s financial performance. 
  Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio) is defined in this study as the market value of equity plus the book 
value of total assets minus the book value of equity divided by the book value of total assets 
(Chung and Pruitt, 1994, p.70; Beiner et al., 2006, p.260). As has been pointed out above, 
Tobin’s Q is the alternative measure of financial performance that is used, as a proxy for the 
markets’ valuation of the quality of a firm’s internal corporate governance structures. Due to 
the  difficulties  involved  in  computing  Tobin’s  (1969)  original  Q-ratio,  such  as  costly 
computational  effort  and  data  requirements,  this  study  follows  Chung  and  Pruitt’s  (1994, 
p.70)
66 approximation of Q, which has been demonstrated to be 96.6% correlated with the 
original Q-ratio. It is normally referred to as the ratio of the market value of the outstanding 
financial  claims  on  a  firm  to  the  current  replacement  cost  of  its  assets  (Lewellen  and 
Bradrinath, 1997, p.78). As has been explained above, due to data limitations, book value of 
assets will be used, as a proxy for current replacement cost of company assets. Generally, the 
Q-ratio measures the effectiveness with which a firm’s management is able to use its assets to 
generate value for shareholders. Like ROA, a higher Q-ratio suggests greater effectiveness of a 
firm’s internal corporate governance structures, as well as a better perception of a company’s 
financial performance by the market (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, p.1045). 
  The concept of Tobin’s Q has great intuitive appeal and is of immense theoretical and 
practical relevance (Chung and Pruitt, 1994, p.70). As such, it has extensively been used, as a 
proxy for financial performance not only in the corporate governance literature (e.g., Morck et 
al., 1988; Yermack, 1996; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Gompers et al., 2003; and Henry, 
2008, amongst others), but also within the larger corporate finance literature (e.g., Chung and 
Pruitt, 1994; Perfect and Wiles, 1994; and Lewellen and Badrinath, 1997, amongst others). 
This  makes  it  a  very  advantageous  performance  proxy  because  its  empirical  validity  is 
grounded  in  a  rigorously  established  empirical  literature.  However,  and  like  any  other 
performance proxy, it has received a barrage of criticisms. Unlike other performance proxies 
like the ROA, however, most of its criticisms concern how it is constructed and potential 
measurement errors (e.g., Klock et al., 1991; Chung and Pruitt, 1994). 
                                                 
66Other approximations for Tobin’s Q have been developed. Lindenberg and Ross (1981), Lang and Litzenberger 
(1989), Perfect and Wiles (1994), and Lewellen and Badrinath (1997), amongst others, have provided some form 
of approximation for Tobin’s original Q. However, Chung and Pruitt’s (1994) approximation is adopted because 
it does not only correlate highly (96.6%) with the original Q, but also is simple and less costly in terms of 
computational effort and the intensity of the data required.   
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  A  major  line  of  criticism  of  Tobin’s  Q  is  that  it  is  too  expensive  in  terms  of 
computational effort and data requirements (Chung and Pruitt, 1994, p.70). As a results, and as 
has been explained above, many approximations have been developed, most of which propose 
the use of book values of assets, equity, and debt (e.g., Chung and Pruitt, 1994; Perfect and 
Wiles, 1994; Lewellen and Badrinath, 1997, amongst others). This leads to a related criticism 
that it is a ‘quasi-historical’ measure, in that its computation involves the use of accounting 
variables prepared under historical cost accounting (Shabbir and Padget, 2005, p.8). Thus, Q 
also  appears  to  suffer  from  most  of  the  weaknesses  of  conventional  accounting-based 
measures of performance. These weaknesses include being prone to managerial manipulation 
and  creative  accounting,  as  has  been  discussed  above.  However,  with  the  gradual  move 
towards  fair  value  accounting  (Alexander  et  al.,  2007,  pp.115-117)  or  even  a  mixture  of 
historical  cost  and  mark-to-market  accounting (Danbolt  and  Rees,  2008, p.272),  it  can  be 
argued that this criticism will increasingly be less valid.  
  Another criticism of Q is that its application may result in spurious correlations with 
corporate governance mechanisms, in that higher Q may not necessarily suggest that a firm’s 
management has a better ability in using its assets in generating value. This is because the 
differences  between  market  and  book  values  can  be  due  to  other  factors,  such  as 
undervaluation of tangible and financial assets recognised on the balance sheet (Beattie and 
Thomson, 2007, p.130). It can also be due to the value of intangibles
67 that have not been 
captured on the balance sheet, as well as market prices that do not accurately reflect intrinsic 
values of assets (Beattie and Thomson, 2007, p.130). Like ROA, Q-ratio may not be able to 
also capture how informal human relationships that may exist among board members, for 
example, affect financial performance.   
Similarly,  as  a  market  based  performance  measure,  changes  in  Q  may  not  be  an 
accurate reflection of underlying economic fundamentals of a firm, but may be driven by 
investors’ sentiments, speculation and rumour-mongering, which are meant to satisfy their 
short-term parochial economic interests (Henwood, 1997, p.145). An anecdotal example of 
this is the widely reported current financial crisis – the so-called ‘credit crunch’ within the 
global financial markets in which share prices of some firms, especially financial companies, 
are ‘alleged’ to have been driven down by investor speculation (e.g., Daglish, 2009; Gorton, 
                                                 
67For example, despite being an important corporate asset, human resource, is often completely not captured on 
corporate balance sheets.   
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2009;  Turner  Review,  2009;  Walker  Review,  2009).  This  resulted  in  a  temporary  ban  of 
‘short-selling’ in financial stocks by investors in the UK and the US.  
Therefore, to minimise the potential impact of these limitations on the results, and as 
has been discussed above, extensive lists of control variables are included in the model. It may 
also justify the use of both accounting and market based measures of performance, allowing 
each measure to complement the weaknesses of the other. 
Following prior research, and assuming that all relations are linear, the first ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression equation to be estimated in the system
68 is: 
∑
=
+ + + =
n
i
it it i it it CONTROLS SACGI FP
1
1 0 e b b a                                           (1) 
where: 
FINANCIAL                     -  stands for the two variables, namely return on assets (ROA)  
PERFORMANCE (FP)  and Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio) as proxies for accounting and market-
based financial performance measures, respectively. 
0 a                - Constant term. 
SACGI              - A constructed South African Corporate Governance Index.  
CONTROLS             - Control variables for sales growth (SGROWTH), capital 
        expenditure (CAPEX), capital structure (GEAR), firm size  
(LNTA), foreign-listing (DUALIST), audit firm size (BIG4), five        
industry dummies of basic materials (BMAT), consumer goods   
(CGOODS), consumer services (CSERVICES), industrials  
(INDUSTRIALS), and technology (TECHN), and five year  
dummies for 2002 to 2006 inclusive. To avoid the  
dummy variable trap, the consumer goods industry, and  
year 2003 are excluded in estimating the equation. 
e               -  Error term. 
To test the robustness of the results, general OLS misspecifications tests, including 
tests for hetereoscedasticity, non-linearity, and multicollinearity, are conducted on a year-by-
                                                 
68It is called a system because in subsection 5.3.2, to test for robustness of the results, as well as for the existence 
of possible interdependence and interactions among alternative corporate governance mechanisms, a system of 
four additional equations will be developed and estimated simultaneously along with equation (1). Also, as a 
robustness check, a lagged performance-corporate governance relationship (i.e., equations 1 and 2) will be re-
estimated as has been specified in equations (10) and (11) in subsection 5.3.1.4 below. The results that will be 
discussed in chapters eight and nine based on un-lagged and lagged corporate governance-financial performance 
structure, respectively, will be essentially the same.  
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year basis, as well as for the pooled panel to ensure that the constant variable ( 0 a ) and the 
slope coefficients ( n b b b + + + ,..., 2 1 ), are both best linear unbiased and consistent estimators. 
As will be discussed further in section 7.2 of chapter seven, these tests include correlation 
analyses, examination of studentised residuals, Durbin-Watson, tolerance, variance inflation 
factor, eigenvalues, and conditions indices, amongst others.  
  In the following subsection, the independent, control, and dependent variables used in 
estimating the equilibrium-variable model will be described. It will also describe how they 
were measured. 
 
5.2.3 The Equilibrium-Variable Model 
 
  As has been discussed above, the equilibrium-variable model is the second equation in 
the system that is estimated. The independent variables in the equilibrium-variable model will 
be described below. 
 
5.2.3.1 The Independent Variables: Individual Corporate Governance Structures 
 
  The  explanatory  variables  in  this  model  consist  of  individual  internal  corporate 
governance  structures  operating  as  single  alternative  corporate  governance  mechanisms  in 
isolation. Appendix 4 contains all the independent variables used in this model. It also defines 
each variable and shows how they were measured. These include: board size (BSIZE); role or 
CEO duality (DUAL); the proportion of non-executive directors (NEDs); the frequency of 
board  meetings  (FBMs); board  diversity  (BDIV);  the presence  of three  key  internal  board 
committees,  namely  audit  committee  (ACOM),  remuneration  committee  (RCOM),  and 
nomination  committee  (NCOM);  director  shareownership  (DTON);  director  shareownerhip 
squared (DTON
2); and director shareownership cubed (DTON
3).    
  These corporate board structure and ownership variables are measured in accordance 
with prior research. Board size (BSIZE) is measured as the total number of directors serving on 
a  company’s  board  at  the  end  of  its  financial  year  (e.g.,  Yermack,  1996;  Mangena  and 
Tauringana, 2008). The proportion of non-executive directors (NEDs) is measured as the total 
number of non-executive directors divided by the total number of directors (e.g., Weir et al., 
2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Director shareownership (DTON) is measured by the total 
number of ordinary shares held by all directors divided by the total number of ordinary shares 
(e.g., Ho and Williams, 2003; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008).   
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Role or CEO duality (DUAL) is a dummy variable that takes the value of “1” if the 
positions of company chairman and CEO are combined, otherwise  “0” (e.g., Rechner and 
Dalton, 1991; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). Board diversity (BDIV) is also a binary variable 
which takes the value of “1” if a company’s board is constituted by at least a white person, a 
black person, a man and a woman, otherwise zero (e.g., Carter ., 2003; Rose, 2007). Similarly 
and consistent with prior literature (e.g., Laing and Weir, 1999; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008; 
Henry, 2008), audit committee (ACOM), remuneration committee (RCOM), and nomination 
committee (NCOM) are measured as dummy variables that take a value of “1” if any of the 
three committees is established at the end a firm’s financial year, otherwise zero.   
 
5.2.3.2 The Control/Omitted Variables 
 
  The control variables included in this model are the same as the eight described in 
subsection 5.2.2.2, and are included in equation (1) as well. 
 
5.2.3.3 The Dependent Variable: Financial Performance 
 
  Similarly, the proxies for financial performance are the same as those described in 
subsection  5.2.2.3,  namely  return  on  assets  (ROA)  and  Tobin’s  Q  (Q-ratio),  which  are 
estimated in equation (1) as well. Similarly, following prior studies and assuming that all 
relations are linear, the second equation to be estimated in the system is: 
 
          
∑
=
+ +
+ + +
+ + +
+ + + + =
n
i
it it i
it
it it it
it it it
it it it it it
CONTROLS DTON
DTON DTON RCOM
NCOM ACOM FBMs
BDIV DUAL NEDs BSIZE FP
1
3
11
2
10 9 8
7 6 5
4 3 2 1 0
e b b
b b b
b b b
b b b b a
                             (2) 
where: 
FINANCIAL              -  stands for the two variables, namely return on assets (ROA)  
PERFORMANCE (FP)  and Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio) as proxies for accounting and     
market-based financial performance measures,    
respectively. 
0 a                -  Constant term. 
BSIZE              -  Board size. 
NEDs               -  Proportion of non-executive directors. 
DUAL              -  Role or CEO duality.  
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BDIV               -  Board diversity. 
FBMs               -  Frequency of board meetings  
ACOM             -  Presence of audit committee. 
NCOM             -  Presence of nomination committee. 
RCOM              -  Presence of remuneration committee. 
DTON                -  Percentage of shareownership by executive and  
 non-executive directors. 
DTON
2             -  Director shareownership squared 
DTON
3                 -   Director shareownership cubed
   
CONTROLS             -  Control variables for sales growth (SGROWTH), capital 
         expenditure (CAPEX), capital structure (GEAR), firm size  
 (LNTA), foreign-listing (DUALIST), audit firm size, (BIG4),  
 five industry dummies of basic materials (BMAT), consumer  
 goods (CGOODS), consumer services (CSERVICES),   
 industrials (INDUSTRIALS), & technology (TECHN) and  
 five year dummies for 2002 to 2006 inclusive. To avoid the  
 dummy variable trap, the consumer goods industry, and  
 year 2003 are excluded in estimating the equation. 
e                 -  Error term. 
Similarly, to test the robustness of the results, general OLS misspecifications tests, 
including tests for hetereoscedasticity, non-linearity, and multicollinearity, will be conducted 
on a year-by-year basis, as well as for the pooled panel to ensure that the constant variable ( 0 a ) 
and  the slope  coefficients  ( n b b b + + + ,..., 2 1 ),  are  both  best  linear  unbiased  and  consistent 
estimators. Also, and as will be discussed further in section 7.2 of chapter seven, these tests 
include correlation analyses, examination of studentised residuals, Durbin-Watson, tolerance, 
variance inflation factor, eigenvalues, and conditions indices, amongst others. 
The next section will describe the various sensitivity analyses conducted in this study. 
Specifically, it will discuss the problem of endogeneity and examines the robustness of the 
empirical  results  to  the  potential  existence  of  such  endogeneity  problems,  as  well  as  the 
presence  of  alternative  internal  corporate  governance  mechanisms  and  their  possible 
interdependence or interaction effects on financial performance.  
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5.3 ROBUSTNESS TESTS/SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
 
Apart  from  general  OLS  misspecifications  checks  as  have  been  indicated  above,  a 
series of sensitivity analyses will be conducted to test the robustness of the results. These will 
include checking the robustness of the results against endogeneity, the existence of alternative 
governance mechanisms, and the estimation of a changes model.      
 
5.3.1 The Problem of Endogeneity 
 
  The econometric problems of endogeneity have recently gained a heightened sense of 
awareness  within  the  positive  accounting  literature  (e.g.,  Börsch-Supan,  and  Köke,  2002; 
Chenhall and Moers, 2007a and b; van Lent, 2007; Larcker and Rusticus, 2007, 2008). A 
variable is said to be endogenous if it is determined within the context of the model, whilst a 
variable is said to be exogenous if it is correlated with the dependent variable, but its values 
are  determined  outside  the  model  (Chenhall  and  Moers,  2007a,  p.177).  The  endogeneity 
problem, therefore, arises when a variable originally assumed to be exogenous within a model 
is actually endogenous. Assume (3) as follows: 
t t t X Y e b a + + = 0                       (3) 
Statistically, the variable t X  is said to be endogenously related to the variable  t Y  if t X  
is correlated with the structural error term, t e , that is., Cov( t X , t e )  0 ¹  (Wooldridge 2002, 
p.50). Briefly, there are four major causes of endogeneity: omitted variables, simultaneity or 
reverse causation, measurement errors, and equilibrium conditions (Wooldridge, 2002, pp.50-
51; Chenhall and Moers, 2007a, pp.180-183; Larcker and Rusticus, 2008, p.2).  
Firstly,  and  as  has  been  pointed  out  in  subsection  5.2.2.2,  omitted  variables 
endogeneity arises if a relevant control variable is, for example, omitted from equation (1) due 
to  data  unavailability  (Wooldridge,  2002,  p.50).  Black  et  al.  (2006,  p.384)  suggest,  for 
example, that firms may appoint non-executive directors just to signal “managers’ intent” to 
treat outside investors fairly, even though non-executive directors in practice may not affect 
the behaviour  of  managers.  In  this  case,  corporate  governance  will  wrongly  proxy for  an 
omitted variable (managers’ intent).  
Secondly, simultaneity or reverse causation arises when at least one of the independent 
variables is also simultaneously determined by the dependent variable  (Wooldridge, 2002, 
p.51).  For  example,  rather  than  firms  with  good  internal  corporate  governance  structures 
receiving higher market valuations, as has been assumed in this study, it could be that firms  
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with  higher  market  values  are  more  likely  to  choose  better  internal  corporate  governance 
structures,  because  they  have  better  investment  opportunities  and  rely  more  on  external 
financing (Beiner et al., 2006, p.250). 
Thirdly,  measurement  error  endogeneity  occurs  if  a  key  independent  variable  is 
imperfectly  measured  (Larcker  and  Rusticus,  2005,  p.3).  For  example,  measurement  error 
endogeneity will arise if the SACGI, which is meant to capture the quality of firms’ internal 
corporate governance structures, is inaccurately measured. Finally, and as has been discussed 
in  subsections  5.2.1  and  5.2.2.2,  equilibrium  conditions  endogeneity  questions  whether 
financial performance can be explained by corporate governance given the assumption that all 
firms attempt to operate under equilibrium conditions (Chenhall and Moers, 2007a, p.183). 
That is, if firms optimally choose corporate governance structures, then it will be inappropriate 
to examine the relationship between performance and corporate governance, as it is evident 
that there will be no association between them. This is because every firm is expected to be in 
equilibrium.    
It has been suggested that endogeneity
69 caused by any of the above factors can limit 
the  validity  of  empirical  models  estimated  (Chenhall  and  Moers,  2007a,  p.173).  In 
econometric terms, if t X  is correlated with  t e , then OLS estimates of the coefficient, t b  will 
be biased and inconsistent, which can result in wrong interpretations of the findings (Larcker 
and Rusticus, 2008, p.10).  
Apart from potential problems of omitted variables, simultaneity or reverse causation, 
measurement errors, and equilibrium conditions, there are additional reasons that call for a 
consideration to be given to endogeneity in this study. First, there is the need to respond to the 
general call for positive accounting researchers to explicitly address potential problems that 
may be posed by endogeneity (e.g., Börsch-Supan, and Köke, 2002; Chenhall and Moers, 
2007a and b). Second, and as has been discussed in chapter four, the current study relies on 
multiple and sometimes conflicting theoretical perspectives. Arguably, this may increase the 
possibility that endogeneity problems will be introduced into the structural equations.   
Third, and as it was evident in chapter four, much of the prior corporate governance 
literature has produced mixed results. However, substantial number of past studies do not 
address any concerns that the potential presence of endogeneity poses. Only a small number of 
                                                 
69It should be noted that there are sharp disagreements within the positive accounting literature as to whether 
endogeneity is a problem worth considering in accounting research (Chenhall and Moers, 2007a and b; Larcker 
and Rusticus, 2007; van Lent, 2007). Specifically, van Lent (2007, pp.197-198, 203) suggests that in practice 
there is little that can be done about endogeneity even if it exists, and as such researchers should be bold enough 
to set aside any concerns of endogeneity, especially when addressing important research questions.   
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prior corporate governance studies have explicitly addressed concerns raised by the potential 
presence of endogeneity (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Himmelberg et al., 1999; Durnev 
and Kim, 2005; Beiner et al., 2006; Black et al., 2006a; Henry, 2008). As has been discussed 
in subsection 4.2 of chapter four, this raises doubts with respect to the reliability of the results 
of a considerable number of prior corporate governance studies.  
In addressing the potential problems that endogeneity poses, this study specifically 
follows the five-step procedure suggested by Larcker and Rusticus (2008, pp.25-31, 59) for 
positive accounting researchers. As has been pointed out above, and also in chapter four, 
Larcker  and  Rusticus  (2008,  pp.25-26,  59)  suggest  that  the  first  step  to  addressing  any 
concerns of endogeneity is to use rigorous accounting theory and logic to specify endogenous 
and exogenous variables in the structural equation. Additionally, and as has been discussed 
above, the researcher needs to explicitly point out some of the reasons why endogeneity may 
potentially be a problem. 
The second step involves exploring the various alternative ways of solving the problem, 
including following standard ‘textbook’ econometric and non-econometric solutions (Larcker 
and Rusticus, 2008, p.25). With regard to non-econometric solutions, this study uses a five-
year panel data. With both time series and cross-sectional properties, statistical theory suggests 
that panel data may help in reducing problems posed by endogeneity (Börsch-Supan and Köke, 
2002,  p.301;  Larcker  and  Rusticus,  2007,  p.208).  Secondly, and as  has  been  discussed  in 
subsection 5.2.2.2, extensive number of control variables have been included in the models to 
mitigate against possible omitted variable endogeneity problems. 
With regard to following standard ‘textbook’ econometric solutions, an instrumental 
variable (IV) model will be estimated to deal with potential omitted variable and measurement 
error endogeneity problems. As suggested by Larcker and Rusticus (2008), two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) and a lagged structure will also be estimated to address endogeneity problems 
that may be posed by omitted variable, simultaneity, and equilibrium conditions. In addition, a 
changes model will be estimated to account for possible firm-level heterogeneity over time.   
The procedures for executing these solutions will be set out below. Specifically, the IV 
estimation method will be dealt with first, followed by the 2SLS, the lagged structure, and 
finally the changes model. These estimations will concentrate purely on the compliance-index 
model (equation 1), which models the SACGI. This is because the SACGI is the main variable 
of focus. It is also more comprehensive as it incorporates almost all the variables included in 
the alternative equilibrium-variable model (equation 2).  
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5.3.1.1 Durbin-Wu-Hausman Exogeneity Test 
The third step as suggested by Larcker and Rusticus (2008) involves conducting an 
exogeneity test on the key explanatory variable to ascertain whether it is actually endogenous 
or not. In this case, following prior corporate governance studies (Shabbir and Padget, 2005, 
p.22; Beiner et al., 2006, p.267), the popular Durbin-Wu-Hausman exogeneity test is followed.  
The test involves a two step procedure. Firstly, the constructed index (that is, the SACGI) 
assumed to be endogenous in equation 1, will first be run on the control variables, and the 
resulting  residuals  from  the  regression  will  be saved  (R-SACGI).  Secondly,  firm  financial 
performance  will  be  regressed  on  the  SACGI,  the  control  variables,  as  well  as  the  saved 
residuals (R-SACGI) from the first stage regression.  If the coefficient on the saved residuals 
(R-SACGI) is significant, then it can be concluded that the constructed index (the SACGI) is 
endogenously related to firm financial performance. This will also suggest that instrumental 
variable (IV) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) models are appropriate methodology to be 
used for the estimations. 
 
5.3.1.2 Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimation and the SACGI 
 
  As has been discussed in subsection 5.3.1, if the SACGI is endogenously related to 
firm financial performance, it could be that an essential control variable(s) has(have) been 
omitted from equation 1 or that the SACGI itself has been imperfectly measured. As suggested 
by Larcker and Rusticus (2008), these two potential endogeneity problems can be addressed 
by estimating an instrumental variable (IV) model. The IV technique involves a two-stage 
procedure. The first stage involves finding a proxy variable (an instrument) for the SACGI, 
which correlates highly with the SACGI, but which is uncorrelated with the structural error 
term ( t e ). In the second stage estimation, the SACGI is replaced by the proxy variable (the 
instrument). In this case, the coefficient on the SACGI will be both consistent and unbiased. 
  However,  there  are  some  shortcomings  that  need  to  be  noted  when  using  the  IV 
estimation. First, in practice, it is extremely difficult to find an instrument that satisfies the 
above requirements (Chenhall and Moers, 2007, p.188; van  Lent, 2007, p.198). Secondly, 
even if an instrument is found that correlates highly with the SACGI, confirming its validity 
and relevance is also a problem (Durnev and Kim, 2005, p.1483; van Lent, 2007; Larcker and 
Rusticus, 2008).  
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 As a result, this study follows the procedure suggested by Beiner et al. (2006, p.267). 
The procedure involves two stages. In the first stage, the SACGI, will be run on the control 
variables, as well as four other variables, including board size (BSIZE), the presence of a 
corporate  governance  committee  (CGCOM),  block  shareholding  (BLKHDNG)  and 
institutional shareholding (INSTHDNG) deemed to be exogenously related to the SACGI. The 
resulting predicted values for the SACGI (P-SACGI) will be saved. In the second stage, the 
SACGI will be replaced with the P-SACGI (as an instrument for the SACGI) in equation 1. 
Equation 1 will then be re-estimated in such a way that financial performance will be run on 
the  P-SACGI  and  the  control  variables.  This  should  generate  consistent  and  unbiased 
coefficient for the SACGI. 
  In theory, and as has been discussed in subsection 5.2.1, larger firms are better placed 
to comply with corporate governance rules than smaller ones. As such, it is hypothesised that 
board size (BSIZE) and audit firm size (BIG4), as proxied by a dummy variable that takes a 
value of one if a firm is audited by any of the big four auditing firms (i.e., Ernst & Young, 
KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Deloitte & Touche), otherwise zero, will be positively 
correlated with the SACGI.  
Also, it is expected that firms that set up corporate governance committees to specially 
monitor the firms’  compliance with corporate governance requirements are more likely to 
have improved internal corporate governance structures than those that do not. As a result, it is 
hypothesised that the presence of a corporate governance committee (CGCOM), as proxied by 
a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a firm has a corporate governance committee, 
zero  otherwise,  will  be  positively  correlated  with  the  SACGI.  As  has  been  discussed  in 
subsection 5.2.2.2, firms with cross-listings or foreign-listings are more likely to have better 
corporate  governance  structures.  This  is  because  cross-listed  firms  are  more  likely  to  be 
subjected to additional listing and governance requirements. Cross-listed firms are also usually 
larger in size. Thus, foreign-listing (DUALLIST) is expected to be positively correlated with 
the SACGI.  
Finally, it is hypothesised that block shareholding (BLKSHDNG), as measured by the 
total number of ordinary shares held by shareholders with at least 5% holdings divided by total 
number  of  ordinary  shares,  will  be  positively  correlated  with  the  SACGI.  Similarly,  it  is 
hypothesised that institutional shareholding (INSTHDNG), as measured by the total number of 
ordinary shares held by all financial and non-financial institutions scaled by the total number 
of ordinary shares, will be positively correlated with the SACGI. This is because block and  
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institutional shareholders can exert influence on the internal corporate governance structures, 
such as board structure and composition (Shabbir and Padget, 2005, p.22).  
As a fourth step suggested by Larcker and Rusticus (2008), it will be demonstrated in 
section 8.3 of chapter nine that the instrument, the P-SACGI, is not only highly correlated 
(relevant) with the original SACGI, but also uncorrelated (valid) with the structural error term 
( t e ). Finally, Larcker and Rusticus (2008) suggest that a comparison regarding the magnitude 
and signs of the coefficients of the OLS and IV estimations be made. This will also be done in 
chapter nine 
 
5.3.1.3 Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS), Alternative Corporate Governance  
Mechanisms and Possible Interdependences/Interactions  
 
  As  has  been  discussed  in  subsection  5.3.1,  omitted  variables,  simultaneity  and 
equilibrium conditions can also introduce endogeneity problems into the structural equation. 
As has been discussed in subsection 5.2.2.1, most of the prior corporate governance studies 
have examined the wealth effects of corporate governance structures in isolation. However, 
the  existence  of  alternative  corporate  governance  mechanisms  and  the  possibility  for  the 
existence of interdependences, for example, may lead to omitted variable bias and spurious 
correlations  (Agrawal  and  Knoeber,  1996,  p.378;  Beiner  et  al.,  2006,  p.252).  Therefore, 
following  Agrawal  and  Knoeber  (1996)  and  Beiner  et  al.  (2006),  an  extensive  set  of 
alternative  internal  corporate  governance  mechanisms,  which  are  not  included  in  the 
compliance-index, will be simultaneously estimated along with the broad compliance-index, 
the SACGI. The alternative corporate governance mechanisms are: (1) leverage (LEV); (2) 
institutional shareholding (INSTHDNG); (3) block shareholding (BLKSHDNG); and (4) board 
size (BSIZE). 
According to Agrawal and Knoeber (1996, pp.378-379) and Beiner et al. (2006, p.252), 
this  allows  for  possible  interdependence  or  interactions  between  these  internal  corporate 
governance structures, by specifying a system of simultaneous equations, where each one of 
the five internal corporate governance structures is the dependent variable in one of the five 
equations.  This  means  that  the  choice  of  any  one  of  the  internal  corporate  govermance 
mechanisms may depend upon the choices of all the other mechanisms, in addition to all the 
control variables in the system (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, p.382; Beiner et al. (2006, p.252).  
To  examine  the  relationship  between  financial  performance  and  internal  corporate 
governance structures, a sixth equation which models financial performance (ROA and Q-ratio)  
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as the dependent variable, will be estimated as part of the system. Following Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996, p.385) and Beiner et al. (2006, p.253), financial performance (ROA and Q-
ratio) will be included in equations 4 to 8 below as an explanatory variable which allows for 
possible  interdependences  or  interactions  (that  is,  it  allows  each  of  the  internal  corporate 
governance structures  to  affect financial  performance, ROA/Q-ratio),  but  also  ensures that 
financial performance affects the choice of each internal corporate governance structure.  
As  suggested  by  Larcker  and  Rusticus  (2008),  in  order  to  control  for  omitted 
variable(s), simultaneity, and equilibrium conditions, equations 4 to 9 that have been specified 
below will be estimated using two-stage least squares (2SLS). Specifically, and as will be 
discussed further in chapter nine, in the first stage, each of equations 4 to 8 will be estimated 
along  with  their  respective  control  variables,  and  the  resulting  predicted  values  (i.e., 
instrumented or predicted part of the corporate governance structures) will be saved. In the 
second stage, each corporate governance mechanism will be replaced with its saved predicted 
instrument from the first stage estimations in equation 9. Equation 9 will subsequently be 
estimated along with the eight control variables.   
 
i) The South African Corporate Governance Index (the SACGI) 
 
  As has been described in subsection 5.2.2.1, the SACGI is a compliance-index that 
incorporates 50 internal corporate governance structures. However, it excludes the other four 
alternative internal corporate governance mechanisms. Following Beiner et al. (2006, p.253), 
it is assumed that the SACGI is determined by the choices of the other four alternative internal  
corporate governance mechanisms and the exogenous variables, including growth potential 
(SGROWTH),  innovative  potential  (CAPEX),  capital  structure  (GEAR),  firm  size  (LNTA), 
audit firm size (BIG4), presence of a corporate governance committee (CGCOM), dual-listing 
(DUALLST), five industry dummies (INDUST) and five year dummies (YD). The basis for the 
selection  of  the  control  variables  has  already  been  described  and  justified  in  subsections 
5.2.2.2  and  5.3.1.2.  Therefore,  assuming  that  all  relations  are  linear  and  labelling  firm 
financial performance, as proxied by ROA and Q-RATIO simply as FP, and all nine exogenous 
variables simply as EXOGENOUS, the first equation in the system to be estimated is: 
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ii) Leverage (LEV) 
 
According to Jensen (1986, p.323; 1993, p.848) debt can serve as an alternative or a 
substitute corporate governance mechanism by reducing the agency costs of ‘free cash flows’ 
through the discouragement of overinvestment of free cash flows in non-positive NPV projects. 
This means that the use of debt has the advantage of motivating managers and their companies 
to increase efficiency and enhance their ability to survive (Jensen, 1986, p.324). The use of 
debt can also increase the value of the firm by offering managers the chance to signal their 
willingness  to  distribute  free  cash  flows,  and  to  be  subjected  to  additional  monitoring  by 
lenders (Beiner et al., 2006, p.256). As has been discussed in subsection 5.2.2.2, from a capital 
structure  perspective,  interest  payments  are  tax  deductible  (Modigliani  and  Miller,  1963, 
p.438), and as such, all else equal, highly leveraged firms should be able to generate higher 
financial performance. Therefore, the dependent variable of the second equation in the system 
is leverage (LEV), as measured by the percentage of total debt to total assets (Weir et al., 2002, 
p.591).  
Following Jensen (1986, p.324), larger firms with regular cash flows will use more 
debt than smaller ones. Consistent with Rajan and Zingales (1995), Bevan and Danbolt (2002, 
2004)  report  that  debt  is  positively  correlated  with  size,  but  negatively  associated  with 
profitability using a sample of UK firms. Hence, it is hypothesised that LEV will be positively 
correlated with firm size (LNTA), but negatively related to financial performance (FP). Also, 
debt increases credit risks and bankruptcy costs (Jensen, 1986, p.324), which may inhibit a 
firm’s ability to pursue innovative, growth and profitable investment opportunities (Myers, 
1977, p.148). Thus, it is expected that growth potential (SGROWTH), and innovative potential 
(CAPEX) will have a negative association with leverage (LEV). Debt usage is also expected to 
differ across industries (INDUST) and over time (YD). Labelling all five exogenous variables 
simply as EXOGENOUS, the second equation in the system to be estimated is: 
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iii) Block Shareholding (BLKSHDNG)  
 
  In theory, concentrated ownership can act as a substitute for better internal corporate 
governance structures by minimising information asymmetry, free-riding, and agency costs 
(e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Urzal, 2009). Similarly, increased monitoring by block  
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shareholders,  in  addition  to  serving  as  a  credible  takeover  threat,  may  also  serve  as  an 
incentive  for  managers  to  pursue  value  maximising  strategies  (Beiner  et  al., 2006,  p.255; 
Young et al., 2008, p.1108). Also, unlike small shareholders, block shareholders have big 
stakes  in  companies  such  that  it  pays  for  them  to  spend  private  resources  to  monitor 
management to increase firm value (FP), and thereby benefiting minority investors (Andres, 
2008, p.432).  
  By  contrast,  block  shareholders  can  also  connive  with  management  to  engage  in 
‘tunnelling’ or expropriate firm assets, resulting in substantial costs to minority shareholders 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, p.1044; Urzal, 2009, p.245). This is more likely to be a problem 
in South Africa where corporate ownership has historically been dominated by a small set of 
very large companies (mining finance houses) built around highly complicated cross-holdings 
and tall pyramids (Barr et al., 1995, p.18). Hence, the third dependent variable in the system of 
equations is block shareholding, as measured by the total number of ordinary shares held by 
shareholders with at least a 5% holding each divided by the total number of ordinary shares. 
  The empirical evidence between block shareholding and financial performance (FP) is 
mixed. While Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) find no relationship 
between  ownership  by  block  shareholders  and  performance,  Haniffa  and  Hudaib  (2006) 
document  a  statistically  significant  positive  and  negative  associations  between  block 
shareholding and, ROA and Q-ratio, respectively. Similarly, Brockman and Yan, (2009) report 
that block shareholding is positively associated with informed trading and decreases volatility 
in a firm’s stock returns. 
All  else  equal,  it  costs more to  buy  a  proportion  of  shares  in  larger  firms than  in 
smaller  firms,  and  so  a  negative  relationship  is  expected  between  block  shareholding 
(BLKSHDNG)  and  firm  size  (LNTA).  Beiner  et  al.  (2006,  p.255)  suggest  that  it  is  more 
attractive to hold shares in a firm with greater growth and innovative potential, and so it is 
expected  that  growth  (SGROWTH)  and  innovative  (CAPEX)  potential  will  be  positively 
associated with block shareholding. Also, gearing (GEAR), as measured by the ratio of debt to 
equity is expected to correlate negatively with block shareholding as firms with concentrated 
ownership are expected to use less debt. Block shareholding is also expected to differ across 
industries (INDUST) and over time (YD). Now, labelling all six exogenous variables simply as 
EXOGENOUS, the third equation to be estimated in the system is: 
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iv) Institutional Shareholding (INSTHDNG)  
 
  Due to their relative financial clout, reputation, knowledge and information advantages, 
institutional shareholders can impact positively on internal corporate governance structures 
and financial performance (FP) by exerting their influence on board structures, composition, 
and functioning (Shabbir and Padget, 2005, p.22; Young et al., 2008, p.1108). Within the 
South African context, institutional shareholding is more likely to be a relevant factor because 
through the use of pyramidical structures, institutional shareholding is intrinsically pervasive 
(Barr et al., 1995, p.18). 
Empirically, McConnell and Servaes (1990) document a positive relationship between 
institutional shareholding and financial performance. Similarly, Yan and Zhang (2009) report 
that institutional ownership is positively correlated with future stock returns. Also, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that large institutional shareholders like the California Public Employees’ 
Retirement  System  (CalPERS)  have  helped  in  improving  internal  corporate  governance 
structures through activism in the US and elsewhere (Shabbir and Padget, 2005, p.22). Hence, 
the  fourth  dependent  variable  in  the  system  of  equations  is  institutional  shareholding 
(INSTHDNG), as measured by the total number of ordinary shares held by both financial and 
non-financial institutions scaled by the total number of ordinary shares. 
Since  it  is  more  attractive  to  hold  shares  in  larger  firms  with  greater  growth  and 
innovative  potential  (Agrawal  and  Knoeber,  1996,  p.383),  it  is  expected  that  growth 
(SGROWTH) and innovative (CAPEX) potential will be positively associated with institutional 
shareholding. Improved internal corporate governance disclosure is positively associated with 
institutional shareholding (Core, 2001, p.446), and so it is expected that the presence of a 
corporate  governance  committee  (CGCOM)  will  be  positively associated  with  institutional 
shareholding. Also, institutional shareholding is expected to differ across industries (INDUST) 
and over time (YD). Hence, referring to all five exogenous variables simply as EXOGENOUS, 
the fourth equation to be estimated in the system is: 
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v) Board Size 
 
  As has been discussed in section 4.2 of chapter four, board size (BSIZE) can have a 
positive or negative impact on firm financial performance (FP). From agency and resource 
dependence perspectives, larger boards are associated with increased monitoring and greater 
opportunities to secure critical business resources (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, p.1038). By 
contrast, organisational theory suggests that larger boards are associated with greater free-
riding and slower decision-making (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992, p.67). The empirical evidence is 
ambiguous.  Yermack  (1996)  and  Guest  (2009)  separately  report  a  negative  association 
between board size and performance, while Beiner et al. (2006) document that board size is 
positively correlated with financial performance. Therefore, the fifth dependent variable in the 
system of equations is board size (BSIZE). 
  As has been discussed in subsections 5.2.2.2 and 5.3.1.2, it is expected that firm size 
(LNTA), foreign-listing or dual-listing (DUALLIST), audit firm size (BIG4), gearing (GEAR) 
and the presence of a corporate governance committee (CGCOM) will be positively associated 
with board size. Smaller firms have greater growth prospects and innovative potential, and so 
it  is  hypothesised  that  innovative  (CAPEX)  and  growth  (SGROWTH)  potential  will  be 
negatively correlated with board size. Now, referring to all nine exogenous variables simply as 
EXOGENOUS, the fifth equation to be estimated in the system is:  
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vi) Firm Financial Performance (FP) 
 
  Finally, to examine the relationship between financial performance and the internal 
corporate  governance  structures,  including  the  four alternative  mechanisms,  the dependent 
variable in the last equation in the system is financial performance (FP – ROA and Q-ratio). 
All the eight control variables included in equation 1, and described in subsection 5.2.2.2 are 
also  included,  and  labelled  simply  as  CONTROLS.  Therefore,  the  final  equation  to  be 
estimated in the system is: 
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Following  Agrawal  and  Knoeber  (1996,  p.385)  and  Beiner  et  al.  (2006,  p.263), 
equation (9) will be estimated along with equations (4) to (8) as a system of simultaneous 
equations  using  two-stage  least  squares  (2SLS).  Specifically,  in  the  first  stage,  each  of 
equations 4 to 8 specified above will be estimated along with their respective control variables. 
The  resulting  predicted  values  (i.e.,  instrumented  or  predicted  part  of  each  corporate 
governance  structure)  will  be  saved.  In  the  second  stage,  each  corporate  governance 
mechanism  will  be  replaced  with  its  saved  predicted  instrument  from  the  first  stage 
estimations in equation 9 above. Equation 9 will subsequently be estimated along with the 
eight control variables. 
This  procedure  as  described  above  considers  financial  performance  (FP)  as 
endogenous along with the five alternative internal corporate governance structures, which 
allows each of the corporate governance mechanisms to affect FP, but also allows FP to affect 
the  choice  of  each  internal  corporate  governance  structure.  As  suggested  by  Larcker  and 
Rusticus (2008), a comparison of the 2SLS estimates with the OLS estimates of equation (9) 
will be made to permit a direct assessment of the differences that arise from the possible 
existence of any endogeneity problems. 
There are two major conditions that need to be satisfied when using 2SLS before the 
system can be identified: the order-condition (a necessary condition) and the rank-condition (a 
sufficient condition) (Brooks, 2002, p.307; Chenhall and Moers, 2007a, p.189). The system of 
equations  consists  of  9  exogenous  variables  [firm  size  (LNTA),  sales  growth  (SGROWH), 
capital expenditure (CAPEX), capital structure (GEAR), audit firm size (BIG4), dual-listing 
(DUALLIST),  the  presence  of  a  corporate  governance  committee  (CGCOM),  industry 
dummies  (INDUST),  and  year  dummies  (YD)]  and  six  endogenous  variables  [(financial 
performance (FP), leverage (LEV), the SACGI, block shareholding (BLKHDNG), institutional 
shareholding (INSTHDNG), and board size (BSIZE)]. The order-condition for identifying a 
system states that the number of  exogenous variables excluded from an equation must be 
greater or equal to the number of endogenous variables included in the equation minus one 
(Beiner et al., 2006, p.263; Chenhall and Moers, 2007a, p.189). This means that at least five of 
the exogenous variables must be excluded from any single equation to identify the system.  
However, and in line with Beiner et al. (2006), as well as suggestions of Chenhall and 
Moers (2007a and b), equations (4) to (9) are independently developed based on theory, logic 
and data availability without excessive regard to satisfying the order-condition. All the six  
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equations in the system are over-identified (have more than four exogenous variables), which 
is acceptable in econometric terms (Brooks, 2002, p.314; Shabbir and Padget, 2005, p.24; 
Beiner et al., 2006, p.263). The rank condition additionally requires that at least one of the 
exogenous variables excluded should have a non-zero coefficient (Chenhall and Moers, 2007a, 
p.189). As will be discussed in chapter eight, none of the exogenous variables has a zero 
coefficient. 
  Like any other research methodology, the 2SLS technique may also suffer from some 
limitations  that  need  to  be  acknowledged.  Firstly,  while  the  separation  of  variables  into 
endogenous and exogenous has been done based on theory and logic as have been suggested 
by Chenhall and Moers (2007a and b) and Larcker and Rusticus (2007, 2008), it may be 
limited to some extent by the arbitrariness of the classification process. It has been suggested 
that it may be possible for the structural equations to be sensitive to system specifications 
(Beiner et al., 2006, p.267). Also, it does not mean that all potential endogeneity problems 
have been completely eliminated, as it is impossible to achieve that in practice (Chenhall and 
Moers,  2007a,  p192;  van  Lent,  2007,  p.198).  However,  and  as  suggested  by  Larcker  and 
Rusticus (2008), the potential existence of endogeneity has been explicitly acknowledged with 
an explicit attempt to minimise its potential impact on the results. 
 
5.3.1.4 Lagged Structure and Changes Model 
 
  Theory and evidence suggests that there is a time lag in the corporate governance-
performance  relationship  in  which  this  year’s  corporate  governance  structures  may  be 
associated with next year’s performance (Vefeas, 1999a; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). This is 
because board decisions may have gestation period within which their full benefits may be 
materialised. It may also be possible for firms with better current financial performance to 
improve  their  internal  corporate  governance  structures  in  a  subsequent  year  in  order  to 
continue to attract external financing, as well as receive higher market valuation. 
Following  prior  studies  (e.g.,  Weir  et  al.,  2002;  Haniffa  and  Hudaib,  2006), 
endogeneity problems that may be caused by potential time lags between the institution of 
internal corporate governance structures and financial performance are controlled for by re-
estimating  equations  1  and  2,  with  one  year  lagged  structure  as  equations  (10)  and  (11), 
respectively: 
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  In a similar vein, if better-governed firms tend to be associated with higher financial 
performance  than  their  poorly-governed  counterparts,  then  it  can  be  argued  that  such  a 
relationship will even be better captured by using changes in internal corporate governance 
structures and financial performance over time to estimate the relationship rather than using 
their  actual  levels.  Also,  even  if  a  statistically  significant  relationship  is  found  between 
corporate  governance  and  financial  performance,  potential  omitted  variables  bias  and 
endogeneity problems can make it difficult to ascertain whether better corporate governance 
indeed causes better financial performance. Arguably, using changes rather than actual levels 
of corporate governance and financial performance may effectively also control for any un-
observable or missing firm-specific variables.  
Further, prior literature suggests that corporate governance standards change over time 
among  firms  (e.g.,  Bauer  et  al.,  2004;  Shabbir  and  Padget,  2005;  Henry,  2008).  If  good 
corporate governance is indeed associated with higher financial performance, then it can also 
be argued that an increase (decrease) in the standard of a firm’s corporate governance should 
be associated with a similar increase (decrease) in its financial performance. Therefore, to test 
the robustness of the results to a changes model, the compliance-index model (equation 1)
70 is 
re-estimated using changes rather than actual levels of the financial performance, corporate 
governance, and the control variables as: 
∑
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where:  FP D stands for changes in firm financial performance,  SACGI D  refers to changes in 
the SACGI, while  CONTROLS D refers to changes in all the control variables, excluding the 
dummy variables of industry, year, audit firm size, and foreign or dual-listing. 
 
 
 
                                                 
70Since the equilibrium-variable model (equation 2) contains a lot of dummy variables, it will be inappropriate to 
estimate a similar model or relationship.  
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5.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY  
 
  To recap, this chapter has focused on the research design. It sought to achieve four 
main  closely  related  objectives.  Firstly,  it  attempted  to  describe  the  data  and  research 
methodology. In this regard, the data, its sources, the sample selection procedure and the main 
research methodology used in this study were comprehensively described. Two main types of 
data are used in this study: internal corporate governance and financial performance variables. 
These were mainly collected from Perfect Information and DataStream, respectively.  Out of 
the 402 listed firms on the JSE Ltd as at 31/12/2006, the full data required was obtained for a 
sample of 169. One hundred (100) firms were then stratify sampled over five consecutive 
years (2002 to 2006 inclusive), resulting in a total of 500 firm-year observations.  
The review also identified the compliance-index and the equilibrium-variable models 
as the two main competing research methodologies within the extant literature. It is contended 
that  while  the  two  competing  models  are  ostensibly  based  on  contrasting  theoretical 
assumptions with their respective potential limitations, prior literature has mainly used one or 
the other based purely on some theoretical arguments without explicitly testing the empirical 
validity of such theoretical propositions. As a result, the two models are explicitly described 
and estimated for the first time within the same study and context to offer new insights into 
their comparative theoretical and empirical validity to potentially serve as a guide for future 
researchers with regard to making their methodological choices. 
The second objective of the chapter has been to explain the rationale for the numerous 
methodological choices made at every stage of the study. In this case, the rationale for the 
choice  of  data,  its  sources,  sampling  procedure,  research  methodology,  and  sensitivity 
analyses  were  explicitly  discussed  throughout  the  study.  Thirdly,  the chapter  attempted  to 
point out the strengths and limitations of the various methodological choices made throughout 
the study. In line with this view, the weaknesses and strengths of the data, its sources, the 
estimated  models,  the  various  proxies  and  measurement  of  the  independent,  control  and 
dependent variable, as well as robustness analyses were thoroughly discussed throughout the 
study.  
The final objective of this chapter has been to offer an indication of the extent to which 
the obtained empirical results are robust to alternative estimations and explanations. In this 
regard, robustness of the results to the existence of potential problems of endogeneity, and 
alternative corporate governance mechanisms were thoroughly explored. More specifically, 
the results were subjected to extensive set of sensitivity analyses, including estimating an  
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instrumental variable model, a two-stage least squares model, a lagged corporate governance-
financial performance structure, and a changes model.  
In the next chapter (chapter six), the main objective is to provide a detailed description 
and explanation for the levels of compliance with the South African Corporate Governance 
Index (the SACGI).  More specifically, it will  generally  attempt to determine the levels of 
compliance among the sampled firms, and ascertain whether the levels of compliance that will 
be observed can be explained by firm size, industry, dual-listing, and audit firm size. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX 
(THE SACGI) 
 
 
6. INTRODUCTION 
 
  This chapter discusses the South African Corporate Governance Index (the SACGI). It 
has  three  main  objectives.  First,  it  provides  a  detailed  description  of  the  SACGI  using  a 
number of descriptive statistics. In this regard, summary descriptive statistics of the levels of 
compliance with the SACGI based on the full sample are reported. The second objective of the 
chapter is to explain the observed variability in the levels of compliance with the SACGI. In 
this  respect,  the  sample  is  split  into  size,  industry,  dual-listed,  and  big  four  audited  sub-
samples.  The  rationale  is  to  ascertain  whether  the  observed  variability  in  the  levels  of 
compliance with the SACGI can be explained by firm size, industry, dual-listing and audit firm 
size.  
In addition to descriptive analyses, a multivariate regression of the SACGI on all the 
eight control variables will be carried out to further ascertain the key determinants of the 
SACGI. As have been explained in chapters two, three and five, a distinquishing feature of the 
South African  corporate  governance  model is that  it  formally  super-imposes a  number  of 
affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions on firms to comply with. 
Therefore, the third and final aim of this chapter is to examine the levels of compliance within 
the South African context specific affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance 
provisions.  
The  rest  of  the  chapter  is  organised  as  follows.  Section  6.1  discusses  descriptive 
statistics of the levels of compliance with the SACGI based on the full sample. Section 6.2 
describes  and  explains  descriptive  statistics  based  on  firm  size.  Section  6.3  examines 
descriptive statistics based on industry. Section 6.4 explores further the determinants of the 
SACGI in a multivariate regression framework. Section 6.5 reports descriptive statistics of the 
levels  of  compliance  with  the  nine  South  African  context  specific  affirmative  action  and 
stakeholder corporate governance issues. Section 6.6 describes other key trends and measures 
of board diversity, while section 6.7 summarises the chapter. 
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6.1 Descriptive Statistics Based on the Full Sample (All 500 Firm Years) 
 
Table 4 reports the levels of compliance among the sampled firms with all the fifty 
individual internal corporate governance provisions that form the South African Corporate 
Governance Index (the SACGI).   
 
Table 4: The Levels of Compliance with the Individual Internal Corporate Governance    
                Provisions among the Sampled Firms  
Compliance Levels Among Firms (%)  Individual Internal Corporate Governance 
Provisions of the SACGI  All  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
1. Board and directors: 
Role duality(DUAL1) 
Board composition(COM1) 
Board chairperson(BCP) 
Frequency of board meetings(FBM1s) 
Individual directors meetings attendance(IDMA) 
Disclosure of directors’ biography(DDB) 
Disclosure of director classification(DDC) 
Appraisal of chair performance & effect.(ACPE) 
Appraisal of CEO/MD perf. & effect.(ACEOPE) 
Evaluation of board perf. & effect.(EBPE) 
Evaluat. of board subcom. perf. & effect.(EBSCPE) 
Director/officer dealings & securities(DDS) 
Office of the company secretary(COSEC1) 
Existence of nomination committee(NCOM1) 
Composition of nomination committee(COM2) 
Chairperson of nomination committee(NCCP) 
Disclosure of nom. com. membership(DM1) 
Nom. com. members’ meetings attendance(INCMMA) 
Existence of remuneration committee(RCOM1) 
Composition of remuneration committee(COM3) 
Chairperson of remuneration committee(RCCP) 
Disclosure of rem. com. membership(DM2) 
Rem. com. members’ meetings attendance(IRCMMA) 
Directors’ rem., interests & share options(DDR) 
Philosophy & procedure of director rem.(DPLR) 
Director access to free legal advice(DAFIPA) 
2. Accounting and auditing: 
Existence of audit committee(ACOM1) 
Composition of audit committee(COM4) 
Chairperson of audit committee(ACCP) 
Disclosure of audit committee membership(DM3) 
Audit com. members’ meetings attendance(IACMA) 
Narrative on the ‘going-concern’(NGC) 
3. Risk Management and internal audit: 
Disclosure of company risks(DCR) 
Disclosure of policy on risks management(DPM) 
Disclosure policy on internal control system(DPI) 
Existence of risk management committee(RISCOM1) 
Risk mgt. com. members’ metngs. attend.(IRISCMA) 
4. Ownership structure: 
Internal ownership(INON1) 
 
74.2 
  62.8 
  32.4 
  78.0 
  67.6 
  96.8 
  73.0 
  11.8 
  10.6 
  25.8 
  14.8 
  68.6 
100.0 
  46.8 
  27.8 
  29.2 
  45.6 
  31.8 
  90.6 
  17.2 
  47.4 
  84.2 
  49.0 
  97.8 
  36.6 
  79.0 
  
90.6 
  46.6 
  49.0 
  86.0 
  54.4 
  98.2 
  
96.8 
  82.4 
  90.0 
  61.0 
  40.6 
 
55.4 
 
 61 
  55 
  17 
  65 
  36 
  94 
  49 
  4 
  3 
  10 
  5 
  55 
100 
26 
10 
10 
23 
  9 
85 
10 
29 
76 
18 
93 
28 
71 
 
87 
28 
26 
79 
21 
97 
 
96 
74 
89 
40 
10 
 
60 
  
64 
  61 
  25 
  75 
  65 
  96 
  70 
  8 
  10 
  24 
  12 
  65 
100 
42 
26 
23 
41 
25 
90 
14 
39 
81 
40 
99 
36 
79 
 
88 
41 
48 
84 
49 
98 
 
95 
81 
87 
59 
35 
 
58 
 
77 
  67 
  34 
  82 
  76 
  98 
  78 
  12 
  13 
  31 
  14 
  72 
100 
52 
30 
32 
51 
36 
91 
17 
53 
85 
57 
99 
39 
81 
 
90 
51 
55 
86 
63 
98 
 
97 
84 
89 
66 
47 
 
52 
  
83 
  65 
  42 
  84 
  78 
  98 
  84 
  16 
  12 
  31 
  18 
  74 
100 
54 
35 
38 
54 
43 
92 
21 
55 
86 
63 
99 
40 
82 
 
93 
52 
56 
87 
68 
99 
 
98 
85 
91 
67 
54 
 
51 
 
86 
  66 
  44 
  84 
  83 
  98 
  84 
  19 
  15 
  33 
  25 
  77 
100 
60 
38 
43 
59 
46 
95 
24 
61 
93 
67 
99 
40 
82 
 
95 
61 
60 
94 
71 
99 
 
98 
88 
94 
73 
57 
      
56  
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Continuation: Table 4 
Compliance Levels Among Firms (%)  Individual Internal Corporate Governance 
Provisions of the SACGI  All  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
5. Integrated sustainability reporting/non-finan.: 
Black economic empowerment(BEE) 
Policy on HIV/AIDS(HIV) 
Policy on health and safety(PHS) 
Policy on employment equity(PEQ) 
Policy on good environmental practices(PEP) 
Corporate social Investment(CSI) 
Disclosure of company code of ethics(DCE) 
Board diversity on the basis of ethnicity(BDIVE1) 
Board diversity on the basis of gender(BDIVG1) 
6. Culture of voluntary compliance & enforcement: 
Contribution to devt. of finan. Journalism(CDFJ) 
Encouraging shareholder activism(PSA) 
Compliance/non-compliance with King II(CNC) 
 
68.6 
  62.0 
  53.8 
  82.6 
  59.4 
  63.0 
  84.6 
  76.4 
  50.0  
   
 .0 
  51.6 
  97.8 
 
51 
45 
36 
80 
47 
54 
76 
69 
39 
  
 0 
37 
96 
 
60 
59 
42 
80 
53 
63 
83 
73 
45 
  
0 
47 
97 
 
71 
66 
59 
84 
62 
62 
85 
76 
51 
  
0 
55 
99 
 
77 
70 
64 
83 
67 
67 
89 
78 
55 
  
0 
57 
99 
 
84 
70 
68 
86 
68 
69 
90 
86 
60 
  
0 
62 
98 
 
 
To facilitate comparison, for each provision, the percentage levels of compliance for 
the pooled sample, as well as for each of the five firm years are reported. Three key findings 
can be observed from Table 4. Firstly, it shows that there are substantial variations in the 
levels of compliance with the individual corporate governance provisions among the sampled 
firms. It ranges from 100% (perfect compliance by all 100 firms over the five-year period) in 
the case of the existence of the office of a company secretary (COSEC1) to 0% (complete non-
compliance by all 100 firms over the five-year period) with respect to the contribution to the 
development of financial journalism (CDFJ).  
The perfect compliance with COSEC1 is consistent with the provisions of the South 
African Companies Act and the 2007 JSE Listings Rules. Both regulations mandate every 
public company to maintain a well-resourced and supportive office of a company secretary to 
oversee effective and efficient functioning of the board. The complete non-compliance with 
CDFJ implies that it may be inappropriate within the South African context. A possible reason 
may be that South Africa seems to already possess a well-developed free and vibrant financial 
press such that there may be no need for firms to spend additional resources to help develop 
financial journalism  (King Report,  2002,  pp.162-163).  Similarly,  and  as  will be  discussed 
further  below,  evidence  of  no  variation  in  these  two  provisions  suggests  that  it  will  be 
methodologically inappropriate to link single corporate governance mechanisms to financial 
performance if all the sampled firms were to comply or not to comply with a provision, as 
suggested by the equilibrium-variable model.    
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It  also  supports suggestions  of  weak implementation and enforcement  of  corporate 
governance  standards  by  regulatory  authorities  in  South  Africa  (e.g.,  Armstrong,  2003; 
Deutsche Bank, 2002; IIF, 2007). For example, global opinion-based surveys conducted by 
CLSA  (2000)  and  Deutsche Bank  (2002)  using  analysts  to  examine  corporate  governance 
standards in emerging markets, suggest that South Africa suffers from weak enforcement of 
corporate governance rules. As has already been discussed in subsection 3.2.2 of chapter three, 
this may be due to the relative dearth of financial resources and trained personnel available to 
South Africa’s regulatory and enforcement embodies, such as the Financial Services Board 
(FSB), the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), and the Registrar of Companies (IIF, 
2007, p.8). 
For eight (16%) provisions, compliance levels are comparatively high. Approximately, 
90%  or  more  of  the  sampled  firms  complied  with  these  provisions.  They  include  the 
description of directors’ biography (DDB), disclosure of individual directors’ remuneration, 
interests  and  share  options  (DDR), provision  of  a narrative  on  the possibility  of  the  firm 
operating as a going-concern (NGC), the disclosure of company risks (DCR), disclosure of 
internal control systems and policies (DPI), a positive statement on the compliance or non-
compliance with the corporate governance provisions of King II (CNC)
71, and the existence of 
remuneration (RCOM1), and audit (ACOM1) committees.  
By contrast, for 11 (22%) provisions, compliance levels are relatively low. Only 40% 
or  less  of  the  sampled  firms  complied  with  these  provisions.  These  provisions  consist  of 
whether  the  chairpersons  of the  board  (BCP),  and  the  nomination  (NCCP)  committee  are 
independent, evaluation of the performance and effectiveness of the board chairman (ACPE), 
the CEO/managing  director  (ACEOPE),  the  board (EBPE),  and  the  board sub-committees 
(EBSCE), the disclosure of the attendance records of meetings by the members of nomination 
(INCMMA),  and  risk  management  (IRISCMA)  committees,  and  whether  the  nomination 
committee consist of a majority of independent non-executive directors (NEDs) (COM2), and 
whether all the members of the remuneration (COM3) committee are Independent NEDs. 
                                                 
71A general observation from reading the annual reports is that, on average, the sampled firms were more willing 
to  explicitly  highlight  (often  repeated throughout the  annual  reports) improvements in  corporate  governance 
standards  or  compliance  with  the  corporate  governance  provisions  of  King  II,  but  less  willing  to  formally 
acknowledge areas of non-compliance or decreases in corporate governance standards. Specifically, and as Table 
4 shows, a majority (about 98%) of the sampled firms did make a general positive statement (especially in the 
introduction section or paragraph of the corporate governance report) on whether they comply or do not comply 
with the corporate governance provisions of King II. A relatively smaller (about 70% as observed from reading 
the annual reports) number, however, did explicitly specify areas of non-compliance and the reasons for non-
compliance.  By  contrast,  almost  all  the  sampled  firms  did  formally  acknowledge  or  highlight  year-on-year 
improvements in corporate governance standards.   
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For the remaining 29 provisions, compliance levels range from 46% with regard to the 
disclosure  of  the  nomination  committee  membership  (DM1)  to  86%  in  the  case  of  the 
disclosure of the audit committee membership (DM3). Overall, the evidence from Table 4 is 
that the sampled firms are  more likely to comply with some of the corporate  governance 
provisions than others. For example, while 74% of the sampled firms have split the roles of 
chairman and CEO (DUAL1), only 32% of them have independent board chairpersons (BCP). 
Also, whilst 98% provide narratives by directors’ on the possibility of their firm operating as a 
‘going-concern’  (NGC),  less  than  12%  evaluate  the  performance  and  effectiveness  their 
chairpersons (ACPE) and CEOs/managing directors (ACEOPE) annually. 
The second major evidence from Table 4, and as has been explained above, is that, on 
comparative basis, the use of the compliance-index model is more likely to achieve better 
variation in the levels of compliance with the SACGI among the sampled firms than using the 
equilibrium-variable model. For example, Table 4 shows that over 90% of the sampled firms 
have  established  a  remuneration  committee.  This  results  in  less  than  10%  variability  in 
compliance levels among the sampled firms, such that if a cross-sectional regression is run on 
such a single corporate governance variable, it is arguably less likely to be value relevant.  
However, on the question of whether the remuneration committee consist entirely of 
independent NEDs (COM3) or is chaired by an independent NED (RCCP), less than 18% or 
50%, respectively, of the sampled firms complied. As a result, when the differences in these 
individual  corporate  governance  variables  are  aggregated  to  form  a  broad  compliance 
corporate governance index, it is arguably more likely to show a relatively sufficient variation 
in  the  levels  of  compliance  among  the  sampled  firms  than  examining  single  corporate 
governance mechanisms in isolation.  
The final major finding from Table 4 is that compliance with the corporate governance 
provisions improves over time. Apart from the perfect compliance/non-compliance cases of 
COSEC1/CDFJ, respectively, as well as internal ownership (INON1)
72 in which there is a 
reduction  (of  a  4  percentage  points)  from  60%  in  2002  to  56%  in  2006  in  the  levels  of 
compliance, the remaining 47 provisions experienced consistent substantial improvements in 
the  levels  of  compliance  among  the  sampled  firms.  Excluding  COSEC1  and  CDFJ,  the 
                                                 
72Internal ownership (INON1) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the percentage of shares held by all 
insiders or non-public shareholders, including directors, officers, and employees is less than 50% of the total firm 
equity, 0 otherwise (see section of 4 of Appendix 2). Similar to the other continuous variables, including board 
composition (COM1), the frequency of board meetings (FBMs), and board diversity  on the basis of gender 
(BDIVG1) and ethnicity (BDIVE1) contained in the SACGI, internal ownership had to be converted from a 
continuous variable to a dummy variable so that it could easily be included in the SACGI without affecting the 
scale of measurement of the remaining 46 dummy variables.  
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provision with the least increase over the five-year period is directors’ narrative on ‘going-
concern’ (NGC), recording only a 2 percentage point improvement (i.e., from 97% in 2002 to 
99% in 2006). However, this is understandable because compliance levels among the sampled 
firms with NGC were already relatively high in 2002.  
In  contrast,  the  disclosure  of  the  risk  management  committee  members’  meetings’ 
attendance records (IRISCMA) experienced the highest increase over the five-year period with 
a 47  percentage  point  increase  (i.e.,  from  10%  in 2002  to  57%  in  2006)  in  the  levels  of 
compliance  across  the  sampled  firms.  For  example,  only  26%  of  the  sampled  firms  had 
established a functioning nomination committee (NCOM1) in 2002. It increased to 42%, 52%, 
54% and 60% in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, respectively, experiencing an overall increase of 
34 percentage points over the five-year period.  
They also show improvements over the findings of prior opinion-based surveys that 
include South African listed firms. The Deutsche Bank (2002) survey examining corporate 
governance standards in emerging markets, including South Africa, for example, reports that 
60%, 47%, and 16% of South African listed firms have audit, compensation, and nomination 
committees in 1999, respectively. Table 4, however, shows that 85%, 85%, and 26% of the 
sampled  firms  have  established  audit,  remuneration,  and  nomination  committees  in  2002, 
respectively.  This  implies  the  number  of  firms  with  audit,  remuneration,  and  nomination 
committees has improved compared with the findings of the Deutsche Bank survey in 1999. 
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Figure 2 compares the year-by-year aggregate levels of compliance with the SACGI 
across the sampled firms using computed means, and yearly increases in percentage points. 
Firstly,  it  demonstrates  further  that  compliance  with  the  corporate  governance  provisions 
among the sampled firms improves over time. Secondly, the mean percentage point increase 
from 2002 to 2006 is 20 (i.e., from 48% in 2002 to 68% in 2006). Thirdly, as the second year 
in which King II became operational, 2003 experienced the highest yearly percentage point 
increase of 9 (i.e., from 48% in 2002 to 57% in 2003) with compliance levels increasing at a 
decreasing rate in the subsequent three years.  
The positive relationship between the levels of compliance and time is consistent with 
the  results  of  the  accounting  disclosure  literature,  prior  corporate  governance  studies,  and 
widely  cited  opinion-based  corporate  governance  surveys.  For  example,  Conyon  (1993), 
Conyon and Mallin (1997), Bauer et al. (2004), Shabbir and Padgett (2005), Cui et al. (2008) 
and Henry (2008) report evidence of substantial improvements in the levels of compliance 
with  corporate  governance  standards  over  time  across  a  sample  of  European,  UK,  and 
Australian, listed firms that were examined by them, respectively. Similarly, opinion-based 
surveys  conducted  by  CLSA  (2000)  and  Deutsche  Bank  (2002)  in  emerging  markets, 
including South Africa, suggest that the introduction of the King Reports is helping to improve 
corporate governance standards among South African listed firms.   
Panel  A  of  Table  5  reports  summary  descriptive  statistics  for  the  SACGI.  For 
comparison purposes, descriptive statistics based on firm size, industry, dual-listing, and audit 
firm size are also presented, and will be referred to in sections 6.2 and 6.3. Consistent with the 
evidence of wide variability in compliance levels with the individual corporate governance 
provisions, it suggests that there is a substantial degree of dispersion in the summary internal 
corporate governance scores among the sampled firms. The scores range from a minimum of 
6% (i.e., 3 out of 50) to a maximum 98% (i.e., 49 out of 50) with the average sampled firm 
complying with 60% of the 50 corporate governance provisions analysed.  
This is similar to the results of prior cross-countries studies that include South Africa 
in their sample. Using the CLSA corporate governance ratings, both Klapper and Love (2004) 
and Durnev and Kim (2005) report average firm-level corporate governance scores in 2000 of 
66% and 61% for a cross-country sample that include South African listed firms, respectively. 
Similarly, opinion-based survey conducted by the Deutsche Bank (2002) in emerging markets, 
including South Africa, suggests that the average corporate governance score among South 
African listed firms was 74%.  
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Appendix 5 is a histogram depicting the distribution of the SACGI.  Since Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression technique will be used to test all the hypotheses that have 
been discussed in chapters four and five, a normal distribution curve has been super-imposed. 
First,  the  skewness  statistic  (-.36)  in  Panel  A  of  Table  5,  rejects  the  null  hypothesis  (the 
absolute  critical  value  for  accepting  skewness  is  zero)  that  the  SACGI  is  symmetrically 
distributed (i.e., skewed to the right with longer left tail) at the 5% significance level.  
By contrast, the kurtosis statistic (-.89) fails to reject the null hypothesis (the absolute 
critical value for rejecting Kurtosis is three) that the SACGI is mesokurtically distributed. The 
negative sign, however, suggests that the observations cluster less and have shorter tails. The 
lack  of  symmetry  in  the  SACGI  may  pose  problems  for  the  OLS  regressions  that  will 
subsequently be estimated in chapter eight. However, and as will be discussed further below, 
the non-normal behaviour depicted by the SACGI is generally very similar to the reported 
results of prior studies that have carried out OLS estimations (Cheung and Wei, 2006, p.913; 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, pp.1048, 1050-1051; Francoeur et al., 2008, p.88). This suggests it 
may be statistically tolerable. 
Appendix 5 also indicates that the SACGI is fairly less non-normal compared with a 
normal distribution. Specifically, and as Panel D of Table 6 shows, less than 5%, 18%, and 
25% of the sampled firms had summary corporate governance scores between 0% and 20%, 
21% and 40%, and 41% and 60%, respectively. By contrast, more than 32% and 19% of the 
sampled firms had corporate governance scores between 61% and 80%, and 81% and 100%, 
respectively.  
Descriptive  statistics  of  the  SACGI  for  each  of  the  five  years  are  fairly  similar  to  those 
observed  for  the  full 500  firm-year  observations. All  show  similar large  variability  (large 
standard deviations) in the levels of compliance with the SACGI (i.e., minimum of 6% in 2002 
to a maximum of 98% in 2005). Similarly, they are all mildly (in comparison with a normal 
distribution) skewed to the right with less clustering among the observations. As has been 
explained above, ascertaining the distributional properties of the SACGI is important because 
the presence  of  extreme  levels  of  non-normal  behaviour  may  pose problems for  the  OLS 
regressions that will be estimated in chapter eight. This is because OLS estimation assumes 
normality in variables. 
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Table 5: Summary Descriptive Statistics for the South African Corporate 
               Governance Index (the SACGI) 
The South African Corporate 
Governance Index (the SACGI) 
 
Mean 
 
T-Test 
Std. 
Dev. 
Skew-
ness 
   Kurt- 
 osis 
Mini- 
mum 
Maxi- 
mum 
Panel A: All Firm Years 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel B: All Small Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel C: All Large Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel D: All B. Material Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel E: All Con. Goods Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel F: All C. Services Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
60.00 
47.58 
56.70 
62.50 
65.08 
68.16 
44.48 
34.48 
40.16 
46.12 
48.24 
53.40 
75.53 
60.68 
73.24 
78.88 
81.92 
82.92 
57.92 
48.10 
54.00 
58.20 
60.50 
68.50 
59.32 
47.80 
56.90 
62.10 
63.40 
66.40 
63.44 
49.00 
59.40 
68.40 
69.90 
70.50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31.05
*** 
26.20
*** 
33.08
*** 
32.76
*** 
33.68
*** 
29.52
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   .96 
 5.50 
   .90 
   .80 
 3.20 
 2.40 
 2.36 
 5.20 
 3.80 
 3.10 
   .30 
   .00 
 6.48
** 
 6.40 
 6.30 
 9.40 
 6.20 
 4.10 
22.03 
19.03 
21.56 
21.83 
21.95 
19.89 
17.69 
12.73 
16.39 
18.23 
17.72 
17.12 
13.28 
14.81 
10.57 
9.11 
9.01 
7.86 
 24.70 
22.91 
26.64 
24.78 
25.45 
20.82  
20.90 
20.47 
20.46 
21.07 
20.98 
18.14  
18.66 
13.40 
17.58 
17.50 
17.92 
   18.43 
 -.36
** 
 -.06
* 
 -.35
** 
 -.56
** 
 -.53
** 
 -.72
** 
  .25
** 
.20
** 
.56
** 
.15
** 
.15
** 
 -.18
** 
-1.18
*** 
-1.09
** 
 -.62
** 
 -.24
** 
 -.25
** 
 -.10
** 
 -.32
** 
 -.04
* 
 -.25
** 
 -.29
** 
 -.20
** 
-1.13
*** 
 -.44
** 
 -.24
** 
 -.49
** 
 -.62
** 
 -.58
** 
 -.43
**  
  .10
** 
.44
** 
  .01
* 
 -.26
* 
 -.00 
 -.08
* 
-.89 
-.81 
-.97 
-.76 
-.77 
-.28 
-.49 
-.17 
-.04 
-.73 
-.42 
-.28 
2.94
* 
   2.59
* 
.42 
-.38 
-.37 
-.85 
-1.22 
-1.47 
-1.34 
-1.27 
-1.42 
.54  
-.93 
-.80 
-.82 
-.98 
-1.07 
-1.51 
-1.00 
-.10 
-1.26 
-1.00 
-1.00 
-1.20 
6.00 
6.00 
10.00 
6.00 
12.00 
12.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
12.00 
12.00 
12.00 
6.00 
6.00 
 46.00 
 60.00 
 66.00 
 66.00 
 10.00 
12.00 
10.00 
14.00 
18.00 
18.00   
6.00 
6.00 
18.00 
24.00 
28.00 
36.00 
28.00 
28.00 
32.00 
36.00 
38.00 
   38.00 
98.00 
86.00 
94.00 
96.00 
98.00 
96.00 
90.00 
66.00 
82.00 
84.00 
90.00 
88.00 
98.00 
86.00 
94.00 
96.00 
98.00 
96.00 
96.00 
86.00 
94.00 
94.00 
96.00 
96.00 
92.00 
80.00 
88.00 
88.00 
92.00 
86.00 
98.00 
80.00 
96.00 
96.00 
98.00 
96.00 
Notes: The t-test in column 3 is the independent samples t-test for equality of means. The mean differences in 
Panel B test for equality of means between all large and all small firms, while those in Panels D, E, and F test for 
equality of means between all basic materials firms, all consumer goods firms, and all consumer services firms, 
and all technology firms, respectively. A mean difference with (***), and (**) indicates that the null hypothesis 
that the means are equal is rejected at the 1%, and 5% significance level, respectively. The skewness and kurtosis 
test statistics in columns 5 and 6, respectively, test for normal distribution. A test statistic with (***), (**), and (*) 
means that  the  null hypothesis  that the SACGI  is  normally  distributed is  rejected  at the  1%,  5%,  and  10% 
significance level, respectively. 
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Continuation: Table 5 
The South African Corporate 
Governance Index (the SACGI) 
 
Mean 
 
T-Test 
Std. 
Dev. 
Skew-
ness 
   Kurt- 
 osis 
Mini- 
mum 
Maxi- 
mum 
Panel G: All Industrials Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel H: All Technology  Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel I: All Dual-listed Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel J: All Non-Dual-listed  
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel K: All Big Four Audited 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel L: All Non-Big Four Aud. 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
62.38 
50.40 
60.10 
64.80 
67.90 
68.70 
56.96 
42.60 
53.10 
59.00 
63.70 
66.40 
74.82 
61.04 
72.48 
76.48 
80.08 
94.00 
55.07 
43.93 
51.03 
57.39 
60.08 
62.89 
66.16 
52.82 
63.38 
69.29 
71.72 
73.58 
44.94 
34.76 
40.93 
45.13 
48.83 
54.90 
5.42
* 
7.80 
7.00 
5.80 
4.20 
2.30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19.74
*** 
17.95
*** 
21.45
*** 
19.09
*** 
20.00
*** 
21.11
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21.22
*** 
18.06
*** 
22.45
*** 
24.16
*** 
22.89
*** 
18.69
*** 
25.20 
21.67 
24.97 
25.79 
25.92 
25.32 
 19.63 
16.03 
17.85 
19.46 
19.25 
17.47 
17.54 
20.09 
16.23 
17.09 
15.91 
7.35 
21.17 
16.49 
20.59 
21.33 
21.48 
19.97 
20.67 
18.76 
20.17 
19.51 
20.01 
18.33 
17.61 
12.68 
15.35 
18.17 
17.84 
17.38 
-.60
** 
-.27
** 
-.68
** 
-.86
** 
-.92
** 
-1.01
** 
-.26
** 
-.01
* 
-.09
* 
-.58
** 
-.67
** 
-.61
** 
-1.88
*** 
-1.46
***  
-2.23
*** 
-2.22
*** 
 2.34
*** 
   .03
* 
  -.07
* 
   .16
** 
  -.04
* 
  -.30
** 
  -.26
** 
  -.40
** 
  -.87
** 
  -.48
** 
  -.79
** 
-1.22
*** 
-1.18
*** 
-1.36
*** 
   .55
** 
   .32
** 
   .75
** 
   .49
** 
   .53
** 
   .25
** 
 -.93 
 -.85 
-1.08 
 -.62 
 -.43 
 -.06 
 -.86 
 -.42 
 -.76 
 -.42 
 -.34 
 -.59 
 4.28
** 
 2.15 
 6.83
*** 
 5.86
*** 
 6.90
*** 
 -.59 
 -.97 
  -.71 
-1.01 
-.95 
-.94 
 .59 
   .12 
  -.33 
    .29 
  1.11 
    .91 
  1.78 
  -.31 
  -.49 
   .33 
  -.67 
  -.22 
  -.67 
10.00 
10.00 
12.00 
12.00 
12.00 
12.00 
   12.00 
12.00 
24.00 
24.00 
24.00 
34.00 
6.00 
6.00 
14.00 
18.00 
22.00 
70.00 
10.00 
10.00 
10.00 
12.00 
12.00 
12.00 
6.00 
6.00 
10.00 
12.00 
12.00 
12.00 
12.00 
12.00 
18.00 
22.00 
20.00 
20.00 
96.00 
86.00 
92.00 
96.00 
96.00 
96.00 
92.00 
70.00 
82.00 
92.00 
90.00 
92.00 
96.00 
96.00 
86.00 
94.00 
96.00 
96.00 
98.00 
80.00 
84.00 
96.00 
98.00 
96.00 
98.00 
86.00 
94.00 
96.00 
98.00 
96.00 
90.00 
62.00 
82.00 
84.00 
90.00 
88.00 
Notes: The t-test in column 3 is the independent samples t-test for equality of means. The mean differences in 
Panel G test for equality of means between all industrial firms and all technology firms. The mean differences in 
Panel I test for equality of means between all dual-listed and all non-dual-listed firms, while those in Panel K test 
for equality of means between all big four audited firms and all non-big four audited firms. A mean difference 
with (***), and (*) indicates that the null hypothesis that the means are equal is rejected at the 1%, and 10% 
significance level, respectively. The skewness and kurtosis test statistics in columns 5 and 6, respectively, test for 
normal distribution. A test statistic with (***), (**), and (*) means that the null hypothesis that the SACGI is 
normally distributed is rejected at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
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     Table 6: Additional Characteristics of the Sampled Firms 
FIRM CLASSIFICATION  DUAL-
LISTING 
BIG FOUR 
AUDITOR 
NON-BIG FOUR 
AUDITOR 
Panel A: Firm Size 
Small 
Large 
Total 
 
3 
23 
    26 
 
25 
46 
71 
 
27 
3 
29 
Panel B: The Country of Dual-listing 
UK and US 
UK 
US 
Total 
 
7 
8 
11 
26 
 
7 
8 
11 
26 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Panel C: Firm Industry 
Technology 
Consumer services 
Consumer Goods 
Industrials 
Basic Materials 
Total 
 
2 
5 
3 
5 
11 
        26 
 
12 
13 
16 
14 
16 
71 
 
8 
7 
5 
6 
3 
29 
Panel D: A Tabular Distribution of the SACGI Scores 
SACGI Scores  %  Number of 
Observations 
% of Sample 
Firms With Scores Between: 
 
 
 
 
Total 
  0 –    20 
21 –   40 
41 –   60 
61 –   80 
  81 – 100 
 
 24 
 89 
124 
165 
    98                
500 
 4.80 
17.80 
24.80 
33.00 
19.60 
      100.00 
 
 
However, and as has been explained above, the level of non-normal behaviour shown 
by the SACGI is generally mild (in relation to a normal distribution), as well as very consistent 
with the findings of previous studies that have also applied OLS technique in estimating their 
structural equations (Cheung and Wei, 2006, p.913; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, pp.1048, 1050-
1051; Francoeur et al., 2008, p.88). As has been explained above, this appears to suggest that 
it may be statistically tolerable.  
In sum, the main evidence that emerges from examining the full sample of firms is that 
despite the expectation that the introduction of King II will speed-up convergence of corporate 
governance standards (e.g., Armstrong, 2003; Malherbe and Segal, 2003), internal corporate 
governance practices among South African listed firms still vary substantially. While this is 
consistent with the variability in compliance levels reported by prior cross-country studies that 
include South Africa (e.g., CLSA, 2000; Pellens et al., 2001; Deutsche Bank, 2002; Klapper 
and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Werder et al., 2005), it demonstrates that a high  
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degree of heterogeneity exists when it comes to the importance South African listed firms 
attach to internal corporate governance structures. Methodologically, and unlike prior studies, 
it also suggests that the internal corporate governance provisions and the sampled firms have 
been adequately selected to achieve sufficient variation. This may reduce the possibilities of 
sample  selection  bias  that  have  arguably  plagued  much  of  the  prior  cross-country  studies 
whose samples incude a number of South African listed firms (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004; 
Durnev and Kim, 2005; Morey et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2009).  
Evidence  of  improving  corporate  governance  standards  among  the  sampled  firms, 
however, implies that contrary to local and international expectations, the current UK-style 
voluntary compliance regime (‘comply or explain’) is at least working to some extent, and 
thus appears to be appropriate for South Africa. This finding is also in line with the results of 
prior studies (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009, pp.376, 383; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009, 
p.262-263).  Specifically,  and  in  reviewing  prior  studies
73 that  have  examined  corporate 
governance standards in firms of countries that have adopted the ‘comply or explain’ regime, 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009, p.376) concludes that “Despite the criticisms that the 
codes’ voluntary nature limits their ability to improve governance practices, codes of good 
governance appear to have generally improved the governance of countries that have adopted 
them, although there is the need for additional reforms ”. 
Following  the  suggestions  of  the  accounting  disclosure  literature  (e.g.,  Lang  and 
Lundholm, 1993; Botosan 1997; Healy and  Palepu, 2001) and prior corporate  governance 
studies (e.g., CLSA, 2000; Deutsche Bank, 2002; Bauer et al., 2004; Drobetz et al., 2004; 
Bebenroth, 2005; Werder et al., 2005), the full sample is split into sub-samples on the basis of 
firm size and industry. This is to ascertain whether the observed wide variability in the levels 
of compliance  with the  corporate governance provisions among the sampled firms  can be 
explained by firm size and industry. Apart from being informed by prior evidence, and as has 
been  explained  in  chapter  five,  the  sample  is  split  on  the basis  of firm  size  and  industry 
because they were the two main criteria on which the stratify sample of 100 was selected.  
In exploring further the characteristics of the SACGI on the basis of firm size and 
industry, three control variables, namely dual-listing, audit firm size, and year will also be 
incorporated into the descriptive analysis. The main reationale for incorporating these three 
                                                 
73Previous studies that have examined the levels of compliance with corporate governance provisons in firms of 
countries that have adopted the ‘comply’ or explain’ compliance regime reviewed by Aguilera and Cuervo-
Cazurra (2009, pp.383-384) are: Conyon (1994); Conyon and Mallin (1997); Weir and Laing (2000); Pellens et 
al., 2001; Bebenroth (2005); Comme (2005); Werder et al. (2005); and Krambia-Kapardis and Psaros (2006), 
amongst others.  
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control  variables  into  the  descripitive  analysis  is  that  unlike  the  remaining  three  control 
variables (namely capital structure, sales growth, and capital expenditure), the available data 
on them are detailed enough such it makes classification simple. For example, and unlike 
capital structure, sales growth or capital expenditure, a firm can simply be classified either as 
cross-listed or not, and audited by a big four or not, amongst others. To investigate further the 
key determinants of the SACGI, a multivariate regression of the SACGI on all the eight control 
variables will be conducted in section 6.4.  
Therefore, the next section will further examine the distributional properties of the 
SACGI among the sampled firms on the basis of firm size, while section 6.3 will do similarly 
on the basis of industry. Section 6.4 will present an analysis of multivariate regression results 
of the  SACGI  on all the  eight  control  variables.  Ssection  6.5  will  also  investigate  similar 
descriptive patterns with respect to the nine South African context specific affirmative action 
and stakeholder issues (the Social-SACGI). 
 
6.2 Descriptive Statistics of the SACGI Based on Firm Size 
 
Panels B and C of Table 5 report summary descriptive statistics of aggregate levels of 
compliance with the SACGI for large and small firms. Figure 3 also presents a comparison of 
the  levels  of  compliance  with  the  SACGI  between  large  and  small  firms  using  computed 
aggregate means. Firstly, both show that compliance levels among large sampled firms are 
consistently higher than for small firms at any period of examination. Specifically, the average 
large firm complied with 76% of the 50 corporate governance provisions analysed. By contrast, 
the average small firm complied only with 44% of the 50 corporate governance provisions 
examined. In fact, the independent samples t-test for equality of means between large and 
small firms in Panel B of Table 5 consistently rejects the null hypothesis that the means are 
equal for any period of examination at the 1% significance level.  
Secondly, and consistent with the evidence of the full sample, compliance levels in 
both large and small firms have improved over time. For example, compliance levels for small 
firms consistently increased from 34% in 2002 to 40%, 46%, 48%, and 53% in 2003, 2004, 
2005, and 2006, respectively. This provides additional evidence that corporate governance 
standards in South African listed firms have improved irrespective of firm size. Finally, Table 
5 suggests that both large and small firms show summary distributional properties similar to 
those observed for the combined sample. It suggests that they are either mildly (in comparison 
to with a normal distribution) skewed to the left or right, have large standard deviations, but  
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are mesokurtically peaked. As has been indicated above, the mild non-normal nature of the 
distributional properties of the SACGI is similar to the reported results of past studies that have 
also conducted OLS estimations (Cheung and Wei, 2006, p.913; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, 
pp.1048, 1050-1051; Francoeur et al., 2008, p.88). As has also been explained above, this is 
important because it suggests that it may be appropriate to estimate structural equations using 
OLS regression technique. 
 
A Comparison of the Levels of Compliance with the SACGI 
between Large and Small Firms Using Computed Means
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         Figure 3: SACGI Compliance Levels by Firm Size 
 
Table  7  below  reports  a  comparison  of  the  levels  of  compliance  with  all  the  50 
individual internal corporate governance provisions analysed between large and small firms. 
The rationale is to ascertain the governance provisions of the SACGI that account for the 
significant differences observed in Table 5 between large and small firms. The sample is split 
into 50 large and 50 small firms as described in subsection 5.1.2 of chapter five. This results in 
50 firms in each firm year, such that all large and small firms will have a total of 250 firm year 
observations each. The t-test in column 4 of Table 7 is the independent samples t-test for 
equality of means between all large and small firms. 
Several  interesting  findings  emerge  from  Table  7.  Firstly,  and  consistent  with  the 
findings at the aggregate levels, there is evidence of significant variability in the levels of 
compliance between all large and small sampled firms. Specifically, it shows that in 46 (92%) 
out of the 50 corporate governance provisions investigated, compliance levels amongst large 
firms,  are  significantly  higher  than  small  firms  at  least  at  the  5%  significance  level.  By 
contrast, four (8%) of the provisions do not present evidence of any significant difference in 
compliance  levels  between  large  and  small  firms.  These  include  the  office  of  a  company  
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secretary  (COSEC1),  contribution  to  the  development  of  financial  journalism  (CDFJ), 
directors’ narrative on the possibility of the firm operating as a ‘going-concern’ (NGC), and a 
positive statement on compliance or non-compliance with the corporate governance provisions 
of King II (CNC).  
Secondly, it shows that the differences in compliance levels observed between large 
and small firms can be explained more by some corporate governance provisions than others. 
Specifically,  16  (32%)  corporate  governance  provisions  exhibited  the  highest  significant 
variability between large and small firms. For these provisions, the variability between the 
average large and small firm is more than 40 percentage points. These are: the disclosure of 
the frequency of board meetings’ (FBM1s), the disclosure of individual directors’ meetings’ 
attendance records (IDMA), explicit classification of directors into executive, non-executive, 
and  independent  non-executive  directors  (DDC), the  existence  of a  nomination  committee 
(NCOM1), whether the membership of the nomination committee (DM1) is disclosed, the 
disclosure  of  members  of  the  nomination  (INCMMA),  and  the  remuneration  (IRCMMA) 
committees’ meetings’ attendance records.  
The  rest  are:  the  disclosure  of  the  criteria  or  procedure  for  determining  directors’ 
remuneration  (DPLR),  whether  the  audit  committee  (COMP4)  consist  of  a  majority  of 
independent NEDs, whether the chairman (ACCP) of the audit committee is an independent 
NED, the existence of a risk management committee (RISCOM1), the disclosure of the audit 
(IACMMA), and risk management (IRISCMA) committees’ members’ meetings attendance 
records, the disclosure of policies and practices aimed at addressing the HIV epidemic among 
the workforce (HIV), the disclosure of environmental policies and practices (PEP), and the 
disclosure of corporate social investments (CSI). For example, while on average, 74% of large 
firms have established audit committees, only 18% of small firms have audit committees. 
Similarly, while 78% of large firms have nomination committees, only 15% of small firms 
have established nomination committees, a difference of 63 percentage points. 
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Table 7: A Comparison of the Levels of Compliance with the Individual Internal Corporate Governance Provisions by firm Size 
Compliance Levels between Large and Small Firms (%) 
All Firm Years  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Individual Internal Corporate Governance 
Provisions of the SACGI 
Large  Small  T-Test  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small 
1. Board and directors: 
Role duality(DUAL1) 
Board composition(COM1) 
Board chairperson(BCP) 
Frequency of board meetings(FBM1s) 
Individual directors meetings attendance(IDMA) 
Disclosure of directors’ biography(DDB) 
Disclosure of director classification(DDC) 
Appraisal of chairperson perf. & effect.(ACPE) 
Appraisal of CEO/MD perf. & effect.(ACEOPE) 
Evaluation of board effect. & perf.(EBPE) 
Evalua. of board subcom. perf. & effect.(EBSCPE) 
Director/officer dealings and securities(DDS) 
Office of the company secretary(COSEC1) 
Existence of nomination committee(NCOM1) 
Composition of nomination committee(COMP2) 
Chairperson of nomination committee(NCCP) 
Disclosure of nom. com. membership(DM1) 
Nom. com. members’ meetings attend.(INCMMA) 
Existence of remuneration committee(RCOM1) 
Composition of remuneration committee(COM3) 
Chairperson of remuneration committee(RCCP) 
Disclosure of rem. com. membership(DM2) 
Rem. com. members’ meetings attendance(IRCMA) 
Directors’ rem., interests & share options(DDR) 
Philosophy & procedure of director rem.(DPLR) 
Director access to free legal advice(DAFIPA) 
 
85.6 
80.4 
46.8 
95.6 
89.2 
99.6 
92.8 
21.6 
19.6  
44.4  
24.8 
85.2  
100.0 
78.8  
47.6  
48.0 
76.4 
57.6 
98.4 
27.2 
64.4 
98.4 
74.4 
99.2 
    59.2 
91.6 
 
62.8 
45.2 
18.0 
60.4 
46.0 
94.0 
53.2 
 2.0 
1.6 
7.2 
4.8 
52.0 
100.0 
14.8 
  8.0 
10.4 
14.8 
  6.0 
82.8 
  7.2 
30.4 
70.0 
23.6 
96.4 
    14.0 
   66.4 
 
.228
** 
.352
** 
.288
** 
.352
** 
.432
** 
.056
* 
.396
** 
.196
** 
.180
** 
.372
** 
.200
** 
.332
** 
.000 
.640
** 
.396
** 
.376
** 
.616
** 
.516
** 
.156
** 
.200
** 
.340
** 
.284
** 
.508
** 
.028
* 
.452
**   
.252
**     
 
74 
72 
28 
88 
54 
98 
76 
 6 
 6 
18 
  8 
74 
100 
48 
20  
20 
42 
18 
94 
18 
46 
94 
34 
96 
48 
86 
   
48 
   38 
   6 
 42 
 18 
 90 
 22 
   2 
   0 
   2 
   2 
 36 
 100 
     4 
     0  
     0 
     4 
     0 
   76 
     2 
   12 
   58 
     2 
   90 
     8 
56 
 
84 
78 
44 
96 
92 
100 
92 
14 
18 
42 
20 
84 
100 
74 
46 
38 
72 
48 
98 
24 
56 
98 
70 
100 
60 
92 
 
44 
44 
6 
 54 
 38 
 92 
 48 
   2 
   2 
   6 
   4 
 46 
 100 
   10 
     6 
     8 
   10 
     2 
   82 
     4 
   22 
   64 
   10  
 98 
   12 
66 
 
88 
86 
50 
98 
100 
100 
96 
22 
24 
50 
22 
90 
100 
90 
52 
54 
88 
66 
100 
22 
70 
100 
84 
100 
60 
94 
 
66 
48 
18 
66 
52 
96 
60 
 2 
 2 
  12 
 6 
54 
100 
14 
  8 
10 
14 
  6 
82 
12 
36 
70 
30 
98 
18 
68 
 
92 
84 
56 
100 
100 
100 
100 
30 
22 
56 
30 
90 
100 
88 
60 
62 
88 
78 
100 
34 
74 
100 
94 
100 
64 
94 
 
74 
46 
28 
68 
56 
96 
68 
 2 
2 
6 
 6 
  58 
100 
20 
10 
14 
20 
  8 
84 
  8 
36 
72 
32 
98 
16 
70 
 
90 
82 
56 
96 
100 
100 
100 
36 
28 
56 
44 
88 
100 
94 
60 
66 
92 
78 
100 
38 
76 
100 
90 
100 
64 
92 
 
82 
50 
32 
72 
66 
96 
68 
 2 
 2 
10 
  6 
66 
100 
26 
16 
20 
26 
14 
90 
10 
46 
86 
44 
98 
16 
72 
Notes: The t-test in column 4 is the independent samples t-test for equality of means between all large and all small firms. A mean difference with (**), and (*) indicates that the null hypothesis 
that the means are equal is rejected at the 1%, and 5% significance level, respectively. 
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Continuation: Table 7 
Compliance Levels between Large and Small Firms (%) 
All Firm Years  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Individual Internal Corporate Governance 
Provisions of the SACGI 
Large  Small  T-Test  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small 
2. Accounting and auditing: 
Existence of audit committee(ACOM1) 
Composition of audit committee(COM4) 
Chairperson of audit committee(ACCP) 
Disclosure of audit commit. Membership(DM3) 
Audit com. members’ meetings attend.(IACMMA) 
Narrative on the ‘going-concern’(NGC) 
3. Risk management and internal audit: 
Disclosure of company risks(DCR) 
Disclosure of policy on risks management(DPM) 
Policy on internal control systems(DPI) 
Existence of risk management committee(RISCOM) 
Risk mgt. com. members’ metngs. attend.(IRISM) 
4. Ownership structure: 
Internal ownership(INON1) 
5. Integrated sustainability reporting/non-fina.: 
Black economic empowerment(BEE) 
Policy on HIV/AIDS(HIV) 
Policy on health and safety(PHS) 
Policy on employment equity(PEQ) 
Policy on good environmental practices(PEP) 
Corporate social Investment(CSI) 
Disclosure of company code of ethics(DCE) 
Board diversity on the basis of ethnicity(BDIVE1) 
Board diversity on the basis of gender(BDIVG1) 
6. Voluntary compliance and  enforcement: 
Contribution to devt. of finan. Journalism(CDFJ) 
Encouraging shareholder activism(PSA) 
Compliance/non-compliance with King II(CNC) 
 
98.8 
74.8 
74.4 
99.6 
79.2 
98.0 
 
99.2 
98.8 
97.2 
81.2 
63.6 
 
72.0 
 
82.8  
88.0  
72.8 
92.4 
85.2 
92.4 
92.8 
92.4  
68.0 
  
.0 
68.8   
97.2 
 
82.4 
18.4 
23.6 
72.4 
29.6 
98.4 
 
94.4 
66.0 
82.8 
40.8 
17.6 
 
38.8 
 
54.4 
36.0 
34.8 
72.8 
33.6 
33.6 
76.4 
60.4 
32.0 
  
.0 
34.4 
98.4 
 
.164
** 
.564
** 
.508
** 
.272
** 
.496
** 
.004 
 
.048
* 
.328
** 
.144
** 
.404
** 
.460
** 
 
.332
** 
 
.284
** 
.520
** 
.380
** 
.196
** 
.516
** 
.588
** 
.164
** 
.320
** 
.360
** 
 
.000 
.344
** 
.012 
 
98 
50 
44 
98 
38 
98 
 
98 
94 
98 
56 
20 
 
74 
 
64 
72 
52 
88 
70 
84 
84 
96 
54 
  
0 
52 
96 
   
76 
     6 
     8 
   60 
     4 
   96 
   
94 
   54 
   80 
   24 
     0 
   
46 
   
38 
   18 
   20 
   72 
   24 
   34 
   68 
   52 
   24 
    
 0 
   22 
   96 
 
100 
70 
74 
100 
78 
98 
 
98 
100 
98 
82 
60 
 
70 
 
76 
86 
58 
92 
80 
94 
94 
90 
64 
  
 0 
62 
  98 
    
76 
   12 
   22 
   68 
   20 
   98 
   
92 
   62 
   76 
   36 
   10 
   
46 
   
44 
   32 
   26 
   68 
   26 
   32 
   72 
   56 
   26 
     
0 
   32 
 100 
 
98 
82 
82 
100 
90 
98 
 
100 
100 
96 
88 
72 
 
72 
 
86 
90 
80 
94 
88 
92 
94 
94 
72 
  
0 
72 
98 
 
82 
20 
28 
72 
36 
98 
 
94 
68 
82 
44 
22 
 
32 
 
56 
42 
38 
74 
36 
32 
76 
58 
30 
  
0 
38 
100 
 
100 
82 
84 
100 
96 
98 
 
100 
100 
96 
90 
84 
 
72 
 
94 
96 
88 
94 
94 
96 
96 
94 
72 
  
 0 
76 
98 
 
86 
22 
28 
74 
40 
100 
 
96 
70 
86 
44 
24 
 
30 
 
60 
44 
40 
72 
40 
38 
82 
62 
38 
  
 0 
38 
100 
 
98 
90 
88 
100 
94 
98 
 
100 
100 
98 
90 
82 
 
72 
 
94 
96 
86 
94 
94 
96 
96 
98 
78 
  
0 
82 
96 
 
92 
32 
32 
88 
48 
100 
 
96 
76 
90 
56 
32 
 
40 
 
74 
44 
50 
78 
42 
42 
84 
74 
42 
  
0 
42 
100 
Notes: The t-test in column 4 is the independent samples t-test for equality of means between all large and all small firms. A mean difference with (**) and (*) indicates significance at 1% and 5% 
level, respectively.   
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In  contrast,  3  (6%)  of  the  corporate  governance  provisions  exhibited  the  least 
significant  variability  between  large  and  small  firms.  For  these  provisions,  the  variability 
between large and small firms is less than 10 percentage points. These are: the disclosure of 
individual directors’ biography (DDB), the disclosure of individual directors’ remuneration, 
any interests, and share options (DDR), and the disclosure of  current and potential future 
company risks (DCR). For instance, on average, 96% of small firms disclosed their individual 
directors’  remuneration,  interests  and  share  options  in  relation  to  99%  by  large  firms,  a 
difference of 3 percentage points. 
For the remaining 27 (54%) of the corporate governance provisions, the variability 
between  large  and  small  firms  ranges  from  16  percentage  points  with  reference  to  the 
existence  of  a  remuneration  committee  (RCOM1)  to  40  percentage  points  in  the  case  of 
whether the nomination committee (COMP2) consist of a majority of independent NEDs. For 
example, on average, 87% of large firms have split the roles of board chaiman and CEO or 
managing  director  (DUAL1)  in  comparison  with  63%  of  small  firms,  a  difference  of  24 
percentage points. Similarly, while 22% and 20% of large firms evaluate the performance and 
effectiveness of their board chairpersons (ACPE) and CEOs or managing directors (ACEOPE), 
respectively,  only  2%  of  small  firms  carry  annual  appraisal  of  the  performance  and 
effectiveness of their board chairpersons and CEOs.  
Finally,  and  consistent  with  the  evidence  obtained  from  examining  the  SACGI  at 
aggregate levels, Table 7 shows that the levels of compliance with the individual corporate 
governance provisions improves over time across both large and small firms. However, the 
pattern of year-by-year improvements in compliance levels is more consistent in the case of 
large firms than for small firms. For instance, only 28% of the large firms had independent 
non-executive directors as board chairpersons (BCP) in 2002. It increased to 44%, 50%, 56% 
and 56% in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, respectively.  
Similarly,  6%  of  small  firms  had  independent  non-executive  directors  as  board 
chairpersons (BCP) in 2002. It remained at 6% in 2003, but increased to 18%, 28%, and 32% 
in 2004, 2005, and 2006, respectively. The variability between large and small firms in the 
levels of compliance with the corporate governance provisions over time also suggests that 
there are differences in adoption rates between large and small firms of corporate governance 
standards. That is, it suggests that large firms are early adopters of King II, while small firms 
are late adopters.   
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As  explained  further  below,  this  is  because  large  firms  have  certain  advantages, 
including  financial,  which  may  make  them  more  responsive  to  changes  in  corporate 
governance rules than small firms. For example, 74% of large firms had split the roles of 
board chairman and CEO or managing director (DUAL1) in 2002 in comparison with 48% of 
small firms, a percentage point difference of 26. By 2006, the gap between large and small 
firms had closed to only 8 percentage points with 90% of large firms having the roles of board 
chairman and CEO or MD split in relation to 82% of small firms. 
   As  has  been  discussed  in  subsection  5.1.4  of  chapter  five,  evidence  of  consistent 
positive relationship between corporate governance scores and large firms supports the results 
of prior South African studies (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004; Bebenroth, 2005; Durnev and 
Kim, 2005; Werder et al., 2005). It is also consistent with theory. Firstly, and as has been 
explained above, compliance with corporate governance provisions has costs implications that 
smaller  firms  may  struggle  to  afford  in  comparison  with  their  larger  counterparts  (e.g., 
Botosan,  1997;  Hassan  and  Marston,  2008).  Secondly,  greater  information  asymmetry 
associated  with  larger  firms  suggests  that  they  can  be  expected  to  have  greater  agency 
problems.  This  will  require  stricter  corporate  governance  mechanisms  to  reduce  the 
possibilities of managerial expropriation (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004; Beiner et al., 2006). 
Thirdly, larger firms are exposed to greater public scrutiny and financial press following. This 
arguably compels them to disclose more than their smaller counterparts. 
Fourthly,  prior  literature  indicates  that  political  costs,  such  as  nationalisation, 
regulation  and  taxation,  for  example,  are  positively  associated  with  firm  size  (Watts  and 
Zimmerman,  1978,  p.115;  Andreasson,  2009,  p.22).  This  means  that  larger  firms  can  be 
expected to comply better with the corporate governance provisions, especially the affirmative 
action and stakeholder provisions of King II than their smaller counterparts. 
Finally, larger firms are more likely to be dual-listed and be subjected to additional 
listing and corporate governance requirements (e.g., Hassan and Marston, 2008; Melvin and 
Valero, 2009). In fact, opinion-based surveys conducted by CLSA (2000) and Deutsche Bank 
(2002) in emerging markets, including South Africa suggest that cross-listed South African 
firms  tend  to  have  better  corporate  governance  standards  than  their  non  dual-listed 
counterparts.  
To ascertain whether cross-listed firms comply better with the corporate governance 
provisions than their non cross-listed counterparts, the sample is split into two: those with 
cross-listings to the UK and US, and those with no cross-listings. As has been discussed in  
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subsection 5.2.2 of chapter five, prior evidence suggests that the US and UK stock markets 
often  maintain  more  rigorous  corporate  governance  requirements  and  better  investor 
protection regimes (e.g., La Porta et al., 1998; Klapper and Love, 2004). 
    As Panels A and B of Table 6 indicate, in total, 26 of the sampled firms (26%) are 
dual-listed. Seven firms are cross-listed to both the UK and US, whilst 8 and 11 firms are 
cross-listed to the UK
74 and US alone, respectively. Of the 26 dual-listed firms, 23 (88%) are 
large, whilst only 3 (12%) are small. This supports prior evidence that large firms are more 
likely to be cross-listed than small firms.  Panels I and J of Table 5 reports the aggregate mean 
levels  of  compliance  with  the  SACGI  by  dual-listed  and  non  dual-listed  sampled  firms, 
respectively.  Figure  4  assesses  the  impact  of  both  dual-listing  and  audit  firm  size  on 
compliance  levels  with  the  SACGI.  Both  indicate  that  dual-listed  sampled  firms  have 
significantly higher corporate governance scores than their non cross-listed firms. Specifically, 
the average dual-listed firm complied with 75% of the 50 corporate governance provisions in 
comparison  with  55%  by  their  non  dual-listed  counterparts.  The  difference  is  statistically 
significant at the 1% level. 
 
Assessing the Impact of Dual-listing and Audit Firm Size on the 
Levels of Compliance with the SACGI Using Computed Means
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         Figure 4: SACGI Compliance Levels by Dual-listing and Audit Firm Size 
 
Similarly,  and  as  has  been  discussed  in  subsection  5.2.2  of  chapter  five,  the  prior 
auditing literature suggests that the size of the audit firm matters (e.g., Shockley, 1981; Sori et 
al., 2006). Specifically, it suggests that the levels of auditor independence and audit quality are 
                                                 
74Three firms, including Aveng Ltd, Oceana Group Ltd, and Portland Cement Ltd that are cross-listed to the UK 
also  maintain  secondary  listing  on  the  stock  markets  of  Australia/New  Zealand,  Namibia,  and  Zimbabwe, 
respectively. Apart from these three, there were no cross-listings to different stock markets other than the UK and 
US stock markets in the sample.   
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positively associated with audit firm size (e.g., Pearson, 1980; DeAngelo, 1981). This stems 
from the fact that due to their reputation, resources (i.e., financial, human, information and 
knowledge),  and  independence  advantages,  larger  audit  firms  are  better  able  to  resist 
management  pressure  in  conflict  situations.  It  also  helps  them  to  be  more  effective  in 
determining the ‘going-concern’ status of firms, and also tend to be more risk-averse (Sori et 
al., 2006, p.2). However, the literature also suggests that audit fees are positively associated 
with audit firm size (e.g., Palmrose, 1986; Gul, 1991). This means that larger firms are more 
likely to make use of the services of larger audit firms as they can be expected to better afford 
the associated higher costs of auditing (higher auditing fees). 
As  has  been  discussed in  section 3.3  of chapter three,  the  King  Reports  recognise 
external auditors as one of the key stakeholders in ensuring that firms voluntarily comply with 
the corporate governance provisions of the Code. Specifically, external auditors are required to 
offer their ‘true and fair’ view on the extent to which the corporate governance provisions of 
King II have been applied. Therefore, following the suggestions of the auditing literature, the 
sample is split into two: firms audited by a big four audit firm (i.e., Deloitte & Touche, Ernst 
& Young, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers), and those audited by a non-big four audit 
firm. The  rationale is to ascertain whether  firms audited by a big four audit firm tend to 
comply better with the corporate governance provisions than those audited by a non-big four 
audit firm. 
As Panels A of Table 6 shows, 71 (71%) of the sampled firms are audited by a big-four 
audit firm, while 29 (29%) are audited by a non big-four audit firm. Of the 71 firms audited by 
a big-four audit firm, 46 (65%) are large, whilst 25 (35%) are small. Of the 29 firms audited 
by a non big-four audit firm, 27 (93%) are small, whereas 3 (7%) are large. This evidence 
supports the suggestions of the auditing literature that larger firms are more likely to make use 
of the services of larger audit firms. Of special interests, Panel B of Table 6 indicates that all 
the 26 dual-listed firms, including the 3 small firms have a big four auditor, supporting the 
reputation  and  independence  advantages  that  larger  audit  firms  have  over  their  smaller 
counterparts. 
Panels  K  and  L  of  Table  5  reports  aggregate  mean  levels  of  compliance  with  the 
SACGI by sampled firms’ audited by a big four audit firm and a non-big four audit firm, 
respectively. Figure 4 assesses the impact of both dual-listing and audit firm size on the levels 
of compliance with the SACGI. Both indicate that firms audited by a big four audit firm have 
significantly higher levels of compliance with the SACGI than those audited by a non big four  
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audit firm. Specifically, the average sampled firm audited by a big four audit firm complied 
with 66% of the 50 corporate governance provisions in comparison with 45% by the average 
firm audited by a non-big four audit firm, which is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
To sum up, this section has attempted to investigate the extent to which the significant 
variability in the levels of compliance with the SACGI observed among the sampled firms can 
be explained by firm size. Overall, the results suggest that the observed variability in the levels 
of  compliance  with  the  SACGI  can  largely  be  explained  by  the  size  of  the  firm.  At  the 
aggregate levels, the average large firm complied with 75% of the 50 corporate governance 
provisions  in  comparison  with  55%  of  the  small  firms,  a  significant  20  percentage-point 
difference.  
For the individual corporate governance provisions, compliance levels in larger firms 
are significantly higher in relation to smaller firms in 46 (92%) of the 50 corporate governance 
provisions investigated. Finally, the analyses also show that large firms are more likely to be 
cross-listed  and  be  audited  by  a  big  four  auditing  firm  with  better  corporate  governance 
standards their non cross-listed and non-big four audited counterparts. 
  The  next  section  will  examine  the  extent  to  which  the  variability  in  the  levels  of 
compliance  with  the  SACGI  observed  among  the  sampled  firms  can  be  explained  by  the 
various industrial groupings. 
 
6.3 Descriptive Statistics Based on Industry Group  
 
As  has  been  discussed  in  subsections  5.1.4  and  5.2.2  of  chapter  five,  both  the 
accounting disclosure literature (e.g., Lang and Lundholm 1993; Botosan, 1997) and prior 
corporate  governance studies (e.g., Bauer et al., 2004; Black et al., 2006a; Henry, 2008), 
suggest that corporate governance standards differ across different industrial groups. Similarly, 
and of particular interest to this study, opinion-based surveys conducted by CLSA (2000) and 
Deutsche Bank (2002) in emerging markets that include South Africa indicate that corporate 
governance standards vary across listed firms in South Africa. Specifically, Deutsche Bank 
(2002) survey reports that the energy sector (similar to the consumer services firms in this 
study) tend to have the highest corporate governance standards. By contrast, the technology, 
hardware and equipment sector (corresponds with the technology firms in this study) has the 
weakest corporate governance standards.  
Therefore, to ascertain whether the variability in the levels of compliance with the 
SACGI observed amongst the sampled firms, can be explained by industrial groupings, the  
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sample is split into five industries
75 as has been described in subsection 5.1.3 of chapter five. 
Panels  D  to  H  of  Table  5  contain  summary  descriptive  statistics  for  the  five  industries. 
Following the suggestion of Deutsche Bank (2002) that technology firms tend to have the 
poorest  corporate  governance  standards,  the  t-test  in  Column  3  tests  whether  the  mean 
aggregate corporate governance scores of technology firms are significantly different from the 
other  four  industries.  Figure  5  also  presents  a  comparison  of  the  aggregate  levels  of 
compliance with the SACGI across the five industries using computed summary means.  
Firstly, Table 5 suggests that the average basic materials, consumer goods, consumer 
services, industrials, and technology firm complied with 58%, 59%, 63%, 62%, and 57% of 
the 50 corporate governance provisions. Secondly, and consistent with the suggestions of the 
Deutsche Bank (2002) survey, consumer services and industrial firms have higher compliance 
levels with the SACGI than technology firms, which is statistically significant at least at the 
10% significance level. In fact, Figure 5 shows that the levels of compliance with the SACGI 
are consistently higher in the cases of consumer services and industrials firms than the other 
three industries.  
 
A Comparison of the Levels of Compliance with the SACGI 
among the Five Industries Using Computed Means
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          Figure 5: SACGI Compliance Levels by Industry  
 
By contrast, the levels of compliance with the SACGI by basic materials and consumer 
goods firms are not significantly higher than for technology firms. However, and consistent 
with the suggestions of the Deutsche Bank (2002) survey, in absolute terms, compliance levels 
with the SACGI are highest (63%) in consumer services firms and least (57%) in technology 
                                                 
75As has explained in subsections 5.1.1 and 5.2.2.2 of chapter five, the industrial groupings are based on the 
JSE’s original industrial classifications and were obtained directly from the Information Department of the JSE 
Ltd.  
 
213 
firms. As Panel C of Table 6 indicates, this may be explained by the fact that technology firms 
have  the  least  cross-listed  and  big  four  audited  firms  in  comparison  with  the  other  four 
industries.  For  example,  of  the  26  cross-listed  firms,  only  2  (8%)  are  technology  firms. 
Similarly, of the 71 firms audited by a big four audit firm, only 12 (17%) are technology firms. 
In contrast, basic materials and consumer services, for example, have 11(42%) and 5 (19%) 
firms cross-listed, respectively. Overall, and in comparison with the firm size groupings, the 
variability  in aggregate  compliance levels  with  the  SACGI  observed  amongst  the sampled 
firms, is explained less by the industrial groupings than by the firm size classifications. 
To  determine  the  corporate  governance  provisions  that  account  for  the  significant 
variability in compliance levels observed between the various industries, compliance levels are 
computed for the individual corporate governance provisions on an industry by industry basis 
as  has  been  described  in  subsection  5.1.3  of  chapter  five.  Table  8  reports  the  levels  of 
compliance with all the 50 individual corporate governance mechanisms examined by the five 
major industrial groupings.  
Firstly, and consistent with the evidence obtained by investigating the aggregate levels 
of compliance, while there are substantial industrial differences in the levels of compliance 
with  some  of  the  individual  corporate  governance  provisions,  others  do  not  show  any 
substantial industrial differences. For example, and consistent with the findings based on the 
full sample, there are no differences in the levels of compliance with the SACGI in the case of 
the  office  of  a  company  secretary  (COSEC1)  and  contribution  to  the  development  of 
journalism  (CDFJ).  In  contrast,  and  in  absolute  levels,  the  remaining  46  (92%)  corporate 
governance provisions show some amount of variability in industrial levels of compliance 
with the SACGI.   
For  example,  for  4  (8%)  of  the  corporate  governance  provisions,  including  the 
disclosure of risk committee members’ meetings’ attendance record (RISCOM1), encouraging 
shareholder activism (PSA), the disclosure of policies and practices with reference to black 
economic empowerment (BEE), and environment (PEP), industrial differences in compliance 
levels  are  highest.  For  these  provisions,  the  difference  between  the  lowest  and  highest 
compliance level is well above 30 percentage points.  
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Table 8: The Levels of Compliance with the Individual Internal Corporate Governance  
               Provisions among the Sampled Firms by Industry 
Compliance Levels Among Firms (%)  Individual Internal Corporate Governance Provisions 
of the SACGI  All 
Firm 
Years 
Basic 
Mat- 
erials 
Con- 
sumer 
Goods 
Con. 
Ser- 
vices 
Ind- 
ust- 
rials 
Tec- 
hno- 
logy 
1. Board and directors: 
Role duality(DUAL1) 
Board composition(COM1) 
Board chairperson(BCP) 
Frequency of board meetings(FBM1s) 
Individual directors meetings attendance(IDMA) 
Disclosure of directors’ biography(DDB) 
Disclosure of director classification(DDC) 
Evaluation of chair performance & effect.(ACPE) 
Appraisal of CEO/MD perf. & effect.(ACEOPE) 
Evaluation of board perf. & effect.(EBPE) 
Evaluat. of board subcom. perf. & effect.(EBSCPE) 
Director/officer dealings & securities(DDS) 
Office of the company secretary(COSEC1) 
Existence of nomination committee(NCOM1) 
Composition of nomination committee(COM2) 
Chairperson of nomination committee(NCCP) 
Disclosure of nom. com. membership(DM1) 
Nom. com. members’ meetings attend.(INCMMA) 
Existence of remuneration committee(RCOM1) 
Composition of remuneration committee(COMP3) 
Chairperson of remuneration committee(RCCP) 
Disclosure of rem. com. membership(DM2) 
Rem. com. members’ meetings attendance(IRCMMA) 
Directors’ rem., interests & share options(DDR) 
Philosophy & procedure of director rem.(DPLR) 
Director access to free legal advice(DAFIPA) 
2. Accounting and auditing: 
Existence of audit committee(ACOM1) 
Composition of audit committee(COM4) 
Chairperson of audit committee(ACCP) 
Disclosure of audit com. membership(DM3) 
Audit com. members’ metngs. attendance(IACMMA) 
Narrative on the ‘going-concern’(NGC) 
3. Risk management and internal audit: 
Disclosure of company risks(DCR) 
Disclosure of policy on risks management(DPM) 
Disc. policy on internal control systems(DPI) 
Existence of risk management committee(RISCOM1) 
Risk mgt. com. members’ metngs. attend.(IRISCMA) 
4. Ownership structure: 
Internal ownership(INON1) 
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Continuation: Table 8 
Compliance Levels Among Firms (%)  Individual Internal Corporate Governance Provisions 
of the SACGI  All 
Firm 
Years 
Basic 
Mat- 
erials 
Con- 
sumer 
Goods 
Con. 
Ser- 
vices 
Ind- 
ust- 
rials 
Tec- 
hno- 
logy 
5. Integrated sustainability reporting/non-financial: 
Black economic empowerment(BEE) 
Policy on HIV/AIDS(HIV) 
Policy on health and safety(PHS) 
Policy on employment equity(PEQ) 
Policy on good environmental practices(PEP) 
Corporate social investment(CS1) 
Disclosure of company code of ethics(CSI) 
Board diversity on the basis of ethnicity(BDIVE1) 
Board diversity on the basis of gender(BDIVG1) 
6. Culture of voluntary compliance and enforcement: 
Contribution to devt. of finan. Journalism(CDFJ) 
Encouraging shareholder activism(PSA 
Compliance/non-compliance with King II(CNC) 
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By  contrast,  for  9  (18%)  of  the  corporate  governance  provisions,  variability  in 
industrial levels of compliance is lowest. These are: whether the roles of chairman and CEO or 
managing director is split (DUAL1), the appraisal of CEO or managing director’s performance 
and effectiveness (ACEOPE), the disclosure of individual directors’ biography (DDB), and 
classification  (DDC),  the  disclosure  of  the  nomination  committee  members’  meetings’ 
attendance  records  (INCMMA),  the  disclosure  of  the  individual  directors’  remuneration, 
interests and share options (DDR), a narrative on whether the firm will be operating as a 
‘going-concern’ (NGC), the disclosure of internal control policies and systems (DPI), and a 
positive statement on compliance or non-compliance with the corporate governance proivions 
of King II (CNC). For these provisions, the variability in the levels of compliance between the 
least and the highest complied industry is below 10 percentage points. 
For the remaining 33 (66%) of the corporate governance provisions, the difference 
between the least and highest complied industry with the SACGI ranges from 10 percentage 
points in the case of the disclosure of policies and practices regarding employment equity 
(PEQ)  to  27  percentage  points  with  respect  to  the  disclosure  of  the  frequency  of  board 
meetings (FBM1s). 
Secondly, and on a comparative basis, consumer services and industrials firms have the 
highest scores in most of the individual corporate governance provisions compared with the 
other three industries. Specifically, in 14 (28%) and 13 (26%) of 50 the individual corporate 
governance provisions analysed, the consumer services and industrials firms complied most,  
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respectively. In the case of consumer services, the provisions include: the frequency of board 
meetings (FBM1s), the individual directors attendance of board meetings (IDMA), director 
classification (DDC), the existence of a remuneration committee (RCOM1), and the disclosure 
of the members of the remuneration committee (DM2), amongst others.    
In  contrast,  technology  firms  have  the  lowest  scores  in  most  of  the  corporate 
governance  provisions  compared  with  the  other  four.  Specifically,  in  14  (28%)  of  the 
corporate governance provisions, technology firms complied the least. These provisions are: 
director access to free independent legal advice (DAFIPA), and HIV/Aids (HIV), health and 
safety (PHS), and environment (PEP) policies and practices, to mention but a few. Overall, 
these  differences  in  the  levels  of  industrial  compliance  with  the  individual  corporate 
governance provisions explain the significant variability in the aggregate levels of compliance 
with the SACGI observed in Table 5 between consumer services or industrials and technology 
firms. 
In conclusion, the evidence of significant variability in the levels of compliance with 
the SACGI between the various industries is consistent with suggestions of both the prior 
accounting  disclosure  and  corporate  governance  literature.  Specifically,  and  of  direct 
relevance, prior cross-country corporate governance studies (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004; 
Durnev and Kim, 2005) and opinion-based surveys (e.g., CLSA, 2000; Deutsche Bank 2002) 
that include South Africa suggest that corporate governance standards vary across different 
industries.  
On a comparative basis, however, the variability in the levels of compliance with the 
50 individual corporate governance provisions observed among the sampled firms is explained 
less by the industrial groupings than by the firm size classifications. Overall, the significant 
firm  size  and  industrial variability in  corporate  governance standards  observed  among  the 
sampled firms, appears to justify the construction of the sample on the basis of firm size and 
industry. Unlike prior cross-country studies that include South Africa (e.g., Klapper and Love, 
2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Chen et al., 2009; Morey et al., 2009), this arguably reduces 
sample  selection  bias  and  also  helps  in  achieving  sufficient  variability  in  the  levels  of 
compliance with the corporate governance standards among the sampled firms. It can also be 
argued that this may improve the generalisability of the results for South African listed firms. 
A crucial issue, however, is that the analyses on the characteristics of the SACGI so far 
have been purely descriptive. Also, and as has been explained above, due data limitations, the 
analyses (descriptive) have concentrated on only five (i.e., firm size, industry, dual-listing,  
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audit firm size, and year) out of the eight control variables. It did not include capital structure, 
sales growth, and capital expenditure. Therefore, to ascertain whether the descriptive patterns 
identified so far hold in a multivariate regression framework, the next section (6.4) explores 
further the determinants of the SACGI by running a multivariate regression of the SACGI on 
all the eight control variables.  
 
6.4 OLS Regression Results of the SACGI on all the Eight Control Variables 
 
   Table  9  contains  OLS  regressions  results  of  the  SACGI  on  all  the  eight  control 
variables. Column 3 of Table 9 first reports the results of multivariate regression of the SACGI 
on the eight control variables for the pooled sample, whilst columns 4 to 8 present similar 
results  for  each  of  the  five  firm  years.  They  indicate  that  the  F-value  of  each  model  is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This means that the coefficients on all the eight control 
variables can jointly explain significant variations in the sampled firms’ SACGI scores. The 
adjusted R
2 for each of the five years is between 30% to 47% for the period 2002-2006 and 
50% for the combined sample. Statistically, this suggests that between 30% to 47% of the 
variations  in  the  sampled  firms’  corporate  governance  standards  (SACGI  scores)  can  be 
explained by the control variables. Over the full five-year sample period, the model possesses 
an average 50% explanatory power over variations in SACGI scores among the sampled firms. 
  With regard to the pooled sample in column 3 of Table 9, and consistent with the 
results of the descriptive analyses presented above (see Tables 5, 6 and 7, as well as Figures 3 
and  4),  the  coefficients  on  firm  size,  dual-listing,  and  audit  firm  size  are  positive  and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This implies that larger firms, cross-listed firms, and 
firms audited by a big four auditing firm, on average, tend to comply better with the SACGI 
than  their  smaller,  non  cross-listed  and  non  big  four  audited  counterparts.  As  has  been 
discussed  above,  this  is  not  theoretically  surprising.  This  is  because  the  prior  literature 
suggests that larger firms tend to have higher agency problems (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004; 
Beiner  et  al.,  2006;  Black  et  al.,  2006a).  This  implies  larger  firms  will  require  stronger 
governance  regimes  to  minimise  the  possibilities  of  managerial  expropriation.    Other 
theoretical  reasons,  such  as  greater  public  scrutiny  and  financial  press  following,  higher 
political costs, and greater financial strength, amongst others, that are often associated with 
larger firms serve as additional incentive for them to comply better with corporate governance 
provisions than their smaller counterparts.  
 
218 
  Similarly,  and  as  has  also been  explained  above,  the  positive  relationship between 
dual-listing  and  the  SACGI,  and  between  audit  firm  size  and  the  SACGI  are  theoretically 
expected. In theory, dual-listed firms are more likely to be subjected to additional listing and 
corporate  governance  requirements  (e.g.,  Hassan  and  Marston,  2008;  Melvin  and  Valero, 
2009). This means that they are more likely to have better corporate governance standards 
than their non cross-listed firms. Also, due to their higher reputations, greater independence, 
and  superior  resources  (financial,  human,  information  and  knowledge)  advantages  (e.g., 
Pearson, 1980; Shockley, 1981; Sori et al., 2006), firms audited by a big four audit firm are 
more likely to comply better with corporate corporate governance rules than their non big four 
audited counterparts.  
In fact, the statistics contained in Table 6 show that larger firms are more likely to be 
cross-listed, as well as to be audited by a big four audit firm. Across the five firm years (i.e., 
columns 4 to 8 of Table 9), the coefficients on firm size, dual-listing, and audit firm size 
remain positive and statistically significant. Overall, it offers further empirical support to the 
results  of  the  descriptive  analyses  that  firm  size,  dual-listing  and  audit  firm  size  impact 
positively on the levels of compliance with good corporate governance practices (the SACGI).  
The coefficient on capital structure, sales growth and capital expenditure in column 3 
of Table 9 are positive, but only capital structure is statistically significant. The statistically 
significant  coefficient  on  capital  structure  is  consitent  with  theoretical  and  empirical 
expectations. Specifically, Bevan and Danbolt (2002, 2004) report a statistically significant 
positive  relationship  between  gearing  and  firm  size  in  a  sample  of  UK  listed  firms.  This 
implies  that  larger  firms  tend  to  have  greater  debt  usage  than  their  smaller  counterparts. 
However, and as has been discussed above, on average, larger sampled firms comply better 
with  the  SACGI  than  their  smaller  counterparts.  This  appears  to  explain  the  statistically 
significant positive relationship between capital structure and the SACGI in column 3 of Table 
9.  
In  contrast,  the  statistically  insignificant  coefficients  on  sales  growth  and  capital 
expenditure indicate that sales growth and capital expenditure do not have any significant 
impact on the SACGI.  The results imply that firms with greater growth opportunities (sales 
growth) and higher innovative potential (capital expenditure) do not necessarily have better 
corporate governance standards (SACGI scores).  
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Table 9: OLS Regression of SACGI on the Control Variables 
  Exp. 
Sign 
All firm years  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Adjusted R
2 
Standard Error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
No. of Observations 
        .495 
  15.666 
      .545 
 35.876(.000)
*** 
500 
     .429 
 14.378 
   1.564 
   8.441(.000)
*** 
     100 
     .468 
 15.728 
   1.729 
   9.693(.000)
*** 
100 
       .439 
   16.356 
     1.857 
     8.735(.000)
*** 
100 
       .428 
   16.609 
     1.839 
     8.396(.000)
*** 
100 
       .300 
   16.643 
     2.027 
     5.239(.000)
*** 
100 
Constant 
Firm size 
Capital structure 
Sales growth 
Capital expenditure 
Dual-listing 
Audit firm size 
Basic materials 
Consumer services 
Industrials 
Technology 
2002 
2004 
2005 
2006 
 
+ 
-/+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
33.250(.000)
*** 
1.591(.000)
*** 
   .048(.028)
** 
  .049(.161) 
  .225(.203) 
 19.032(.000)
*** 
 18.913(.000)
*** 
-7.254(.002)
*** 
 7.955(.000)
*** 
  2.650(.238) 
  2.670(.233) 
-9.019(.000)
*** 
 6.360(.004)
*** 
 8.792(.000)
*** 
11.456(.000)
*** 
27.185(.000)
*** 
1.236(.000)
*** 
  .048(.272) 
  .089(.207) 
  .539(.171) 
20.428(.000)
*** 
 13.265(.000)
*** 
  -6.654(.170) 
 5.305(.250) 
 1.361(.770) 
-1.559(.738) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
31.962(.000)
*** 
.925(.010)
*** 
 .034(.481) 
-.060(.430) 
     .563(.199) 
19.579(.000)
*** 
21.925(.000)
*** 
-10.520(.053)
* 
    6.911(.171) 
  1.251(.806) 
  1.946(.704) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
34.872(.000)
*** 
.927(.008)
*** 
    .014(.790) 
    .023(.812) 
      .807(.053)
** 
15.265(.001)
*** 
23.638(.000)
*** 
  -9.738(.081)
* 
   11.059(.040)
** 
   2.848(.588) 
   3.538(.500) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
41.735(.000)
*** 
2.591(.000)
*** 
    .081(.130) 
    .038(.665) 
    .429(.304) 
21.568(.000)
*** 
20.712(.000)
*** 
-8.600(.119) 
  10.900(.045)
** 
  5.311(.339) 
  4.843(.379) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
47.318(.000)
*** 
2.343(.000)
*** 
   .054(.330) 
     .178(.071)
* 
  -.117(.767) 
 17.956(.000)
*** 
15.872(.000)
*** 
-3.903(.478) 
  5.382(.327) 
    .961(.860) 
 2.855(.594) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Notes: coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, **
 and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Also, consumer goods industry and 
year 2003 are excluded from the regression analyses. They are used as base industry and year, respectively, for purposes of comparison. 
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Across the five firm years (i.e., columns 4 to 8 of Table 9), the coefficients on capital 
structure,  sales  growth  and capital  expenditure  remain  statistically insignificant  except  for 
sales growth in year 2006 in column 8 of Table 9. Generally, the results suggest that the ability 
of capital structure, sales growth, and capital expenditure to explain variations in the SACGI is 
weaker compared with that of firm size, dual-listing, and audit firm size. 
Finally,  and  with  respect  to  the  coefficients  on  the  industry  and  year  dummies  in 
column 3 of Table 9, they are generally consistent with the results of the descriptive analyses 
that  have  been  presented  above.  Consistent  with  the  descriptive  statistics  that  have  been 
reported in Table 5 and by Figure 5, for example, the coefficient on industrials and technology 
dummies are not statistically significant. By contrast, the coefficient on consumer services 
firms is positive and statistically significant, whilst the coefficient on basic materials firms is 
statistically significant, but has a negative sign. This implies that consumer services firms have 
the  highest  (highest  significant  positive  coefficient)  level  of  compliance  with  the  SACGI, 
whereas basic materials firms have the least (least significant negative coefficient) level of 
compliance with the SACGI. Generally, the results based on the industry dummies contained 
in  columns  3  to  8  of  Table  9  are  largely  consistent  with  the  conclusions  based  on  the 
descriptive analyses that the ability of industrial classifications to explain variations in the 
SACGI is relatively weak compared with that of firm size. 
Further,  the  coefficients  on  all  four  year  dummies  in  column  3  of  Table  9  are 
statistically significant. In line with the results of descriptive analyses (see Tables 4, 5 and 7, 
as well as Figures 2, 3 and 4), the coefficient on year 2002 is negative, whereas those on years 
2004,  2005  and  2006  are  positive.  The  results  imply  that  compliance  levels  among  the 
sampled  firms  were  highest  in  2006  (highest  significant  positive  coefficient),  whilst 
compliance levels  were  least  among  the  sampled  firms  in 2002  (least  significant  negative 
coefficient).  The  results  are  consistent  with  theoretical  and  empirical  expectations. 
Theoretically, and within a voluntary corporate governance regime (‘comply or explain’), it 
takes time for listed firms to adjust their internal corporate governance structures to reflect the 
recommendations  of  corporate  governance  regulations.  Empirically,  recent  evidence  by 
Shabbir and Padget (2005) and Henry (2008), for example, also suggests that compliance with 
corporate governance provisions improves over time, using a sample of UK and Australian 
listed firms, respectively.  
To summarise, this section has attempted to ascertain whether descriptive patterns of 
factors explaining variations in the levels of compliance with the SACGI identified in sections  
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6.2 and 6.3 also hold within a multivariate regression framework. Consistent with the results 
of the descriptive analyses, the findings based on the multivariate regression analysis indicate 
that variations in the SACGI are largely explained by firm size, dual-listing, and audit firm size, 
but moderately by industrial groupings. Similarly, the results suggest that, on average, highly 
geared  firms  tend  to  have  significantly  higher  SACGI  scores  than  their  lowly  geared 
counterparts.  The  results,  however,  suggest  that  the  ability  of  sales  growth  and  capital 
expenditure to explain variations in the SACGI is relatively weak. Finally, and in line with the 
results of the descriptive analyses, the findings based on the multivariate regression analyis 
indicates that compliance with the SACGI among the sampled firms generally improves over 
time. 
As has been described in section 5.2 of chapter five, the uniqueness of the SACGI is 
that it contains South African context specific affirmative action and stakeholder corporate 
governance provisions. In the next and last section on the distributional characteristics of the 
SACGI, the levels of  compliance with the nine  South African  context specific affirmative 
action and stakeholder provisions will be further analysed. 
 
6.5 Descriptive Statistics Based on the South African Context Specific Issues 
 
  As  has  been  explained  in  subsection  5.2.2  of  chapter  five,  a  sub-index  (known  as 
Social-SACGI)  containing  10  South  African  context  specific  affirmative  action  and 
stakeholder  corporate  governance  provision,  is  constructed.  The  9  affirmative  action  and 
stakeholder  provisions  include:  board  diversity  on  the  basis  of  gender  (BDIVG1),  and 
ethnicity  (BDIVE1),  policies  and  practices  with  regard  to  black  economic  empowerment 
(BEE), HIV/Aids (HIV), employment equity (PEQ), health and safety (PHS), environment 
(PEP), ethics (DCE), and corporate social investment (CSI).  
  This section, therefore, examines the distributional characteristics of the Social-SACGI. 
Table 10 reports summary descriptive statistics based on the full sample, firm size, industry, 
dual-listing and audit firm size for the Social-SACGI. The rationale is to ascertain whether the 
firm size and industrial patterns observed in the levels of compliance with the SACGI also 
exist in terms of compliance with the Social-SACGI.  
Similar to Table 5, Panel A of Table 10 reports the aggregate levels of compliance with 
the Social-SACGI for the full sample. Panels B and C report levels of compliance with the 
Social-SACGI by small and large firms, respectively.  
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Table 10: Summary Descriptive Statistics for the Nine South African Context  
   Specific Governance Index at Aggregate Levels (the Social-SACGI) 
The Social-SACGI (South African 
Context Specific Provisions) 
 
Mean 
 
T-Test 
Std. 
Dev. 
Skew-
ness 
   Kurt- 
 osis 
Mini- 
mum 
Maxi- 
mum 
Panel A: All Firm Years 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel B: All Small Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel C: All Large Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel D: All B. Material Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel E: All Con. Goods Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel F: All C. Services Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
66.71 
55.22 
62.00 
68.44 
72.22 
75.22 
48.22 
37.78 
42.44 
49.11 
52.89 
58.89 
85.20 
72.67 
81.56 
87.78 
91.56 
92.44 
67.44 
60.56 
62.78 
67.78 
68.89 
77.22 
61.50 
50.56 
57.78 
64.44 
61.11 
70.56 
71.89 
55.56 
65.00 
77.78 
81.11 
80.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36.98
*** 
34.89
*** 
39.12
*** 
38.67
*** 
38.67
*** 
33.55
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1.56 
10.00 
 2.22 
 2.78 
 5.00 
 2.22 
 4.39 
 0.00 
 7.22 
   .44 
 7.78 
 4.44 
 6.00
* 
 5.00 
 0.00 
12.78
* 
 7.22 
 5.00 
29.21 
28.75 
28.61 
29.98 
29.93 
26.60 
26.50 
22.11 
22.66 
26.57 
27.91 
26.49 
17.92 
23.67 
16.28 
15.10 
12.20 
12.39 
 33.51 
33.31 
36.46 
33.99 
32.56 
28.49  
29.28 
29.17 
29.29 
29.63 
30.05 
28.45  
24.69 
24.18 
24.26 
21.33 
20.74 
   24.34 
 -.60
** 
 -.07
* 
 -.45
** 
 -.71
** 
 -.96
** 
 -.99
** 
  .00
 
.21
** 
.12
** 
.05
* 
.25
** 
 -.38
** 
-1.25
*** 
  -.75
** 
 -.58
** 
-1.24
*** 
-2.52
*** 
-2.80
*** 
 -.69
** 
 -.32
** 
 -.50
** 
 -.68
** 
 -.86
** 
-1.46
*** 
 -.37
** 
  .20
** 
 -.49
** 
 -.31
** 
 -.71
** 
 -.69
**  
  .60
** 
.00
 
 -.53
** 
 -.84
** 
 -.86
** 
-1.18
*** 
-.86 
-.99 
-.88 
-.71 
-.27 
-1.06 
-1.16 
-1.01 
-1.21 
-1.24 
-1.17 
-.89 
2.23
 
  -.29
 
   .98
 
.55 
.47 
.99 
-1.06 
-1.58 
-1.40 
-1.14 
.79 
1.11  
-1.15 
-1.07 
-1.09 
-.79 
-.89 
-.75 
-.60 
-1.09 
.20 
-.65 
-.63 
.43 
.00  
.00  
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
11.11 
11.11 
 33.33 
 33.33 
 33.33 
 33.33 
 .00 
.00 
.00 
11.11 
11.11 
11.11   
11.11 
11.11 
11.11 
11.11 
11.11 
11.11 
11.11 
22.22 
11.11 
33.33 
33.33 
   22.22 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
77.88 
88.89 
88.89 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
Notes: The t-test in column 3 is the independent samples t-test for equality of means. The mean differences in 
Panel B test for equality of means between all large and all small firms, while those in Panels D, E, and F test for 
equality of means between all basic materials firms, all consumer goods firms, and all consumer services firms, 
and all technology firms, respectively. A mean difference with (***), and (*) indicates that the null hypothesis 
that the means are equal is rejected at the 1%, and 10% significance level, respectively.  The skewness and 
kurtosis test statistics in columns 5 and 6, respectively, test for normal distribution. A test statistic with (***), 
(**), and (*) means that the null hypothesis that the Social-SACGI is normally distributed is rejected at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
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Continuation: Table 10 
The Social-SACGI (South African 
Context Specific Provisions) 
 
Mean 
 
T-Test 
Std. 
Dev. 
Skew-
ness 
   Kurt- 
 osis 
Mini- 
mum 
Maxi- 
mum 
Panel G: All Industrials Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel H: All Technology  Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel I: All Dual-listed Firms 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel J: All Non-Dual-listed  
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel K: All Big Four Audited 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel L: All Non-Big Four Aud. 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
66.44 
58.89 
59.44 
67.22 
71.11 
75.56 
65.89 
50.56 
65.00 
65.00 
73.89 
75.00 
86.04 
78.67 
83.11 
87.56 
88.00 
92.89 
60.27 
47.41 
54.96 
62.07 
66.96 
69.93 
73.21 
62.13 
68.39 
75.74 
78.40 
81.38 
50.80 
38.31 
46.36 
50.57 
57.09 
61.69 
 .56
 
8.33 
7.00 
5.56 
2.78 
  .56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25.77
*** 
31.26
*** 
28.15
*** 
25.49
*** 
21.04
*** 
22.96
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22.41
*** 
23.82
*** 
22.03
*** 
25.17
*** 
21.31
*** 
19.69
*** 
31.51 
30.61 
29.79 
33.52 
33.31 
29.86 
25.67  
22.93 
24.79 
25.31 
26.80 
23.05 
20.20 
26.04 
23.32 
20.11 
19.49 
10.58 
28.91 
25.27 
27.58 
28.78 
29.73 
27.87 
27.88 
28.64 
28.15 
27.04 
26.62 
25.04 
26.21 
21.33 
23.58 
25.99 
29.21 
25.47 
-.72
** 
-.53
** 
-.49
** 
-.74
** 
-.99
** 
-1.55
*** 
-.37
** 
 .08
* 
-.30
** 
-.33
** 
-.97
** 
-.69
** 
-2.36
*** 
-1.92
***           
-1.99
*** 
-2.60
*** 
-2.79
*** 
-1.45
*** 
  -.30
** 
   .21
** 
  -.20
** 
  -.44
** 
  -.68
** 
  -.74
** 
-1.08
** 
  -.47
** 
  -.95
** 
-1.29
*** 
-1.49
*** 
-1.75
*** 
   .26
** 
   .61
** 
   .53
** 
   .19
** 
  -.15
** 
   .02
* 
 -.78 
 -.84 
  -.95 
 -.82 
 -.30 
 -.83 
 -.98 
 -.69 
 -.88 
 -.96 
 -.14 
 -.80 
 6.50
*** 
 3.78
** 
 5.53
*** 
 8.27
*** 
 9.82
*** 
 1.24 
-1.11 
  -.86 
-1.00 
-1.04 
-.80 
-.61 
   .17 
   .79 
  -.06 
   .77 
  1.36 
  2.38 
 -1.04 
   -.30 
   -.60 
 -1.09 
 -1.23 
 -1.26 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
   11.11 
11.11 
22.22 
22.22 
11.11 
33.33 
.00 
.00 
11.11 
11.11 
11.11 
66.67 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
11.11 
11.11 
11.11 
11.11 
11.11 
22.22 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
88.89 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
Notes: The t-test in column 3 is the independent samples t-test for equality of means. The mean differences in 
Panel G test for equality of means between all industrial firms and all technology firms. The mean differences in 
Panel I test for equality of means between all dual-listed and all non-dual-listed firms, while those in Panel K test 
for equality of means between all big four audited firms and all non-big four audit firms. A mean difference with 
(***) indicates that the null hypothesis that the means are equal is rejected at the 1% significance level. The 
skewness and kurtosis test statistics in columns 5 and 6, respectively, test for normal distribution. A test statistic 
with (***), (**), and (*) means that the null hypothesis that the Social-SACGI is normally distributed is rejected 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
 
 
Similarly,  the  t-test  in  column  3  of  Table 10  is  the  independent  samples  t-test  for 
equality of means between large and small firms, technology firms and each of the remaining 
four industries, dual-listed firms and non dual-listed firms, and big four audited and non-big  
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four audited firms, respectively. Several findings emerge from Table 10. Firstly, consistent 
with the evidence of wide variability in aggregate levels of compliance with the SACGI, Panel 
A suggests that there is a substantial degree of dispersion in the levels of compliance with the 
Social-SACGI among the sampled firms. The scores range from a minimum of 0% (i.e., 0 out 
of 9) to a maximum 100% (i.e., 9 out of 9) with the average sampled firm complying with 
67%  of the  9 South  African  context specific  affirmative  action  and  stakeholder  corporate 
governance  provisions  analysed.  This  is  higher  when  compared  with  the  mean  level  of 
compliance with the SACGI of 60%.  
As will be discussed further in chapters seven and eight, this also implies that any 
financial performance consequences of complying with the Social-SACGI can be expected to 
be  similar  in  direction  to  that  of  the  SACGI.  However,  if  firms  with  better  corporate 
governance standands (as measured by compliance with the corporate governance provisions 
of King II) do generate higher financial returns, then it can be argued that the magnitude of 
complying with the Social-SACGI (67%) will be expected to be higher than that of the SACGI 
(60%) for the sampled firms.  
Secondly, and in line with the patterns observed with the SACGI, compliance with the 
Social-SACGI  improves  over  time.  While  the  average  firm  complied  with  55%  of  the  9 
affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions in 2002, it increased to 
75% in 2006, a percentage point difference of 20. Thirdly, the Social-SACGI depicts similar 
distributional characteristics exhibited by the SACGI.  All show similar large variability in the 
levels of compliance with the Social-SACGI and also depict similar large standard deviations.  
Similarly, most of them are mildly (in comparison with a normal distribution) skewed 
to the right or left, but normally peaked. As has already been explained, the mild nature of the 
deviations from normal distributional data properties depicted by the Social-SACGI is in line 
with the findings reported by prior studies that have applied OLS technique in estimating their 
structural equations. As has been explained above, this is relevant because it implies that it 
may be statistically appropriate to carry out OLS estimations. Fourthly, and similar to the 
SACGI, Panels B and C of Table 10, in addition to Figure 6 suggest that there is substantial 
variability in the aggregate levels of compliance with the Social-SACGI between large and 
small  firms. Specifically,  the  average  small  firm  complied  with  48%  of the  9 affirmative 
action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions compared to 85% of large firms, a 
statistically significant percentage point difference of 37.   
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As  has  been  explained  in  subsection 5.2.2  of chapter five, this is not  theoretically 
surprising. This is because compliance with these affirmative action and stakeholder corporate 
governance provisions places additional cost implications on firms, which larger firms can be 
expected to better afford than smaller firms. More importantly, political cost theory suggests 
that  larger  firms  are  more  susceptible  to  political  threats  of  break-ups,  nationalisation, 
regulation,  and  taxation  (Watts  and  Zimmerman,  1978,  p.115;  Andreasson,  2009,  p.22). 
Therefore, larger firms can be expected to comply better with the Social-SACGI in order to 
reduce potential political costs, and also gain acess to critical resources, such as tax-holidays, 
subsidies and government contracts. 
 
A Comparison of the Levels of Compliance with the Social-
SACGI between Large and Small Firms Using Computed Means
0
20
40
60
80
100
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 All
Year/Period
S
-
S
A
C
G
I
(
m
e
a
n
%
)
Large
Small
All Firms
 
Figure 6: Social-SACGI Compliance Levels by Firm Size 
 
  Fifthly, and in line with the SACGI, Panels I to L of Table 10, as well as Figure 7 
indicate that the variability in the levels of compliance with the Social-SACGI can also be 
explained by dual-listing and audit firm size. Specifically, they show that while the average 
cross-listed firm complied with 86% of the 9 affirmative action and stakeholder corporate 
governance provisions, its non cross-listed counterpart complied with 60% of the provisions, a 
statistically significant percentage point difference of 26. Similarly, Panels K and L of Table 
10,  in  addition  to  Figure  7  indicate  that  there  are  significant  differences  in  the  levels  of 
compliance  with  the  Social-SACGI  between  big  four  and  non  big  four  audited  firms. 
Specifically, the average big four audited company complied with 73% of the 9 affirmative 
action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions compared with 51% by a non big-four 
audited firm, a statistically significant percentage point difference of 22.   
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As has been discussed in subsection 6.3, the significant differences observed in the 
levels of compliance with the Social-SACGI on the basis of dual-listing and audit firm size is 
theoretically expected. This is because the sample suggests that cross-listed firms are likely to 
be large and be subjected to extra rigorous corporate governance requirements. This seems to 
help cross-lited firms to have better corporate governance standards than their non dual-listed 
counterparts. Similarly, the sample indicates that big four audited firms are more likely to be 
large  and  cross-listed,  which  suggests  they  are  also  more  likely  to  have  better  corporate 
governance standards than their non big-four audited counterparts.  
 
 
Assessing the Impact of Dual-listing and Audit Firm Size on the 
Levels of Compliance with the Social-SACGI Using Computed 
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  Figure 7: Social-SACGI Compliance Levels by Dual-listing and Audit Firm Size 
 
  Finally, and in line with the SACGI, Panels D to H of Table 10 suggest that there is 
some amount of variability in levels of compliance with the Social-SACGI across the five 
industries.  Specifically,  the  average  basic  materials  firm  complied  with  67%  of  the  9 
affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions in comparison to 62%, 
72%, 66%, and 66% by consumer goods, consumer services, industrials, and technology firms, 
respectively. However, and unlike the firm size, dual-listing, and audit firm size groupings, 
only consumer services firms show significantly higher levels of compliance with the Social-
SACGI  than  those  of  technology  firms,  the  industry  with  the  least  aggregate  levels  of 
compliance with the Social-SACGI. 
  To ascertain which of the 9 individual affirmative action and stakeholder corporate 
governance provisions account more for the variability in aggregate levels of compliance with 
the Social-SACGI observed among the sampled firms, the levels of compliance with the 9  
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individual provisions are further examined. Table 11 presents the levels of compliance among 
the sampled firms with the 9 South African context specific affirmative action and stakeholder 
corporate governance provisions. To facilitate easy comparison, Panels A and C repeat the 
pooled and industry levels of compliance reported in Tables 4 and 8 for the 9 affirmative 
action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions, respectively.  
 Firstly, and similar to the results of the full sample, Panel A of Table 11 suggests that 
there is considerable amount of variation in the levels of compliance with the South African 
context  specific  affirmative  action  and  stakeholder  corporate  governance  issues.  The 
affirmative  action  and  stakeholder  provision  with  the  weakest  compliance  score  (50%)  is 
board diversity on the basis of gender (BDIVG1), whilst the issue with the highest score (85%) 
is the disclosure of company code of ethics (DCE). For the remaining 7 South African context 
specific affirmative action and stakeholder provisions, including board diversity on the basis 
of ethnicity (BDIVE1), policies and practices with regard to black economic empowerment 
(BEE), HIV/Aids (HIV), health and safety (PHS), employment equity (PEQ), environment 
(PEP), corporate and social investment (CSI), compliance levels are above 53%. This is higher 
when  compared  with  the  average  levels  of  compliance  with  some  of  the  conventional 
corporate  governance  provisions,  such  as  independent  board  chairman  (BCP)  among  the 
sampled firms. 
Secondly, and similar to the results of the  full sample, Table 7 suggested that the 
variability in the aggregate levels of compliance with the Social-SACGI can be explained by 
firm size. Specifically, Table 7 indicated that larger firms tended to have significantly higher 
scores than smaller firms for all the 9 affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance 
provisions examined. The provision with the highest significant difference between large and 
small firms is corporate social investment (CSI) with a percentage point difference of 59. 
By contrast, the provision with the least significant difference between large and small 
firms is the disclosure of company ethics (DCE) with a percentage point difference of 16. For 
the  remaining  7  affirmative  action  and  stakeholder  corporate  governance  provisions,  the 
variability  in  the  levels  of  compliance  between  large  and  small  firms  ranges  from  20 
percentage points with respect to employment equity (PEQ) to 52 percentage points in the case 
of HIV/Aids (HIV). 
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Table 11: Compliance Levels Among the Sampled Firms with the Nine Individual  
      South African Context Specific Corporate Governance Provisions 
Compliance Levels Among Firms (%)  Individual Internal Corporate Governance Provisions 
(South African Context Specific Issues)  All  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Panel A: South African Context Specific Issues 
Black economic empowerment(BEE) 
Policy on HIV/AIDS(HIV) 
Policy on health and safety(PHS) 
Policy on employment equity(PEQ) 
Policy on good environmental practices(PEP) 
Corporate social investment(CSI) 
Disclosure of company code of ethics(DCE) 
Board diversity on the basis of ethnicity(BDIVE1) 
Board diversity on the basis of gender(BDIVG1) 
Panel B: Other Board Diversity Measures 
 
Board diversity(eth.& gen.) as a % of board size 
Women(gender) as a % of board size 
Non-whites(ethnicity) as a % of board size 
Non-white women (gend.) as a % of board size 
Non-white men (gender) as a % of board size 
Women (gender) as a % of board diversity 
Non-whites(ethnicity) as a % of board diversity 
Non-white women as a % of women (gender) 
Non-white women (gender) as a % of non-white 
%boards with at least 1 non-white man and woman 
%boards with at least 1 non-white 
%boards with at least 1 woman 
%boards with at least 1 non-white man 
%boards with at least 1 non-white woman  
 
68.6 
  62.0 
  53.8 
  82.6 
  59.4 
  63.0 
  84.6 
  76.4 
  50.0  
 
    
23.3 
  8.0 
19.7 
  4.4 
15.3 
34.3 
84.4 
55.6 
22.6 
41.6 
75.0 
50.0 
70.4 
34.0 
 
51 
45 
36 
80 
47 
54 
76 
69 
39 
 
 
17.1 
   5.8 
 13.8 
   2.4 
 11.3 
33.8 
 80.6 
 40.7 
 17.1 
28.0 
71.0 
38.0 
63.0 
20.0 
 
60 
59 
42 
80 
53 
63 
83 
73 
45 
 
 
19.8 
6.7 
15.8 
2.8 
13.1 
33.7 
79.7 
41.7 
17.4 
35.0 
74.0 
45.0 
65.0 
23.0 
 
71 
66 
59 
84 
62 
62 
85 
76 
51 
 
  
23.8 
7.7 
19.8 
4.1 
15.7 
34.0 
84.6 
53.3 
20.8 
43.0 
76.0 
51.0 
69.0 
33.0 
 
77 
70 
64 
83 
67 
67 
89 
78 
55 
 
  
26.9 
9.3 
23.1 
5.6 
17.6 
34.7 
85.7 
59.8 
24.2 
46.0 
78.0 
56.0 
75.0 
42.0 
 
84 
70 
68 
86 
68 
69 
90 
86 
60 
 
  
28.9 
10.3 
24.5 
7.2 
18.6 
35.5 
88.3 
69.9 
28.1 
54.0 
86.0 
60.0 
80.0 
52.0 
Panel C: Industry  All  BM  CG  CS  IN  TE 
Black economic empowerment(BEE) 
Policy on HIV/AIDS(HIV) 
Policy on health and safety(PHS) 
Policy on employment equity(PEQ) 
Policy on good environmental practices(PEP) 
Corporate social investment(CS1) 
Disclosure of company code of ethics(CSI) 
Board diversity on the basis of ethnicity(BDIVE1) 
Board diversity on the basis of gender(BDIVG1) 
68.6 
  62.0 
  53.8 
  82.6 
  59.4 
  63.0 
  84.6 
  76.4 
  50.0  
68 
69 
70 
72 
81 
54 
83 
66 
44 
52 
64 
49 
84 
73 
59 
77 
63 
36 
63 
72 
55 
87 
60 
72 
90 
86 
62 
76 
60 
55 
78 
46 
69 
78 
81 
55 
84 
45 
40 
92 
37 
61 
95 
86 
53 
Notes: Abbreviations are defined as follows: basic materials firms (BM), consumer goods firms (CG), consumer 
services firms (CS), industrial firms (IN), and technology firms (TE). 
  
 
Thirdly, and in line with the full sample, Panel C of Table 11 suggests that there is 
some amount of variability in the levels of compliance with the 9 provisions across the five 
industries.  Consumer services  firms  have  the  highest  compliance  levels  in  3 out  of the  9 
provisions. These are: HIV/Aids (HIV), corporate social investment (CSI), and board diversity 
on the basis of gender (BDIVG1). For black economic empowerment (BEE), employment 
equity (PEQ), and the disclosure of company ethics (DCE), technology firms complied most,  
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while basic materials firms complied most with the health and safety (PHS), and environment 
(PEP) provisions.  
In contrast, consumer goods firms complied least with five provisions. These are: black 
economic empowerment (BEE), health and safety (PHS), the disclosure of company ethics 
(DCE), board diversity on the basis of ethnicity (BDIVE1), and gender (BDIVG1). Similarly, 
technology firms complied least with three provisions. These are: HIV/Aids (HIV), health and 
safety  (PHS),  and  environment  (PEP),  while  basic  materials  firms  complied  least  with 
corporate  social  investment  (CSI).  The  variability  in  compliance  levels  within  the  South 
African  context  specific  corporate  governance  and  stakeholder  provisions  across  the  five 
industries means that some industries may be more sensitive to some of the special provisions 
than others. For example, basic materials firms are more exposed to environmental issues, 
whilst  black  empowerment  deals,  especially  involving  government  contracts,  are  more 
common among the technology firms. 
To  conclude,  this  subsection  has  examined  the  levels  of  compliance  among  the 
sampled  firms  with  the  South  African  context  specific  affirmative  action  and  stakeholder 
corporate governance provisions. Consistent with the SACGI, there is significant variability in 
the levels of compliance with the Social-SACGI among the sampled firms.  Similar to the 
SACGI,  the  variability  in  the  levels  of  compliance  amongst  the  sampled  firms,  can  be 
explained by size, dual-listing, audit firm size, and industry effects. Specifically, large, dual-
listed,  and  big  four  audited  firms  have  significantly  higher  levels  of  compliance  with  the 
Social-SACGI  than  their  small,  non  dual-listed,  and  non-big  four  audited  counterparts, 
respectively. Consumer services firms also have significantly higher levels of compliance with 
the Social-SACGI than their technology counterparts, the industry with the least aggregate 
levels  of  compliance  with  the  Social-SACGI.  Similar  to  the  results  of  the  SACGI,  the 
variability in the levels of compliance with the Social-SACGI is explained more by firm size 
than by industry differences. 
 
6.6 Other Key Trends and Measures of Board Diversity 
 
Finally, to ascertain the level of diversity within South African corporate boards, Panel 
B of Table 11 reports trends with reference to other key measures of board diversity. It shows 
that the average sampled firm has approximately 23% of its board members as women (gender 
diversity) and non-whites (ethnicity). This means that the average South African listed firm’s  
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board
76 is dominated (77%) by white males. Swartz and Firer (2005) suggest that the low 
representation of non-whites in particular on South African corporate boards may be due to 
lack of experience and qualifications caused by the lingering negative social and economic 
effects of Apartheid. As will be discussed further in chapters eight and ten, the small number 
of women and non-white representation on South African corporate boards also implies that 
they may not be able to have significant impact on firm financial performance. 
 Empirically,  the  finding  is  in  line  with  the  results  of  prior  corporate  governance 
studies (e.g., Brammer et al., 2007; Fraucoeur et al., 2008).  For example, and of special 
interest to this study, using a sample of 117 South African listed firms in 2003, Swartz and 
Firer (2005) report that the average non-white and women representation on South African 
corporate boards is 20%.  Similarly, in a sample of 543 UK firms, Brammer et al. (2007) find 
that only 13% of the average UK corporate board members originate from diverse ethnic and 
gender backgrounds. 
Of  the  23%  diverse  board  members,  only  34%  are  women.  In  fact,  of  the 
approximately  20%  non-whites  found  on  an  average  firm’s  board,  only  22%  are  women. 
Overall, only 8% of the board members of an average sampled firm are women of which 
slightly more than 4% (i.e., 56% as a proportion of women) are women of colour. This is far 
less than the number of non-white males (15%) as percent of the average board size. The 
evidence of low representation of women on South African corporate boards is also consistent 
with the findings of prior studies (e.g., Carter et al., 2003; Singh and Vinnicombe, 2004). For 
instance, Swartz and Firer (2005) report that the board of an average South African listed firm 
consisted of only 6% of women in 2003. Similarly, Singh and Vinnicombe (2004) find that the 
percentage of women who held FTSE 100 directorships was only 7% in 2002.  
An interesting finding, however, is that the average South African corporate board has 
more  non-white  women  (56%)  representation  than  their  white  counterparts.  Similarly,  the 
percentage of non-whites as a percentage of board diversity is 84%, which is relatively high. 
Also,  irrespective  of  the  board  diversity  measure  used,  diversity  among  South  African 
corporate  boards  has  substantially  improved over time.  For  instance, the  average sampled 
firm’s  board  had  only  17%  of  its  members  originating  from  diverse  ethnic  and  gender 
backgrounds in 2002. By 2006, it had increased to 29%, a 12 percentage point increase over 
the five-year period.  
                                                 
76As will be discussed further in chapter seven, the average South African listed firm has a board size of 9.69 or 
approximately 10 members.  
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In terms of the distribution of non-whites and women across the sampled firms, similar 
patterns are observed. Approximately 42% of the sampled firms have at least a non-white and 
a woman representation on their boards. This means that 58% of the sampled firms do not 
have at least a woman and non-white on their boards. As has been noted in subsection 4.2.2.2 
of chapter four, the large numbers of zero observations of board diversity among the sampled 
firms imply that it will be inappropriate to measure board diversity as a continuous variable. 
By  contrast,  70%  of  the  sampled  firms  have  at  least  a  non-white  man  representation, 
suggesting  that  there  is  relatively  less  women  representation  on  South  African  corporate 
boards. In fact, only 50% of the sampled firms have at least one woman board representation, 
of which 34% (68% by proportion of women) are at least represented only by a non-white 
woman.  Overall,  75%  of  the  sampled  firms  have  at  least  a  non-white  man  or  non-white 
woman representation on their boards.  
Also, South African listed firms with board members from diverse gender and ethnic 
backgrounds are generally increasing. For example, only 28% of the sampled firms had at 
least  one  woman  and  a  non-white  representation  on  their  boards  in  2002.  It  consistently 
increased to 35%, 43%, 46%, and 54% in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, respectively. Similarly, 
only 38% of the sampled firms had at least one woman representation on their boards in 2002.  
It also consistently increased to 45%, 51%, 56%, and 60% in 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, 
respectively. 
The increasing diversity among South African corporate boards may be explained by 
the increasing willingness of the sampled firms to comply with employment equity and black 
empowerment  provisions.  It  may  also  explain  the  increasing  representation  of  non-white 
women on corporate boards. Black women directors in particular command a premium in 
South  Africa  because  they  tend  to  satisfy  both  ethnic  and  gender  diversity  requirements. 
Despite the improving board diversity, however, the findings also suggest that board members 
from diverse backgrounds (ethnic and gender) within South African listed firms are still very 
small in number. 
 
 
6.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This  chapter  has  discussed  the  South  African  Corporate  Governance  Index  (the 
SACGI). It attempted to achieve three main objectives. Firstly, it sought to provide a detailed 
description of the SACGI using a number of descriptive statistics. In this regard, the chapter  
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provided a detailed description of the SACGI based on the full sample. Generally, it showed 
that there were substantial variations in the levels of compliance with the SACGI amongst the 
sampled firms.  
At the aggregate levels, the scores ranged from a minimum of 6% (3 out of 50) to a 
maximum of 98% (49 out of 50) with the average South African listed firm complying with 
60% (30) of the 50 corporate governance provisions analysed. For the individual corporate 
governance provisions, there were variations in the levels of compliance in 48 (96%) of them. 
Overall,  an  examination  of  the  distribution  of  the  pooled  sample  showed  that  despite  the 
expectation that the introduction of the King Reports will speed-up convergence of corporate 
governance standards, there are still substantial variations in the levels of compliance with the 
individual corporate governance provisions among South African listed firms.  
However, and in line with the results of prior studies that have examined the levels of 
compliance  with  a  code  of  corporate  governance  in  a  voluntary  compliance  regime,  the 
findings indicate that corporate governance standards have generally improved among South 
African listed firms. A major policy implication of this finding is that the current UK-style 
voluntary compliance regime (‘comply or explain’) is at least working to some extent, and 
thus seems to be appropriate for South Africa. 
The  second  objective  of  the  chapter  has  been  to  ascertain  whether  the  observed 
variability in the levels of compliance with the SACGI can be explained by firm size, industry, 
dual-listing and audit firm size. Similar to the the prior evidence, the analyses show that the 
observed variability in the levels of compliance with the SACGI can largely be explained by 
firm size, and moderately by industry. Specifically, and at the aggregate levels, the average 
large  firm  complied  with  75%  of  the  50  corporate  governance  provisions  analysed  in 
comparison with 44% by the average small firm.  
Examination of the individual corporate governance provisions, also showed that in 46 
(92%) out of the 50 corporate governance provisions investigated, compliance levels among 
large firms were significantly higher than small firms. The analyses also indicated that large 
firms are more likely to be dual-listed and be audited be a big four audit firm with better 
corporate  governance  standards  than  their  non  cross-listed  and  non  big-four  audited 
counterparts,  respectively.  Similarly,  the  analyses  suggested  that  some  of  the  observed 
variability  in  the  levels  of  compliance  with  the  SACGI  can  be  explained  by  industrial 
groupings,  but  to  a  lesser  degree  when  compared  with  the  firm  size  classifications. 
Specifically, and at the aggregate levels, the consumer services firms complied most with the  
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SACGI. By contrast, technology firms complied least with the SACGI. The results based on 
multivariate regression analysis generally offered empirical support to those of the descriptive 
analyses that variations in the SACGI can largely be explained by firm size, dual-listing, and 
audit firm size, but moderately by industrial groupings. 
The final objective of the chapter has been to assess the levels of compliance with the 
nine South African context specific affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance 
provisions  (the  Social-SACGI).  Consistent  with  the  results  based  on  the  full  sample,  the 
statistics indicated that there is a considerable amount of variation in the levels of compliance 
with the Social-SACGI. Similarly, the analyses suggested that the observed variability in the 
levels  of  compliance  with  the  social-SACGI  can  largely  be  explained  by  firm  size  and 
moderately by industry.   
Finally,  analyses  of  the  trends  in  board  diversity  showed  that  irrespective  of  the 
measure used, diversity among South African corporate boards has substantially improved 
over  time.  Despite  the improving  board  diversity,  however,  the  findings  also  suggest that 
board members from diverse backgrounds (ethnic and gender) within South African listed 
firms are still very small in number.  
In  the  next  chapter  (chapter  seven),  the  main  aim  will  be  to  present  descriptive 
statistics,  as  well  as  test  the  Ordinary  Least  Squares  (OLS)  regression  assumptions. 
Specifically,  descriptive  statistics  of  the  financial  performance,  control  and  the  remaining 
corporate  governance  variables  will  be  reported  and  discussed.  The  OLS  regression 
assumptions that have been mentioned in chapter five will then be tested.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND OLS ASSUMPTIONS 
 
 
7. INTRODUCTION 
 
  This  chapter  discusses  the  data  and  the  Ordinary  Least  Squares  (OLS)  regression 
assumptions. It seeks to achieve three main objectives. First, it seeks to explain how outliers in 
the financial performance and control variables were dealt with. Second, it presents detailed 
descriptive  statistics  of  the  dependent  (financial  performance)  and  the  other  independent 
(corporate  governance)  variables.  Finally,  it  tests  the  OLS  regression  assumptions  of 
multicollinearity, autocorrelation, normality, homoscedasticity, and linearity. The rest of the 
chapter  is  organised  as  follows.  Section  7.1  reports  detailed  descriptive  statistics  for  the 
dependent  and  the  remaining  independent  variables.  Section  7.2  tests  the  OLS  regression 
assumptions, while section 7.3 summarises the chapter. 
   
 
7.1 SUMMARY DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
      MEASURES AND OTHER CONTINUOUS INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
  This section presents descriptive statistics relating to the proxies for the dependent 
(financial  performance),  the  other  independent  (corporate  governance),  and  the  control 
(exogenous)  variables.  However,  before  presenting  the  descriptive  statistics,  the  next 
subsection first describes how outliers in the financial performance and the control variables 
were treated. 
 
7.1.1 Dealing with Outliers in the Financial Performance and Control Variables 
 
  There were extreme values in the financial performance proxies, namely Tobin’s Q (Q-
ratio) and return on assets (ROA), and in the control variables, especially gearing (GEAR), 
and  sales  growth  (SGROWTH).  Outliers  were  also  present  in  the  alternative  corporate 
governance mechanism – leverage (LEV). For example, the minimum (maximum) value for 
sales growth was -96% (2,236%), while that of gearing was -221% (6,085%). Similarly, the 
minimum (maximum) value for ROA was -240% (60%), the value for Tobin’s Q was .15 
(7.98), and the value for leverage was 0% (157%), respectively. Apart from being extreme 
values,  some  of  the  figures  did  not  make  economic  or  theoretical  sense.  For  example,  a  
 
235 
gearing ratio above 100% is theoretically meaningless. This is because, in theory, a firm can 
either use a combination of debt and equity or a maximum of 100% debt or equity. 
Therefore, to limit the effects of outliers, and specifically following Klapper and Love 
(2004, p.708), and Chhaochharia and Grinstein, (2009, p.242), the financial performance and 
the control variables were winsorised at the 5% and 95% levels. Specifically, all the 500 firm 
year  values  of  each  of  the  financial  performance  and  control  variables  were  ranked  in 
ascending  order.  The  top  and  bottom  25  values  of each of  the  financial  performance and 
control  variable  were  replaced  with  the  26
th  and  475
th  values,  respectively.  As  will  be 
explained further below, the statistics that will be reported and discussed for the control and 
financial performance variables will be values after winsorisation. 
First, and as has been discussed below, the financial performance and control variables 
were winsorised because the presence of outliers could seriously violate the OLS assumptions 
upon which the models estimated in this study will be based. Second, winsorising or excluding 
outliers is a common practice within the corporate governance literature (Durnev and Kim, 
2005, p.1473; Beiner et al., 2006, p.259; Black et al., 2006a, p.379; Bruno and Claessens, 
2007,  p.17;  and  Chhaochharia  and  Grinstein,  2007,  p.1796,  amongst  others).  Finally,  and 
following prior studies (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005), the corporate 
governance  variables  were  not  winsorised
77.  In  fact,  and  as  will  be  discussed  below,  the 
corporate governance variables generally have less extreme values.  
Table 12 contains the summary descriptive statistics of all the variables for all the 500 
firm  years, as well as their respective annual values. Panels A and B of Table 12 present 
summary statistics for the dependent variables (financial performance), Panels C to I of Table 
12  report  summary  statistic  for  the  other  continuous  independent/alternative  corporate 
governance  mechanisms,  whilst  Panels  J  to  M  of  Table  12  do  the  same  for  the  control 
variables. Similar to the SACGI, for each variable, the mean, standard deviation, skewness, 
kurtosis, minimum and maximum values will be reported. 
 
7.1.2 Descriptive Statistics of the Financial Performance Measures 
 
Panels A and B of Table 12 report descriptive statistics for the dependent variables. 
First, Panel A of Table 12 shows that the ROA after winsorisation ranges from a minimum of  
                                                 
77The whole regression results that will be reported and discussed below were first run with the outliers included 
before winsoring at the 5% and 95% levels. The results were essentially the same as those that will be reported 
below. As has been explained above, the main rationale for winsoring is to help minimise potential serious 
violations of the OLS assumptions upon which the regression analyses will be based.    
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-21%  to  a  maximum  of  30%  with  an  average  of  9%  for  the  overall  sample  period.  The 
standard deviation is 12.39, indicating that there is a significant variation in accounting returns 
among the sampled firms. Panel B of Table 12 suggests that the Q-ratio after winsorisation 
also ranges from a minimum of .63 and maximum of 3.01 with an average of 1.49 for the 
combined sample. The standard deviation of .65 indicates that there is less variation in market 
performance  among  the  sampled  firms.  Consistent  with  the  suggestions  of  the  normal 
histogram plot (which for purposes of brevity not presented here), the skewness and kurtosis 
statistics indicate that the performance variables are mildly (relative to a normal distribution) 
non-normal. For example, the skewness (absolute critical value for accepting skewness is zero) 
statistic of -.67 for the ROA indicates that the distribution departs from symmetry with a 
longer than a normal left tail.  
By contrast, the kurtosis statistic (the absolute critical value for rejecting kurtosis is 
three)  of  .43  indicate  that  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  ROA  is  mesokurtically  distributed 
cannot be rejected. The positive sign, however, indicates that the ROA values cluster more and 
have longer tails than that of a normal distribution.  
Similarly, in line with the suggestions of the normal histogram plot (for reasons of 
brevity  not  reported  here),  the  skewness  statistic  of  .85  for  the  Q-ratio  suggests  that  the 
distribution departs from  symmetry  with  a  longer  than  a  normal  right  tail
78.  The  kurtosis 
statistic of -.01 suggests that the null hypothesis that the Q-ratio is mesokurtically distributed 
cannot be rejected. The negative sign, however, means that the Q-ratio values cluster less and 
have shorter tails than that of a normal distribution. As has been discussed in chapter six, the 
mild  (in  comparison  with  a  normal  distribution)  nature  of  the  non-normal  distributional 
characteristics depicted by the variables are consistent with the reported findings of previous 
studies that have carried out OLS estimations (Cheung and Wei, 2006, p.913; Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006, pp. 1048, 1050-1051; Francoeur et al., 2008, p.88). This means that it may be 
statistically tolerable to conduct OLS estimations. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
78To reduce non-normalities in the variables, rank and natural log transformations of all the continuous variables 
used  in  this  study  were  taken  both  before  and  after  winsorising  (e.g.,  Gujarati,  1995;  2003;  Brooks,  2003; 
Maddala, 2005). With the exception of firm size (total assets), the distributions and estimations based on the rank 
and natural log transformations did not produce better results than those based on the actual levels of all the 
variables.  
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Table 12: Summary Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent and All Continuous  
                Independent Variables Based on All (500) Firm-Year Observations 
Dependent/Independent Variables  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Skew- 
ness 
Kurt- 
osis 
Mini- 
mum 
Maxi- 
mum 
Panel A: Return on assets (%) All  
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel B: Tobin’s Q All  
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel C: Board size All  
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel D: Non-exec. Directors (%) All  
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel E: Frequency of Board meetings   
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel F: Director ownership (%) All 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel G: Leverage (%) All 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
8.75 
7.71 
8.72 
7.11 
9.20 
11.03 
1.49 
1.26 
1.24 
1.43 
1.68 
1.85 
9.69 
9.47 
9.44 
9.68 
9.84 
10.04 
57.24 
52.34 
55.78 
58.87 
59.62 
59.56 
5.29 
5.10 
5.14 
5.47 
5.33 
5.37 
19.54 
20.13 
19.92 
19.83 
19.57 
18.23 
15.71 
16.84 
15.90 
15.51 
15.07 
15.11 
12.39 
12.41 
11.46 
13.25 
13.05 
11.52 
.65 
.55 
.53 
.55 
.68 
.70 
4.33 
4.34 
4.26 
4.47 
4.48 
4.14 
17.97 
18.77 
20.80 
16.92 
15.95 
16.17 
2.16 
2.14 
2.15 
1.90 
2.74 
1.76 
24.47 
23.83 
24.06 
25.46 
24.97 
24.43 
12.45 
13.16 
12.85 
12.22 
12.04 
12.11 
-.67
** 
-.75
** 
-.72
** 
-.52
** 
-.76
** 
-.56
** 
.85
** 
1.37
*** 
1.26
*** 
.80
** 
.51
** 
.40
** 
1.05
** 
1.01
** 
.96
** 
1.17
*** 
1.35
*** 
.76
** 
-.68
** 
-.73
** 
-.75
** 
-.60
** 
-.35
** 
-.54
** 
3.49
*** 
2.56
*** 
1.69
*** 
1.22
*** 
5.96
*** 
.82
** 
1.23
*** 
1.21
*** 
1.18
*** 
1.27
*** 
1.22
*** 
1.36
*** 
.33
** 
.23
** 
.24
** 
.42
** 
.38
** 
.39
** 
 .43 
 .83 
1.07 
-.25 
.39 
.50 
-.01 
1.78 
1.45 
 .78 
-.67 
-.93 
2.31 
 2.16 
1.78 
3.10
* 
    3.95
** 
     .63 
    1.10 
 .90 
 .97 
 .26 
1.17 
1.30 
26.39
*** 
  7.89
*** 
  5.16
*** 
    1.46 
  46.00
*** 
  .71 
  .42 
 .62 
 .41 
 .47 
 .32 
 .66 
   -1.07 
-1.24 
-1.24 
 -.93 
 -.90 
 -.93 
-21.38 
-21.38 
-21.38 
-21.38 
-21.38 
-21.38 
.63 
.63 
.63 
.63 
.63 
.63 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
3.00 
4.00 
4.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
2.00 
.00 
2.00 
2.00 
2.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.02 
.02 
.02 
.02 
.02 
.02 
29.85 
29.85 
29.85 
29.85 
29.85 
29.85 
3.01 
3.01 
2.96 
3.01 
3.01 
3.01 
31.00 
28.00 
27.00 
30.00 
31.00 
24.00 
100.00 
84.62 
80.00 
84.62 
100.00 
100.00 
27.00 
15.00 
14.00 
12.00 
27.00 
10.00 
93.81 
91.22 
89.99 
93.81 
89.36 
89.60 
39.36 
39.36 
39.36 
39.36 
39.36 
39.36 
The skewness and kurtosis test statistics in columns 4 and 5, respectively, test for normal distribution. A test 
statistic with (***), (**), and (*) means that the null hypothesis that a variable is normally distributed is rejected 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. Return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio), and 
leverage (LEV) were winsorised at the 5% and 95% levels. The statistics reported for these variables refer to 
values after winsorisation. This explains why the minimum and maximum pooled and annual values for these 
variables are the same. The corporate governance variables, namely board size, the percentage of non-executive 
directors, the frequency of board meetings, and director ownership were not winsorised. 
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Continuation: Table 12 
Dependent/Independent Variables  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Skew-
ness 
Kurt- 
osis 
Mini- 
mum 
Maxi- 
mum 
Panel H: Institutional ownership (%) All  
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel I: Block ownership (%) All   
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel J: Firm size All  
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel K: Gearing (%) All  
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel L: Sales growth (%) All 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel M: Capital expenditure (%) All 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
71.02 
70.47 
69.53 
72.00 
71.03 
71.66 
59.91 
69.15 
61.25 
60.35 
59.97 
57.85 
5.93 
5.89 
5.88 
5.90 
5.94 
6.05 
37.83 
41.43 
37.62 
37.49 
35.28 
37.33 
11.33 
16.21 
4.36 
4.57 
12.09 
14.26 
5.70 
5.22 
5.36 
5.74 
6.03 
6.14 
25.98 
25.26 
26.81 
25.46 
26.37 
26.43 
20.85 
21.80 
21.73 
21.78 
19.91 
19.15 
1.07 
1.04 
1.07 
1.08 
1.08 
1.06 
32.96 
33.87 
33.44 
33.44 
31.84 
32.54 
20.72 
22.13 
22.26 
18.27 
20.64 
18.26 
4.18 
3.90 
4.06 
4.22 
4.28 
4.40 
-.40
** 
-.21
** 
-.59
** 
-.41
** 
-.53
** 
-.46
** 
-.42
** 
-.37
** 
-.48
** 
-.51
** 
-.47
** 
-.35
** 
-.11
** 
-.83
** 
-.11
** 
-.18
** 
-.11
** 
.56
** 
.54
** 
-.36
** 
.51
** 
.67
** 
.63
** 
.57
** 
.10
** 
.28
** 
.13
** 
.68
** 
.21
** 
.31
** 
.83
** 
.96
** 
1.00
** 
.84
** 
.71
** 
.68
** 
     .28 
     .28 
 4.89
*** 
10.25
*** 
9.39
*** 
8.84
*** 
   -.61 
   -.84 
   -.65 
   -.56 
   -.33 
   -.46 
   1.25 
   1.25 
   1.31 
 -1.36
 
  -1.25 
  -.93 
   -.94 
  -1.15 
   1.00 
.82 
    -.75 
.85 
    -.03
 
    -.36
 
-.14
 
.68 
.03
 
.79 
    -.27 
.32 
.41 
-.26 
-.40 
-.70 
.28 
.28 
4.89 
10.32 
9.02 
8.84 
6.72 
11.27 
10.30 
6.72 
11.51 
11.64 
4.12 
4.12 
4.12 
4.12 
4.12 
4.12 
.02 
.02 
.02 
.02 
.02 
.02 
-30.35 
-30.35 
-30.35 
-30.35 
-30.35 
-30.35 
.47 
.47 
.47 
.47 
.47 
.47 
99.61 
99.57 
99.61 
98.30 
98.35 
99.00 
99.69 
99.69 
97.34 
97.84 
95.72 
92.64 
7.55 
7.55 
7.55 
7.55 
7.55 
7.55 
99.31 
99.31 
99.31 
99.31 
99.31 
99.31 
54.19 
54.19 
54.19 
54.19 
54.19 
54.19 
15.08 
15.08 
15.08 
15.08 
15.08 
 15.08 
The skewness and kurtosis test statistics in columns 4 and 5, respectively, test for normal distribution. A test 
statistic with (***), and (**) means that the null hypothesis that a variable is normally distributed is rejected at 
the 1%, and 5%, significance level, respectively. Firm size (LNTA), gearing (GEAR), sales growth (SGROWTH), 
and capital expenditure (CAPEX) were winsorised at the 5% and 95% levels. The statistics reported for these 
variables refer to values after winsorisation. This explains why the minimum and maximum pooled and annual 
values are identical for these variables. The corporate governance variables, namely institutional ownership and 
block ownership were not winsorised. 
 
 
Across the years, Panels A and B show that accounting and market performance of the 
sampled firms were highest in 2006 with an average ROA  and Q-ratio of 11% and 1.85, 
respectively. By contrast, ROA was least in 2004 with a mean of 7%, while the Q-ratio was 
least in 2004 with an average of 1.24. This indicates that the South African economy might  
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have performed poorly in 2003 and 2004, but the market strongly recovered in 2006. This may 
be due to the significant depreciation of the South African Rand as a result of poor gold and 
diamond prices on the international markets over the 2003-2004 period (e.g., Armstrong, 2003; 
Malherbe and Segal, 2003). Overall, the averages of the ROA and Q-ratio are consistent with 
those reported by prior South African studies. Klapper and Love (2004) report an average 
ROA  and  Q-ratio  of  9%  and  1.90, respectively,  for  a  cross-country  sample of  374  firms, 
including South Africa in 1999. Ho and Williams (2003) also report an average ROA value of 
13% for a sample of 84 South African firms in 1998. 
 
7.1.3 Descriptive Statistics of the Independent/Alternative Governance Mechanisms 
 
  The independent/alternative corporate governance mechanisms are presented in Panels 
C to I of Table 12.  Panel C indicates that board size ranges from a minimum of 3 and a 
maximum of 31 with an average size of 9.69 for a South African listed firm. This is within the 
average board size recommended (i.e., between 8 and 10) by Lipton and Lorsch (1992), for 
greater  board  efficiency  and  effectiveness.  The  respective  five  annual  means  were  stable, 
ranging between 9.44 and 10.04 in 2003 and 2006, respectively. The overall range is within 
the  provisions  of  the  South  African  Companies  Act  1973.  It  recommends  that  a  public 
company must have a minimum board size of two, but does not specify a maximum size. 
It is also consistent with the results of previous South African studies. Opinion-based 
survey conducted by the Deutsche Bank in 2002 suggests that the number of members on 
South  African  corporate  boards  ranges  from  5  to  30  with  an  average  board  size  of  12. 
Similarly, Ho and Williams (2003) find an average board size of 13.02 for a sample of 84 
South African firms in 1998. Finally, using a sample of 117 South African listed firms in 2003, 
Swartz and Firer (2005) report that the average South African board consist of 10.30 members.  
  Panel D of Table 12 reports the composition of South African boards. It shows that 
South African corporate boards are dominated by non-executive directors (NEDs) with a mean 
percentage of NEDs of 57% for the pooled sample. Consistent with observations regarding the 
other corporate governance mechanisms, the mean percentage of NEDs increased from 52% in 
2002 to  60%  in  2006. This  suggests that  the King  Reports  have  helped  in  making  South 
African corporate boards more independent. They are also in line with the evidence of prior 
South African studies. Ho and Williams (2003) find an average percentage of NEDs of 52%, 
whereas Mangena and Chamisa (2008) report a mean of 57% and 41% for a sample of control 
and suspended South African listed firms, respectively.   
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Similarly, Panel E of Table 12 presents the frequency of board meetings in a year. It 
indicates that the average annual number of board meetings increased from 5.10 in 2002 to 
5.37 in 2006. Overall, the frequency of board meetings ranges from a minimum of zero to a 
maximum of 27
79 with the average South African listed firm meeting more than 5 times in a 
year. This is higher than the minimum of 4 annual meetings recommended by King II. It is 
also in line with the results of previous studies. As has been discussed in chaper six, 78% of 
the  sampled  firms  complied  with  the  recommendation  of  having  a  minimum  of  4  annual 
meetings. Using a sample of 307 US listed firms between 1990 to 1994, Vefeas (1999a) find 
that  the  average  US  board  holds  7.45  annual  meetings.  Similarly,  for  a  sample  of  157 
Zimbabwean  listed  firms,  Mangena  and  Tauringana  (2006) report  that  the  average  annual 
number of board meetings is 3.30. Finally, El Mehdi (2007) finds that the average annual 
number of board meetings for 24 Tunisian listed firms is 3.98. 
  Panel  F  of  Table  12  reports  director  shareownership.  It  shows  that  director 
shareownership ranges from 0% to 94% with an average of 20%. This is consistent with the 
findings of previous South African studies, but substantially higher than those reported for 
some developed markets. Mangena and Chamisa (2008) report a mean of 20% and 23% for a 
sample  of  control  and  suspended  South  African  listed  firms,  respectively.  By  contrast, 
Yermack  (1996)  and  Weir  et  al.  (2000)  report  an  average  of  9%  and  3%  of  director 
shareownership in a sample of US and UK listed firms, respectively. Panel H of Table 12 
contains  institutional  shareholding.  It  indicates  that  institutional  shareholding  ranges  from 
0.28%  to  99%  with  an  average  of  71%.  This  is  remarkably  high  and  is  quite  similar  to 
institutional shareholdings in some developed markets. For example, Henry (2008) reports that 
UK institutional ownership ranges from 60% to 75%. A study by Barr et al. (1995), however, 
suggests that most of the South African institutional shareholdings are in the form of complex 
cross-holdings and pyramidical structures. 
Finally, Panel I of Table 12 reports block shareholding. The Panel suggests that block 
shareholding also ranges from 7% to 99% with a mean of 60%. This indicates that the average 
South African listed firm has a concentrated ownership structure. It is also substantially higher 
when  compared  with  the  levels  of  ownership  concentration  in  some  mature  markets,  but 
consistent with the results of previous South African studies. Mangena and Chamisa (2008) 
                                                 
79Examination of the data shows that there are substantial variations in the distribution of the number of board 
meetings among the sampled firms. Specifically, in 169(31.71%), 78(14.63%), 73(13.70%), and 33(6.19%) of the 
500 firm year observations, the number of board meetings in a year was 4, 6, 5, and 7 times, respectively. 
Similarly, in 11(2.06%) firm year observations, the annual number of meetings held was 3, 8, and 9 times each.   
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report an average block ownership of 61% and 50% for a sample of control and suspended 
South African listed firms, respectively. By contrast, Yermack (1996) and Shabbir and Padget 
(2005) report an average block ownership of 24% and 29% for a sample of US and UK listed 
firms, respectively. The incidence of block ownership, however, decreased from an average of 
60% in 2002 to 58% in 2006. This may be explained by the introduction of more rigorous 
Listings Rules by the JSE aimed at discouraging the listing of concentrated ownerships and 
pyramidical structures (e.g., Malherbe and Segal, 2003; Armstrong et al., 2006). 
 
7.1.4 Descriptive Statistics of the Control/Exogenous Variables 
 
  Panels  J  to  M  of  Table  12  contain  summary  descriptive  statistics  for  the 
control/exogenous variables. First, Panel J shows that the mean firm size as proxied by a 
natural  logarithm  of  a  firm’s  total  assets  increased  from  5.89(R6.14bn)  in  2002  to 
6.05(R6.31bn)  in  2006.  Overall,  firm  size  after  winsorising  ranges  from 4.12(R0.13bn)  to 
7.55(R35.77bn) with a mean of 5.93(R6.18bn). Panel K suggests that the average gearing ratio 
after winsorising ranges from 35% in 2005 to 41% in 2002 with an overall mean for the entire 
sample period of 37%. This indicates that the average sampled firm is moderately geared. This 
is also consistent with the reported results of prior research. Mangena and Chamisa (2008) 
report an average gearing ratio of 86% and 47% for a sample of suspended and control South 
African listed firms, respectively.  
Consistent with the ROA and Q-ratio, Panel L indicates that the average sales growth 
after winsorising was least in 2004 at 4%, but highest in 2006 at 14%. Overall, the average 
sampled firm’s sales grew by 11%. Finally, Panel M suggests that the average investments in 
assets  for  innovation  and  growth  as  represented  by  capital  expenditure  after  winsorising 
consistently increased from about 5% in 2002 to 6% in 2006. The average firm invested 6% in 
assets over the entire sample period. Compared with the financial performance and corporate 
governance variables, the control variables have relatively larger standard deviations, which 
also imply that the sample has been adequately selected to achieve sufficient variation. 
  The  next  section  will  test  the  OLS  assumptions,  as  well  as  present  the  results  of 
bivariate correlation analyses. 
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7.2 TESTS OF OLS ASSUMPTIONS AND BIVARIATE CORRELATION ANALYSES  
       
As  has  been  explained  in  chapters  five  and  six,  Ordinary  Least  Squares  (OLS) 
multivariate regression technique is used to test all the hypotheses that have been discussed in 
chapters four and five. As a result, OLS assumptions of multicollinearlity, autocorrelation, 
normality, homoscedasticity, and linearity are tested. First, the multicollinearity assumption is 
tested by conducting a correlation matrix among the variables. Table 13 contains a correlation 
matrix for the financial performance and all the continuous corporate governance variables. As 
has been discussed above, the skewness and kurtosis statistics reported in Table 12 suggested 
that the variables generally suffer from mild non-normal behaviour. As a result, Table 13 
reports  both  Pearson’s  parametric  and  Spearman’s  non-parametric  correlation  coefficients. 
The bottom left half of the table presents Pearson parametric correlation coefficients, whilst 
the upper right half of the table contains Spearman’s non-parametric alternative.   
Table  13  shows  that  the  coefficients  of  both  the  parametric  and  non-parametric 
bivariate correlations are very similar. The similar nature of the parametric and non-parametric 
correlation coefficients seems to suggest that any remaining non-normalities in the variables 
may be mild, and are also similar to those reported by prior studies (Cheung and Wei, 2006, 
p.913; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, pp. 1048, 1050-1051; Francoeur et al., 2008, p.88). As has 
been discussed in chapter six, this appears to indicate that it may be statistically tolerable to 
use OLS technique to estimate the specified structural equations. Apart from the SACGI and 
its sub-indices, both matrices suggest that correlations among the variables are relatively low, 
indicating that no serious multicollinearity
80 problems remain.  
Additionally,  tolerance  statistics,  variance  inflation  factor  (VIF),  eigenvalues, 
condition indices, and variance proportions, which test for multicollinearity are computed (for 
purposes  of  brevity  is  not  reported  here)  for  both  the  compliance-index  and  equilibrium-
variable models based on both the accounting (ROA) and market (Q-ratio) based measures of 
financial performance after winsorisation.  
According to Gujarati (2003, p.351-353), tolerance statistic close to one means that 
there is little multicollinearity, whereas a value close to zero suggests that multicolliearity may 
                                                 
80There were high significant initial correlations between the SACGI and board size (.667), the SACGI and firm 
size (.762), and between board size and firm size (.761). This was resolved by running board size (BSIZE) on the 
SACGI, firm size and the remaining seven seven variables. The regression residuals (R_BSIZE) were saved and 
used as a proxy for board size (BSIZE). RW refers to regression residuals based on the winsorised financial 
performance and control variables. This procedure was repeated to obtain RW_LNTA, a proxy for firm size. This 
also resulted in high correlations between BSIZE and RW_BSIZE (.612), and LNTA and RW_LNTA (.508), but 
low  correlations  between  RW_BSIZE  and  RW_LNTA  (-.442),  RW_LNTA  and  the  SACGI  (.000),  and 
RW_BSIZE and the SACGI (.000).  
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be  a  threat.  Also,  a  VIF  statistic  below  the  value  of  ten  implies  non-existence  of  severe 
multicollinearity problems (Gujarati, 2003, p.351-353). With the exception of the ownership 
variables
81 of  the  equilibrium-variable  model,  tolerance  statistics  (for  brevity  reasons  not 
shown here) for all the variables are close to the critical value of one, whilst none of the VIF 
statistics is above the critical value of ten.  
Brooks  (2003,  p.404),  suggests  that  eigenvalues  above  the  critical  value  of  zero 
indicates that multicollineratiy may not be a problem, whereas Gujarati (2003, p.351-353) 
indicates that condition indices below the critical value of thirty imply that multicollinearity 
may  not  be  a  serious  concern.  Similarly,  apart  from  the  ownership  variables  of  the 
equilibrium-variable model, all the eigenvalues (for the sake of brevity not shown here) are 
above the critical value of zero, while none of the condition indices is above the critical value 
of  thirty.  Similar  to  the  suggestions  of  the  parametric  and  non-parametric  correlation 
coefficients in Table 13, the correlation of variance proportions (for purposes of brevity not 
reported here) generally indicates low levels of correlation among the variables. Overall, the 
collinearity  statistics  (including  the  parametric  and  non-parametric  correlation  matrices, 
condition indices, eigenvalues, tolerance statistics, variance proportions and VIF) suggest that 
the levels of multicollinearity in the variables appear to be statistically tolerable. 
By contrast, Table 13 shows that there are high correlations between the SACGI, the 
Social-SACGI, the Economic-SACGI, and the predicted instrument to be used as a proxy for 
the SACGI (P-SACGI) in conducting the endogeneity test (instrumental variable estimation) in 
chapter  nine.  As  expected,  and  has  also  been  noted  already  above,  there  are  high,  but 
statistically  tolerable  correlations  among  the  three  director  ownership  variables,  namely 
director  ownership,  director  ownership  squared,  and  director  ownership  cubed.  The  high 
correlation  between  the  SACGI  and  the  P-SACGI  (i.e.,  .864  and  .868  for  Pearson  and 
Spearman coefficients, respectively) appears to suggest that it may be a relevant instrument for 
the SACGI.  
   
                                                 
81This is less surprising because the ownership variables, especially director ownership
2 and director ownership
3 
are  squared  and  cubed  versions  of  the  director  ownership  variable,  respectively,  which  affects  their  normal 
distribution properties. As expected, there are also high correlations (see Table 13) among the three director 
ownership  variables.  Further,  rank  and natural log transformations of these  variables  did  not  produce  better 
distributions and estimations than those based on the actual levels of the variables. They are included because 
excluding them did not result in significant changes in the regression results.   
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Table 13: Correlation Matrix of Financial Performance and All Continuous Corporate Governance Variables for All (500) Firm Years 
  ROA  Q-ratio  SACGI  S-
SACGI 
E-
SACGI 
P-
SACGI 
BSIZE  NEDs  FBMs  DTORN  INST- 
HDNG 
BLK- 
HDNG 
DTORN
2  DTORN
3 
ROA 
 
Q-ratio 
 
SACGI 
 
S-
SACGI 
 
E-
SACGI 
 
P-
SACGI 
 
BSIZE 
 
NEDs 
 
FBMs 
 
DTORN 
 
INST- 
SHDNG 
 
BLK- 
SHDNG 
 
DTORN
2 
 
DTORN
3 
 
 
 .283
*** 
 
 .322
*** 
 
 
 .325
*** 
 
 
 .302
*** 
 
 
 .276
*** 
 
-.040
* 
 
 .013
* 
 
-.034
* 
 
-.079
* 
 
 
 .116
*** 
 
 
-.052
* 
 
-.060
* 
 
-.051
* 
 .391
*** 
 
 
 
 .320
*** 
 
 
 .323
*** 
 
 
 .299
*** 
 
 
 .326
*** 
 
 .131
*** 
 
 .179
*** 
 
 .107
** 
 
-.203
*** 
 
 
 .162
*** 
 
 
-.073
* 
 
-.166
*** 
 
-.147
*** 
 .276
*** 
 
 .372
*** 
 
 
 
 
 .836
*** 
 
 
 .987
*** 
 
 
 .864
*** 
 
 .000 
 
 .398
*** 
 
 .167
*** 
 
-.533
*** 
 
 
 .314
*** 
 
 
-.287
*** 
 
-.455
*** 
 
-.391
*** 
 .295
*** 
 
 .387
*** 
 
 .806
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 .736
*** 
 
 
 .757
*** 
 
 .051
* 
 
 .323
*** 
 
 .162
*** 
 
-.469
*** 
 
 
 .354
*** 
 
 
-.184
*** 
 
-.403
*** 
 
-.345
*** 
 .261
*** 
 
 .346
*** 
 
 .988
*** 
 
 
 .711
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 .841
*** 
 
-.015
* 
 
 .395
*** 
 
 .153
*** 
 
-.519
*** 
 
 
 .283
*** 
 
 
-.300
*** 
 
-.442
*** 
 
-.381
*** 
 .235
*** 
 
 .384
*** 
 
 .868
*** 
 
 
 .772
*** 
 
 
 .844
*** 
 
 
 
 
 .094
** 
 
 .363
*** 
 
 .145
*** 
 
-.497
*** 
 
 
 .364
*** 
 
 
-.331
*** 
 
-.414
*** 
 
 .353
*** 
-.060
* 
 
 .145
*** 
 
-.042
* 
 
 
 .018
* 
 
 
-.057
* 
 
 
 .005
 
 
 
 
-.150
*** 
 
  .060
* 
 
  .067
* 
 
 
  .154
*** 
 
 
  .176
*** 
 
  .079
* 
 
  .087
* 
-.032
* 
 
 .196
*** 
 
 .378
*** 
 
 
 .276
*** 
 
 
 .375
*** 
 
 
 .336
*** 
 
-.142
*** 
 
 
 
 .152
*** 
 
-.338
*** 
 
 
 .154
*** 
 
 
-.110
** 
 
-.267
*** 
 
-.222
*** 
-.001 
 
 .140
*** 
 
 .276
*** 
 
 
 .241
*** 
 
 
 .259
*** 
 
 
 .251
*** 
 
 .117
*** 
 
 .183
*** 
 
 
 
-.076
* 
 
 
 .024
* 
 
 
-.063
* 
 
 .025
* 
 
 .004 
-.133
*** 
 
-.276
*** 
 
-.527
*** 
 
 
-.457
*** 
 
 
-.516
*** 
 
 
-.504
*** 
 
 .111
*** 
 
-.430
*** 
 
-.218
*** 
 
 
 
 
-.294
*** 
 
 
 .262
*** 
 
 .812
*** 
 
 .798
*** 
 .158
*** 
 
 .225
*** 
 
 .347
*** 
 
 
 .355
*** 
 
 
 .323
*** 
 
 
 .410
*** 
 
 .104
** 
 
 .175
*** 
 
 .006 
 
-.311
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 .299
*** 
 
-.241
*** 
 
-.191
*** 
-.027
* 
 
-.092
** 
 
-.285
*** 
 
 
-.185
*** 
 
 
-.301
*** 
 
 
-.342
*** 
 
 .171
*** 
 
-.126
*** 
 
-.048
* 
 
 .132
*** 
 
 
 .237
*** 
 
 
 
 
  .306
*** 
 
  .314
*** 
-.133
*** 
 
-.272
*** 
 
-.524
*** 
 
 
-.453
*** 
 
 
-.513
*** 
 
 
-.503
*** 
 
 .113
*** 
 
-.430
*** 
 
-.218
*** 
 
  .832
*** 
 
 
 -.314
*** 
 
 
  .127
*** 
 
 
 
 .839
*** 
-.121
*** 
 
 -.181
*** 
 
-.438
*** 
 
 
-.360
*** 
 
 
-.425
*** 
 
 
-.503
*** 
 
 .104
** 
 
-.379
*** 
 
-.167
*** 
 
 .819
*** 
 
 
-.314
*** 
 
 
  .127
*** 
 
 .845
*** 
Notes: the bottom left half of the table presents Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients, whilst the upper right half of the table presents Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients. 
 
***, ** and
  * denote correlation is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Variables are defined as follows: return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio), the South African 
Corporate Governance Index (the SACGI), the Social-SACGI (S-SACGI), the Economic-SACGI (E-SACGI), the Predicted-SACGI (P-SACGI), board size (BSIZE), the percentage of non-executive 
directors (NEDs), the frequency of board meetings (FBMs), director shareownership (DTORN), institutional shareownership (INSTSHDNG), block shareownership (BLKSHDNG), director 
shareownership squared (DTORN
2) and director shareownership cubed (DTORN
3).  
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The high correlation between the SACGI and the Social-SACGI (i.e., .836 and .806 for 
Pearson and Spearman coefficients, respectively) indicates that, on average, firms with higher 
corporate governance scores also tend to comply better with the South African context specific 
affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions.  
In  fact,  and  as  has  been  discussed  in  section  6.5  of  chapter  six,  the  average  firm 
complied  better  with  the  Social-SACGI  (67%)  than  the  SACGI  (60%).  As  has  also  been 
explained  in  section  6.5  of  chapter  six,  this  implies  that  any  financial  performance 
consequences of complying with the Social-SACGI can be expected to be similar in direction 
to  that  of  the  SACGI.  However,  if  firms  with  better  corporate  governance  standards  (as 
measured by compliance with the provisions of King II) tend to be associated with higher 
financial returns,  then  it  can  be  argued  that the  magnitude of  complying with  the  Social-
SACGI (67%) will be expected to be higher than that of the SACGI (60%) for the sampled 
firms. Also, the SACGI and the Economic-SACGI are highly (i.e., .987 and .988 for Pearson 
and Spearman coefficients, respectively) correlated. This is expected because the SACGI is 
dominated  by  the  Economic-SACGI.  Specifically,  82%  (41  out  of  50)  of  the  corporate 
governance provisions that also form part of the SACGI constitute the Economic-SACGI. 
As expected, director (DTON) and block (BLKSHDNG) ownerships are negatively 
correlated with the SACGI. This indicates that firms with higher director/block ownership tend 
to have poorer internal corporate governance structures. This is in line with both the theory 
and evidence that due to the associated increased monitoring, block ownership can serve as an 
alternative  to  or  a  substitute  for  better  internal  corporate  governance  (e.g.,  Andres,  2008; 
Young et al., 2008). 
In contrast, institutional shareholding (INSTHDNG) is positively associated with the 
SACGI.  This  suggests  that  institutional  shareholders  can  complement,  as  well  as  impact 
positively  on  a  firm’s  internal  corporate  governance  structures,  including  board  size  and 
percentage  of  non-executive  directors.  This  is  because  they  possess  superior  financial 
resources,  specialised  knowledge, information  collection  and  analyses  advantages  over  the 
average individual investor (Young et al., 2008, p.1108). 
As hypothesised, the SACGI is positively related to both the accounting (ROA) and 
market (Q-ratio) based measures of financial performance. This means that firms with higher 
quality internal corporate governance structures are valued higher (Q-ratio) and/or performed 
better (ROA). This is consistent with prior South African evidence. Specifically, using cross-
country samples of listed firms that include South Africa, Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev  
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and  Kim  (2005),  and  Morey  et  al.  (2009)  report  a  statistically  significant  and  positive 
coefficient  of  .020,  .060,  and  .470  between  the  Q-ratio  and  their  composite  corporate 
governance index, respectively. Similarly, using a cross-country sample of listed firms that 
include South Africa, Klapper and Love (2004) find a statistically significant and positive 
coefficient of .10 between ROA and their composite corporate governance index. 
Apart from the correlation analyses, examination of scatter plots, Cook’s distances, 
Durbin-Watson,  leverage  values,  studentised  residuals,  normal  histogram,  probability-
probability (P-P) and quantile-quantile (Q-Q) plots of residuals (for reasons of brevity are not 
presented  here),  skewness  and  kurtosis  tests  are  conducted  to  test  for  homoscedasticity, 
autocorrelation, normality and linearity assumptions. 
First, scatter plots, studentised residuals, leverage values, and Cook’s  distances are 
computed  to  test  for  the  existence  of  outliers  that  can  cause  hetereoscedasticity  and  non-
linearity in the variables after winsorising. The constructed scatter plots for ROA, Q-ratio and 
the SACGI (for brevity purposes not reported here) indicate that outliers are no longer present 
with the distributions looking fairly random and linear.  
Studentised  residuals  (stud.  residuals),  leverage  values,  and  Cook’s  distances  after 
winsorising for both the compliance-index and equilibrium-variable models based on both the 
ROA and Q-ratio are computed (for brevity reasons not reported here). Cook’s distance and 
leverage  value  greater  than  the  absolute  value  of  one  indicates  the  presence  of  outliers, 
whereas studentised residual greater than the absolute value of three suggests the presence of 
outliers (Maddala, 2005, pp.470-474). None of the Cook’s distances and Leverage values is 
greater than one. Specifically, the Cook’s distances for the four models range from a minimum 
of .000 to a maximum of .080 with a highest mean of .003. Similarly, the leverage values 
range from a minimum of .017 to a maximum of .540 with a highest mean of .058. Studentised 
residuals for the four models range from a minimum of -3.084 to a maximum of 3.826 with a 
highest mean of .006. The minimum (-3.084) and maximum (3.826) values are above the 
critical value of three, which imply a limited number of outliers still exist. On average (.006), 
however, the residual statistics suggest the non-existence of severe outliers.  
Second, Durbin-Watson test statistic tests for the presence of autocorrelation in the 
residuals from a regression. According to Brooks (2003 p.163) and Gujarati (2003, p.467-469), 
Durbin-Watson value of two and above suggests that successive residual terms are, on average, 
much different in value to one another. Computed Durbin-Watson test statistics are reported in 
Tables 9, 14, 16 to 26, and 29. They generally indicate that the Durbin-Watson statistics are  
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either  close  to  or  above  one.  This  indicates  the  presence  of  moderate  rather  than  severe 
positive autocorrelation problems. 
  Finally, skewness and kurtosis test statistics (see Table 12), normal histogram (not 
shown here for purposes of brevity), and proability-probability (P-P) (for brevity reasons not 
reported  here)  plots  of  regression  residuals  are  conducted  to  test  for  normality.  Table  12 
reports computed skewness and kurtosis statistics for all the variables except the SACGI and 
the Social-SACGI. Tables 5 and 10 in chapter six reported the skewness and kurtosis statistics 
for the SACGI and the Social-SACGI, respectively. Generally, the skewness statistics reject the 
null hypothesis that the variables are symmetrically distributed at least at the 10% significance 
level.  However,  as  has  already  been  explained,  the  rejections  are  generally  mild  (in 
comparison with a normal distribution), and are also very similar to the reported results of past 
studies that have carried similar OLS estimations (Cheung and Wei, 2006, p.913; Haniffa and 
Hudaib,  2006,  pp.  1048,  1050-1051;  Francoeur  et  al.,  2008,  p.88).  This  implies  that  any 
remaining non-normalities may be statistically tolerable. 
By contrast, the kurtosis statistics generally do not reject the null hypothesis that the 
variables  are  mesokurtically  distributed.  This  indicates  the  non-existence  of  severe  non-
normalities in the variables. A normal histogram plot (for brevity purposes not presented here) 
of  regression  residuals  after  winsorising  for  both  the  compliance-index  and  equilibrium-
variable models based on both the ROA and Q-ratio were conducted. Similarly, a normal P-P 
plot (not reported for reasons of brevity) of regression residuals after winsorising for both the 
compliance-index and equilibrium-variable models based on both the ROA and Q-ratio were 
conducted.  
In line with the suggestions of the standard errors contained in Tables 9, 14, 16 to 26, 
and 29, they show that the regression residuals are less non-normally distributed. Further, a 
normal  histogram,  P-P,  and  Q-Q  plots  (for  purposes  of  brevity  not  reported  here)  after 
winsorising  for  the  ROA,  the  Q-ratio  and  the  SACGI  were  constructed.  Similar  to  the 
distribution  of  the bivariate  scatter  plots,  they  indicate that  the  ROA,  the  Q-ratio  and  the 
SACGI are less non-normally distributed. Overall, the analyses suggest that any remaining 
multicollinearities, hetereoscedasticities, non-normalities, and non-linearities in the variables 
are not so severe to cause serious violations of the OLS assumptions. This implies that it will 
be statistically appropriate to conduct multivariate OLS regression analyses.  
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7.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter has focused on describing the data and testing the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) assumptions. It attempted to achieve three main objectives. Firstly, it sought to clearly 
explain how outliers in the financial performance and control variables were treated. Secondly, 
it sought to provide a detailed description of the data using a battery of descriptive statistics. In 
this  regard,  a  detailed  description  of  the  dependent  (financial  performance)  and  the  other 
independent (corporate governance) variables were presented. The third and final objective of 
the  chapter  has  been  to  test  the  OLS  assumptions  of  multicollinearity,  autocorrelation, 
normality,  homoscedasticity  and  linearity.  In  this  regard,  correlation  matrices,  scatter  and 
normal histogram plots, Cook’s distance, condition indices, residual, and tolerance statistics 
were reported. Together, they indicated generally that there were no serious violations of the 
OLS assumptions, and thus statistically appropriate to carry out OLS regressions. 
The  next  chapter  will,  therefore,  report  the  main  estimated  OLS  empirical  results. 
Specifically, it will discuss the estimated OLS multivariate regression results based on both 
the compliance-index and equilibrium-variable models.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
8. INTRODUCTION 
  
This chapter discusses the empirical results.  It seeks to achieve four main objectives. 
First, it investigates whether better-governed firms based on the equilibrium-variable model 
will be associated with higher financial performance, as measured by return on assets (ROA) 
and  Tobin’s  Q  (Q-ratio).  In  this  regard,  estimated  OLS  regression  results  based  on  the 
equilibrium-variable  model  will  be  reported  and  discussed.  Second,  it  examines  whether 
better-governed firms based on the compliance-index model will be associated with higher 
financial performance, as proxied by return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio). In this 
respect,  estimated  OLS  regression  results  based  on  the  compliance-index  model  will  be 
presented and analysed. Third, it investigates the economic consequences of complying with 
the South African context specific affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance 
provisions for listed firms. In this vein, estimated OLS regression results based on the Social-
SACGI will be reported and discussed. Finally, the chapter compares the empirical properties 
and explanatory powers of the compliance-index (the economic-SACGI) and the equilibrium-
variable models using summary descriptive statistics and diagnostics.  
The  rest of  the  chapter  is  organised  as  follows.  Section  8.1  presents  the  empirical 
results. Specifically, subsection 8.1.1 discusses the findings from the multivariate regression 
analyses based on the equilibrium-variable model to test hypotheses one to seven. Subsection 
8.1.2 reports the regression results based on the compliance-index model to test hypothesis 
eight. To ascertain the financial effects of complying with the South African context specific 
affirmative  action  and  stakeholder  corporate  governance  provisions  on  the  sampled  firms, 
subsection 8.1.3 report the estimated regression results based on both the Social-SACGI and 
Economic-SACGI. Section 8.2 compares the regression results of the compliance-index (the 
Economic-SACGI) and equilibrium-variable models, while section 8.3 summarises the chapter.  
 
 
8.1 EMPIRICAL RESULTS: MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSES 
 
  This section presents the main regression results. Specifically, subsection 8.1.1 will 
report the regression results for the equilibrium-variable model to test hypotheses one to seven.  
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Subsection 8.1.2 will discuss the regression results for the compliance-index model to test 
hypothesis  eight,  whereas  subsection  8.1.3  will  do  similarly  for  the  results  of  the  Social-
SACGI and Economic-SACGI. Further, for each model, the results based on the accounting 
based  measure  of  financial  performance  (ROA)  will  be  presented  first,  followed  by  those 
based on the market based measure of financial performance (Q-ratio). 
   
8.1.1 Empirical Results: The Equilibrium-Variable Model 
 
8.1.1.1 Results Based on the Accounting Measure of Financial Performance (ROA) 
 
  Table 14 contains OLS regression results for the equilibrium-variable model based on 
the accounting based measure of financial performance (ROA). To facilitate comparison and 
easy  following,  Table  15  presents  a  summary  of  all  seven  hypotheses  and  results  for  the 
equilibrium-variable model based on all firm years for both the ROA and the Q-ratio. As a 
result, Table 15 will also be referred to in subsection 8.1.1.2. The variables of focus in this 
model are the first 11 corporate governance variables. Column 3 of Table 14 first presents the 
results of multivariate regression of ROA on the 11 corporate governance variables alone, 
whereas  columns  4  to  9  report  the  results  of  multivariate  regression  of  ROA  on  the  11 
corporate governance variables and the control variables for the combined sample, as well as 
for each of the five firm-years, respectively.  
Column 3 of Table 14 suggests that the F-value is statistically significant at the 1% 
significance  level.  Therefore,  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  coefficients  of  the  11  corporate 
governance variables are jointly equal to zero can be rejected. It suggests that the coefficients 
on  the  11  corporate  governance  variables  can  jointly  explain  significant  variations  in  the 
sampled firms’ accounting returns. The adjusted R
2 is approximately 6%. This means that at 
least 6% of the variations in the sampled firms’ accounting returns (ROA) can be explained 
jointly by the 11 corporate governance variables.  
The coefficients on the percentage of non-executive directors (NEDs), board diversity, 
director ownership, director ownership
 squared, and director ownership cubed are statistically 
significant,  whereas  the  coefficients  on  board  size,  CEO  duality,  the  frequency  of  board 
meetings, the existence of audit, nomination, and remuneration committees are not statistically 
significant. The positive coefficients on director ownership
 squared (which will be explained 
further  below),  board  diversity,  the  existence  of  audit,  nomination,  and  remuneration 
committees,  in  addition  to  the  negative  coefficient  on  director  ownership  cubed,  are  also 
theoretically expected (see column 3 of Table 15). By contrast, the negative coefficients on  
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board size, the percentage of NEDs, and the frequency of board meetings in addition to the 
positive  coefficient  on  CEO  duality  are  inconsistent  with  hypothesised  relationship  (see 
column 3 of Table 15). 
Therefore, to test whether the observed theoretically unexpected relationships could be 
spuriously  caused  by  some  omitted  variables,  the  control  variables  are  included  in  the 
regressions  in  Columns  4  to  9  of  Table  14.  It  suggests  that  the  F-value  is  statistically 
significant for the pooled sample, and in year 2006, but insignificant in the remaining four 
years.  The  adjusted  R
2  for  each  of  the  five  years  is  between  1%-10%,  and  12%  for  the 
combined sample. This compares, for example, with the adjusted R
2 of 23% of Weir and Laing 
(2000, p.274), and 27% of Haniffa and Hudaib (2006, p.1055) for their pooled regressions of 
ROA on a number of corporate governance and control variables.  
With  reference  to  the  11  corporate  governance  variables,  the  signs  of  all  the 
coefficients remain unchanged for the complete sample. However, the coefficients on board 
diversity, director ownership, director ownership squared, and director ownership cubed that 
were  statistically  significant,  are  now  insignificant.  In  contrast,  the  coefficients  on  CEO 
duality and the existence of a nomination committee, which were statistically insignificant, are 
now significant. These sensitivities may be due to omitted variables bias resulting from the 
exclusion of the control variables. Therefore, the estimated coefficients that include the control 
variables are discussed further. 
To start with, the coefficient on the first corporate governance variable, board size, is 
negative, but not significant over the entire sample period. This rejects hypothesis two (see 
column 6 of Table 15) that there is a statistically significant and positive relationship between 
board size and ROA. In contrast, it supports the results of prior South African studies (Ho and 
Williams, 2003; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008), as well as other international evidence (e.g., 
Eisenberg et al., 1998; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Shabbir and Padget, 2005; Guest, 2009). For 
instance, Ho and Williams (2003) report a statistically insignificant and negative relationship 
between board size and the value added by a firm’s physical and intellectual resources, using a 
sample of 84 South African firms. 
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Table 14: OLS Regression Results of the Equilibrium-Variable Model Based on Return on Assets (ROA –Accounting Measure) 
  Exp. sign  All firm years  All firm years  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Adjusted R
2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
No. of observations 
      .063 
    .116 
    .904 
 3.522(.000)
*** 
    500 
    .115 
    .114 
    .925 
3.125(.000)
*** 
  500 
  -.086 
   .115 
 2.010 
   .747(.763) 
   100 
  .007 
  .115 
1.794 
1.028(.419) 
   100 
  .021 
  .127 
2.114 
1.144(.331) 
   100 
  .042 
  .126 
1.980 
1.180(.298) 
   100 
  .102 
  .110 
1.918 
1.615(.097)
* 
   100 
Constant 
Board size 
CEO duality 
Non-executiv. dtors. 
Dtor. ownership 
Dtor. ownership
2 
Dtor. ownership
3 
Board diversity 
Board meetings 
Audit committee 
Nomination com. 
Remuneration com. 
Firm size  
Capital structure  
Sales growth  
Capital expenditure  
Dual-listing  
Audit firm size 
Basic materials  
Consumer services  
Industrials  
Technology  
Year 2002 
Year 2004 
Year 2005 
Year 2006 
 
+ 
- 
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
+ 
-/+ 
+ 
- 
  .048(.383)
 
 -.003(.138)
 
  .023(.159) 
 -.001(.016)
** 
 -.003(.044)
** 
  .000(.060)
* 
 -.000(.093)
* 
  .036(.004)
*** 
 -.002(.418) 
  .038(.680) 
  .021(.122) 
  .051(.539) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .046(.435)
 
-.002(.311)
 
 .029(.037)
** 
-.002(.032)
** 
-.003(.131)
 
 .000(.104)
 
-.000(.106)
 
 .021(.112)
 
-.003(.324)
 
 .050(.581) 
 .021(.091)
* 
 .034(.641) 
 .001(.928)
 
 .000(.021)
** 
 .001(.000)
*** 
-.002(.105) 
 .024(.138) 
 .010(.559) 
-.011(.611) 
-.002(.925) 
-.014(.464) 
 .006(.772) 
-.014(.457) 
-.011(.550) 
-.012(.495) 
-.002(.928) 
-.016(.931)
 
-.003(.630)
 
 .032(.418) 
-.001(.613)
 
-.004(.444)
 
 .000(.812) 
-.000(.991)
 
 .022(.517) 
-.004(.612) 
 .196(.330) 
 .016(.669) 
 .005(.970) 
-.013(.706) 
-.001(.089)
* 
 .002(.045)
* 
-.004(.377) 
-.014(.738) 
-.057(.289) 
 .080(.159) 
 .034(.514) 
 .034(.509) 
 .016(.791) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .155(.185)
 
-.007(.242)
 
 .043(.261)
 
-.002(.061)
* 
 .003(.594)
 
-.000(.850) 
-.000(.927) 
 .053(.109) 
 .007(.297) 
-.023(.890) 
 .022(.570) 
 .028(.844) 
-.010(.774) 
 .000(.970) 
 .002(.014)
** 
-.005(.200) 
 .021(.579) 
-.034(.428) 
 .007(.887) 
-.110(.385) 
-.040(.025)
** 
-.046(.367) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
  .050(.748)
 
 -.003(.714)
 
  .022(.668)
 
 -.001(.282)
 
 -.001(.780)
 
  .000(.763) 
  .000(.735) 
  .034(.369) 
 -.006(.512)
 
  .110(.525)
 
  .052(.211) 
 -.055(.779) 
 -.041(.249) 
.000(.840) 
.003(.014)
** 
.002(.674) 
.002(.956) 
.018(.677) 
 -.032(.559) 
 -.051(.307) 
 -.042(.396) 
  .021(.691)  
- 
- 
- 
- 
-.108(.542)
 
-.002(.805)
 
-.004(.944)
 
-.000(.993)
 
-.005(.297)
 
  .000(.226)
 
 -.000(.222) 
  .019(.591)
 
 -.003(.572)
 
  .248(.177) 
  .017(.690) 
 -.036(.811) 
.032(.328) 
 -.001(.108) 
  .002(.029)
** 
 -.004(.266) 
.022(.598) 
.037(.402) 
 -.021(.708) 
.046(.333) 
 -.008(.879) 
  .011(.828) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-.088(.600)
 
  .000(.971)
 
  .083(.048)
** 
  .000(.869)
 
 -.002(.585)
 
  .000(.501)
 
 -.000(.533) 
  .013(.687) 
  .012(.111)
 
 -.334(.066)
* 
  .008(.813)
 
-.141(.278) 
 .004(.878) 
-.001(.084)
* 
 .001(.106) 
-.003(.335) 
 .038(.275) 
 .015(.691) 
-.020(.662) 
 .024(.557) 
 .002(.971) 
 .025(.544) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Notes: coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, **
 and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Also, consumer goods industry and year 2003 are excluded 
from the regression analyses. They are used as base industry and year, respectively, for purposes of comparison. Director ownership
2 and director ownership
3 refers to director ownership squared 
and director ownership cubed, respectively.  
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Table 15: A Summary Table of All Hypotheses and Results for the Equilibrium-Variable Model Based on All Firm Years 
Dependent 
Varaiabe 
Return on Assets (ROA)  Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio) 
Independent 
Variable 
Hypothesis 
Number 
Hypothesised 
Sign 
Actual 
Sign of 
Result 
Statistical 
Significance of 
Result 
Conclusion 
(Hypothesis) 
Hypothesised 
Sign 
Actual 
Sign of 
Result 
Statistical  
Significance of 
Result 
Conclusion 
(Hypothesis) 
Board diversity 
 
Board size 
 
CEO duality 
 
Non-exec. dtors. 
 
Board meetings 
 
Audit committee 
 
Nomination com. 
 
Remuneration co. 
 
Dtor. ownership 
 
Dtor. ownership
2 
 
Dtor. ownership
3 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
6 
 
6 
 
7 
 
7 
 
7 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
-/+ 
 
-/+ 
+ 
 
- 
 
       + 
 
- 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
- 
Insignificant 
 
insignificant 
 
Significant(5%) 
 
Significant(5%) 
 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
 
Significant(10%) 
 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
 
Accepted 
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
-/+ 
 
-/+ 
- 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
- 
Insignificant 
 
Significant(10%) 
 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
 
Significant(10%) 
 
Insignificant 
 
Insignificant 
Rejected 
 
Accepted 
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
 
Rejected 
 Notes: The Table presents a summary of all the seven hypotheses tested and results for the equilibrium-variable model. Columns 2 to 6 present information relating to hypotheses 1 to seven with 
regard to the ROA, while columns 7 to 10 do similarly with respect to the Q-ratio. The information in columns 7 to 10 wil be referred to in the discussions at subsection 8.1.1.2. Director 
ownership
2 refers to director ownership squared, whilst director ownership
3 refers to director ownership cubed.  
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However, the results differ from prior studies that document a statistically significant 
and positive link between board size and accounting returns (e.g., Sanda et al., 2005; Haniffa 
and  Hudaib,  2006;  Mangena  and  Tauringana,  2008).  Theoretically,  it  implies  that  larger 
boards are less effective. Within the South African context, this appears to indicate further that 
board appointments may be made in order to meet affirmative action provisions, such as black 
empowerment and employment equity targets rather than for the quality of their contributions 
to board decisions.  
CEO duality, board diversity, and the existence of audit, nomination and remuneration 
committees,  are  found  to  be  positively  associated  with  accounting  returns,  but  only  CEO 
duality and the existence of a nomination committee are significant for the pooled sample. 
CEO  duality  is  further  significant  in  year  2006.  The  statistically  significant  and  positive 
association between CEO duality and ROA rejects hypothesis three (see column 6 of Table 15) 
that CEO duality significantly impacts negatively on firm financial performance. It also does 
not lend empirical support to the recommendations of corporate governance codes, including 
King II that the roles of company chairman and CEO should be split.  
Empirically, this finding is different from the results of previous studies that report a 
statistically significant and negative relationship between ROA and role duality (e.g., Rechner 
and Dalton, 1991; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Specifically, it does not lend empirical support 
to the results of Ho and Williams (2003) who report a statistically significant and negative 
association between CEO duality and the intellectual capital performance of 84 South African 
listed firms. In contrast, the results lend empirical support to the findings of Donaldson and 
Davis  (1991)  and  Boyd  (1995)  that  there  is  a  statistically  significant  and  positive  nexus 
between role duality and ROA. Theoretically, it suggests that role duality allows a visionary 
and  charismatic  CEO  the  opportunity  to  have  a  sharper  focus  on  firm  objectives  without 
excessive  board  interference  (Haniffa  and  Cooke,  2002,  p.321).  It  also  facilitates  quick 
decision-making, which may improve financial performance.  
The statistically significant and positive coefficient on the presence of a nomination 
committee  supports  hypothesis  six  (see  column  6  of  Table  15)  that  the  presence  of  a 
nomination  committee  impacts  positively  on  accounting  returns.  It  also  offers  empirical 
support to the recommendations of many corporate governance codes, including King II that 
call for the establishment of board committees. Empirically, it rejects the results of Bozec 
(2005)  who  reports  a  statistically  insignificant  relationship  between  ROA  and  the 
establishment of a nomination committee in a sample of 25 Canadian listed firms from 1976 to  
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2005. Theoretically, the establishment of a nomination committee can improve the process by 
which directors are appointed, as well as the independence of the board and its decisions. 
Arguably, this can potentially impact positively on firm financial performance by enhancing 
the effectiveness with which the board carries out its monitoring and advisory functions. 
On the other hand, the results suggest that the presence of audit and remuneration 
committees are positively related to ROA, but both are statistically insignificant. This does not 
support hypothesis six (see column 6 of Table 15), as well as the recommendations of King II. 
Given the high adoption rate of audit and remuneration committees, their insignificance in 
explaining ROA is not empirically too surprising. This is because, and as has already been 
discussed  in  chapter  six,  less  than  10%  of  the  sampled  firms’  do  not  have  audit  and 
remuneration  committees,  which  results  in  less  variation  among  them.  This  also  raises 
questions as to the methodological appropriateness for estimating the corporate governance-
financial performance link by applying the equilibrium-variable model. This is because it can 
be argued that if all firms were to fully comply or not to completely comply with some of the 
single corporate governance provisions, then there will simply be no cross-sectional variations 
in the variables for them to be value relevant in any regression. 
The statistically insignificant relationship between board diversity and  ROA means 
that  hypothesis  one  (see  column  6  of  Table  15)  is  rejected.  As  has  been  discussed  in 
subsection 6.5 of chapter six, this is less empirically surprising. This is because the number of 
non-whites and women representation on South African corporate boards are small such that 
they may not be able to have any significant impact on board decisions. Empirically, it does 
not support the results of Swartz and Firer (2005) that South African listed firms significantly 
enhance their intellectual capital performance by having ethnically diversed board of directors. 
However, the positive coefficients are consistent with the findings of Adler (2001) who report 
that board diversity impact positively on accounting returns. By contrast, it rejects the results 
of Shrader et al. (1997) who find a negative association between board diversity and ROA. 
The  positive  coefficient  is  also  consistent  with  theory.  It  has  been  suggested  that  board 
diversity  increases  creativity  and  innovation  in  decision-making  due  to  differences  in 
cognitive abilities, which impacts positively on performance (Carter et al., 2003, p.36). 
The percentage of non-executive directors (NEDs) and frequency of board meetings 
are negatively related to accounting returns, but only the percentage of NEDs is statistically 
significant for the full sample. The statistically significant and negative relationship between 
the percentage of NEDs and ROA means that hypothesis four (see column 6 of Table 15) is  
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not supported. This finding is also contrary to the expectations of many corporate governance 
codes, including King II, which promote the inclusion of more NEDs on corporate boards. 
Empirically, it also does not support the results of prior South African studies of Ho and 
Williams  (2003)  and  Mangena  and  Chamisa  (2008)  that  indicate  that  more  NEDs  impact 
positively on firm performance. However, it supports previous corporate governance evidence 
(e.g., Weir and Laing, 2000; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), which 
reports a negative link between the percentage of NEDs and ROA.  
Theoretically, stewardship theory suggests that non-executive directors often command 
less knowledge about the business, and find it difficult to understand the complexities of the 
firm (Weir and  Laing,  2000, p.267). This negatively affects performance. The statistically 
insignificant and negative ROA-the frequency of board meetings nexus means that hypothesis 
five (see column 6 of Table 15) can be rejected.  It also implies that the recommendations of 
King II that South African corporate boards must hold a minimum of four meetings in a year 
are not  empirically supported.  Empirically,  this  finding  is  consistent  with  the result  of  El 
Mehdi (2007) who reports a statistically insignificant association between the frequency of 
board meetings and ROA for a sample of 24 Tunisian listed firms from 2000 to 2005. By 
contrast, it does not support the results of Mangena and Tauringana (2006) who document a 
statistically significant and positive relationship between the frequency of board meetings and 
ROA in a sample of 157 Zimbabwean listed firms from 2001 to 2003. 
Theoretically, the negative coefficient on the frequency of board meetings under the 
ROA supports the idea that frequent board meetings are not necessarily beneficial. A higher 
frequency of board meetings, for example, can result in higher costs in the form of managerial 
time, travel expenses, refreshment, and directors’ meetings fees.  
Director shareownership is found to be negatively related to accounting returns, but not 
statistically significant. This implies that hypothesis seven (see column 6 of Table 15) is not 
supported. In contrast, it is consistent with the results of previous South African studies (e.g., 
Ho and Williams, 2003; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008). For example, using a sample of 84 
South African listed firms, Ho and Williams (2003) report a negative association between 
director ownership and a firm’s physical and intellectual capital performance. Theoretically, 
the negative coefficient  can be explained by the entrenchment hypothesis. The hypothesis 
states that at high levels of shareholding, directors may hold sufficient voting power to protect 
themselves  against  any  disciplinary  actions  from  minority  shareholders.  This  motivates  
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managers to engage in opportunistic behaviour, including the consumption of more perquisites, 
which impacts negatively on firm financial performance.  
To replicate the results of Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990), two 
additional  ownership  variables  –  director  ownership  squared  and  cubed  are  introduced. 
Specifically, Morck et al. (1988) document a positive director ownership-performance link at 
lower levels (0% to 5% - interests convergence), a negative relationship at moderate levels 
(5% to 25% - entrenchment), and additional positive association at higher levels (above 25% - 
interests convergence). This results in a non-linear relationship between director ownership 
and performance. 
 The results show that director ownership squared and director ownership cubed
82 are 
negatively  and  positively  associated  with  ROA,  respectively,  but  both  are  statistically 
insignificant. The positive and negative coefficient on director ownership squared and director 
ownership cubed, respectively, suggests the presence of a non-linear relationship. However, 
the statistically insignificant coefficients fail to offer empirical support to past evidence, which 
indicates significant curvilinear director ownership-performance link (e.g., Morck et al., 1988; 
McConnell and Servaes, 1990). Overall, the statistically insignificant and negative coefficient 
on director shareownership does not support the director entrenchment hypothesis. Similarly, 
statistically insignificant coefficients on director shareownership cubed and squared also fail 
to offer evidence to neither support the director interest alignment hypothesis nor director 
entrenchment hypothesis even at higher levels of director shareownership. 
With respect to the control variables, and consistent with predictions, firm size, capital 
structure, sales growth and dual-listing are found to be positively associated with accounting 
returns, whilst capital expenditure is negatively related to ROA for the pooled sample. Audit 
firm size is also positively related to ROA for the full sample. However, only capital structure 
and  sales  growth  are  statistically  significant  for  the  combined  sample,  whereas  firm  size, 
capital structure and dual-listing are significant over the entire sample period. The statistically 
                                                 
82Following  Beiner  et  al.  (2006),  the  coefficients  on  director  shareownership,  directorship  shareownership 
squared, and director shareownership cubed are interpreted separately. This is because unlike Morck et al. (1988) 
and McConnell (1990) who investigate the non-linear director shareownership-firm value relationship in isolation, 
in this study and similar to Beiner et al. (2006), the curvilinear relationship is explored alongside eight other 
corporate governance mechanisms. Director shareownership levels are, therefore, not classified from 0% to 5%, 
5% to 25%, and 25% above range, as done by Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Sevaes (1990). However, 
and as has been reported above, in this study, director shareownership ranges from 0% to 94% for the pooled 
sample.  This  makes  it  difficult  to  ex  ante  determine  the  potential  turning  points  and  the  direction  of  the 
coefficients on director shareownership squared and director shareownership cubed. Therefore, the coefficients 
on the director shareownership variables are interpreted separately based on the post ante predicted coefficients 
and statistical significance.   
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significant and positive coefficient on capital structure implies that higher levels of gearing 
can  significantly  increase  performance  by  reducing  agency  conflicts  often  associated  with 
having  ‘free  cash  flows’  by  self-serving  managers  (Jensen,  1993,  p.323).  The  positive 
coefficient on firm size offers empirical support to past evidence, which suggests a positive 
link between firm size and ROA (e.g., Weir and Laing, 2000; Bozec, 2005). The positive, but 
statistically insginficant relationship between audit firm size and ROA for the full sample is 
theoretically not expected. 
By  contrast,  the  statistically  significant  and  positive  sales  growth-ROA  link  is 
consistent with theory and previous evidence that, on average, firms that generate higher sales 
are more likely to report higher accounting profits (Klapper and Love, 2004; Shabbir and 
Padget, 2005). Similarly, the positive coefficient on dual-listing supports recent cross-country 
evidence that includes South Africa by Charitou and Louca (2009), which indicates that cross-
listed firms are associated with higher operating accounting returns than their non cross-listed 
counterparts.  
In contrast, the negative relationship between capital expenditure and ROA indicates 
that investments in assets are capital intensive, but often tend to have positive impact on future 
profitability (Weir et al., 2002, p.589). This negatively affects current accounting profits. It 
also seems  to suggest  the  existence  of  of  lagged  structure  relationship  between  ROA and 
capital expenditure. As a robustness test, a lagged corporate governance-financial performance 
structure will be estimated in chapter nine. Finally, the results show that none of the industry 
and year dummies is significant for the combined sample. This fails to support prior results of 
Shabbir  and  Padgett  (2005),  and  Haniffa  and  Hudaib  (2006)  that  suggest  that  accounting 
returns of firms differ across different industries and financial years.  
 
8.1.1.2 Results Based on Market Measure of Financial Performance (Q-ratio) 
 
Table 16 contains OLS regression results for the equilibrium-variable model based on 
the  market  based  measure  of  financial  performance  (Q-ratio).  Similarly,  the  variables 
investigated  in  this  model  are  the  first  11  corporate  governance  variables.  As  has  been 
explained above, to facilitate comparison and easy following, Table 15 presents a summary of 
all seven hypotheses and results for the equilibrium-variable model based on all firm years for 
both the ROA and the Q-ratio. Column 3 of Table 16 first reports the results of multivariate 
regression of the Q-ratio only on the 11 corporate governance variables, while columns 4 to 9 
present the results of multivariate regression of the Q-ratio on the 11 corporate governance  
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variables and the control variables for the pooled sample, as well as for each of the five firm-
years, respectively.  
Consistent  with  the  ROA,  Column  3  of  Table  16  indicates  that  the  F-value  is 
statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level.  This  suggests  that  the  null  hypothesis  that  the 
coefficients of the 11 corporate governance variables are jointly equal to zero can be rejected. 
It implies that the coefficients on the 11 corporate governance mechanisms can jointly explain 
significant differences in the sampled firms’ market value. The adjusted R
2 is approximately 
6%, which is also virtually the same as the adjusted R
2 obtained for the ROA. This means that 
at least 6% of the variations in the sampled firms’ market value (Q-ratio) can be explained 
jointly by the 11 corporate governance variables.  
With the exceptions of the negative coefficient on the existence of an audit committee, 
and the positive coefficient on CEO duality, the signs of the coefficients of the remaining 9 
corporate governance mechanisms are as theoretically expected (see column 7 of Table 15). 
However,  only  board  diversity  is  statistically  significant.  The  statistically  significant 
coefficient on the constant term in column 3 of Table 16 appears to suggest that there may be 
omitted variables bias. Therefore, to investigate whether the lack of significant relationship 
between the Q-ratio and the corporate governance structures is spuriously caused by some 
omitted variables, the control variables are added to the regressions in Columns 4 to 9 of Table 
16. 
Table 16 indicates that the F-Value is statistically significant for the pooled sample, 
and for each of the five firm-years except 2005. The adjusted R
2 for each of the five years is 
between 11% and 24%, and 29% for the combined sample. This is consistent with the results 
of previous studies. For instance, Weir et al. (2002, p.597), and Haniffa and Hudaib (2006, 
p.1053) report adjusted R
2 of 22% and 28%, respectively, for their pooled regressions of the 
Q-ratio on a group of corporate governance and control variables.  
Of particular interest, the adjusted R
2 of the regressions of ROA and the Q-ratio on the 
11 corporate governance mechanisms alone are virtually the same. However, including the 
control variables leads to substantially higher adjusted R
2 for the Q-ratio than for the ROA. 
This  implies  that  the  observed  difference  in  the  ability  of  the  11  corporate  governance 
variables to explain the variations in the ROA and Q-ratio is accounted for by the contribution 
of the control variables.  
With respect to the 11 corporate governance structures, the results show some level of 
sensitivities when the control variables are added. First, the direction of the coefficients on  
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CEO  duality,  board  diversity,  and  the  existence  of  audit,  nomination  and  remuneration 
committees have changed. Second, board diversity, which was statistically significant, is now 
insignificant, whereas board size and director ownership that were statistically insignificant, 
are now significant. These sensitivities may be due to omitted variables bias arising out of the 
exclusion of the control variables. Therefore, the discussion below is based on the estimated 
coefficients that include the control variables. 
To  begin  with,  and  in  contrast  to  accounting  returns,  board  size  is  found  to  be 
positively related to the market based measure of performance and statistically significant for 
the full sample. This lends support to hypothesis two (see column 10 of Table 15) that there is 
a statistically significant and positive relationship between the Q-ratio and board size. It also 
supports past evidence that documents a statistically significant and positive nexus between 
the Q-ratio and board size (e.g., Adams and Mehran, 2005; Beiner et al., 2006; Henry, 2008; 
Mangena and Tauringana, 2008). It, however, contradicts the results of past studies that report 
a statistically significant and negative link between board size and the Q-ratio (e.g., Yermack, 
1996; Vefeas 1999a and b; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Cheng et al., 2008; Coles et al., 2008; 
Guest, 2009).  
Theoretically, this indicates that the market perceives larger boards as more effective. 
This is because larger boards offer greater access to their firms’ external environment, which 
reduces  uncertainties  and  facilitates  securing  of  critical  resources,  such  as  finance,  raw 
materials and contracts (e.g., Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Goodstein et al., 1994).  Within the 
South African context, securing and renewing profitable government and mining contracts, for 
example, are usually tied-up with meeting black economic empowerment and employment 
equity targets (e.g., Murray, 2000; Malherbe and Segal, 2003). As has already been discussed 
in chapter six, however, larger firms have significantly higher levels of compliance with black 
economic empowerment and employment equity provisions. This means that larger firms may 
be  more  likely  to  secure  profitable  government  backed  black  economic  empowerment 
contracts that may help them to receive higher market valuation than their smaller counterparts. 
CEO duality and board diversity are found to be negatively related to market valuation, 
but both are statistically insignificant over the entire sample period. The coefficients are in the 
opposite  direction  to  those  of  the  accounting  returns.  The  statistically  insignificant  and 
negative coefficient on  CEO duality does not support hypothesis three  (see column 10 of 
Table 15), as well as the recommendations of King II. It implies that CEO duality has no 
impact on the sampled firms’ market value. Empirically, this finding  is in line with prior  
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studies that report a statistically insignificant link between the Q-ratio and CEO duality (e.g., 
Vefeas and Theodorou, 1998; Sanda et al., 2005; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Specifically, the 
finding offers further empirical support to the results of Mangena and Chamisa (2008) that 
role duality has no impact on on the likelihood that a firm will be suspended from listing on 
the JSE  in  a sample  of  81 South  African  listed  firms.  The  negative  coefficient, however, 
suggests that the market perceives CEO duality as a bad practice. This is because it tends to 
give too much power to one person who can choose to engage in opportunistic activities.  
The statistically insignificant and negative coefficient on board diversity implies that 
hypothesis  one  (see  column  10  of  Table  15)  is  similarly  rejected.  It  also  contradicts  the 
recommendations of King II and the results of Carter et al. (2003) that suggest a statistically 
significant and positive link between board diversity and the Q-ratio. This finding is, however, 
in  line  with  the  result  of  Rose  (2007)  that  indicates  that  board  diversity  has  statistically 
insignificant relationship with the Q-ratio. Theoretically, this suggests that the market views 
diversed board members as bringing their individual interests to the board. The greater the 
diversity of these interests, the higher the potential for conflicts and factions to emerge, which 
impairs boardroom cohesion and performance (Goodstein et al., 1994, p.243). 
Of special note, the differences in the sensitivities of board size and the other corporate 
governance mechanisms, that will be discussed below, towards the two performance measures, 
may be explained by the differences in their respective effects, strengths, and weaknesses. For 
example,  and  as  has  been  discussed  in  subsection  5.2.2.3  of  chapter  five,  as  a  historical 
measure, ROA is unable to reflect current changes in  market valuation. By contrast,  as a 
market measure, the Q-ratio reflects expected future developments that may be masked by 
current  fluctuations  in  business  conditions.  It  also  offers  empirical  support  to  previous 
evidence, which suggests that insiders (managers – ROA) and outsiders (shareholders – Q-
ratio) value corporate governance differently (Black et al., 2006a, p.370; Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006). Overall, it appears to justify the use of both accounting and market based measures of 
performance, allowing each measure to complement the weaknesses of the other. 
In contrast to the ROA, the coefficients on the percentage of NEDs and the frequency 
of  board  meetings  are  positive,  but  the  coefficient  on  the  percentage  of  NEDs  is  not 
statistically significant over the entire sample period, while the coefficient on the frequency of 
board  meetings  is  only  significant  in  2003.  The  statistically  insignificant  and  positive 
relationship between the percentage of NEDs and the Q-ratio does not offer empirical support 
to the recommendations of King II and hypothesis four (see column 10 of Table 15).   
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Table 16: OLS Regression Results of the Equilibrium-Variable Model Based on Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio – Market Measure) 
  Exp. Sign  All firm years  All firm years  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Adjusted R
2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
No. of observations 
      .062 
    .623 
  1.032 
 3.466(.000)
*** 
    500 
    .290 
    .542 
    .983 
7.690(.000)
*** 
  500 
   .171 
   .501 
 2.008 
 1.660(.076)
* 
   100 
  .164 
  .492 
1.740 
1.749(.048)
** 
  100 
  .243 
  .455 
2.105 
2.286(.006)
*** 
   100 
  .110 
  .641 
1.905 
1.504(.108) 
   100
 
  .153 
  .651 
2.007 
1.763(.042)
** 
   100 
Constant 
Board size 
CEO duality 
Non-executive dtors. 
Dtor. ownership 
Dtor. ownership
2 
Dtor. ownership
3 
Board diversity 
Board meetings 
Audit committee 
Nomination com. 
Remuneration com. 
Firm size  
Capital structure  
Sales growth  
Capital expenditure  
Dual-listing  
Audit firm size 
Basic materials  
Consumer services  
Industrials  
Technology  
Year 2002 
Year 2004 
Year 2005 
Year 2006 
 
+ 
- 
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
-/+ 
+ 
-/+ 
+ 
+ 
 1.322(.000)
*** 
  .020(.101)
 
  .002(.985) 
  .003(.278)
 
 -.011(.217)
 
  .000(.287)
 
 -.000(.264)
 
  .179(.008)
*** 
  .021(.147) 
 -.354(.473) 
  .089(.220) 
  .229(.689) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .642(.024)
** 
 .022(.064)
* 
-.117(.153)
 
 .003(.255)
 
-.018(.084)
* 
 .000(.153)
 
-.000(.192)
 
-.025(.701)
 
 .011(.424)
 
 .068(.876) 
-.105(.141)
 
-.119(.765) 
-.183(.003)
*** 
-.003(.000)
*** 
 .002(.124)
 
 .020(.005)
*** 
 .086(.267) 
 .271(.001)
*** 
 .428(.000)
*** 
 .551(.000)
*** 
 .217(.002)
*** 
 .308(.000)
*** 
-.022(.811) 
 .183(.033)
** 
 .398(.000)
*** 
 .581(.000)
*** 
 .572(.466) 
 .003(.910)
 
-.082(.635) 
 .003(.572)
 
 .000(.995)
 
-.000(.910) 
-.000(.809)
 
-.129(.384) 
 .014(.669) 
 .380(.664) 
-.128(.420) 
 .580(.313) 
 .057(.706) 
-.006(.012)
** 
 .006(.048)
** 
 .013(.484) 
 .169(.372) 
 .315(.098)
* 
 .478(.057)
* 
 .372(.101) 
 .183(.410) 
-.027(.916) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .799(.113)
 
 .030(.251)
 
-.140(.390) 
-.002(.582)
 
 .008(.700)
 
-.000(.564) 
-.000(.713) 
-.026(.852) 
 .080(.010)
*** 
-.272(.698) 
-.157(.348) 
 .239(.691) 
-.164(.264) 
-.002(.218) 
 .000(.982)
 
 .002(.903) 
 .135(.415) 
 .333(.074)
* 
 .527(.023)
** 
 .421(.046)
** 
 .221(.269)
 
 .184(.397) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
2.076(.000)
*** 
  .028(.257)
 
 -.143(.442)
 
  .006(.159)
 
 -.005(.781)
 
  .000(.786) 
 -.000(.571) 
  .073(.583) 
 -.002(.946)
 
-1.093(.182)
 
  .019(.899) 
 -.134(.811) 
 -.125(.325) 
 -.003(.082)
* 
  .007(.094)
* 
.001(.954)
 
.015(.919) 
.291(.068)
* 
  .184(.343) 
  .390(.031)
** 
  .212(.230)
 
  .382(.050)
**  
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .451(.618)
 
 .026(.412)
 
-.310(.320)
 
 .004(.607)
 
-.051(.053)
* 
 .002(.065)
* 
-.000(.070)
* 
  .010(.956)
 
 -.001(.967)
 
  .849(.362) 
  .051(.813) 
  .154(.839) 
 -.292(.179) 
 -.004(.127) 
  .008(.075)
* 
  .031(.085)
* 
.093(.660) 
.220(.323) 
  .251(.376) 
.585(.018)
** 
  .057(.825) 
  .162(.547) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-.576(.559)
 
  .038(.226)
 
 -.078(.756)
 
  .006(.296)
 
 -.038(.130)
 
  .001(.147)
 
 -.000(.116) 
 -.073(.694) 
  .033(.460)
 
1.123(.291)
 
 -.242(.231)
 
  .534(.485) 
 -.313(.157) 
 -.005(.049)
** 
  .004(.384) 
  .019(.321) 
 -.072(.726) 
  .411(.066)
* 
  .616(.024)
** 
  .393(.126) 
  .718(.014)
** 
  .409(.065)
* 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Notes: coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, **
 and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Also, consumer goods industry and year 2003 are excluded 
from the regression analyses. They are used as base industry and year, respectively, for purposes of comparison. Director ownership
2 and director ownership
3 refers to director ownership squared 
and director ownership cubed, respectively. 
 
263 
The positive coefficient on the percentage of NEDs, however, lends support to the 
results of previous South African studies (e.g., Ho and Williams, 2003; Mangena and Chamisa, 
2008). Mangena and Chamisa (2008) report, for example, that South African corporate boards 
dominated by NEDs are less likely to be suspended from the stock exchange. The statistically 
insignificant and positive nexus between the frequency of board meetings and the Q-ratio 
indicates that hypothesis five (see column 10 of Table 15) is also not empirically supported. It 
also implies that the recommendations of King II that South African corporate boards must 
hold a minimum of four meetings in a year are not empirically supported. It is also not in line 
with the results of prior studies that report a statistically significant and negative association 
between the frequency of board meetings and the Q-ratio (e.g., Vefeas 1999a; Carcello et al., 
2002; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006).  
By  contrast, the positive coefficient supports the results of Karamanou and Vefeas 
(2005) and Mangena and Tauringana (2006) that document a positive relationship between the 
frequency of board meetings and the Q-ratio. Unlike the finding of this study, however, the 
results  of  Karamanou  and  Vefeas  (2005)  and  Mangena  and  Tauringana  (2006)  were 
statistically  significant.  The  positive,  but  statistically  insignificant  nexus  between  the 
frequency of board meetings and the Q-ratio also indicates that even though the frequency of 
board meetings has no valuation implications for the sampled firms, the market perceives it as 
a good corporate governance practice. This is because a higher frequency of board meetings 
can lead to enhanced managerial monitoring. 
Similar  to  the  results  of  the  ROA,  the  existence  of  a  remuneration  committee  is 
positively related to the Q-ratio. By contrast, the coefficients on the existence of audit and 
nomination committees are negative. Also, the coefficients on all three board committees are 
statistically insignificant over the entire sample period. This rejects hypothesis six (see column 
10 of Table 15) and does also not lend empirical support to the recommendations of King II. 
The mixed and insignificant results may be explained by the fact that there is generally a high 
level of compliance with board committees, which results in insufficient variation among the 
sampled firms.  
As has been explained above, this also brings into question as to the methodological 
appropriateness for estimating the corporate governance-financial performance link by using 
the equilibrium-variable model. This is because it can be argued that if all firms were to fully 
comply or not to completely comply with some of the single corporate governance provisions,  
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then there will simply be no cross-sectional variations in the variables for them to be value 
relevant in any regression. 
Empirically, the findings are consistent with the results of prior studies that report a 
statistically insignificant relationship between board committees and the Q-ratio (e.g., Vefeas 
and  Theodorou,  1998;  Weir  and  Laing,  2000;  Weir  et  al.,  2002).  Vefeas  and  Theodorou 
(1998), for example, report a statistically insignificant nexus between the presence of audit, 
nomination, and remuneration committees and the Q-ratio.  By contrast, the finding does not 
offer empirical support to the results of previous studies that report statistically significant and 
positive  or  negative  association  between  board  committees  and  the  Q-ratio  (e.g.,  Vefeas, 
1999a; Karamanous and Vefeas, 2005). The finding is also not consistent with the results of 
Mangena and Chamisa (2008). Mangena and Chamisa (2008) report that the presence of an 
audit committee significantly reduces the possibility of a firm being suspended from listing on 
the JSE in a sample of 81 South African listed firms. 
The  results  of  director  ownership  and  director  ownership  cubed  are  negatively 
correlated to market performance, whilst director ownership squared is positively associated 
with the Q-ratio. All of them are only statistically significant in 2005. This indicates that 
hypothesis seven is not supported (see column 10 of Table 15). The statistically significant 
and  negative  link  between  director  ownership  and  the  Q-ratio  supports  the  entrenchment 
hypothesis (Short and Keasey, 1999; Beiner et al., 2006), as well as the results of previous 
South African studies (e.g., Ho and Williams, 2003; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008).  
The implication of this finding is that at high levels of shareholding, directors tend to 
concentrate on maximising their own utility, such as guaranteed employment with attractive 
salaries to the disadvantage of other shareholders. This is because they hold enough voting 
power  to  effectively  insulate  themselves  against  any  disciplinary  action.  The  evidence  of 
significant  positive  and  negative  coefficients  on  director  ownership  squared  and  director 
ownership cubed, respectively, offers additional empirical support to the results of Morck et al. 
(1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990), who report significant non-monotonic relationship 
between director ownership and the Q-ratio. Overall, the statistically significant and negative 
coefficient  on  director  ownership  suggests  director  entrenchment  with  no  evidence  of  a 
reversal to interest alignment even at higher levels of director ownership. 
With respect to the control variables, all of them show the hypothesised relationships 
with the Q-ratio. Also, firm size, capital structure, audit firm size and capital expenditure are 
statistically  significant  for  the  combined  sample,  whereas  sales  growth  is  statistically  
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significant in 2002, 2004 and 2005. Audit firm size is also statistically significant for all firm 
years except 2005. Dual-listing, however, is not significant over the entire sample period. All 
the industry and year dummies except 2002 are significant for the pooled sample. As has been 
explained above, this also means that the substantial difference in the adjusted R
2 between 
ROA and the Q-ratio is explained by the contribution of the control variables. 
The  statistically  significant  and  negative  coefficient  on  firm  size  offers  empirical 
support to the results of previous studies that report a negative relationship between firm size 
and the Q-ratio (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Durnev and Kim, 2005), but contradicts the 
findings of those that establish a positive relationship (e.g., Yermack,  1996; Carter et al., 
2003). Similarly, the significant negative coefficient on capital structure indicates that firms 
that  use  more  debt  restrict  their  financial  flexibility  and  capacity  to  pursue  positive  NPV 
projects (Myers, 1977, p.148).  
On the contrary, the statistically significant and positive coefficients on sales growth 
and capital expenditure suggest that faster growing firms receive higher valuation from the 
market, because of the expectation that they will generate higher future performance (Klapper 
and  Love,  2004,  p.712).  The  positive  coefficient  on  dual-listing  is  consistent  with  recent 
evidence (e.g., Klapper and Love, 2004; Black et al., 2006a). Theoretically, this implies that 
South  African  firms  that  cross-list  to  the  UK  and  US  markets,  and  submit  themselves  to 
increased investor protection associated with those markets, are better able to exploit growth 
opportunities due to the greater access to external capital (Melvin and Valero, 2009, p.66). The 
positive and statistically significant coefficient on audit firm size over the entire sample period 
except 2005 means that firms that are audited by a big four audit firm receive higher market 
valuation than those that are audited by a non big four audit firm.  
Finally, consistent with prior studies (e.g., Durnev and Kim, 2005; Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006), the results show that a firm’s industry and year of operation affects its Q-ratio. The 
industry dummies show that consumer services firms (have highest statistically significant 
coefficient) performed significantly better than their counterparts in the other four industries. 
Similarly,  the  year  dummies  indicate  that  the  average  firm  received  significantly  higher 
market valuation in 2006 (highest statistically significant coefficient) than in any other year. 
To  conclude,  this  subsection  has  discussed  the  results  of  the  equilibrium-variable 
model based on both the ROA and the Q-ratio. In line with the prior equilibrium-variable 
literature, the results based on both the ROA and the Q-ratio are generally mixed. First, the 
findings  suggest  that  regardless  of  the  firm  financial  performance  measure  used,  board  
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diversity has no statistically significant impact on firm financial performance in South Africa. 
This fails to support hypothesis one (see columns 6 and 10 of Table 15). It does not also lend 
support to recommendations of King II and the general efforts in South Africa to diversify 
corporate boards. As has been explained already, this is empirically less surprising given the 
small number of women and non-whites that are currently on South African corporate boards.  
Second, the findings indicate that market returns (Q-ratio) are significantly higher if a 
firm  has  a  larger  board  size,  but  this  is  not  reflected  in  any  significant  measure  in  its 
accounting returns (ROA). This statistically significant and positive relationship between the 
Q-ratio and board size supports hypothesis two (see column 10 of Table 15). By contrast, the 
statistically  insignificant  and  negative  relationship  between  ROA  and  board  size  do  not 
support hypothesis two (see column 6 of Table 15). The positive board size and the Q-ratio 
relationship also contradicts much of the prior UK and US evidence (e.g., Yermack, 1996; 
Vefeas, 1999; Shabbir and Padget, 2005; Guest, 2009). However, it lends empirical support to 
a number of non UK and US studies (e.g., Beiner et al., 2006; Henry, 2008; Mangena and 
Tauringana, 2008).  
This appears to imply that within the UK and US context, the stock market values the 
ability of smaller corporate boards to effectively monitor and advise managers higher than the 
potential greater access to resources that is usually associated with larger boards. In contrast, 
and within the South African context, the positive association between board size and the Q-
ratio  seems  to  indicate  that  greater  access  to  a  firm’s  external  environment,  which  may 
facilitate securing critical resources that is often associated with larger boards, is rather highly 
valued by the stock market. 
Third, the findings indicate that firms that combine the roles of board chairman and 
CEO generate significantly higher accounting returns than their counterparts that split the roles. 
This  fails  to  support  hypothesis  three  (see  column  6  of  Table  15).  However,  it  has  no 
significant impact on market valuation (also fails to support hypothesis three, see column 10 
of Table 15) even though role or CEO duality is generally considered by the market as a 
negative corporate governance practice. This implies that the policy of King II and the JSE’s 
Listing Rules for South African firms to follow Cadbury-style suggestion to split the two roles 
may not be appropriate. A major theoretical implication of the statistically significant and 
positive ROA-CEO duality relationship is that role duality allows a visionary and charismatic 
CEO  the  opportunity  to  have  a  sharper  focus  on  firm  objectives  without  excessive  board 
interference.  
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Fourth, the findings indicate that boards with a higher percentage of non-executive 
directors  generate  significantly  lower  accounting  returns,  rejecting  hypothesis  four  (see 
column 6 of Table 15). Further, even though having more non-executive directors on the board 
is perceived positively by the market, it has no significant impact on market valuation. This 
does  not  support  hypothesis  four  (see  column  10  of  Table  15).  It  also  implies  that  the 
Cadbury-style recommendation of King II and the JSE’s Listing Rules that South African 
boards  should  consist  of  a  majority  of  non-executive  directors  may  not  necessarily  be 
applicable in South Africa.  
Theoretically,  the  statistically  significant  and  negative  association  between  the 
percentage of non-executive directors and ROA supports stewardship theory. It suggests that 
non-executive directors often command less knowledge about the business, and find it difficult 
to understand the complexities of the firm. Also, corporate boards dominated by non-executive 
directors  tend  to  stifle  managerial  initiative  and  delay  strategic  action,  which  arise  from 
excessive managerial monitoring. This can impact negatively on a firm’s ability to generate 
higher accounting returns.  
Fifth, the findings suggest that the frequency of board meetings has no statistically 
significant impact on financial performance, regardless of the measure used. The statistically 
insignificant nexus between the frequency of board meetings and firm financial performance 
indicates that hypothesis five (see columns 6 and 10 of Table 15) is not empirically supported. 
It also implies that the recommendations of King II that South African corporate boards must 
hold a minimum of four meetings in a year are not empirically supported. 
Sixth, the findings are mixed when it comes to board subcommittees. The findings 
indicate  that  firms  that  have  established  a  nomination  committee  tend  to  generate  higher 
accounting returns. This supports hypothesis six (see column 6 of Table 15). By contrast, the 
findings  suggest  that  firms  with  audit  and  remuneration  committees  have  no  impact  on 
accounting returns and market valuation. This fails to support hypothesis six (see columns 6 
and 10 of 15). It generally implies that the Cadbury-style suggestion of King II and the JSE’s 
Listing  Rules  that  South  African  listed  firms  should  establish  audit,  nomination,  and 
remuneration committees may not be applicable.   
The  seventh  and  final  finding  indicates  that  the  market  values  firms  with  higher 
director shareownership significantly lower, but higher director ownership appears to have no 
significant impact on accounting returns. This does not offer empirical support to hypothesis 
seve (see columns 6 and 10 of Table 15). It also implies that higher director shareownership  
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may  result  in  director  entrenchment  and  expropriation  to  the  disadvantage  of  minority 
shareholders. Overall, and as expected, the results suggest that some of the single corporate 
governance  mechanisms  impact  positively  on  firm  financial  performance,  others  impact 
negatively  on  the  financial  performance,  whereas  some  seem  to  have  no  impact  on  the 
financial performance of the sampled firms.  
The  next  subsection  will  discuss  the  results of  the compliance-index  model to  test 
hypothesis eight. Specifically, the results based on the accounting based measure of financial 
performance (ROA) will first be discussed, followed by those based on the  market based 
measure of financial performance (Q-ratio). 
 
8.1.2 Empirical Results: The Compliance-Index Model 
 
8.1.2.1 Results Based on the Accounting Measure of Financial Performance (ROA) 
 
  Table 17 contains OLS regression results for the compliance-index model based on the 
accounting based measure of financial performance (ROA). For this model, the main variable 
of focus is the South African Corporate Governance Index (the SACGI). Column 3 of Table 17 
first presents the results of a simple regression of ROA on the SACGI alone, whereas columns 
4 to 9 report the results of multivariate regression of ROA on the SACGI and the control 
variables for the pooled sample, as well as for each of the five firm-years, respectively.  
Column 3 of Table 17 suggests that the F-value of the simple regression is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This means that the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the 
SACGI is equal to zero can be rejected. It indicates that the coefficient on the SACGI can 
explain significant variations in the sampled firms’ accounting returns. The adjusted R
2 is 
approximately 10%. This implies that at least 10% of the variations in the sampled firms’ 
accounting  returns  (ROA)  can  be  explained  by  the  quality  of  their  internal  corporate 
governance structures (the SACGI). This is relatively better compared with those reported by 
prior South African studies. Specifically, in a cross-country sample that include South Africa, 
Klapper and Love (2004, p.719) report an adjusted R
2 of 3% for a simple regression of ROA 
on their composite corporate governance index. As hypothesised (i.e., hypothesis eight), and 
in line with the suggestions of the parametric and non-parametric correlation coefficients, the 
coefficient on the SACGI is positive (.002) and statistically significant at the 1% level. This 
also supports the positive (.08) and significant (p<.01) relationship reported by Klapper and 
Love (2004, p.719).  
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Table 17: OLS Regression Results of the Compliance-Index Model Based on Return on Assets (ROA – Accounting Measure) 
  Exp. 
Sign 
All firm years  All firm years  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Adjusted R
2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
No. of observations 
        .102 
      .117 
      .869 
 57.706(.000)
*** 
500 
     .189 
     .111 
     .881 
   8.751(.000)
*** 
500 
     .233 
     .109 
   2.097 
   3.736(.000)
*** 
100 
      .071 
      .110 
    1.834 
    1.686(.090)
* 
100 
     .187 
     .119 
   1.727 
   3.071(.002)
*** 
100 
     .165 
     .119 
   2.155 
   2.777(.004)
*** 
100 
     .133 
     .107 
   1.892 
   2.383(.012)
** 
100 
Constant 
SACGI 
Firm size  
Capital structure  
Sales growth  
Capital expenditure  
Dual-listing  
Audit firm size 
Basic materials  
Consumer services  
Industrials  
Technology  
Year 2002 
Year 2004 
Year 2005 
Year 2006 
 
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
+ 
-/+ 
+ 
- 
-.021(.1661) 
 .002(.0001)
*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .005(.808) 
 .002(.000)
*** 
 .013(.165) 
 .000(.004)
*** 
 .002(.000)
*** 
-.001(.563) 
 .012(.397) 
-.015(.270) 
-.034(.043)
** 
-.021(.183) 
-.025(.121) 
 .004(.790) 
 .000(.998) 
-.019(.224) 
-.017(.305) 
-.006(.698) 
 .000(.998) 
 .003(.001)
*** 
 .009(.649) 
-.001(.044)
** 
 .002(.000)
*** 
-.003(.295) 
-.027(.422) 
-.021(.473) 
 .004(.907) 
-.034(.333) 
-.033(.350) 
-.012(.734) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .022(.614) 
 .002(.010)
*** 
-.006(.812) 
-.000(.830) 
 .001(.021)
** 
-.002(.506) 
 .011(.732) 
-.037(.240) 
-.005(.893) 
-.061(.088)
* 
-.028(.428) 
-.010(.774) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-.055(.259) 
 .002(.002)
*** 
 .004(.869) 
 .000(.371) 
 .002(.018)
** 
 .002(.557) 
 .007(.832) 
-.004(.900) 
-.057(.154) 
-.051(.204) 
-.054(.166) 
-.002(.954) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .002(.966) 
 .002(.036)
** 
 .056(.018)
** 
-.001(.161) 
 .001(.032)
** 
-.001(.688) 
 .027(.446) 
-.006(.854) 
-.066(.100)
* 
 .025(.532) 
-.012(.766) 
 .011(.778) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .042(.378) 
 .001(.080)
* 
 .002(.905)
 
-.001(.008)
*** 
 .002(.011)
** 
-.001(.624) 
 .038(.217) 
-.017(.566) 
-.043(.227) 
 .018(.603) 
 .020(.571) 
 .044(.210) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Notes: coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, **
 and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Also, consumer goods industry and year 
2003 are excluded from the regression analyses. They are used as base industry and year, respectively, for purposes of comparison.  
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To  ascertain  whether  the  statistically  significant  positive  relationship  could  be 
spuriously caused by omitted control variables, the regressions in columns 4 to 9 of Table 17 
include  the  control  variables.  They  show  that  the  F-value  of  each  model  is  statistically 
significant. This means that the coefficients on the SACGI and the control variables can jointly 
explain significant variations in the sampled firms’ accounting returns.  The adjusted R
2 for 
each of the five years is between 7% to 23% for the 2002-2006 period and 19% for the pooled 
sample. Statistically, this means that between 7% to 23% of the variations in the sampled 
firms’ accounting returns (ROA) can be explained by the quality of their internal corporate 
governance structures (the SACGI) and the control variables. Over the full five-year sample 
period, the model possesses an average of 19% explanatory power. This compares with the 
adjusted R
2 of 29% for the pooled sample, including the control variables, of Klapper and 
Love (2004). 
  Colum  4  of  Table  17  indicates  that  the  SACGI  remains  positive  and  statistically 
significant, after adding the control variables, over the entire sample period. This supports 
hypothesis eight that there is a statistically significant and positive relationship between the 
SACGI and firm financial performance, based on ROA. It also means that, on average, better-
governed South African listed firms are associated with higher accounting returns than their 
poorly-governed counterparts. Specifically, the finding can be quantified as a one standard 
deviation improvement in the average firm’s mean internal corporate governance (the SACGI) 
score from 60% to 82%, can be expected to be associated with an increase in its average 
accounting returns (ROA) by at least 4% (22.03 x .002) from 9% to 13%, certeris paribus.  
Overall,  the  results  are  generally  consistent  with  those  of  previous  corporate 
governance studies (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Shabbir and Padget, 2005; Cui et al., 2008), 
but specifically with the findings of Klapper and Love (2004, p.719) and Chen et al. (2009). 
Using  a  cross-country  sample that  includes  South  African listed firms,  Klapper  and  Love 
(2004)  document  a  positive  (.10)  and  statistically  significant  (p<.01)  relationship  between 
higher firm-level corporate governance quality and accounting returns (ROA). 
Similarly, in a cross-country sample that includes South Africa, Chen et al. (2009) 
report  a  statistically  significant  and  negative  relationship  between  a  firm-level  composite 
corporate governance index and cost of equity capital. Theoretically, this suggests that better-
governed firms in their sample are able to raise capital at cheaper cost to better exploit growth 
opportunities that helps in boosting accounting returns.  
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With  respect  to  the  control  variables,  the  coefficient on  capital  structure  and  sales 
growth are statistically significant for the pooled sample, whereas firm size is only significant 
in year 2005. In contrast, the coefficients on audit firm size, dual-listing and the year dummies 
are  not  significant  in  any  period,  while  all  except  the  basic  materials  industry  dummy  is 
significant for the full sample, and also in year 2005. 
The positive and statistically significant (p<.05) coefficient on firm size in 2005 is not 
consistent with expectations. It indicates that larger firms tend to be associated with higher 
accounting returns. It also contradicts previous results of Ho and Williams (2003), but is in 
line with those of Gompers et al. (2003), Klapper and Love (2004) and Shabbir and Padget 
(2005).  As  hypothesised,  the  coefficient  on  sales  growth  is  significant  and  positively 
associated with financial performance as measured by ROA over the entire sample period. 
Theoretically,  past  sales  growth  tend  to  be  positively  correlated  with  future  growth 
opportunities (Klapper and Love, 2004, p.720). This implies that firms with higher past sales 
growth are likely to be associated with higher accounting returns. 
Similarly, and in line with predictions, the coefficient on capital structure (gearing) is 
positive  and  statistically  significant  for  the  pooled  sample.  It  is,  however,  significant  and 
negative in the year 2002 and 2006. As has already been discussed in subsection 5.2.2 of 
chapter  five,  gearing  can  either impact  positively  or  negatively on  ROA.  The  statistically 
significant and negative coefficient in 2002 and 2006, for example, suggests that due to the 
costs of financial distress, such as bankruptcy that are usually associated with higher levels of 
gearing,  firms that use  more debt  restrict their  financial flexibility and  capacity to pursue 
positive NPV projects (Myers, 1977, p.148).  
By contrast, the statistically significant and positive coefficient for the pooled sample 
indicate  that  higher  levels  of  gearing  can  increase  accounting  returns  by  reducing  agency 
conflicts associated with ‘free cash flows’ by opportunistic managers (Jensen, 1986, p.323). 
The negative relationship between gearing and performance also supports previous findings. 
Specifically, Bevan and Danbolt (2002, 2004) and Ho and Williams (2003) report statistically 
significant and negative relationship between gearing and accounting profits. The negative 
sign  on  the  coefficient  of  audit  firm  size  is  theoretically  expected,  but  it  is  statistically 
insignificant. This implies that audit firm size appears to have no impact on the sampled firms’ 
accounting returns. 
 The statistically insignificant coefficients on dual-listing and the year dummies reject 
the hypotheses that dual-listing and firm year affect a firm’s accounting returns. The negative  
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and statistically insignificant coefficient on dual-listing further rejects the results of Charitou 
and  Louca  (2009).  Using  a  cross-country  sample  that  include  South  Africa,  Charitou  and 
Louca (2009) find that dual-listing is positively associated with operating accounting returns.  
It also rejects the suggestions of cross-country surveys conducted in emerging markets 
that include South Africa by CLSA (2000) and Deutsche Bank (2002) that cross-listing is 
expected  to  impact  positively  on  operating  financial  performance.  Finally,  the  significant 
negative coefficient on the basic materials industry dummy implies that basic materials firms 
tend to be associated with significantly lower accounting returns than their counterparts. This 
offers support to the results of Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) that a firm’s industry of operation 
can affect its accounting (ROA) performance. 
 
8.1.2.2 Results Based on the Market Measure of Financial Performance (Q-ratio) 
 
  Table 18 contains OLS regression results for the compliance-index model based on the 
market based measure of financial performance (Q-ratio). Similarly, the main variable of focus 
is the SACGI. Column 3 of Table 18 first presents the results of a simple regression of the Q-
ratio on the SACGI only, whilst columns 4 to 9 report the results of multivariate regression of 
the  Q-ratio  on  the  SACGI  and  the  control  variables  for  the  full  sample  in  addition  to  a 
regression for each of the five firm-years, respectively.  
Consistent with the results of the ROA, Column 3 of Table 18 suggests that the F-
value of the simple regression is statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests that the 
null hypothesis that the coefficient on the SACGI is equal to zero can be rejected. It implies 
that the SACGI can explain statistically significant variations in the sampled firms’ market 
value. The adjusted R
2 is 10%, which is very similar to the adjusted R
2 obtained for the ROA. 
This also indicates that at least 10% of the variations in the sampled firms’ market value (Q-
ratio) can be explained by the quality of their internal corporate governance structures (the 
SACGI). This is also an improvement in the results reported by Klapper and Love (2004). It is, 
however, very similar to the results of Black et al. (2006a).  
Using a cross-country sample that includes South Africa, Klapper and Love (2004, 
p.719) report an adjusted R
2 of 3% for a simple regression of the Q-ratio on their composite 
corporate governance index. In a simple regression of the Q-ratio on their composite corporate 
governance index, Black et al. (2006a, p.381) document adjusted R
2 of 12%.   
 
273
Table 18: OLS Regression Results of the Compliance-Index Model Based on Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio – Market Measure) 
  Exp. 
Sign 
All firm years  All firm years  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
Adjusted R
2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
No. of observations 
       .100 
     .617 
   1.018 
 56.633(.000)
*** 
500 
     .292 
     .548 
   1.039 
 14.729(.000)
*** 
500 
     .160 
     .506 
   2.089 
   2.716(.005)
*** 
100 
     .218 
     .469 
   1.936 
   3.503(.000)
*** 
100 
      .071 
      .530 
    1.966 
    1.690(.089)
* 
100 
     .142 
     .632 
   1.933 
   2.495(.009)
*** 
100 
     .167 
     .641 
   2.185 
   2.804(.004)
*** 
100 
Constant 
SACGI 
Firm size  
Capital structure  
Sales growth  
Capital expenditure  
Dual-listing  
Audit firm size 
Basic materials  
Consumer services  
Industrials  
Technology  
Year 2002 
Year 2004 
Year 2005 
Year 2006 
 
+ 
- 
-/+ 
+ 
-/+ 
+ 
+ 
 .926(.000)
*** 
 .009(.000)
*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .720(.000)
*** 
 .004(.008)
*** 
-.172(.000)
*** 
-.003(.000)
*** 
 .001(.373)
 
 .020(.001)
*** 
 .192(.006)
*** 
 .158(.016)
** 
 .237(.004)
*** 
 .416(.000)
*** 
 .099(.209) 
 .215(.006)
*** 
 .053(.501) 
 .178(.024)
** 
 .397(.000)
*** 
 .565(.000)
*** 
 .899(.000)
*** 
 .001(.737)
 
 .011(.912) 
-.003(.070)
* 
 .003(.226)
 
 .014(.309) 
 .321(.039)
** 
 .134(.327) 
 .192(.266) 
 .257(.118) 
-.032(.844) 
 .184(.263) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .681(.000)
*** 
 .003(.015)
** 
-.265(.009)
*** 
-.001(.344) 
-.003(.223)
 
 .014(.303) 
 .135(.334) 
 .183(.172) 
 .238(.149) 
 .355(.021)
** 
-.043(.780) 
 .151(.323) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
  .985(.000)
*** 
  .001(.667) 
 -.209(.056)
* 
 -.001(.561)
 
  .002(.537)
 
  .003(.831) 
  .146(.328) 
  .160(.295) 
  .204(.248) 
  .439(.014)
** 
  .230(.178)
 
  .206(.227) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1.172(.000)
*** 
  .002(.706)
 
 -.178(.154)
 
 -.004(.069)
* 
  .004(.291)
 
  .039(.015)
** 
  .269(.152) 
  .098(.571) 
  .080(.707)
 
  .451(.033)
** 
  .032(.880) 
  .063(.765) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1.094(.000)
*** 
  .005(.096)
* 
 -.199(.110)
 
 -.006(.007)
*** 
  .002(.638)
 
  .027(.077)
* 
  .136(.455) 
  .143(.412) 
  .342(.110) 
  .533(.014)
** 
  .234(.268) 
  .358(.085)
* 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Notes: coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, **
 and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Also, consumer goods industry and year 
2003 are excluded from the regression analyses. They are used as base industry and year, respectively, for purposes of comparison. 
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 As  predicted  (i.e.,  hypothesis  eight),  the  SACGI  is  positive (.009)  and  statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This finding also supports the results of prior studies. Specifically, 
in a simple regression of the Q-ratio on their composite corporate governance indices, Klapper 
and Love (2004) and Black et al. (2006a) separately report statistically significant and positive 
relationships of .011 and .006, respectively. 
The statistically significant coefficient on the constant term in column 3 of Table 18 
seems to suggest that there may be omitted variables bias. Therefore, to control for potential 
omitted variables bias, control variables are added to the regressions in columns 4 to 9 of 
Table 18. In line with the results for the ROA, Column 4 of Table 18 shows that the F-value of 
each model is statistically significant. It indicates that the coefficients on the SACGI and the 
control variables can jointly explain significant variations in the sampled firms’ market value. 
The adjusted R
2 for each of the five years is between 7% and 21%, and 29% for the combined 
sample. This is generally similar to the results of prior South African studies. Using cross-
country samples that include South Africa, Klapper and Love (2004, p.719), Durnev and Kim 
(2005, p.1482), and Morey et al. (2009, p.260) report adjusted R
2 that include control variables 
of 37%, 34%, and 17%, respectively. 
As  expected  (i.e.,  hypothesis  eight),  Table  18  indicates  that  the  coefficient  on  the 
SACGI  is  positive  over  the  entire  sample  period.  However,  the  coefficient  is  statistically 
significant for the combined sample, as well as in 2003 and 2006, but insignificant in 2002, 
2004 and 2005
83. The statistically significant coefficient for the pooled sample, and in 2003 
and  2006  supports  hypothesis  eight  that  there  is  a  statistically  significant  and  positive 
relationship between the SACGI and the Q-ratio. 
This  indicates  that  investors  reward  South  African  listed  firms  that  show  higher 
standards of corporate governance with higher market valuation. Specifically, the result can be 
interpreted as a one standard deviation improvement in the average firm’s internal corporate 
governance (the SACGI) score from 60% to 82%, can be expected to be associated with an 
                                                 
83The statistically insignificant coefficients in 2004 and 2005 in particular are not empirically too surprising 
because, and as has already been discussed in chapter six, compliance with the SACGI generally improves over 
time. As variability in corporate governance standards across the sample reduces over time, the variability in 
market valuation (variation in the Q-ratio over time will be discussed further in chapter nine) among the sampled 
firms appears to also reduce. That is, with convergence of corporate governance standards over time, the ability 
of the SACGI to explain valuation differences among the sampled firms seems to also reduce. This also offers 
firm-level evidence to support the results of cross country studies, including Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev 
and Kim (2005), Chen et al. (2009), and Morey et al. (2009), which suggest that corporate governance matters 
more in countries with poor legal and investor protection regimes.  
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increase in its average market valuation (Q-ratio) by at least 20% (22.03 x .009) from 1.49 to 
1.79, all else equal.  
Of particular interest, and as expected, the adjusted R
2 for the pooled sample of 29%, 
and the valuation impact of 20% for the Q-ratio, are substantially higher when compared with 
those of the ROA. As has already been discussed in subsection 5.2.2.3 of chapter five, this 
may  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  ROA  is  a  historical  measure,  which  reflects  actual 
accounting profits from the operations of firms. By contrast, as a market based measure, Q-
ratio reflects potential future growth opportunities of firms. This implies that the association 
between  firm-level  improvements  in  the  quality  of  corporate  governance  and  financial 
performance is more likely to be tighter for the market based measure (Q-ratio) than for the 
accounting based measure of performance (ROA). The adjusted R
2 of the full sample in the 
regression analysis when the control variables are added is higher for the Q-ratio than for the 
ROA. The adjusted R
2 for the ROA and Q-ratio, however, become essentially the same when 
the control variables are excluded. This further suggests that the control variables account 
more for the observed differences in the adjusted R
2 between the two performance measures. 
Overall, the positive relationship between the Q-ratio and the SACGI offers additional 
empirical support to the extant corporate governance literature, as well as the results of prior 
South African studies. For example, Beiner et al. (2006), Black et al., (2006a), and Henry 
(2008) find that corporate governance is positively correlated with the Q-ratio for a sample of 
Swiss, South Korean, and Australian listed firms, respectively. Similarly, using cross-country 
samples that include South Africa, Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev and Kim (2005), and 
Morey et al. (2009) separately report a statistically significant and positive link between the 
Q-ratio and the quality of a firm’s corporate governance.  
The evidence of a statistically significant and positive internal corporate governance-
performance link is also in line with the extant theory.  It has been suggested that compliance 
with a Code of Best Governance Practice, such as King II, is a major way by which firms 
signal  to  investors  that  they  are  better-governed,  and  by  implication  working  in  the  best 
interests  of  shareholders  (Shabbir  and  Padget,  2005,  p.1).  The  positive  perception  is  then 
translated by investors into higher valuation for such firms perceived by the market to be 
better-governed. 
With regard to the control variables, the coefficient on sales growth, year 2002 and 
industrials firms’ dummies are not statistically significant, whereas the rest are statistically 
significant for the combined sample. In line with predictions, firm size, and capital structure  
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are negatively associated with the Q-ratio, whilst sales growth, capital expenditure, audit firm 
size and dual-listing are positively correlated with the Q-ratio for the full sample.  
Across the years, the negative coefficient on firm size is further statistically significant 
in 2003 and 2004, whereas the negative coefficient on capital structure is also significant in 
2002, 2005 and 2006. The negative relationship between gearing and performance suggests 
that more profitable firms tend to use less debt than equity. This is because equity offers 
managers  more  financial  flexibility  (Shabbir  and  Padget,  2005,  p.19).  The  negative  size-
performance link also indicates that investors perceive smaller firms as better performers than 
their larger counterparts (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, p.1052). Empirically, the findings are 
consistent with the results of prior corporate governance studies. Specifically, Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996), Durnev and Kim (2005), and Henry (2008) report statistically significant and 
negative association between the Q-ratio and firm size.  
Across the  years, the positive coefficient on capital expenditure is also statistically 
significant in 2005 and 2006. The statistically significant and positive coefficients on capital 
expenditure offers empirical support to the theory that firms with greater investment in assets, 
innovation and technology, are more able to stimulate faster growth, and tend to be associated 
with  superior  sustainable  performance  (Jermias,  2007,  p.829).  The  positive  relationship 
between capital expenditure and the Q-ratio generally supports the results of prior studies (e.g., 
Black et al., 2006a; Brown et al., 2009). 
Apart from the full sample, the positive coefficient on dual-listing is also statistically 
significant at the 5% level in 2002. The statistically significant and positive coefficient on 
dual-listing in 2002 supports the idea that firms resort to cross-listing as a way of reducing the 
agency costs of controlling shareholders by offering them greater access to cheaper external 
capital. This makes them better able to take advantage of growth opportunities relative to their 
non-dual-listed  counterparts  (Doidge  et  al.,  2009,  p.425;  Melvin  and  Valero,  2009,  p.66). 
Evidence  of  a  statistically  significant  and  positive  dual-listing-performance  link  is  also 
consistent with the results of recent corporate governance studies. Specifically, using cross-
country samples that include South Africa, Klapper and Love (2004) and Charitou and Louca 
(2009) independently report that cross-listed firms generate higher financial performance than 
their non dual-listed counterparts. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on audit 
firm size for the pooled sample implies that the market values firms that are audited by a big 
four audit firm higher than those that are audited a non big four audit firm.  
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Of special interest is that the coefficients on all of the industry and year dummies for 
the combined sample are positive. As has been explained above, except for the coefficients on 
industrials firms and year 2002, which are statistically insignificant, all the industry and the 
year  dummies  for  the  pooled  sample  are  statistically  significant.  The  positive  industry 
coefficients suggest that, on average, industrial firms (positive but insignificant coefficient) 
performed poorly compared with their counterparts in the other four industries. Similarly, and 
in line with the suggestions of the descriptive statistics, performance was lower for the average 
firm in 2002 than in the other years. By contrast, the results indicate that consumer services 
firms  received  higher  (highest  significant  positive  coefficient)  market  valuation  than  their 
counterparts. Also, and similar to the results of the descriptive statistics, the year coefficients 
show that the average sampled firm’s market valuation was higher in 2006 (highest significant 
positive coefficient) than in the other years. 
Overall, the results offer empirical support to prior evidence that suggests that a firm’s 
industry and year of operation can affect its financial performance. Specifically, Klapper and 
Love  (2004),  Beiner  et  al.  (2006),  and  Haniffa  and  Hudaib  (2006)  separately  report 
statistically significant industrial differences in the levels of financial performance, whereas 
Shabbir and Padget (2005) and Henry (2008) independently find that financial performance of 
firms tend to differ over time. 
To sum up, this subsection has presented the results of the compliance-index model. 
Consistent with the prior literature, it shows that irrespective of the performance measure used, 
on  average,  better-governed  firms  are  associated  with  significantly  higher  financial 
performance than their poorly-governed counterparts. Generally, this offers empirical support 
to hypothesis eight. However, and interpreting the coefficients of the simple regressions, the 
association between the Q-ratio and firm-level corporate governance appears to be stronger 
than the relationship between firm-level corporate governance and ROA. This is theoretically 
expected because, as a historical based measure, accounting profit reflects actual company 
performance, while as a market based measure, the Q-ratio captures NPV of all future growth 
opportunities.  
By contrast, when simple regressions of the performance measures (ROA and Q-ratio) 
against the SACGI without the control variables are run, the results show that the ability of the 
SACGI to explain variations in the ROA and Q-ratio are very similar. However, when the 
control variables are added, the explanatory power of the Q-ratio becomes substantially higher  
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than the ROA. This indicates that the contribution of the control variables accounts more for 
the observed difference in the SACGI’s ability to explain variations in the ROA and Q-ratio. 
As have been discussed in chapters five, six and seven, the SACGI will be split into 
two: the Social-SACGI and the Economic-SACGI. This is to help in quantifying the economic 
consequence of complying with the nine South African context specific affirmative action and 
stakeholder corporate governance provisions (the Social-SACGI) on South African listed firms. 
Therefore, the next subsection will discuss the results obtained based on estimating the Social-
SACGI and the Economic-SACGI. 
 
8.1.3 OLS Regression Results of the Link between Financial Performance and  
         Sub-Indices 
 
Table 19 contains the regression results of the financial performance proxies (ROA and 
Q-ratio) on the two constructed sub-indices: the Social-SACGI and the Economic-SACGI. As 
have been explained in chapters five and six, the Social-SACGI consists of nine South African 
context specific affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions. These are 
board  diversity  on  the  basis  of  ethnicity  (BDIVE1)  and  gender  (BDIVG1),  policies  and 
practices with respect to black economic empowerment (BEE), HIV/Aids (HIV), employment 
equity (PEQ), health and safety (PHS), environment (PEP), corporate social investment (CSI), 
and  ethics  (DCE).  The  Economic-SACGI  is  made  up  of  the  remaining  41  ‘conventional’ 
corporate governance provisions. Methodologically, splitting the SACGI is in line with past 
corporate governance studies (e.g., Durnev and Kim, 2005; Black et al., 2006a). For example, 
Durnev  and  Kim  (2005)  split  their  composite  corporate  governance  index  into  investor 
protection, transparency, and social awareness sub-indices. 
The  rationale  is  to  empirically  investigate  whether  compliance  with  the  two  sub-
indices  results  in  different  impacts  on  the  sampled  firms’  financial  performance.  This  is 
because, and from a theoretical perspective, it has been contended that the inclusion of the 
South  African  context  specific  affirmative  and  stakeholder  issues  as  part  of  the  general 
corporate governance provisions for listed firms to comply by King II imposes excessive costs 
burden on them (e.g., Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 2002; LSE, 2007). If this contention 
holds, then a priori, it can be expected that compliance with the Social-SACGI is more likely 
to negatively affect the sampled firms’ financial performance. By contrast, compliance with 
the  Economic-SACGI  can  be  expected  to  have  a  positive  impact  on  the  sampled  firms’ 
financial performance.  
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Table 19: OLS Regression Results of Financial Performance on the Social and Economic Sub-indices 
Performance  Variable  Exp. 
sign 
ROA  Q-ratio  ROA  Q-ratio  ROA  Q-ratio  ROA  Q-ratio 
Adjusted R
2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
No. of observations 
        .104 
      .117 
      .871
 
 58.641(.000)
*** 
500 
    .103 
    .617 
  1.027 
58.163(.000)
*** 
500 
   .181 
   .112 
   .873 
8.332(.000)
*** 
500 
    .298 
    .545 
  1.040 
15.110(.000)
*** 
500 
    .089 
    .118 
    .864 
49.892(.000)
*** 
500 
    .087 
    .622 
  1.018 
50.103(.000)
*** 
500 
  .179 
  .112 
  .978 
8.233(.000)
*** 
500 
    .291 
    .520 
  1.059 
14.600(.000)
*** 
500 
Constant 
Social-SACGI 
Economic-SACGI 
Firm size 
Capital structure 
Sales growth 
Capital expenditure 
Dual-listing 
Audit firm size 
Basic materials 
Consumer services 
Industrials 
Technology 
2002 
2004 
2005 
2006 
 
- 
+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
+ 
-/+ 
+ 
-/+ 
-.004(.743) 
 .001(.000)
*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1.011(.000)
*** 
  .001(.000)
*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .030(.142) 
 .001(.000)
*** 
- 
 .008(.384) 
 .000(.002)
*** 
 .001(.000)
*** 
-.001(.416) 
 .016(.236) 
 .002(.905) 
-.042(.010)
*** 
-.019(.244) 
-.022(.177) 
-.000(.995) 
-.009(.573) 
-.016(.321) 
-.012(.462) 
-.001(.993) 
 .716(.000)
*** 
 .003(.009)
*** 
- 
-.180(.000)
*** 
-.003(.000)
*** 
 .001(.476) 
 .019(.002)
*** 
 .168(.006)
*** 
 .161(.009)
*** 
 .230(.004)
*** 
 .408(.000)
*** 
 .101(.196) 
 .200(.011)
** 
 .049(.526) 
 .175(.025)
** 
 .391(.000)
*** 
 .559(.000)
*** 
-.013(.398) 
- 
 .002(.000)
*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
.970(.000)
*** 
- 
.009(.000)
*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .011(.614) 
- 
 .002(.000)
*** 
 .014(.140)
 
 .000(.002)
*** 
 .002(.000)
*** 
-.001(.670) 
 .019(.191) 
-.012(.368) 
-.034(.043)
** 
-.019(.240) 
-.025(.124) 
 .007(.675) 
-.001(.961) 
-.018(.264) 
-.014(.374) 
-.004(.823) 
 .746(.000) 
- 
 .006(.010)
*** 
-.172(.000)
*** 
-.003(.000)
*** 
 .001(.345) 
 .021(.001)
*** 
 .210(.002)
*** 
 .172(.010)
*** 
 .232(.004)
*** 
 .423(.000)
*** 
 .101(.202) 
 .219(.005)
*** 
 .047(.552) 
 .183(.020)
** 
 .404(.000)
*** 
 .574(.000)
*** 
Notes: coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, and **
  denote p-value is significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. Also, consumer goods industry and year 2003 are excluded from the 
regression analyses. They are used as base industry and year, respectively, for purposes of comparison. 
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Columns 3 and 4 of Table 19 present the regression results of ROA and Q-ratio on the 
Social-SACGI  alone  without  the  control  variables.  The  F-values  of  both  regressions  are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Therefore, the null hypothesis that the coefficient on 
the Social-SACGI is equal to zero can be rejected. It means that the coefficient on the Social-
SACGI can explain significant differences in the sampled firms’ financial performance. The 
adjusted R
2 is approximately 10% for both the ROA and Q-ratio. This means that on its own, 
the Social-SACGI can explain approximately 10% of the variability in the sampled firms’ 
ROA and Q-ratio. This is very similar to the adjusted R
2 reported in Column 3 of Tables 17 
and 18 for the SACGI, but statistically 0.2% and 0.3% higher in the case of ROA and the Q-
ratio, respectively. As have been discussed in chapters six and seven, this is expected because 
the average firm’s compliance level with the Social-SACGI was higher (67%) than the average 
firm’s  compliance  level  (60%)  with  the  SACGI.  This  explains  the  marginally  higher 
explanatory power of the Social-SACGI compared with the SACGI. 
The coefficient on the Social-SACGI under both the ROA and Q-ratio is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The positive link between the Social-SACGI and the 
two financial performance proxies (ROA and Q-ratio) is contrary to theoretical expectations. 
This implies that, on average, firms that comply better with the South African context specific 
affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions (the Social-SACGI) are 
associated with higher accounting returns and/or receive higher market valuation.  
The statistically significant coefficient on the constant term in column 4 (under the Q-
ratio) of Table 19 seems to suggest that there may be omitted variables bias. As a result, to test 
whether the unexpected positive relationship between the Social-SACGI and the performance 
proxies is spuriously caused by some omitted variables, the control variables are added to the 
regressions in Columns 5 and 6 of Table 19. The F-values of both regressions are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This means that the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the 
Social-SACGI and the control variables are jointly equal to zero can be rejected. This indicates 
that  the  coefficients  on  the  Social-SACGI  and  the  control  variables  can  jointly  explain 
significant  differences  in  the  sampled  firms’  financial  performance.  The  adjusted  R
2  is 
approximately  18%  and  30%  for  the  ROA  and  Q-ratio,  respectively.  This  means  that  the 
Social-SACGI together with the control variables can explain approximately 18% and 29% of 
the variability in the sampled firms’ ROA and Q-ratio, respectively. This is also very similar 
to the adjusted R
2 reported in Column 4 of Tables 17 and 18 for the SACGI with the control  
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variables, but statistically 0.8% lower with respect to the ROA, and .6% higher in the case of 
the Q-ratio.  
Similar to the results of the SACGI, when simple regressions are run, the ability of the 
Social-SACGI to explain variations in the ROA and Q-ratio are essentially the same. However, 
once control variables are included, the ability of the Social-SACGI to explain variations in the 
Q-ratio is substantially (12%) higher than the ROA. This implies that the observed difference 
in explanatory power between the ROA and Q-ratio can be attributed to the effects of the 
control variables. 
With respect to the coefficient on the Social-SACGI, it remains positive under both 
performance measures, the ROA and Q-ratio. The main difference, however, is that whereas 
the coefficient under the ROA remains unchanged at .001, that of the Q-ratio has increase 
from .001 to .003. This means that the valuation impact for complying with the Social-SACGI 
when control variables are included is higher at 9% (i.e., 29.21 x .003) for the Q-ratio than for 
the ROA at 3% (i.e., 29.21 x .001). As has already been explained above, this is theoretically 
expected because, as a market based measure, Q-ratio captures discounted future expected 
cash flows without accounting for potential deviations from actual cash flows. By contrast, as 
a historical based measure, ROA reflects actual accounting profits from operations, including 
deviations  from  projected  profits.  This  explains  the  observed  difference  in  valuation 
consequences of complying with the Social-SACGI between the ROA and Q-ratio. 
What  then  explains  the  positive  rather  than  the  theoretically  expected  negative 
relationship  between  the  Social-SACGI  and  financial  performance  proxies?  As  have  been 
discussed in chapters six and seven, both the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients 
indicate that the levels of compliance with the Social-SACGI are statistically significant and 
positively correlated with the levels of  compliance with the SACGI.   This shows that, on 
average, the sampled firms’ with higher total corporate governance (the SACGI) scores also 
tend  to  comply  better  with  the  South  African  context  specific  affirmative  action  and 
stakeholder corporate governance provisions (the Social-SACGI).  
Practically,  and  as  will  be  explained  further  below,  this  means  that  the  valuation 
consequences of complying with the South African context specific affirmative action and 
stakeholder corporate governance provisions appears to outweigh the costs implications such 
that  there  is  a  net  positive  impact  on  financial  performance.  Empirically,  the  positive 
coefficient  offers  support  to  the  results  of  Durnev  and  Kim  (2005,  p.1482)  who  report  a  
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positive, but statistically insignificant, relationship between their social awareness sub-index 
and the Q-ratio.  
Despite being contrary to theoretical expectations, evidence that the sampled  firms 
tend to be associated with higher accounting returns (ROA) or investors value (the Q-ratio)  
compliance with the affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions in 
South Africa is, however, less surprising. As has been discussed in chapters two and three, 
even though the South African corporate governance model is predominantly Anglo-American, 
listed  firms  are  officially  required  to  comply  with  a  number  of  affirmative  action  and 
stakeholder provisions. This compels listed firms to depict some of the major characteristics of 
both  the  ‘shareholding’  and  ‘stakeholding’  governance  models.  Most  of  these  affirmative 
action and stakeholder provisions are meant to address some of the apparent negative social 
and economic legacies of Apartheid in South Africa. 
As has also been discussed in chapter three, apart from being part of King II and the 
JSE’s listing rules, some of the stakeholder provisions, such as employment equity (PEP) and 
black economic empowerment (BEE) are backed by enforceable statutory legislation. There 
are  also  occasional  implicit  threats  from  government  (political  cost)  of  its  intentions  to 
introduce more stringent laws if firms do not voluntarily comply (e.g., Rossouw et al., 2002; 
West, 2009). This implies that listed firms, and especially large companies, are more likely to 
voluntarily comply with the South African context specific affirmative action and stakeholder 
provisions in order to minimise potential political costs, such as strigent regulation, taxation, 
and nationalisation (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, p.115; Andreasson, 2009, p.22). Together, 
they appear to compel firms to comply with the affirmative action and stakeholder provisions, 
and also seems to explain why compliance with the Social-SACGI is higher than the SACGI.  
Crucially,  and  of  a  particular  relevance  to  basic  materials  and  technology  firms, 
securing and renewing profitable government and mining contracts, for instance, are normally 
linked to satisfying black empowerment and employment equity targets (e.g., Murray, 2000; 
Malherbe and Segal, 2003). This means that compliance with the Social-SACGI may be a 
major way by which firms can gain access to valuable resources, including securing profitable 
government backed empowerment deals and contracts that can facilitate growth and improve 
long-term financial performance. This seems to serve as a major additional motivation for 
firms to voluntarily comply with the Social-SACGI, and hence, appears to explain the positive 
association between the Social-SACGI and both the ROA and Q-ratio.  
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With reference to the control variables, their statistical significance and direction of the 
coefficients  remain  very  similar  to  those  reported  in  column  4  of  Tables  17  and  18, 
respectively. For example, the significance and the coefficients of firm size, capital structure, 
sales growth, capital expenditure, audit firm size and dual-listing under both the ROA and Q-
ratio remain unchanged when compared with those of the combined SACGI, indicating that the 
results  are  stable.  Overall,  the  results  suggest  that  the  Social-SACGI  holds  significant 
explanatory  power  over  the  variability  in  firm  financial  performance  with  or  without  the 
control variables. 
Columns 7 and 8 of Table 19 report the regression results of ROA and Q-ratio on the 
Economic-SACGI alone without the control variables. The F-values of both regressions are 
statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level.  This  suggests  that  the  null  hypothesis  that  the 
coefficient  on  the  Economic-SACGI  is  equal  to  zero  can  be  rejected.  It  indicates  that  the 
coefficient on the Economic-SACGI can explain significant differences in the sampled firms’ 
financial performance. The adjusted R
2 is approximately 9% for both the ROA and Q-ratio. 
This  means  that  on  its  own,  the  Economic-SACGI  can  explain  approximately  9%  of  the 
variability in the sampled firms’ ROA and Q-ratio. This is approximately 1% less than the 
adjusted R
2 reported in Column 3 of Tables 17 and 18 for the SACGI. This is expected because, 
on average, the Social-SACGI holds more explanatory power than the SACGI. As a result, the 
Economic-SACGI appears to loose some of its explanatory power through the exclusion of the 
Social-SACGI from the SACGI. Consistent with theoretical predictions, the coefficient on the 
Economic-SACGI under both the ROA and Q-ratio is positive and statistically significant at 
the  1%  significance  level.  This  supports  the  previous  conclusion  that,  on  average,  better-
governed firms are associated with higher financial performance than their poorly-governed 
counterparts.  
The statistically significant coefficient on the constant term in column 8 (under the Q-
ratio) of Table 19 appears to suggest that there may be omitted variables bias. Therfore, to 
ascertain whether the positive relationship between the Economic-SACGI and the performance 
proxies is spuriously caused by some omitted variables, the control variables are included in 
the  regressions  in  Columns  9  and  10  of  Table  19.  The  F-value  of  both  regressions  are 
statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level.  This  implies  that  the  null  hypothesis  that  the 
coefficients on the Economic-SACGI and the control variables are jointly equal to zero can be 
rejected. This indicates that the coefficients on the Economic-SACGI and the control variables 
can jointly explain significant differences in the sampled firms’ financial performance. The  
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adjusted R
2 is approximately 18% and 29% for the ROA and Q-ratio, respectively. This means 
that the Economic-SACGI together with the control variables can explain approximately 18% 
and 29% of the variability in the sampled firms’ ROA and Q-ratio, respectively. This is also 
very similar to the adjusted R
2 reported in Column 4 of Tables 17 and 19 for the SACGI with 
the  control  variables,  but  statistically  1%  and  .1%  less  in  the  case  of  ROA  and  Q-ratio, 
respectively. 
With respect to the coefficient on the Economic-SACGI, it remains positive under both 
the ROA and Q-ratio. The main difference, however, is that while the coefficient under the 
ROA remains the same at .002, that of the Q-ratio has decreased from .009 to .006. This may 
also be explained by the exclusion of the impact of the Social-SACGI from the SACGI. 
With reference to the control variables, their statistical significance and direction of the 
coefficients remain essentially the same as those reported in column 4 of Tables 17 and 18, 
respectively. For example, the significance and the coefficient of firm size, capital structure, 
sales growth, capital expenditure, audit firm size and dual-listing under both the ROA and Q-
ratio remain unchanged when compared with those of the combined SACGI, indicating that the 
results  are  stable.  Overall,  the  results  suggest  that  the  Economic-SACGI  holds  significant 
explanatory power over the variability in the sampled firms’ financial performance with or 
without the control variables. This reinforces the earlier conclusion that South African listed 
firms with higher quality corporate governance standards, on average, tend to be associated 
with higher financial returns than their counterparts with lower quality corporate governance 
standards. 
In  summing  up,  this  subsection  has  examined  the  economic  consequences  of 
complying with the nine South African context specific affirmative action and stakeholder 
corporate governance provisions (the Social-SACGI) for South African listed firms. Contrary 
to  theoretical  expectations,  compliance  with  the  Social-SACGI  is  found  to  be  statistically 
significant and positively related to both the ROA and Q-ratio. The main implication of this 
evidence is that South African listed firms that comply better with the nine affirmative action 
and stakeholder corporate governance provisons tend to be associated with significantly higher 
financial returns, as measured by the ROA and Q-atio than their counterparts that do not.  
Despite being contrary to theoretical predictions, however, the results can be explained 
within the South African context. Compliance with the Social-SACGI appears to be a major 
way by which South African listed firms seem to reduce possible political costs and also gain 
access to valuable resources, such as securing profitable mining and government contracts to  
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expand growth opportunities and improve long-term financial performance. This appears to 
serve as a great motivation for firms to comply with the Social-SACGI, and thus may explain 
the  positive  relationship  between  the  Social-SACGI  and  both  the  ROA  and  Q-ratio.  As 
hypothesised,  the  Economic-SACGI  is  found  to  be  statistically  significant  and  positively 
associated with both the ROA and Q-ratio. Overall, the results support the earlier conclusion 
that, on average, better-governed South African listed firms tend to be associated with higher 
financial returns than their poorly-governed counterparts. 
In  the  final  section  below,  the  empirical  strengths  of  the  compliance-index  (the 
Economic-SACGI) model and the equilibrium-variable model will be assessed and compared 
using their respective results, as well as the summary  regression diagnostics. Specifically, 
subsection 8.2.1 will compare their respective regression results, whilst subsection 8.2.2 will 
carry out similar comparison using their respective summary regression diagnostics. 
 
 
8.2 A COMPARISON OF THE RESULTS OF THE COMPLIANCE-INDEX AND     
      THE EQUILIBRIUM-VARIABLE MODELS 
 
  As  has  been  discussed  in  subsection  5.2.1  of  chapter  five,  the  prior  literature  has 
mainly either used a compliance-index model or an equilibrium-variable model. To date, no 
researcher has used both approaches within the same study and context in order to assess their 
respective  potential  empirical  strengths.  This  section  attempts  to  fill  this  gap  in  the  prior 
literature  by  comparing  further  the  results  obtained  under  the  compliance-index  and  the 
equilibrium-variable models. 
    
8.2.1 A Comparison of the Empirical Results of the Compliance-Index and the  
         Equilibrium-Variable Models 
   
Since  the  compliance-index  model  contains  conventional  (41  out  of  50)  and  non-
conventional  (9  out  of  50)  corporate  governance  provisions,  it  may  be  in  appropriate  to 
compare  its  results  with  those  of  the  equilibrium-variable  model,  which  contains  only 
conventional corporate governance mechanisms. As a result, the comparison is done by using 
the  Economic-SACGI  and  the  equilibrium-variable  model.  Comparing  the  results
84 of  the 
                                                 
84Despite the fact that the two models have different number of explanatory variables, drawing comparisons of 
the  respective  strengths  of  their  empirical  results  is  deemed  appropriate.  This  is  because  both  models  are 
estimated based on the same dataset and context. More importantly, and as has been discussed in subsection 5.2.1 
of chapter five, the models are based on distinct or contrasting ontological, epistemological, methodological and 
data requirements assumptions. For example, past researchers using the compliance-index model have usually 
composed some measure of a ‘compliance or composite’ corporate governance index in examining the corporate  
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equilibrium-variable  model  in  Tables  14  and  16  to  those  of  the  compliance-index  (the 
Economic-SACGI)  in  Table  19  model  and  ignoring  possible  endogenity  problems  and 
potential interdependences
85, a number of interesting findings emerge. The results contained in 
Table 19 show that irrespective of the performance measure used, the Economic-SACGI is 
statistically significant with consistent positive coefficient over the entire sample period (for 
brevity purposes, the results for the firm years are not reported here) in the case of the ROA. 
The  Economic-SACGI  is  statistically  insignificant  in  2002,  2004  and  2005  (for  brevity 
purposes, the results for the firm years are not presented here) with respect to the Q-ratio.  
However,  the  p-values  are  relatively  low  (relatively  close  to becoming  statistically 
significant) with consistently positive coefficients. Overall, and consistent with the results of 
recent researchers who also constructed some measure of ‘composite’ corporate governance 
index (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Beiner et al., 2006; Henry, 2008), it suggests that a firm’s 
internal corporate governance structures significantly and positively impact on its financial 
(both accounting and market based measures) performance.  
  By contrast, and in line with previous evidence (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Vefeas, 1999; 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), the results of the equilibrium-variable model presented in Tables 
14 and 16 are highly mixed. Irrespective of the performance proxy used, most of the corporate 
governance  variables  are  statistically  insignificant,  and  even  where  they  are  found  to  be 
significant, the sign of the coefficients are not consistent across the performance measures. 
Overall, and consistent with past evidence (e.g., Weir and Laing, 2000; Weir et al., 2002), the 
results obtained from this model suggest either a statistically weak or insignificant relationship 
between the selected single internal corporate governance structures and financial performance. 
  In  summary,  it  is  evident  from  the  reported  results  that  the  compliance-index 
(Economic-SACGI) model provides better empirical properties, as well as explanatory power 
than  the  equilibrium-variable  model.  In  the  next  and  last  subsection,  summary  regression 
diagnostics will be examined further to ascertain whether similar conclusions can be drawn.  
 
                                                                                                                                                         
governance-financial performance link (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Beiner et al., 2006; Black et al., 2006a; Henry, 
2008; Morey et al., 2009). Similarly, the equilibrium-variable model researchers have applied different measures 
and/or  number  of  single  corporate  governance  metrics  in  assessing  the  corporate  governance-financial 
performance relationship, such as board size (Yermack, 1996; Guest, 2009), director ownership (Morck et al., 
1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990), the frequency of board meetings (Vefeas, 1999a), board diversity (Carter et 
al., 2003), as well as a number of corporate governance provisions together (e.g., Laing and Weir, 1999; Weir et 
al., 2002; Bozec, 2005; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006).  
85In chapter nine, the extent to which the results reported in this chapter are robust or sensitive to the potential 
existence of endogeneities and interdependences among possible alternative corporate governance mechanisms 
will be examined.  
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8.2.2 A Comparison of Summary Regression Diagnostics 
 
First, and as has been discussed in chapter seven, normal distributional properties and 
statistics  were  conducted  for  both  the  compliance-index  (the  Economic-SACGI)  and 
equilibrium-variable  models.  They  indicate  that  irrespective  of  the  financial  performance 
measure and regression diagnostic used, the compliance-index (the Economic-SACGI) model 
provides better distributional properties than the equilibrium-variable model. For example, 
while  none  of  the  computed  tolerance  statistics  for  the  compliance-index  (the  Economic-
SACGI) model is above the critical value of one, some of the equilibrium-variables, such as 
director ownership, have tolerance statistics well above the critical value of one. Similarly, the 
statistics show that the equilibrium-variable model possesses poor Cook’s distances, condition 
indices, eigenvalues, variance proportions, VIF, and studentised residuals, in comparison with 
those of the compliance-index (the Economic-SACGI) model.  
Second, Table 20 presents summary regression diagnostics from both the compliance-
index (the Economic-SACGI) and the equilibrium-variable models. They have already been 
reported in Tables 14, 16 and 19, but have been repeated to facilitate comparison. Panels A to 
G  report  summary  regression  diagnostics  for:  the  pooled  sample,  but  without  the  control 
variables; the pooled sample with the control variables; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005; and 2006 
firm years, respectively.  
For each model, adjusted R
2, F-value and its statistical significance, standard error, and 
Durbin-Watson statistics are reported. Briefly, the adjusted R
2 provides an indication of the 
extent to which the internal corporate governance variables are able to explain the observed 
variability in the financial performance measure under consideration. The higher the adjusted 
R
2, the greater the explanatory power of the model. 
The  F-value  tests  for  whether  the  coefficients  on  all  the  independent  (corporate 
governance) variables in a particular model are jointly significant. The lower the significance 
level (i.e., closer to zero), the better the model. The standard error is a measure of the standard 
deviation of the distribution of the regression residuals. The lower the standard errors, the 
better the model. Durbin-Watson statistic tests for the level of autocorrelation in a particular 
model.  A  higher  Durbin-Watson  statistic  indicates  the  absence  of  serious  autocorrelation 
problems.     
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Table 20: A Comparison of Summary Regression Diagnostics 
Compliance-Index 
Model (E-SACGI) 
Equilibrium-
Variable Model 
Regression Diagnostics 
ROA  Q-ratio  ROA  Q-ratio 
Panel A: All firm Years – without control variables 
Adjusted R
2 
F-value 
F-value significance 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson statistic 
 
.089 
49.892 
.000 
.118 
.864 
 
.087 
50.103 
.000 
.622 
1.018 
 
.063 
3.522 
.000 
.116 
.904 
 
.062 
3.466 
.000 
.623 
1.032 
All firm Years – with control variables 
Adjusted R
2 
F-value 
F-value significance 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson statistic 
 
.179 
8.233 
.000 
.110 
.978 
 
.291 
14.600 
.000 
.520 
1.059 
 
.115 
3.125 
.000 
.114 
.925 
 
.290 
7.690 
.000 
.542 
.983 
Panel C: 2002 firm Year 
Adjusted R
2 
F-value 
F-value significance 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson statistic 
 
.218 
3.867 
.000 
.103 
2.125 
 
.194 
3.479 
.000 
.492 
2.064 
 
-.086 
.747 
.781 
.115 
2.010 
 
.171 
1.660 
.076 
.501 
2.008 
Panel D: 2003 firm Year 
Adjusted R
2 
F-value 
F-value significance 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson statistic 
 
.054 
1.634 
.095 
.109 
1.846 
 
.206 
3.158 
.000 
.436 
2.085 
 
.007 
1.028 
.419 
.115 
1.794 
 
.164 
1.749 
.048 
.492 
1.740 
Panel E: 2004 firm Year 
Adjusted R
2 
F-value 
F-value significance 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson statistic 
 
.204 
3.648 
.000 
.103 
1.864 
 
.086 
1.985 
.046 
.518 
1.959 
 
.021 
1.144 
.331 
.127 
2.114 
 
.243 
2.286 
.006 
.455 
2.105 
Panel F: 2005 firm year 
Adjusted R
2 
F-value 
F-value significance 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson statistic 
 
.185 
3.672 
.000 
.101 
2.423 
 
.154 
3.658 
.000 
.624 
1.938 
 
.042 
1.180 
.298 
.126 
1.980 
 
.110 
1.504 
.108 
.641 
1.905 
Panel G: 2006 firm year 
Adjusted R
2 
F-value 
F-value significance 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson statistic 
 
.168 
3.648 
.000 
.124 
1.804 
 
.184 
3.216 
.001 
.636 
2.328 
 
.102 
1.615 
.097 
.110 
1.918 
 
.153 
1.763 
.042 
.651 
2.007 
 
 
In line with the better distributional properties shown by the compliance-index (the 
Economic-SACGI) model, irrespective of the financial performance measure and the summary 
regression diagnostic used, they indicate that the compliance-index (the Economic-SACGI)  
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model  possesses  better  summary  diagnostics  than  the  equilibrium-variable  model.  For 
example,  while  the  adjusted  R
2  of  the  compliance-index  (the  Economic-SACGI)  model  in 
Panel  A  of  Table  20  suggests  that  the  Economic-SACGI  can  explain  about  9%  of  the 
variability in the ROA that of the equilibrium-variable model indicates that the 11 corporate 
governance mechanisms can only explain about 6%. The same trend is observed in Panels B to 
G of Table 20 for the Adjusted R
2.  
With regards to the F-value, while the F-values of the entire compliance-index (the 
Economic-SACGI) model are statistically significant, those of the equilibrium-variable model 
are not significant in years 2002 to 2005 in the case of the ROA, and in year 2005 with respect 
to  the  Q-ratio.  The  standard  errors  and  Durbin-Watson  statistics,  however,  present  mixed 
evidence. While the standard errors and Durbin-Watson statistics of the compliance-index (the 
Economic-SACGI) model are lower and higher, respectively, in the case of the Q-ratio, the 
opposite holds when the ROA is examined. Overall, and consistent with the suggestions of the 
individual variables’ p-values and coefficients, the compliance-index (the Economic-SACGI) 
model  appears  to  possess  better  empirical  properties  and  explanatory  power  than  the 
equilibrium-variable model. 
  Methodologically, this implies that despite its costly and labour intensive nature, on 
average,  it  seems  to  be  value  relevant  to  construct  some  measure  of  a  ‘compliance  or 
composite’ corporate governance index when examining the corporate governance-financial 
performance  relationship  rather  than  to  use  single  corporate  governance  mechanisms  in 
isolation. A major explanation (as have been discussed in chapters five and six) is that because 
the construction of a compliance-index (the Economic-SACGI) involves the use of several 
corporate  governance  variables,  it  appears  to  be  better  able  to  capture  actual  qualitative 
differences in corporate governance disclosures across firms. Arguably, this makes it more 
likely to achieve better cross-sectional variation in the quality of corporate governance among 
the sampled firms with higher explanatory power than using the equilibrium-variable model.  
 
 
8.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter has focused on presenting and discussing the empirical results regarding 
the  link  between  internal  corporate  governance  structures  and  firm  financial  performance. 
Specifically,  the  chapter  attempted  to  achieve  four  main  objectives.  First,  it  attempted  to 
examine  whether  better-governed  firms  based  on  the  equilibrium-variable  model  will  be  
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associated with higher financial performance, as measured by return on assets (ROA) and 
Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio). Consistent with the prior evidence, the results based on the equilibrium-
variable model indicate either a statistically weak or no relationship between the eleven single 
corporate governance structures and firm financial performance examined. Second, it sought 
to investigate whether better-governed firms based on the compliance-index model will be 
associated  with  higher  financial  performance.  The  results  based  on  the  compliance-index 
model suggest that there is a statistically significant and positive relationship between the 
SACGI and firm financial performance. This means that, on average, better-governed South 
African listed firms tend to be associated with higher financial returns, as measured by ROA 
and the Q-ratio than their poorly-governed counterparts.  
Third, the chapter attempted to quantify the economic consequences of complying with 
the  Social-SACGI  for  South  African  listed  firms.  Contrary  to  theoretical  expectations,  the 
results suggest that firms that comply better with the Social-SACGI tend to be associated with 
higher financial returns than firms that comply less with the Social-SACGI. Evidence of a 
positive  relationship  between  the  Social-SACGI  and  financial  performance  is,  however, 
consistent with the conditions within the South African corporate context. Within the South 
African corporate context, compliance with Social-SACGI appears to be a major way by which 
firms may gain access to critical business resources to enhance growth and improve financial 
performance.  
Finally, the chapter compared the empirical strengths of the two models based on their 
respective summary regression results and diagnostics. Whilst the results of the compliance-
index (the Economic-SACGI) model indicate a statistically significant and positive link with 
consistent  coefficients,  those  of  the  equilibrium-variable  model  are  ambiguous.  A  further 
comparison of the summary regression diagnostics indicates that, on average, the compliance-
index (the Economic-SACGI) model show better empirical properties, as well as explanatory 
power than those of the equilibrium-variable model. A major methodologically implication is 
that despite its expensive and labour intensive nature, on average, it appears to be valuable to 
construct some measure of a ‘compliance or composite’ corporate governance index when 
investigating the governance-financial performance relationship than to use single corporate 
governance mechanisms in isolation. 
A crucial issue is that the results presented so far ignores the possible existence of 
endogeneity  problems,  and/or  interdependences  among  possible  alternative  corporate 
governance mechanisms. The positive link between the SACGI and firm financial performance  
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that  has  been  established,  for  example,  could  be  spurious.  Therefore,  in  the  next  chapter 
(chapter nine), the main aim is to offer an indication of the extent to which the obtained 
empirical results are robust or sensitive to alternative estimations and explanations. In this 
regard, the robustness or sensitivity of the results to the existence of potential problems of 
endogeneity, and alternative corporate governance mechanisms will be thoroughly explored. 
More specifically, the results will be subjected to an extensive set of sensitivity analyses, 
including  estimating:  a  lagged  corporate  governance-financial  performance  structure;  an 
instrumental variable model; a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model; and a changes model.  
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CHAPTER NINE 
ROBUSTNESS OR SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
 
 
9. INTRODUCTION 
 
  This chapter discusses results based on a series of robustness or sensitivity analyses. 
The central objective is to demonstrate how the results reported in chapter eight are robust or 
sensitive to alternative explanations and estimations. More specifically, the chapter subjects 
the results presented in chapter eight to an extensive set of sensitivity analyses, including 
carrying out a lagged financial performance-corporate governance structure, an instrumental 
variable (IV) model, a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model, and a changes model estimations. 
The  remainder  of  the  chapter  is  organised  as  follows.  Section  9.1  briefly  outlines  the 
procedure suggested by Larcker and Rusticus (2008) for positive accounting researchers to 
address  endogeneity  problems  in  positive  accounting  research.  Section  9.2  reports  results 
based on estimating a lagged financial performance-corporate governance structure. Section 
9.3 discusses results based on estimating an instrumental variable (IV) model. Section 9.4 
reports  results  based  on  estimating  a  two-stage  least  squares  (2SLS)  model.  Section  9.5 
examines the relationship between year-on-year changes in both the financial performance 
proxies and the SACGI, whereas section 9.6 summarises the chapter. 
 
 
9.1 RESULTS AIMED AT ADDRESSING THE EXISTENCE OF POTENTIAL 
      ENDOGENITY PROBLEMS 
 
  As has already been explained in chapters five and eight, the results reported so far 
ignore  the  existence  of  possible  endogenity  problems,  as  well  as interdependences  among 
possible alternative corporate governance structures. Therefore, the next four sections examine 
the extent to which the reported results are robust or sensitive to the existence of potential 
endogenities  and  interdependences  among  possible  alternative  corporate  governance 
mechanisms. However, before presenting the results based on the robustness or sensitivity 
tests, the procedure for addressing potential endogeneity problems is first outlined below. 
As has been described in section 5.3 of chapter five, and unlike most of the prior 
literature,  in  this  study,  problems  that  the  potential  presence  of  endogeneity  poses  are  
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explicitly addressed. Specifically, the five-step procedure proposed by Larcker and Rusticus 
(2008, pp.25-31, 59) for positive accounting researchers is followed.  
Briefly, Larcker and Rusticus (2008, p.25) suggest that the first step in addressing any 
concerns  of  endogeneity  is  to  use  rigorous  accounting  theory  and  logic  to  specify  the 
endogenous  (dependent)  and  exogenous  (independent)  variables  within  the  structural 
equations.  In  chapters  four  and  five,  the  theoretical  links  between  the  dependent  and 
independent variables were discussed. Additionally, Larcker and Rusticus (2008) indicate that 
the  researcher  needs  to  explicitly  point  out  some  of  the  reasons  why  endogeneity  may 
potentially be a problem.  
As has also been discussed in subsection 5.3.1 of chapter five, due to potential omitted 
variables, measurement errors, equilibrium conditions and simultaneity or reverse causation, 
endogeneity could potentially be a problem in this study. Moreover, and as evident in chapter 
four, the corporate governance phenomenon is very complex. As a result, the study has relied 
on multiple, and sometimes conflicting theoretical perspectives, which arguably also increases 
the possibility that endogeneity could be introduced into the specified structural equations. 
According  to  Larcker  and  Rusticus  (2008),  the  second  step  involves  exploring  the 
various  alternative  ways  of  solving  the  endogeneity  problem.  As  has  been  described  in 
subsection 5.3.1,  problems  that  the potential  existence  of endogeneity  poses  are  explicitly 
addressed in four main ways. As will be discussed further below, these include estimating: (1) 
a lagged financial performance-corporate governance structure; (2) an instrumental variable 
model;  (3)  a  two-stage  least  squares  model;  and  (4)  a  changes  model.  The  third  step  as 
suggested by Larcker and Rusticus (2008) involves conducting exogeneity test on the key 
explanatory  variable  to  ascertain  whether  it  is  actually  endogenous  or  not.  In  this  case, 
following prior corporate governance studies (Shabbir and Padget, 2005, p.22; Beiner et al., 
2006, p.267), the popular Durbin-Wu-Hausman exogeneity test will be followed below. 
The fourth step suggested by Larcker and Rusticus (2008) is to demonstrate that any 
instrument used as a proxy for the original variable is a relevant and valid instrument. As will 
be explained further below, the predicted instrument to be used as a proxy for the SACGI (i.e., 
P-SACGI) in carrying out the instrumental variable (IV) estimation is a relevant and valid 
instrument.  The  final  step  suggested  by  Larcker  and  Rusticus  (2008)  is  to  compare  the 
magnitude, statistical significance and signs of the OLS and endogeneity corrected estimations 
to ascertain the extent to which they are robust or sensitive to the presence of endogeneity 
problems.     
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In the following four sections, results based on the four endogeneity analyses will be 
discussed  and  compared  with  those  based  on  the  OLS  estimates  that  have  already  been 
reported in chapter eight. Specifically, section 9.2 will present results obtained by estimating a 
lagged  financial  performance-corporate  governance  structure.  Section  9.3  discusses  results 
based on instrumental variable (IV) estimates. Section 9.4 reports results based on a two-stage 
least  squares  (2SLS)  model,  whereas  section  9.5  presents  results  based  on  estimating  a 
changes model.  
   
 
9.2 RESULTS BASED ON ESTIMATING A LAGGED FINANCIAL  
      PERFORMANCE-CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
   
  This  section  discusses  results  based  on  estimating  a  lagged  financial  performance-
corporate governance structure to deal with endogeneity problems that may arise as a result of 
a  time-lag  in  the  financial  performance-corporate  governance  relationship.  Specifically, 
subsection  9.2.1  reports  results  obtained  by  estimating  a  lagged  financial  performance-
corporate  governance  structure  based  on the  equilibrium-variable  model,  while  subsection 
9.2.2  presents  results  obtained  by  estimating  a  lagged  financial  performance-corporate 
governance structure based on the compliance-index model.  
 
9.2.1 Results from Estimating a Lagged Financial Performance-Corporate  
         Governance Structure based on the Equilibrium-Variable Model 
 
Columns  7  to  10  of  Table  21  contain  the  results  obtained  by  estimating  a  lagged 
financial performance-corporate governance structure for the equilibrium-variable model as 
specified in equation 11 in chapter five and repeated below:  
 
            
∑
=
- - -
- -
- - - -
- - - -
+ +
+ +
+ + + +
+ + + + =
n
i
it it i it
it it
it it it it
it it it it it
CONTROLS DTON
DTON DTON
RCOM NCOM ACOM FBMs
BDIV DUAL NEDs BSIZE FP
1
1 1
3
1 11
2
1 10 1 9
1 8 1 7 1 6 1 5
1 4 1 3 1 2 1 1 0
e b b
b b
b b b b
b b b b a
              (11) 
 
where FP refers to the financial performance proxies, as measured by the ROA and Q-ratio, 
and BSIZE, NEDS, DUAL, BDIV, FBMs, ACOM, NCOM, RCOM, DTON, DTON
2 and DTON
3 
is  defined  as  board  size,  the  percentage  of  non-executive  directors,  CEO  duality,  board 
diversity, the frequency of board meetings, audit, nomination, and remuneration committees,  
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director shareownership, director shareownership squared, and director shareownership cubed, 
respectively. CONTROLS refers to the eight control variables, namely firm size, dual-listing, 
audit firm size, capital structure, capital expenditure, sales growth, industry, and year dummies. 
Lagging the variables also reduces the total firm-year observations from 500 to 400.  
To facilitate comparison, and as suggested by Larker and Rusticus (2008), Columns 3 
to 6 of Table 21 repeat the results based on estimating an un-lagged corporate governance-
financial performance structure reported in Columns 3 and 4 of Tables 14 and 16 in chapter 
eight,  respectively.  Similar  to  the  results  of  based  on  estimating  the  un-lagged  structure 
contained in Columns 3 to 6 of Table 21, Columns 7 and 8 of Table 21 first present the results 
of a multivariate regression of the ROA and Q-ratio on the 11 corporate governance structures 
alone.  
Columns 9 and 10 then report the results of a multivariate regression of the ROA and 
Q-ratio  on  the  11  corporate  governance  mechanisms  and  the  control  variables  based  on 
estimating a lagged structure, respectively. In line with the results based on estimating the un-
lagged structure, Columns 7 and 8 indicate that the F-values for both the ROA and Q-ratio are 
statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level.  This  suggests  that  the  null  hypothesis  that  the 
coefficient  on  the  SACGI  is  equal  to  zero  can  be  rejected.  This  also  implies  that  the 
coefficients on the 11 corporate governance variables can jointly explain significant variations 
in the sampled firms’ accounting returns and market value, respectively. 
 The adjusted R
2 is approximately 9% and 6% for the ROA and Q-ratio, respectively. 
This implies that at least 9% and 6% of the differences in the sampled firms’ accounting 
returns  and  market  value  can  be  explained  by  the  11  corporate  governance  structures, 
respectively. This is very similar to the results reported in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 21 based 
on  estimating  the  un-lagged  structure,  but  statistically  2.5%  higher  in  the  case  of  ROA, 
and .1% less with respect to the Q-ratio, respectively. 
With reference to the coefficients on the 11 corporate governance variables in columns 
7 and 8 of Table 20 based on estimating the lagged structure, three main cases of sensitivities 
can  be  observed  when  compared  with  those  in  Columns  3  and  4  of  Table  21  based  on 
estimating an un-lagged structure. First, the sign on the coefficient of CEO duality under the 
Q-ratio  in  Column  8  has  changed  from  positive  to  negative,  but  remains  statistically 
insignificant.  Second,  the  direction  of  the  coefficient  on  the  frequency  of  board  meetings 
under  the  ROA  in  Column  7  has  changed  from  negative  to  positive,  but  also  remains 
statistically insignificant.  
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Table 21: Results of the Equilibrium-Variable Model Based on a Lagged Financial Performance-Corporate Governance Structure 
    Results Based on an Un-lagged Performance-Governance Structure   Results Based on a Lagged Performance-Governance Structure 
Perform.  Var.  Exp.sign  ROA  Q-ratio  ROA  Q-ratio  ROA  Q-ratio  ROA  Q-ratio 
Adjusted R
2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
No. of observa. 
      .063 
    .116 
    .904 
 3.522(.000)
*** 
    500 
    .062 
    .623 
  1.032 
 3.466(.000)
*** 
    500 
    .115 
    .114 
    .925 
3.125(.000)
*** 
  500 
    .290 
    .542 
    .983 
7.690(.000)
*** 
  500 
    .088 
    .116 
    .973 
 3.815(.000)
*** 
    400 
  .062 
  .624 
1.185 
2.932(.001)
*** 
   400 
 .105 
 .115 
1.020 
2.562(.000)
*** 
   400 
  .271 
  .550 
1.123 
5.963(.000)
*** 
   400 
Constant 
Board size 
CEO duality 
Per. of NEDs 
Dtor ownership 
Dtor ownership
2  
Dtor ownership
3 
Board diversity 
Board meetings 
Audit comm.. 
Nom. comm.. 
Rem. comm. 
Firm size 
Capital structure 
Sales growth 
Capital expendit. 
Dual-listing 
Audit firm size 
Basic materials 
Consumer service 
Industrials 
Technology 
2002 
2004 
2005 
2006 
 
+ 
- 
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
 
 
  .048(.383)
 
 -.003(.138)
 
  .023(.159) 
 -.001(.016)
** 
 -.003(.044)
** 
  .000(.060)
* 
 -.000(.093)
* 
  .036(.004)
*** 
 -.002(.418) 
  .038(.680) 
  .021(.122) 
  .051(.539) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 1.322(.000)
*** 
  .020(.101)
 
  .002(.985) 
  .003(.278)
 
 -.011(.217)
 
  .000(.287)
 
 -.000(.264)
 
  .179(.008)
*** 
  .021(.147) 
 -.354(.473) 
  .089(.220) 
  .229(.689) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .046(.435)
 
-.002(.311)
 
 .029(.037)
** 
-.002(.032)
** 
-.003(.131)
 
 .000(.104)
 
-.000(.108)
 
 .021(.112)
 
-.003(.328)
 
 .050(.581) 
 .021(.095)
* 
 .034(.641) 
 .001(.928)
 
 .000(.021)
** 
 .001(.000)
*** 
-.002(.105) 
 .024(.138) 
 .010(.559) 
-.011(.611) 
-.002(.925) 
-.014(.464) 
 .006(.772) 
-.014(.457) 
-.011(.550) 
-.012(.495) 
-.002(.928) 
 .642(.024)
** 
 .022(.064)
* 
-.117(.153)
 
 .003(.255)
 
-.018(.084)
* 
 .000(.153)
 
-.000(.192)
 
-.025(.701)
 
 .011(.424)
 
 .068(.876) 
-.105(.141)
 
-.119(.765) 
-.183(.003)
*** 
-.003(.000)
*** 
 .002(.124)
 
 .020(.005)
*** 
 .086(.267) 
 .271(.001)
*** 
 .428(.000)
*** 
 .551(.000)
*** 
 .217(.002)
*** 
 .308(.000)
*** 
-.022(.811) 
 .183(.033)
** 
 .398(.000)
*** 
 .581(.000)
*** 
-.016(.783) 
-.005(.039)
** 
 .010(.598) 
-.001(.025)
** 
-.003(.088)
* 
 .000(.118) 
-.000(.160) 
 .042(.003)
*** 
 .002(.421) 
 .117(.209) 
 .015(.336) 
 .029(.727) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
1.438(.000)
*** 
 .011(.440) 
-.024(.810) 
 .003(.204) 
-.010(.331) 
 .000(.448) 
-.000(.446) 
 .213(.005)
*** 
 .022(.177) 
-.552(.270) 
 .084(.305) 
 .326(.470) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-.026(.697) 
-.005(.086)
* 
 .018(.365)
 
-.001(.041)
** 
-.004(.107)
 
 .000(.124)
 
-.000(.111) 
 .033(.035)
** 
 .002(.539)
 
 .118(.211) 
 .011(.530) 
 .023(.784) 
-.002(.899) 
 .000(.924) 
 .001(.001)
*** 
-.003(.063)
* 
 .020(.286) 
 .012(.546) 
-.015(.535) 
-.001(.968) 
-.014(.531) 
-.001(.967) 
- 
 .002(.913) 
 .018(.389) 
 .022(.293) 
 .674(.037)
** 
 .011(.414) 
-.142(.130)
 
 .004(.157)
 
-.020(.060)
* 
 .001(.136) 
-.000(.108)
 
 .012(.874)
 
 .010(.476)
 
-.260(.565)
 
-.127(.124) 
-.334(.414)
 
-.178(.015)
** 
-.003(.002)
*** 
 .004(.007)
*** 
 .015(.044)
** 
 .094(.292) 
 .256(.007)
 *** 
 .346(.004)
*** 
 .553(.000)
*** 
 .194(.073)
* 
 .291(.012)
** 
- 
 .252(.008)
*** 
 .485(.000)
*** 
 .640(.000)
*** 
Notes: coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, **
 and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Also, consumer goods industry and year 2003 are excluded 
from the regression analyses. They are used as base industry and year, respectively, for purposes of comparison. Director ownership
2 and director ownership
3 refers to director ownership squared 
and director ownership cubed, respectively. To facilitate comparison, and as suggested Larker and Rusticus (2008), Columns 3 to 6 repeat the results based on an un-lagged performance-corporate 
governance structure reported in Columns of 3 and 4 of Tables 14 and 16 in chapter eight, respectively, whereas Columns 7 to 10 present alternative results based on a lagged performance-
corporate  governance  structure.  Note  further  that  the  un-lagged  structure  is  based  on  500  firm  year  observations,  whilst  the  lagged  structure  is  based  on  400  firm  year  observations. 
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Finally, the statistical significance of the coefficients on board size, director ownership 
squared,  and  director  ownership  cubed  under  the  ROA  in  Column  7  have  changed. 
Specifically, the coefficients on director ownership squared and director ownership cubed, 
which were statistically significant at the 10% level, are no longer statistically significant. By 
contrast, the coefficient on board size, which was statistically insignificant, is now statistically 
significant at the 5% level. The statistical significance and direction of the coefficients of the 
remaining 7 and 10 corporate governance variables under the ROA and Q-ratio, respectively, 
remain unchanged whether a lagged or un-lagged financial performance-corporate governance 
structure is estimated. This suggests that the majority of the results based on the un-lagged 
structure  reported  in  chapter  eight  are  not  sensitive  to  a  lagged  financial  performance-
corporate governance structure. 
The statistically significant coefficient on the constant term in columns 4 and 8 (under 
the Q-ratio) of Table 21 seems to suggest that there may be omitted variables bias. Therefore, 
to examine whether the limited sensitivities identified in the results of the lagged structure are 
spuriously caused by some omitted variables, the control variables are added to the regressions 
in columns 9 and 10 of Table 21. In line with the results reported in chapter eight, Columns 9 
and 10 indicate that the F-values for both the ROA and Q-ratio remain statistically significant 
at  the  1%  level.  Therefore,  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  coefficients  on  the  11  corporate 
governance mechanisms and the control variables are jointly equal to zero can be rejected. 
This also suggests that the 11 corporate governance structures and the control variables can 
jointly explain significant differences in the sampled firms’ accounting returns and market 
value, respectively. 
The adjusted R
2 is approximately 11% and 27% for the ROA and Q-ratio, respectively. 
This means that at least 11% and 27% of the differences in the sampled firms’ accounting 
returns and market value can jointly be explained by the 11 corporate governance mechanisms 
and  the control  variables,  respectively. This is also  very  similar to  the  results  reported  in 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 21 based on estimating an un-lagged structure, but statistically 1.5% 
less in the case of ROA, and 1.9% less with respect to the Q-ratio, respectively. The slight 
reductions in explanatory power may also be explained by the 20% decrease in the number of 
firm-year observations (i.e., from 500 to 400).  
Similar to the results based on estimating the un-lagged structure, the adjusted R
2 of 
the regressions of the ROA and Q-ratio on the 11 corporate governance mechanisms alone are 
essentially the same. However, once the control variables are added, the adjusted R
2 for the Q- 
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ratio becomes substantially higher than that of the ROA. This also implies that the difference 
in explanatory power between the ROA and Q-ratio can be attributed to the contribution of the 
control variables. 
With regard to the coefficient on the 11 corporate governance variables based on an 
un-lagged structure under both the ROA and Q-ratio in Columns 9 and 10 of Table 21, a 
limited  number  of  sensitivities  can  be  identified.  First,  the  sign  of  the  coefficient  on  the 
frequency of board meetings in Column 9 under the ROA, which was negative is now positive, 
but remain statistically insignificant. Second, the statistical significance of the coefficients on 
board size, CEO duality, board diversity, and the existence of a nomination committee under 
the ROA in Column 9 have changed. Specifically, the coefficients on board size and board 
diversity, which were not statistically significant in Column 5, are now statistically significant 
in column 9. In contrast, the coefficient on CEO duality and the existence of a nomination 
committee  which,  were  statistically  significant  in  Column  5,  are  no  longer  statistically 
significant in column 9. 
Third, the sign on the coefficients on board diversity and the presence of an audit 
committee  under  the  Q-ratio  in  Column  10  have  changed,  but  they  remain  statistically 
insignificant.  Finally,  board  size,  which  was  statistically  significant  under  the  Q-ratio  in 
Column 6, is no longer statistically significant under the Q-ratio in Column 10. The direction 
and statistical significance of the coefficients on the remaining 6 and 8 corporate governance 
structures under the ROA and Q-ratio, respectively, remain unaffected whether a lagged or an 
un-lagged financial performance-corporate governance structure is estimated. Generally, the 
results suggest that the evidence regarding the sensitivity or robustness of the 11 corporate 
governance  variables  to  a  lagged  financial  performance-corporate  governance  structure  is 
mixed. Specifically, whereas the coefficient on a majority of the 11 corporate governance 
mechanisms are robust to the estimation of a lagged structure, the coefficients on a limited 
number (i.e., board size, CEO duality, board diversity and frequency of board meetings) are 
sensitive to the estimation of a lagged structure with or without the control variables.  
First, the observed sensitivities in some of the corporate governance mechanisms, such 
as board size and CEO duality may indeed suggest that there is a time-lag between them and 
firm financial performance. Second, the sensitivities may be due to misspecifications within 
the structural equation, such as potential omitted variables bias. Third, and as has already been 
pointed out above, it may also be explained by the differences in the number of firm-year 
observations. Overall and on a comparative basis, it offers additional empirical support to the  
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previous conclusion in chapter eight that the results of the equilibrium-variable model are 
generally conflicting.  
 With reference to the control variables, two main cases of sensitivities in the control 
variables to the estimation of a lagged structure can be identified. First, the positive sign on the 
coefficient on firm size in Column 5 under the ROA has now changed to negative in Column 9 
of Table 21, but remain statistically insignificant. Second, the statistical significance of the 
coefficients on capital structure and capital expenditure under the ROA in Column 9, and sales 
growth under the Q-ratio in Column 10 have changed.  
Specifically, the coefficients on capital expenditure under the ROA in Column 5 and 
sales growth under the Q-ratio in Column 6, which were statistically insignificant, are now 
statistically  significant  under  the  ROA  and  Q-ratio  in  Columns  9  and  10  of  Table  21, 
respectively. By contrast, the coefficient on capital structure under the ROA in Column 5, 
which was statistically significant at the 5% level, is now statistically insignificant in Column 
9 of Table 21. These sensitivities may indicate the existence a lagged structure relationships 
between  capital  expenditure  and  the  ROA,  between  capital  structure  and  the  ROA,  and 
between  sales  growth  and  the  Q-ratio.  The  coefficient  and  statistical  significance  of  the 
remaining  control  variables,  including  audit  firm  size,  dual-listing,  the  year  and  industry 
dummies remain affected whether a lagged or an un-lagged structure is estimated. 
In conclusion, this subsection has sought to ascertain the extent to which the results of 
the  equilibrium-variable  model  based  an  un-lagged  financial  performance-corporate 
governance structure discussed in chapter eight are robust or sensitive to the estimation of a 
lagged financial performance-corporate governance structure. Generally, and consistent with 
results of the equilibrium-variable model reported in chapter eight, the evidence regarding the 
sensitivity or robustness of the results to a lagged or an un-lagged financial performance-
corporate governance structure is mixed. While the direction and the statistical significance of 
the coefficients on a majority of the 11 corporate governance mechanisms examined remain 
unchanged whether a lagged or an un-lagged structure is estimated, a limited number (i.e., 
board size, CEO duality, board diversity and the frequency of board meetings) show some 
level of sensitivity.   
As has been explained above, these sensitivities may suggest that there is indeed a 
financial performance-corporate governance time-lag for the sensitive corporate governance 
mechanisms, such as board size and CEO duality. It may also be explained by the differences 
in the number of observations between the lagged and un-lagged structures. Overall, these  
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findings offer further support to the earlier conclusions in chapter eight that there is either a 
statistically weak or insignificant relationship between most of the eleven individual internal 
corporate governance structures and financial performance.  
The  next  subsection  will  also  examine  the  extent  to  which  the  results  of  the 
compliance-index model based on estimating an un-lagged financial performance-corporate 
governance structure are robust or sensitive to an estimation of a lagged structure. 
 
9.2.2 Results from Estimating a Lagged Financial Performance-Corporate  
         Governance Structure based on the Compliance-Index Model 
 
Columns  7  to  10  of  Table  22  contain  the  results  obtained  by  estimating  a  lagged 
financial  performance-corporate  governance  structure  for  the  compliance-index  model.  To 
facilitate comparison, and as suggested by Larker and Rusticus (2008), Columns 3 to 6 of 
Table 22 repeat results based on an un-lagged corporate governance-financial performance 
structure reported in Columns 3 and 4 of Tables 17 and 18 in chapter eight, respectively. 
Unlike  the  un-lagged  structure  equations,  the  lagged  structure  models  are  estimated  as 
specified in equation 10 of chapter five and repeated below: 
                         ∑
=
- - - + + + =
n
i
it it i it it CONTROLS SACGI FP
1
1 1 1 1 0 e b b a                          (10) 
  
where FP refers to the financial performance proxies, as measured by ROA and the Q-ratio, 
SACGI is the South African Corporate Governance Index, and CONTROLS refers to the eight 
control  variables,  namely  firm  size,  dual-listing,  audit  firm  size,  capital  structure,  capital 
expenditure, sales growth, industry, and year dummies. Lagging the variables also reduces the 
total firm-year observations from 500 to 400.  
The decision to estimate a lagged structure is motivated by the theory and evidence 
that there is a time-lag in the corporate governance-financial performance association (e.g., 
Vefeas,  1999a;  Haniffa  and  Hudaib,  2006).  One  reason  is  that  board  decisions  may  have 
gestation  periods  within  which  they  may  be  fully  realised.  As  such,  estimating  a  lagged 
structure is one way by which potential endogenity problems, such as reverse causality that 
may  be  associated  with  the  corporate  governance-financial  performance  time  lag  may  be 
avoided.  
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Table 22: Results of the Compliance-Index Model Based on a Lagged Financial Performance-Corporate Governance Structure 
    Results Based on an Un-lagged Performance-Governance Structure   Results Based on a Lagged Performance-Governance Structure 
Performance  
Variable 
Exp. 
sign 
ROA  Q-ratio  ROA  Q-ratio  ROA  Q-ratio  ROA  Q-ratio 
Adjusted R
2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
No. of observations 
      .102 
    .117 
    .869 
57.706(.000)
*** 
   500 
    .100 
    .617 
  1.018 
56.633(.000)
*** 
   500 
  .189 
  .111 
  .881 
8.751(.000)
*** 
   500 
    .292 
    .548 
  1.039 
14.729(.000)
*** 
   500 
     .095 
     .118 
     .904 
42.676(.000)
*** 
   400 
    .084 
    .633 
  1.056 
37.583(.000)
*** 
   400 
  .142 
  .115 
  .999 
5.731(.000)
*** 
   400 
   .268 
   .566 
 1.012 
11.442(.000)
*** 
   400 
Constant 
SACGI 
Firm size 
Capital structure 
Sales growth 
Capital expenditure 
Dual-listing 
Audit firm size 
Basic materials 
Consumer services 
Industrials 
Technology 
2002 
2004 
2005 
2006 
 
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
 
 
-.021(.166) 
 .002(.000)
*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .926(.000)
*** 
 .009(.000)
*** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 .005(.808) 
 .002(.000)
*** 
 .013(.165) 
 .000(.004)
*** 
 .002(.000)
*** 
-.001(.563) 
 .012(.397) 
-.015(.270) 
-.034(.043)
** 
-.021(.183) 
-.025(.121) 
 .004(.790) 
 .000(.998) 
-.019(.224) 
-.017(.305) 
-.006(.698) 
 .720(.000)
*** 
 .004(.008)
*** 
-.172(.000)
*** 
-.003(.000)
*** 
 .001(.373)
 
 .020(.001)
*** 
 .192(.006)
*** 
 .158(.016)
** 
 .237(.004)
*** 
 .416(.000)
*** 
 .099(.209) 
 .215(.006)
*** 
 .053(.501) 
 .178(.024)
** 
 .397(.000)
*** 
 .565(.000)
*** 
-.011(.510) 
 .002(.000)
*** 
 
 
1.041(.000)
*** 
  .009(.000)
*** 
 
 
 
 .010(.666) 
 .002(.000)
*** 
 .016(.152) 
-.000(.843) 
 .001(.000)
*** 
-.002(.267) 
 .012(.474) 
-.015(.346) 
-.039(.042)
** 
-.012(.504) 
-.021(.251) 
 .016(.395) 
- 
-.027(.112) 
-.011(.538) 
-.005(.778)  
 .799(.000)
*** 
 .003(.045)
** 
-.166(.003)
*** 
-.003(.002)
*** 
 .008(.010)
*** 
 .010(.185) 
 .226(.006)
*** 
 .157(.041)
** 
 .248(.009)
*** 
 .464(.000)
*** 
 .143(.115) 
 .208(.022)
** 
- 
.185(.025)
** 
 .439(.000)
*** 
 .577(.000)
*** 
Notes: coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, **
 and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Also, consumer goods industry and year 2003 are excluded 
from the regression analyses. They are used as base industry and year, respectively, for purposes of comparison. To facilitate comparison, and as suggested by Larcker and Rusticus (2008), 
Columns 3 to 6 repeat the results based on estimating an un-lagged financial performance-corporate governance structure reported in Columns 3 and 4 of Tables 17 and 18 in chapter eight, 
respectively, whereas Columns 7 to 10 contain alternative results based on estimating a lagged financial performance-corporate governance structure. Note further that the un-lagged structure is 
based on 500 firm year observations, whilst the lagged structure is based on 400 firm year observations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
302 
Similar to the results based on estimating the un-lagged structure presented in Columns 
3 to 6 of Table 22, Columns 7 and 8 of Table 22 first report the results of a simple regression 
of the ROA and Q-ratio on the SACGI alone, respectively. Columns 9 and 10 then report the 
results of a multivariate regression of the ROA and Q-ratio on the SACGI and the control 
variables based on estimating the lagged structure, respectively. Consistent with the results 
based on estimating the un-lagged structure, Columns 7 and 8 of Table 22 indicate that the F-
values for both the ROA and Q-ratio are statistically significant at the 1% level. This means 
that the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the SACGI is equal to zero can be rejected. This 
also  indicates  that  the  coefficient  on  the  SACGI  can  explain  significant  variations  in  the 
sampled firms’ accounting returns and market value, respectively. 
 The adjusted R
2 is approximately 10% and 8% for the ROA and Q-ratio, respectively. 
This implies that at least 10% and 8% of the differences in the sampled firms’ accounting 
returns and market value can be explained by the quality of their internal corporate governance 
structures, respectively. This is virtually similar to the results reported in Columns 3 and 4 of 
Table 22 based on estimating the un-lagged structure, but statistically .7% and 1.6% less for 
the ROA and Q-ratio, respectively. Similarly, the coefficient on the SACGI under both the 
ROA and Q-ratio remain positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The magnitude 
of  the  coefficient  under  both  the  ROA  and  Q-ratio  remain  the  same  at  .002  and  .009, 
respectively. This means that generally the results reported in chapter seven are not sensitive 
to estimating a lagged financial performance-corporate governance structure. 
The statistically significant coefficient on the constant term in columns 4 and 8 (under 
the Q-ratio) of Table 22 appears to indicate that there may be an omitted variables bias. As a 
result,  to  investigate  whether  the  lack  of  sensitivity  of  the  results  to  estimating  a  lagged 
structure is falsely caused by some omitted variables, the control variables are added to the 
regressions in columns 9 and 10 of Table 22. In line with the results based on estimating the 
un-lagged structure, Columns 9 and 10 indicate that the F-values for both the ROA and Q-
ratio  are  statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level.  Therefore,  the  null  hypothesis  that  the 
coefficients on the SACGI and the control variables are jointly equal to zero can be rejected. 
This  suggests  that  the  SACGI  and  the  control  variables  can  jointly  explain  significant 
differences in the sampled firms’ accounting returns and market value, respectively. 
The adjusted R
2 is approximately 14% and 27% for the ROA and Q-ratio, respectively. 
This means that at least 14% and 27% of the differences in the sampled firms’ accounting 
returns  and  market  value  can  be  explained  by  the  SACGI  and  the  control  variables,  
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respectively. Statistically, this is 4.7% and 2.4% less compared with the adjusted R
2 for the 
ROA and Q-ratio in Columns 5 and 6 of Table 22 based on estimating the un-lagged structure, 
respectively.  The reductions in explanatory power may be explained by the 20% decrease in 
the number of firm-year observations (i.e., from 500 to 400). Consistent with the results of the 
un-lagged  structure,  when  a simple  regression  is  run,  the  ability  of  the SACGI  to explain 
variations  in  the  ROA  and  Q-ratio  are  essentially  the  same.  However,  once  the  control 
variables  are  added,  the  explanatory  power  of  the  SACGI  under  the  Q-ratio  becomes 
substantially higher than that of the ROA. This implies that the difference in  explanatory 
power  between  the  ROA  and  Q-ratio  can  be  attributed  to  the  contribution  of  the  control 
variables.  
 Similarly,  the  coefficient  on  the  SACGI  under  both  the  ROA  and  Q-ratio  remain 
positive,  but  whereas  the  coefficient  on  the  SACGI  under  the  ROA  remains  statistically 
significant at the 1% level, that of the Q-ratio is now statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Also, while the magnitude of the coefficient on the SACGI under the ROA remains unchanged 
at .002, that of the Q-ratio has witnessed a slight derease from .004 to .003. Also, the slight 
reductions in the level of statistical significance of the coefficient under the Q-ratio may be 
explained by the 20% decrease in the number of firm-year observations (i.e., from 500 to 400).  
Generally, the results based on estimating the lagged financial performance-corporate 
governance  structure  are  essentially  the  same  as  those  based  on  estimating  the  un-lagged 
structure  with  or  without  the  control  variables.  This  supports  the  previous  conclusion  in 
chapter eight that South African listed firms with higher corporate governance standards tend 
to be associated with higher financial performance than their counterparts with poor corporate 
governance standards. As will be discussed further in section 9.5, one reason for the limited 
change in the results based on estimating the lagged and un-lagged financial performance-
corporate governance structures may be that the year-by-year changes in the SACGI observed 
in chapter six are not substantial enough to cause any statistically significant changes in the 
firm financial performance proxies. 
 With reference to the control variables, the statistical significance, the direction and 
magnitude of the coefficients on firm size, capital expenditure, dual-listing, audit firm size, the 
industry and the year dummies under both the ROA and Q-ratio remain essentially unchanged. 
By contrast, the statistical significance and the direction of the coefficient on capital structure 
under the ROA, and the statistical significance of the coefficient on sales growth under the Q-
ratio have changed. Specifically, the coefficient on capital structure under the ROA which was  
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positive  and  statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level  is  now  negative  and  statistically 
insignificant.  Similarly,  the  coefficient  on  sales  growth  under  the  Q-ratio,  which  was 
statistically insignificant, is now statistically significant at the 1% level. These sensitivities 
may suggest that a lagged structure relationship exists between capital structure and ROA, and 
between sales growth and the Q-ratio. 
In short, this subsection has sought to ascertain the extent to which the results of the 
compliance-index model based on estimating an un-lagged financial performance-corporate 
governance structure discussed in chapter eight are robust or sensitive to estimating a lagged 
structure. Generally, apart from a limited number of changes in the magnitude and statistical 
significance levels that are observed and described above, the general evidence is that the 
compliance-index  model  results  reported  in  chapter  eight  are  essentially  robust  whether  a 
lagged or an un-lagged financial performance-corporate governance structure is estimated.  
Overall,  the  results  support  the  earlier  conclusion  in  chapter  eight  that  there  is  a 
statistically  significant  and  positive  relationship  between  the  SACGI  and  firm  financial 
performance. The general tenor of such a relationship remains the same whether an accounting 
or a market based financial performance proxy is used. As has already been explained above, 
one reason for the limited change in the results based on estimating the lagged and un-lagged 
financial performance-corporate governance structures may be that the year-on-year changes 
in the SACGI observed in chapter six are not substantial enough to cause any statistically 
significant  changes  in  the  firm  financial  performance  measures.  On  comparative  basis, 
however, the results of the compliance-index model are generally more stable, and show better 
empirical properties than those of the equilibrium-variable model. 
The  next  section  will  discuss  the  results  of  the  compliance-index  model  based  on 
estimating an instrumental variable model. 
 
 
9.3 RESULTS OF THE COMPLIANCE-INDEX MODEL BASED ON  
      INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE (IV) ESTIMATION  
 
This section reports the results of the compliance-index model based on instrumental 
variable (IV) estimates rather than OLS estimates. As has already been stated above, to be able 
to conduct IV estimation, exogeneity test will have to be first conducted to determine whether 
or not the SACGI is actually endogenous. In this regard, following prior corporate governance 
studies (Shabbir and Padget, 2005, p.22; Beiner et al., 2006, p.267), the popular Durbin-Wu-
Hausman exogeneity test is followed. The procedure involves two stages.   
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As specified in equation 13 below, in the first stage, the SACGI is assumed to be 
endogenous in equation 1, and is regressed on the eight control variables considered to be 
exogenous to the SACGI. These are: firm size (LNTA), capital structure (GEAR), sales growth 
(SGROWTH),  capital  expenditure  (CAPEX),  dual-listing  (DUALLIST),  audit  firm  size 
(BIG4), the five industry dummies (INDUST), and the five year dummies (YD). The resulting 
regression residuals from equation 13 are saved and referred to as R-SACGI. 
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In the second stage, and as specified in equation 14 below, the financial performance 
proxies (FP - ROA and Q-ratio) are regressed on the SACGI, the saved regression residuals (R-
SACGI), and the control variables (CONTROLS). If the coefficient on the saved regression 
residuals (R-SACGI) is statistically significant, then it can be concluded that the SACGI is 
endogenously related to firm financial performance.  
      ∑
=
+ + + + =
n
i
it it i it it it CONTROLS SACGI R SACGI FP
1
2 1 0 _ e b b b a                     (14) 
 
In contrast, if the coefficient on the R-SACGI is statistically insignificant, then it will 
indicate that the SACGI is exogenously related to firm financial performance. As has been 
described  in  subsection  5.3.1  of  chapter  five,  this  will  imply  that  OLS  estimates  of  the 
regression coefficients will be biased and inconsistent. This can result in wrong interpretations 
of the research findings (Larcker and Rusticus, 2008, p.10). However, and as has also been 
noted  in  subsection  5.3.1  of  chapter  five,  there  are  substantial  disagreements  within  the 
positive  accounting  literature  as  to  whether  endogeneity  is  a  problem  that  needs  to  be 
considered in accounting research (Chenhall and Moers, 2007a and b; Larcker and Rusticus, 
2007;  van  Lent,  2007).  Specifically,  van  Lent  (2007,  pp.197-198,  203)  suggests  that  in 
practice  there  is  little  that  can  be  done  about  endogeneity  even  if  it  exists,  and  as  such 
researchers should be bold enough to ignore any threats that the existence of endogeneity may 
pose. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 23 report the results of Durbin-Wu-Hausman exogeneity test. 
The results of the test are mixed: the coefficient on the R-SACGI under the ROA is statistically 
insignificant, whereas the coefficient under the Q-ratio is statistically significant at the 5%  
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level. This suggests that the SACGI is exogenously (i.e., not determined within the equation) 
related to the ROA, but endogenously (i.e., determined within the equation) related to the Q-
ratio. To be more cautious, and also following previous corporate governance studies (e.g., 
Shabbir and Padget, 2005; Beiner et al., 2006), however, the IV estimation is conducted for 
both the ROA and Q-ratio.  
As has been discussed in subsection 5.3.1 of chapter five, the IV estimation technique 
involves two stages. The first stage involves finding a proxy variable (an instrument) for the 
SACGI,  which  correlates  highly  with  the  SACGI  (i.e.,  relevant),  but  correlates  lowly  or 
uncorrelated with the regression residuals (i.e., valid). Finding an instrument that satisfies the 
relevance and validity criteria is extremely difficult (Durnev and Kim, 2005, p.1483). As a 
result, and as has been explained in subsection 5.3.1 of chapter five, this study follows a two-
stage procedure proposed by Beiner et al. (2006, p.267).  
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In the first stage, and as specified in equation 15, the SACGI is regressed on board size 
(BSIZE), institutional shareholding (INSTSHDNG), block shareholding (BLKSHDNG), the 
presence of a corporate governance committee (CGCOM)
86, and the eight control variables 
(CONTROLS)  considered  to  be  exogenously  related  to  the  SACGI.    These  are:  firm  size 
(LNTA), capital structure (GEAR), sales growth (SGROWTH), capital expenditure (CAPEX), 
dual-listing (DUALLIST), audit firm size (BIG4), the five industry dummies (INDUST), and 
the  five  year  dummies  (YD).  In  the  second  stage,  the  predicted  regression  values  from 
equation 15 are saved (P-SACGI). The SACGI is then replaced with the P-SACGI (i.e., the 
predicted instrument) to re-estimate the compliance-index model. 
However, before the P-SACGI can be used to re-estimate the compliance-index model, 
it has to be ascertained whether it is a relevant and valid instrument for the SACGI. Table 24 
reports a correlation matrix of the financial performance proxies, the SACGI, the P-SACGI, 
the R-SACGI, and the alternative corporate governance mechanisms
87.   
                                                 
86As has been defined in subsection 5.3.1.2 of chapter five, this committee is a dummy variable that takes the 
value  of  1  if  a  firm  has  separate  committee  specifically  tasked  to  monitor  its  compliance  with  corporate 
governance standards or regulations, 0 otherwise.   
87Section 9.4 will discuss the results based on estimating a two-stage least squares model and the availability of 
alternative corporate governance mechanisms. Table 24 will, therefore, be referred to again in section 9.4.  
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Table 23: Results of the Compliance-Index Model Based on Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimates 
  Exp. 
Sign 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test  Instrumental Variable Estimates  OLS Estimates 
Adjusted R
2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
No. of observations 
    .184 
  .118 
  .880 
7.986(.000)
*** 
      500 
    .312 
    .531 
  1.085 
15.346(.000)
*** 
    500 
  .168 
  .116 
  .856 
7.964(.000)
*** 
     500 
    .318 
    .543 
  1.068 
16.341(.000)
*** 
     500 
  .189 
  .111 
  .881 
8.751(.000)
*** 
   500 
    .292 
    .548 
  1.039 
14.729(.000)
*** 
   500 
Performance Measure    ROA  Q-ratio  ROA  Q-ratio  ROA  Q-ratio 
Constant 
SACGI 
R-SACGI 
P-SACGI 
Firm size  
Capital structure  
Sales growth  
Capital expenditure  
Dual-listing  
Audit firm size 
Basic materials  
Consumer services  
Industrials  
Technology  
Year 2002 
Year 2004 
Year 2005 
Year 2006 
 
+ 
-/+ 
+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
   .012(.540) 
   .002(.028)
** 
   .003(.486) 
- 
   .046(.298) 
   .000(.009)
*** 
   .001(.010)
*** 
  -.000(.741) 
   .029(.284) 
  -.020(.246) 
  -.081(.048)
** 
  -.019(.423) 
  -.038(.116) 
   .027(.469) 
  -.021(.675) 
  -.065(.128) 
  -.010(.743) 
  -.003(.876) 
  .368(.034)
** 
  .010(.006)
*** 
 -.006(.045)
** 
- 
 -.248(.010)
*** 
 -.005(.000)
*** 
  .001(.486) 
  .014(.009)
*** 
  .049(.754) 
  .245(.006)
*** 
  .382(.000)
*** 
  .425(.000)
*** 
  .094(.428) 
  .145(.034)
** 
  .142(.108) 
  .116(.159) 
  .436(.000)
*** 
  .584(.000)
*** 
  -.012(.764) 
- 
- 
   .002(.000)
*** 
  -.010(.362) 
   .000(.010)
*** 
   .002(.000)
*** 
  -.001(.498) 
   .011(.496) 
  -.019(.325) 
  -.028(.068)
* 
  -.027(.148) 
  -.018(.169) 
   .023(.562) 
  -.002(.798) 
  -.034(.156) 
  -.022(.218) 
  -.014(.431)  
   .542(.000)
*** 
- 
- 
   .008(.005)
*** 
  -.263(.000)
*** 
  -.003(.006)
*** 
   .002(.258) 
   .017(.008)
*** 
   .118(.162) 
   .131(.046)
** 
   .265(.002)
*** 
   .586(.000)
*** 
   .048(.429) 
   .094(.345) 
   .148(.025)
** 
   .136(.084)
* 
   .524(.000)
*** 
   .672(.000)
*** 
   .008(.808) 
   .002(.000)
*** 
- 
- 
   .013(.165) 
   .000(.004)
*** 
   .002(.000)
*** 
  -.001(.563) 
   .012(.397) 
  -.015(.270) 
  -.034(.043)
** 
  -.021(.183) 
  -.025(.121) 
   .004(.790) 
   .000(.998) 
  -.019(.224) 
  -.017(.305) 
  -.006(.698) 
  .720(.000)
*** 
  .004(.008)
** 
- 
- 
 -.172(.000)
*** 
 -.003(.000)
*** 
  .001(.373)
 
  .020(.001)
*** 
  .192(.006)
*** 
  .158(.016)
** 
  .237(.004)
*** 
  .416(.000)
*** 
  .099(.209) 
  .215(.006)
** 
  .053(.501) 
  .178(.024)
** 
  .397(.000)
*** 
  .565(.000)
*** 
 Notes: coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, **
 and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Also, consumer goods   industry and year 
2003 are excluded from the regression analyses. They are used as base industry and year, respectively, for purposes of comparison. Columns 3 and 4 contain results of the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test. As has already been explained in subsection 5.3.1.1 of chapter five, the R-SACGI is the saved residuals of a regression of the SACGI on the eight 
control variables. This has also been specified in equation 13. The P-SACGI is the predicted instrument to be used as a proxy for the SACGI. As has also been described in 
subsection 5.3.1.2 of chapter five, the P-SACGI is the saved predicted values of a regression of the SACGI on variables exogenous to the SACGI, including board size, the 
presence of corporate governance committee, block shareholding, institutional shareholding, as well as the eight control variables. This has also been specified in equation 15. 
Columns 5 and 6 report coefficient estimates based on the predicted instrument (the P-SACGI). To facilitate comparison, and as suggested Larcker and Rusticus (2008), 
Columns 7 and 8 repeat OLS estimates contained in Column 4 of Tables 17 and 18 in chapter eight, respectively.   
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Table 24: Correlation Matrix of Performance and Alternative Corporate Governance Mechanisms for All (500) Firm Years 
  ROA  Q-ratio  SACGI  P-
SACGI 
R-
SACGI 
DUA- 
LIST 
LEV 
 
BSIZE  BIG4  GEAR 
 
INST- 
SHDNG 
BLK- 
SHDNG 
CGCOM  LNTA 
ROA 
 
Q-ratio 
 
SACGI 
 
P-
SACGI 
 
R-
SACGI 
 
DUA-
LIST 
 
LEV 
 
BSIZE 
 
BIG4 
 
GEAR 
 
INST- 
SHDNG 
 
BLK- 
SHDNG 
 
CGCOM 
 
LNTA 
 
 
 .283
*** 
 
 .322
*** 
 
 
 .276
*** 
 
 
 .155
*** 
 
 
 .144
*** 
 
-.087
* 
 
-.040
* 
 
 .131
*** 
 
-.096
** 
 
 
 .116
*** 
 
 
-.052
* 
 
 .145
*** 
 
 .051
* 
 .391
*** 
 
 
 
 .320
*** 
 
 
 .326
*** 
 
 
 .138
*** 
 
 
 .236
*** 
 
-.151
*** 
 
 .131
*** 
 
 .181
*** 
 
 .046
* 
 
 
 .162
*** 
 
 
-.073
* 
 
 .148
*** 
 
-.127
*** 
 .276
*** 
 
 .372
*** 
 
 
 
 
 .864
*** 
 
 
 .556
*** 
 
 
 .471
*** 
 
 .066
* 
 
 .000
 
 
 .477
*** 
 
 .000
 
 
 
 .314
*** 
 
 
-.287
*** 
 
 .537
*** 
 
 .000
 
 .235
*** 
 
 .384
*** 
 
 .868
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 .108
** 
 
 
 .543
*** 
 
 .075
* 
 
 .094
** 
 
 .544
*** 
 
 .008
 
 
 
 .364
*** 
 
 
-.331
*** 
 
 .624
*** 
 
 .294
*** 
 .181
*** 
 
 .168
*** 
 
 .539
*** 
 
 
 .132
*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 .001
 
 
 .006 
 
 .003
 
 
 .209
*** 
 
 .026
* 
 
 
 .104
** 
 
 
-.125
*** 
 
 .148
*** 
 
-.639
*** 
 .133
*** 
 
 .258
*** 
 
 .483
*** 
 
 
 .551
*** 
 
 
 .016
* 
 
 
 
 
 .109
** 
 
-.000
 
 
 .331
*** 
 
 .000
 
 
 
 .270
*** 
 
 
-.133
*** 
 
 .480
*** 
 
 .000
 
-.108
** 
 
-.121
*** 
 
 .116
*** 
 
 
 .116
*** 
 
 
 .048
* 
 
 
 .130
*** 
 
 
 
 -.032
* 
 
  .079
* 
 
  .000 
 
 
  .037
* 
 
 
  .066
* 
 
  .124
*** 
 
 -.005 
-.060
* 
 
 .145
*** 
 
-.042
* 
 
 
 .005
 
 
 
 .019
* 
 
 
-.110
*** 
 
-.042
* 
 
 
 
 .039
* 
 
 .090
** 
 
 
 .154
*** 
 
 
 .176
*** 
 
-.020
* 
 
-.446
** 
 .130
*** 
 
 .196
*** 
 
 .480
*** 
 
 
 .544
*** 
 
 
 .241
*** 
 
 
 .331
*** 
 
 .051
* 
 
 .024
* 
 
 
 
 .043
* 
 
 
 .073
* 
 
 
-.160
*** 
 
 .260
*** 
 
 .097
** 
-.126
*** 
 
 .081
* 
 
 .019
* 
 
 
 .021
* 
 
 
 .006
 
 
 
 .037
* 
 
-.049
* 
 
 .144
*** 
 
 .057
* 
 
 
 
 
 .009
 
 
 
-.061
* 
 
-.078
* 
 
-.084
* 
 .158
*** 
 
 .225
*** 
 
 .347
*** 
 
 
 .410
*** 
 
 
 .114
** 
 
 
 .322
*** 
 
 .011
* 
 
 .104
** 
 
 .097
** 
 
 .003
 
 
 
 
 
 
 .299
*** 
 
 .241
*** 
 
-.013
* 
-.027
* 
 
-.092
** 
 
-.285
*** 
 
 
-.342
*** 
 
 
-.132
*** 
 
 
-.139
*** 
 
  .041
* 
 
 .171
*** 
 
-.165
*** 
 
-.016
* 
 
 
  .237
*** 
 
 
 
 
-.098
** 
 
-.138
*** 
 .111
*** 
 
 .197
*** 
 
 .547
*** 
 
 
 .630
*** 
 
 
 .136
*** 
 
 
 .480
*** 
 
 .144
*** 
 
-.067
* 
 
 .260
*** 
 
-.104
** 
 
 
 .264
*** 
 
 
-.112
*** 
 
 
 
 .088
** 
 .027
* 
 
-.123
*** 
 
 .032
* 
 
 
 .309
*** 
 
 
-.578
*** 
 
 
 .006
 
 
 -.002 
 
-.428
*** 
 
 .093
** 
 
-.101
** 
 
 
-.008
 
 
 
-.149
*** 
 
 .093
** 
Notes: the bottom left half of the table contains Pearson’s parametric correlation coefficients, whilst the upper right half of the table reports Spearman’s non-parametric correlation coefficients. 
 
***, ** and
  * denote correlation is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  Variables are defined as follows: return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio), the South African 
Corporate Governance Index (the SACGI), Predicted-SACGI (P-SACGI), Residual-SACGI (R-SACGI), dual-listing (DUALIST), leverage (LEV), board size (BSIZE), audit firm size (BIG4), 
capital  structure/gearing  (GEAR),  institutional  shareholding  (INSTSHDNG),  block  shareholding  (BLKSHDNG),  corporate  governance  committee  (CGCOM),  and  firm  size  (LNTA). 
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As the skewness and kurtosis statistics contained in Table 12 of chapter seven suggests 
that the variables show some level of non-normal behaviour, Table 24 reports both the Pearson 
parametric and the Spearman non-parametric correlation coefficients. Similar to Table 13 of 
chapter  seven,  the  bottom  left  half  of  the  table  reports  Pearson  parametric  correlation 
coefficients, whereas the upper right half of the table presents Spearman’s non-parametric 
alternative. 
The results show that the P-SACGI (predicted instrument) is highly significant and 
positively correlated with the SACGI (.864 and .868 for the Pearson and Spearman correlation 
coefficients, respectively). By contrast, and unlike the SACGI, which is highly correlated with 
the R-SACGI (regression residuals) (.556 and .539 for the Pearson and Spearman correlation 
coefficients, respectively), the P-SACGI is lowly correlated with the R-SACGI (.108 and .132 
for the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients, respectively). This suggests that P-
SACGI is to a greater extent a relevant and valid instrument for the SACGI. It also means that 
replacing the SACGI with the P-SACGI in the compliance-index model should results in an 
unbiased and consistent coefficient estimate, particularly for the coefficient on the P-SACGI 
under the Q-ratio. 
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 23 contain the results of the compliance-index model based 
on the instrumental variable (the P-SACGI). To facilitate comparison, and as suggested by 
Larcker and Rusticus (2008), Columns 7 and 8 repeat the OLS results of the compliance-index 
model contained in Column 4 of Tables 17 and 18 of chapter eight, respectively. Columns 5 
and 6 of Table 23 indicate that the F-values for both the ROA and Q-ratio remain statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Therefore, the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the P-SACGI 
and control variables are jointly equal to zero can be rejected. It implies that the P-SACGI and 
the  control  variables  can  jointly  explain  significant  variations  in  the  ROA  and  Q-ratio, 
respectively. 
The adjusted R
2 of approximately 17% for the ROA based on the instrumental variable 
estimates in Column 5 is statistically 2 percentage point lower than the 19% based on the OLS 
estimates in Column 7. The adjusted R
2 for the Q-ratio based on the instrumental variable 
estimates  in  Column  6  is  also  similar  to  that  of  the  OLS  estimates  in  Column  8,  but 
statistically 2.6% higher. This means that the coefficient on the P-SACGI and the  control 
variables can explain approximately 17% and 32% of the variations in the sampled firms’ 
accounting returns and market value, respectively.   
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Similarly,  the  coefficients  on  the  P-SACGI  under  both  the  ROA  and  Q-ratio  in 
Columns 5 and 6, respectively, remain positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Consistent with the suggestions of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman exogeneity test that the SACGI is 
actually exogenously related to the ROA, the coefficient on the P-SACGI under the ROA in 
Column 5 remains unchanged at .002 when compared with the OLS estimate in Column 7. By 
contrast, the coefficient on the P-SACGI under the Q-ratio in Column 6 has increased by 
approximately 50% from .004 in Column 8 to .008 in Column 6. This is consistent with the 
suggestions of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test that the SACGI is actually endogenously related 
to the Q-ratio.  
The increase in the coefficient on the P-SACGI under the Q-ratio is expected. This is 
because, and as will be clarified further in section 9.4, past studies suggest that instrumental 
variables  tend  to  over-predict  (e.g.,  Beiner  et  al.,  2006;  Henry,  2008).  For  example,  the 
coefficient on the Henry (2008)’s internal corporate governance score for a sample of 116 
Australian listed firms increased from an OLS estimate of .056 to .074 under the instrumental 
variable estimate. Generally, the results based on the instrumental variable estimates indicate 
that  the  statistically  significant  and  positive  financial  performance-corporate  governance 
relationship reported in chapter eight is robust whether the instrumented part (the P-SACGI) or 
the un-instrumented part of the SACGI (the SACGI) is used. Overall, the results support the 
earlier  conclusion  in  chapter  eight  that  South  African  listed  firms  with  better  corporate 
governance  standards  tend  to  be  associated  with  higher  financial  performance  than  their 
counterparts with poor corporate governance standards. 
With respect to the control variables, three cases of sensitivities can be identified. First, 
the coefficient on firm size, which was positive under the ROA in Column 7 of Table 23 is 
now negative, but remains statistically insignificant in Column 5 of Table 23. Second, the 
coefficient on dual-listing under the Q-ratio in Column 8, which was statistically significant at 
the 1% level, is no longer statistically significant in Column 6. Third, the coefficient on the 
year  2002  dummy  under  the  Q-ratio  in  Column  8  of  Table  23,  which  was  statistically 
insignificant, is now statistically significant at the 5% level in Column 6. Apart from these 
sensitivities,  the  coefficients  and  statistical  significance  of  the  estimates  based  on  the 
instrumental variables in Column 5 and 6 of Table 23 are generally essentially similar to the 
OLS estimates in Column 7 and 8 of Table 23.  
In  summary,  this  section  has  examined  the  extent  to  which  the  results  of  the 
compliance-index model reported in chapter eight are sensitive or robust to the existence of an  
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endogenous  relationship  between  the  financial  performance  proxies  and  the  SACGI.  The 
results  of  the  Durbin-Wu-Hausman  test  aimed  at  determining  whether  the  SACGI  is 
endogenously related to the proxies are mixed. Specifically, it suggests that the SACGI is 
exogenously related to the ROA, but endogenously related to the Q-ratio. To be more cautious, 
and also following prior corporate governance studies, however, instrumental variable (IV) 
estimates are conducted for both the ROA and Q-ratio.  
The  results  based  on  the  instrumental  variable  estimates  suggest  that  there  is  a 
statistically  significant  and  positive  relationship  between  firm  financial  performance  and 
corporate governance. The tenor of such a positive relationship remains unchanged whether an 
accounting or a market based measure of performance is used. Generally, the findings are 
consistent  with  the  results  of  the  compliance-index  model  based  on  the  OLS  estimates 
presented in chapter eight. Overall, the results support the earlier conclusion in chapter eight 
that,  on  average,  better-governed  South  African  firms  tend  to  be  associated  with  higher 
financial performance than their poorly-governed counterparts. 
The  next  section  will  discuss  the  results  of  the  compliance-index  model  based  on 
estimating a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model and the existence of alternative corporate 
governance mechanisms.    
 
 
9.4 RESULTS BASED ON ESTIMATING TWO-STAGE LEAST SQUARES,  
      ALTERNATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS AND  
      POSSIBLE INTERDEPENDENCES 
 
  As has been discussed in subsection 5.3.1.3 of chapter five, most of the prior corporate 
governance studies have examined the wealth effects of corporate governance structures in 
isolation (e.g., Morck et al., 1988; Yermack, 1996; Vefeas, 1999a; Guest, 2009). However, in 
practice, it can be argued that shareholders will rarely rely on a single corporate governance 
mechanism  to  monitor  managerial  behaviour.  The  existence  of  alternative  corporate 
governance structures, for example, suggests that OLS regression of financial performance on 
single  corporate  governance  mechanisms  may  lead  to  omitted  variable  bias  and  spurious 
correlations (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, p.378; Beiner et al., 2006, p.252). It is also possible 
for interactions or independences to exist among alternative corporate governance structures in 
order to maximise their efficiency and effectiveness.  
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  Therefore, following Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Beiner et al. (2006), a set of 
four
88 alternative corporate governance mechanisms are simultaneously estimated along with 
the SACGI. These are: (1) leverage; (2) block shareholding; (3) institutional shareholding; and 
(4)  board  size.  These  four  corporate  governance  structures  are  not  included  in  the  broad 
composite corporate governance index, the SACGI.  
To  ascertain  the  level  of  correlation  among  the  variables,  Table  24  contains  a 
correlation  matrix  for  the  financial  performance  proxies,  the  four  alternative  corporate 
governance mechanisms, and  the  exogenous  variables.  The correlation  coefficients  for  the 
exogenous variables cover those that were not reported in Table 13 of chapter seven due to 
limited space. These are dual-listing (DUALLIST), audit firm size (BIG4), firm size (LNTA), 
and the presence of a corporate governance committee (CGCOM). Similar to Table 13, the 
bottom left half of Table 24 contains the Pearson parametric correlation coefficients, while the 
upper right half presents the Spearman non-parametric correlation coefficients. 
Generally, both the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients contained in Table 
24 suggest that there are low
89 correlations among the SACGI, the four alternative corporate 
governance mechanisms  and  the exogenous  variables.  First,  dual-listing (DUALLIST) and 
audit firm  size  (BIG4)  are  statistically significant  and  positively  correlated.  Both  are  also 
significant  and  positively  correlated  with  the  SACGI.  This  is  consistent  with  the  results 
reported in chapter six, which suggest that, on average, cross-listed and big four audited firms 
comply better with the SACGI. Second, and as hypothesised, the existence of  a corporate 
governance committee (CGCOM) is statistically significant and positively associated with the 
SACGI. This indicates that firms that set up a corporate governance committee to monitor 
compliance with corporate governance rules tend to have better governance standards. 
Third,  audit  firm  size,  dual-listing  and  the  presence  of  a  corporate  governance 
committee are significant and positively associated with both the ROA and Q-ratio. This is 
expected because these firms also tend to have better corporate governance standards. As has 
already been described in chapter seven, block (BLKSHDNG) and institutional shareholdings 
                                                 
88Even  though  there  are  other  alternative  corporate  governance  structures,  such  as the market  for  corporate 
control, data is only available for the four alternative corporate governance mechanisms used in this study at the 
time of data collection.  
89Before winsorising at the 5% and 95% levels, there was a statistically significant low (.308) correlation between 
the  alternative  corporate  governance  mechanism,  leverage  (LEV)  and  the  control  variable  capital  structure 
(GEAR). After winsorising, the correlation between them was very high (.938). This was resolved by regressing 
the  GEAR  on  LEV  and  the  remaining  seven  control  variables.  The  regression  residuals  (R-GEAR),  which 
correlated lowly (.000) with LEV, but quite highly (.348) with GEAR was used as a proxy for capital structure 
(GEAR).   
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(INSTSHDNG)  are  significant  and  negatively  and  positively  associated  with  the  SACGI, 
respectively. As will be discussed further below, this suggests that block shareholding and the 
SACGI are substitutes, whereas institutional shareholding and the SACGI are complements. 
Fourth,  and  as  expected,  audit  firm  size,  dual-listing,  and  the  presence  of  a  corporate 
governance  committee  are  all  significant  and  positively  associated  with  institutional 
shareholding, but significant and negatively correlated with block shareholding.  
Similarly, institutional shareholding is significant and positively related to the ROA 
and Q-ratio, while block shareholding is negatively associated with the ROA and Q-ratio. 
Fifth, and consistent with predictions, leverage (LEV) is significant and positively associated 
with the SACGI, but significant and negatively associated with the ROA and Q-ratio. Finally, 
board size is significant and positively associated with the Q-ratio, indicating that the market 
perceives larger boards as more effective. 
The next subsection will discuss the results of the compliance-index model based on 
estimating a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model and the existence of alternative corporate 
governance  mechanisms.  Specifically,  subsection  9.4.1  will  report  results  based  the  ROA, 
whereas subsection 9.4.2 will discuss results based on the Q-ratio. 
 
9.4.1 Regression Results from Estimating Two-Stage Least Squares Based on ROA 
 
As  has  been  explained  above,  past  studies  suggest  that  firms  tend  to  use  multiple 
corporate governance mechanisms to limit opportunistic activities of managers (e.g., Agrawal 
and Knoeber, 1996; Beiner et al., 2006). A major implication is that a regression of the ROA 
on a single corporate governance mechanism can result in omitted variable endogenity as have 
been discussed above and also in chapter five. To avoid this, and following Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996) and Beiner et al. (2006), four alternative corporate governance mechanisms in 
addition to the SACGI are introduced. These are leverage, block shareholding, institutional 
shareholding, and board size. They are the only alternative corporate governance structures for 
which data was available at the time of data collection. They do not also form part of the broad 
compliance corporate governance index, the SACGI.  
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Table 25: Regression Results from a Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation of Equations (4) – (9) Based on ROA 
Dependent Variable 
(Equation) 
Exp. 
sign 
SACGI   
(4) 
Leverage 
(5) 
Block shareholding 
(6) 
Inst. shareholding 
(7) 
Board size 
(8) 
ROA 
(9) 
Adjusted R
2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
No. of observations 
      .657 
    .128 
.804 
48.550(.000)
*** 
      500 
  .034 
  .122 
  .643 
2.087(.008)
*** 
      500 
    .302 
    .175 
  1.104 
13.628(.000)
*** 
      500 
    .297 
    .218 
    .924 
13.302(.000)
*** 
      500 
    .216 
    .029 
    .842 
7.828(.000)
*** 
   500 
     .758 
     .076 
     .791 
 84.352(.000)
*** 
       500 
Constant 
SACGI 
Leverage  
Block ownership 
Institutional owners. 
Board size 
ROA 
Corporate gov. com. 
Audit firm size 
Firm size  
Capital structure  
Sales growth  
Capital expenditure  
Dual-listing  
Basic materials  
Consumer services  
Industrials  
Technology  
Year 2002 
Year 2004 
Year 2005 
Year 2006 
 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
 
   .355(.000)
*** 
- 
   .001(.000)
*** 
  -.003(.000)
*** 
   .002(.000)
*** 
  -.005(.055)
* 
   .301(.000)
*** 
   .118(.000)
*** 
   .149(.000)
*** 
  -.050(.000)
*** 
  -.000(.842) 
   .020(.502) 
   .270(.066)
* 
   .061(.001)
*** 
  -.043(.026)
** 
   .023(.216) 
   .036(.054)
* 
   .003(.859) 
  -.081(.000)
*** 
   .061(.001)
*** 
   .074(.000)
*** 
   .093(.000)
*** 
   .070(.024)
** 
   .001(.008)
*** 
- 
   .001(.020)
** 
  -.000(.496) 
  -.003(.297) 
  -.123(.014)
** 
- 
- 
  -.002(.872) 
- 
   .000(.899) 
   .003(.039)
** 
- 
  -.014(.436) 
   .004(.803) 
   .028(.120) 
  -.017(.318) 
   .017(.329) 
  -.011(.524) 
  -.017(.330) 
  -.014(.419) 
   .573(.000)
*** 
  -.005(.000)
*** 
   .002(.020)
** 
- 
   .004(.000)
*** 
   .006(.107) 
   .062(.386) 
- 
- 
  -.043(.011)
** 
  -.002(.036)
** 
   .001(.013)
** 
   .002(.319) 
- 
   .020(.437) 
  -.045(.076)
* 
   .026(.311) 
   .025(.319) 
  -.062(.014)
** 
   .018(.473) 
   .021(.414) 
   .009(.718) 
    .051(.371) 
    .005(.000)
*** 
   -.001(.447) 
    .005(.000)
*** 
- 
    .012(.004)
*** 
    .005(.955) 
    .018(.469) 
- 
    .048(.024)
** 
- 
   -.001(.273) 
    .000(.961) 
- 
    .035(.264) 
    .087(.006)
*** 
   -.021(.496) 
   -.019(.549) 
    .066(.036)
** 
   -.012(.711) 
   -.030(.335) 
   -.030(.348) 
-1.162(.058)
* 
-.016(.055)
* 
-.006(.462) 
   .008(.213) 
   .016(.001)
*** 
- 
-.260(.782) 
 .516(.065)
* 
 .724(.010)
*** 
-2.239(.000)
*** 
   .011(.224) 
   .000(.986) 
   .002(.928) 
-.314(.316) 
-.161(.637) 
-.060(.859) 
 .104(.755) 
-.023(.944) 
-.091(.785) 
 .088(.791) 
 .137(.680) 
   .181(.590) 
    .418(.000)
*** 
    .002(.000)
*** 
   -.074(.000)
*** 
   -.001(.036)
** 
    .004(.010)
*** 
   -.012(.008)
*** 
- 
- 
   -.018(.341) 
   -.265(.000)
*** 
   -.000(.842) 
    .002(.000)
*** 
    .082(.000)
*** 
   -.064(.000)
*** 
   -.128(.000)
*** 
   -.037(.031)
** 
    .094(.005)
*** 
   -.096(.000)
*** 
    .058(.000)
*** 
   -.032(.000)
*** 
   -.080(.000)
*** 
   -.043(.000)
*** 
Notes: Coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, **
 and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Also, consumer goods industry and year 2003 are excluded 
from the regression analyses. They are used as base industry and year, respectively, for purposes of comparison. As has been explained in subsection 5.3.1.3 of chapter five, to limit endogenity 
problems, four alternative corporate governance mechanisms in addition to the SACGI are introduced. These are: leverage, block shareholding, institutional shareholding, and board size. They are 
the alternative corporate governance structures for which data was available at the time of data collection. They do not also form part of the broad composite index, the SACGI. Equations 4 to 9 are 
estimated as a system of simultaneous equations by using two-stage least squares. Specifically, in the first stage, each of equations 4 to 8 specified in subsection 5.3.1.3 of chapter five and reported 
in Columns 3 to 7 are first estimated along with their respective control variables. The resulting predicted values (i.e., instrumented or predicted part of each corporate governance structure) are 
saved. In the second stage, the SACGI, leverage, block shareholding, institutional shareholding, and board size are replaced with their instrumented or predicted values from equations 4 to 8 in 
equation 9, respectively. Equation 9, specified in subsection 5.3.1.3 of chapter five and reported in Column 8 is subsequently estimated along with the control variables.    
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As  has  been  discussed  in  subsection  5.3.1.3  of  chapter  five,  the  four  alternative 
corporate  governance  mechanisms  in  addition  to  the  SACGI  are  estimated  simultaneously 
using two-stage least squares (2SLS). Specifically, in the first stage, each of equations 4 to 8 
specified in subsection 5.3.1.3 of chapter five is estimated along with their respective control 
variables. The resulting predicted values (i.e., instrumented or predicted part of each corporate 
governance structure) are saved. In the second stage, each corporate governance mechanism is 
replaced with its saved predicted instrument from the first stage estimations in equation 9 as 
specified in subsection 5.3.1.3 of chapter five. Equation 9 is subsequently estimated along 
with the eight control variables. 
As  has  also  been  explained  in  chapter  five,  financial  performance  (ROA)  is  also 
included in equations 4 to 8 as an independent variable, but as the dependent variable in 
equation  9.  The  main  rationale  is  to  test  for  the  possible  existence  of  endogeneities  or 
simultaneities  between  the  five  corporate  governance  structures  and  the  ROA.  That  is,  it 
permits each of the five corporate governance structures to affect financial performance, but 
also allows the ROA to affect the choice of each of the five corporate governance mechanisms.  
Table 25 contains the results from a two-stage least squares estimation of equations 4 
to 9 based on the ROA as discussed in subsection 5.3.1.3 of chapter five. As can be observed, 
each  of  the  five  corporate  governance  mechanism  acts  as  either  the  dependent  or  the 
independent variable in one of equations 4 to 8 along with their respective exogenous (control) 
variables.  Similar  to  the  inclusion  of  the  ROA,  the  rationale  is  to  allow  for  possible 
interrelations or interdependences (i.e., complementarities or substitutions) to exist among the 
five corporate governance structures. 
The F-values of equations 4 to 8 in Columns 3 to 7 of Table 25 are all statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This means that the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the 
exogenous variables reported in Columns 3 to 7 of Table 23 are jointly equal to zero can be 
rejected. It implies that the coefficients on the explanatory variables in Columns 3 to 7 can 
jointly explain significant differences in the SACGI, leverage, block shareholding, institutional 
shareholding, and board size, respectively. The adjusted R
2 ranges between 3% for equation 5 
in Column 4 to 66% for equation 4 in Column 3 of Table 25.  
This is consistent with the adjusted R
2 reported by prior corporate governance studies. 
For example, using five alternative corporate governance mechanisms in addition to a broad 
composite corporate governance index, Beiner et al. (2006, p.265) report adjusted R
2 ranging 
between 41% for their leverage to 44% for their broad composite corporate governance index.  
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Similarly, using six alternative corporate governance mechanisms, Black et al. (2006a, p.390) 
report adjusted R
2 of 19% for their disclosure sub-index to 77% for their shareholder rights 
sub-index. 
Generally, the results from equations 4 to 8 contained in Columns 3 to 7 of Table 25 
present an interesting pattern of statistically significant interdependences among most of the 
five corporate governance mechanisms. As the results for the SACGI from equation 4 reported 
in  Column  3  of  Table  25  show,  all  four  alternative  corporate  governance  structures  are 
statistically significantly related to the SACGI. Also, leverage and institutional shareholding 
are  positively  related  to  the  SACGI,  whereas  board  size  and  block  shareholding  have  a 
negative relationship with the SACGI. 
Empirically,  the  evidence  of  a  statistically  significant  and  negative  SACGI-block 
shareholding  relationship  in  Column  3  of  Table  25,  suggests  substitutability  between  the 
SACGI  and  block  shareholding.  This  also  supports  the  idea  that  firms  optimally  choose 
corporate  governance  structures,  whereby  a  greater  usage  of  one  corporate  governance 
mechanism  results  in  a  lesser  usage  of  another.  Theoretically,  this  is  consistent  with  the 
hypothesis that firms with poor corporate governance structures can compensate that with a 
dominant vigilant block shareholder (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Beiner et al., 2006). 
By  contrast,  the  statistically  significant  and  positive  relationship  between  the  SACGI  and 
institutional shareholding in Column 3 of Table 25 indicates that they complement each other. 
It supports the theory that due to their relative superior knowledge and financial clout, greater 
institutional shareholding impacts positively on internal corporate governance structures (e.g., 
Core, 2001; Shabbir and Padget, 2005).  
The statistically significant and positive coefficient between the SACGI and ROA in 
Column 3 of Table 25 indicates that there is a reverse relationship between the SACGI and 
accounting performance. That is, firms with higher SACGI scores do not only help to generate 
higher accounting returns, but that there is also reverse association – firms with higher ROA 
also seems to adopt better corporate governance mechanisms.  
With regard to the findings for leverage from equation 5 presented in Column 4 of 
Table 25, the results show that the SACGI and block shareholding are statistically significant 
and positively associated with leverage. By contrast, institutional shareholding and board size 
in Column 4 of Table 25 are statistically insignificant and negatively related to leverage. This 
means that South African listed firms with higher levels of leverage may not be necessarily 
associated  with  higher  SACGI  scores  and  greater  block  shareholding.  The  statistically  
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significant and positive association between leverage and the SACGI, and between leverage 
and  block  shareholding  in  Column  4  of  Table  25,  indicate  that  there  a  complementarity 
relationship between leverage and the SACGI, and between leverage and block shareholding. 
It means that firms with good corporate governance standards are better placed to raise debt at 
a cheaper cost. 
Empirically,  the  statistically  significant  and  positive  leverage-block  shareholding 
relationship in Column 4 of Table 25 offers empirical support to the reported findings of 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996). In contrast, it does not support the results of Beiner et al. (2006) 
who report statistically insignificant and negative association between block shareholding and 
leverage. The statistically significant and negative leverage-ROA relationship in Column 4 of 
Table 25 suggests that there is a simultaneous or reverse association between the ROA and 
leverage. That is, due to the high cost of financial distress and less flexibility often associated 
with leverage (Myers, 1977, p.148), managers of profitable firms are less likely to rely on debt 
financing, but also highly levered firms generate poor accounting returns. 
  With  reference  to  the  results  for  block  shareholding  from  equation  6  reported  in 
Column  5  of  Table  25,  they  show  that  a  lower  SACGI  score,  a  greater  institutional 
shareholding and leverage are statistically significantly associated with block shareholding. 
This evidence is consistent with the results of Beiner et al. (2006) who document similar 
interrelations among the same three corporate governance mechanisms. By contrast, it fails to 
support  the  results  of  Agrawal  and  Knoeber  (1996)  who  report  a  statistically  significant 
negative relationship between block and institutional shareholdings.  
Since it costs more to acquire larger ownership stakes, especially in larger firms, the 
statistically significant and positive block shareholding-institutional shareholding association 
in Column 5 of Table 25 is more consistent with prior theory. That is, block shareholders are 
more  likely  to  be  institutional  shareholders  than  the  other  way  round.  The  statistically 
significant  and  negative  relationship  between  block  shareholding  and  the  SACGI,  but  the 
positive  association  between  block  shareholding  and  leverage  in  Column  5  of  Table  25, 
indicates  that  there  is  a  significant  reverse  association  between  block  shareholding  and 
leverage.  The  statistically  significant  and  positive  reverse  association  between  block 
shareholding and leverage is, however, theoretically less expected.  
This  is  because  as  block  shareholding  is  associated  with  poor  internal  corporate 
governance standards (i.e., SACGI scores), it is expected that it will be more difficult for such 
firms to raise external debt from the market. A plausible explanation may be that even though  
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firms dominated by block shareholders tend to have poor corporate governance structures, 
they are still able to raise debt from the market, but possibly at a significantly higher cost. 
Finally, the coefficient on the ROA in Column 5 of Table 25 is positive, but statistically 
insignificant, suggesting that more profitable firms may not necessarily be dominated by block 
shareholders. 
  With respect to the findings for institutional shareholding from equation 7 contained in 
Column 6 of Table 25, they indicate that a higher SACGI score, a greater block shareholding, 
and a larger board size are statistically significantly associated with institutional shareholding. 
The negative, but statistically insignificant relationship between institutional shareholding and 
leverage offers empirical support to the results of Agrawal and Knoeber (1996). 
Evidence  of  a  statistically  significant  and  positive  institutional  shareholding-block 
shareholding,  and  institutional  shareholding-SACGI  associations  in  Column  6  of  Table  25 
imply  that  there  are  statistically  significant  reverse  interdependences  among  these  three 
alternative corporate governance mechanisms. This means that better-governed firms are more 
attracted to institutional shareholders, but also the presence of institutional shareholders can 
impact positively on internal corporate governance mechanisms. Finally, the coefficient on the 
ROA in Column 6 of Table 23 is negative, but statistically insignificant, indicating that more 
successful firms may not necessarily attract institutional shareholders. 
  With reference to the results for board size from equation 8 reported in Column 7 of 
Table 25, they suggest that board size is statistically significantly associated with a lower 
SACGI score and a greater institutional shareholding. It also implies that there is a reverse 
statistically  significant  and  positive  association  between  board  size  and  institutional 
shareholding, but a reverse statistically significant and negative relationship between board 
size and the SACGI. This also means that board size and the SACGI appear to be substitutes, 
whereas board size and institutional shareholding seem to be complements.  
Finally,  the  coefficient  on  the  ROA  in  Column  7  of  Table  25  is  negative,  but 
statistically  insignificant.  This  indicates  that  more  financially  successful  firms  may  not 
necessarily  end  up  with  having  larger  board  size.  Overall,  the  results  suggest  interesting 
patterns  of  interdependences  or  simultaneities  among  the  five  corporate  governance 
mechanisms, as well as between the ROA and the five corporate governance structures. This 
indicates that the use of 2SLS to estimate the corporate governance-financial performance 
relationship appears to be appropriate.  
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  Considering the exogenous (control) variables in Columns 3 to 7 of Table 25, most of 
the coefficients have the expected signs with some being statistically significant and others not. 
For  example,  big  four  audited  firms,  cross-listed  firms,  and  firms  which  have  established 
corporate governance committees in Column 3 of Table 25 tend to have significantly higher 
SACGI  scores.  As  hypothesised,  the  coefficient  on  capital  expenditure  is  statistically 
significant and positively related to the SACGI. The significant negative relationship between 
the  SACGI  and  firm  size  in  Column  3  of  Table  25  is,  however,  surprising  without  any 
immediate convincing explanation. A possible explanation is that it may be due to sensitivities 
arising out of the specification of the system of equations, such as omitted variable(s) bias. 
The industry and year dummies in Column 3 of Table 25 also show that corporate governance 
standards significantly differ across different industries and years.  
With regard to leverage in Column 4 of Table 25, all the control variables, including 
the year and industry dummies, are statistically insignificant, except capital expenditure. This 
explains the relatively low reported adjusted R
2 of equation 5. The statistically significant and 
positive leverage-capital expenditure association in Column 4 of Table 25 indicates that firms 
with heavy investment in fixed assets tend to have higher levels of debt. 
Block shareholding in Column 5 of Table 25 is statistically significant and negatively 
correlated with firm size and capital structure. However, it also shows that block sharehoding 
is  statistically  significant  and  positively  associated  with  sales  growth,  as  hypothesised. 
Consistent with prediction, institutional shareholding in Column 6 of Table 25 is statistically 
significant and positively associated with firm size. This is because larger firms are more 
attractive  to  institutional  investors  (Agrawal  and  Knoeber,  1996,  p.383).  Similarly,  and 
consistent  with  predictions,  audit  firm  size  and  the  presence  of  a  corporate  governance 
committee in Column 7 of Table 25 are statistically significant and positively associated with 
board size. The statistically significant and negative relationship between firm size and board 
size Column 7 of Table 25 is theoretically unexpected. It may be due to sensitivities arising 
out  of  potential  misspecification  of  the  system  of  equations,  such  as  potential  omitted 
variable(s). 
Equation  9  in  Column  8  of  Table  25  allows  for  the  existence  of  potential 
interdependences or simultaneities among the alternative corporate governance structures. It 
also utilises the ROA as an explanatory variable in predicting the instrumented part of all five 
corporate governance mechanisms. This allows the ROA to affect each corporate governance  
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mechanism, but also permits the corporate governance structures to affect the ROA in order to 
capture potential complementary, simultaneous or substitution effects.  
The F-value of equations 9 in Column 8 of Table 25 is significant at the l% level. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis that the coefficients for the exogenous  variables are jointly 
equal to zero can be rejected. In addition to capturing the control variables, the adjusted R
2 is 
76% in Column 8 of Table 25. This is very high, but consistent with theoretical and empirical 
expectations (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Gujarati, 1995, 2003; Wooldridge, 2002)
90.  
For example, Black et al. (2006a) report that the adjusted R
2 increased from 33% with regard 
to  the  un-instrumented  composite  corporate  governance  index  to  64%  in  the  case  of  the 
instrumented  composite  corporate  governance  index.  This  suggests  their  instrumented 
composite corporate governance index’s predictions are greater than the un-instrumented one.  
With regard to the coefficients of the corporate governance mechanisms in Column 8 
of Table 25, they suggest significant evidence of interdependences or simultaneities among the 
alternative corporate governance structures. Most importantly, the SACGI remains positive 
and statistically significant in Column 8 of Table 25. The magnitude of the coefficient on the 
SACGI also remains unchanged at .002 as reported in Column 4 of Table 17 of chapter eight. 
This means that the earlier conclusion in chapter eight that, on average, better-governed firms 
tend to be associated with higher accounting returns than their poorly-governed counterparts is 
robust whether alternative corporate governance mechanisms are present or not. Leverage, 
block shareholding, institutional shareholding and board size in Column 8 of Table 25 are all 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  
Following past studies (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Beiner et al., 2006; Black et 
al.,  2006a)  and  assuming  instrument  validity,  the  statistically  significant  and  negative 
relationship between the ROA and block shareholding in Column 8 of Table 25 supports the 
entrenchment hypothesis. It implies that block shareholders seem to be more interested in the 
private benefits of control at the expense of minority shareholders than engaging in effective 
                                                 
90Theoretically,  the  instrumented  part  of  each  corporate  governance  mechanism  contains  portions  of  the 
remaining four alternative corporate governance structures, as well as parts of the ROA. Empirically, this makes 
the instrumented parts of the corporate governance mechanisms to predict financial performance more strongly 
than their un-instrumented counterparts (e.g., Beiner et al., 2006; Black et al., 2006a). This means that, while 
inferences from the regression diagnostics, statistical significance and direction of coefficients may be accurate, 
their true magnitudes are more likely to be over or underestimated (Beiner et al., 2006, p.271). This is because 
they measure the strength of the instrumented parts of the corporate governance mechanisms to predict financial 
performance  rather  than  the  corporate  governance  mechanisms  themselves.  This  also  means  that  the  high 
adjusted R
2 may be spurious. Indeed, the main aim of the analysis is to ascertain whether there are significant 
interdependences  (substitution  or  complementary  effects)  exist  among  the  alternative  corporate  governance 
mechanisms rather than the explanatory power of the model.  
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monitoring of managers. The statistically significant and negative impact of leverage on the 
ROA fails to lend support to the tax advantage theory of capital structure and the effective 
utilisation of free cash flow theory of agency (e.g., Myers, 1977; Jensen, 1986).  
Also, the statistically significant and negative coefficient between the ROA and board 
size in Column 8 of Table 25 suggests that larger boards are ineffective. With respect to the 
South African context, it indicates board appointments may be made in order to meet black 
economic empowerment and employment equity targets rather than for the quality of their 
contributions  to  board  decisions.  By  contrast,  the  statistically  significant  and  positive 
relationship between ROA and institutional shareholding in Column 8 of Table 25 supports 
the  suggestions  of  Barr  et  al.  (1995,  p.19).  Barr  et  al.  (1995)  suggest  that  despite  the 
pervasiveness  of  complex  institutional  cross-holdings  and  pyramidical  structures  in  South 
Africa, it represents an efficient way by which South African companies are able to finance 
new growth opportunities without giving up substantial control.  
Unlike the SACGI, the control variables in Column 8 of Table 25 show some level of 
sensitivities when compared with the results presented in Column 4 of Table 17 in chapter 
eight. First, the directions of the coefficient on firm size, capital structure, capital expenditure 
and dual-listing in Column 8 of Table 25 have changed. Second, firm size, capital expenditure, 
dual-listing, the industry and the year dummies that were not statistically significant, are now 
statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level.  This  partly  explains  the  relatively  high  reported 
adjusted R
2. It suggests that in the presence of alternative corporate governance structures, the 
reported results for the control variables in chapter eight are not robust. These sensitivities 
may be due to misspecifications within the system of equations, such as potential omitted 
variable(s)  bias.  Generally,  the  results  in  Column  8  of  Table  25  indicate  that  the  control 
variables  interrelate  differently  with  the  instrumented  part  of  the  alternative  corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
Together, the results in Column 8 of Table 25 imply that a higher SACGI score, a 
greater institutional shareholding along with a lesser block shareholding, a smaller board size 
and a lesser debt usage is associated with higher accounting returns. The results also show 
significant reverse associations between the ROA, the SACGI, and leverage. This suggests that 
higher accounting returns is significantly associated with a higher SACGI score, but a lesser 
debt usage. Overall, allowing for the existence of potential interdependences or endogeneities 
among  the  alternative  corporate  governance  mechanisms,  the  results  support  the  previous 
conclusion in chapter eight that, on average, better-governed South African listed sampled  
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firms  tend  to  be  associated  with  higher  accounting  returns  than  their  poorly-governed 
counterparts.  
   
9.4.2 Regression Results from Estimating Two-Stage Least Squares Based on Q-ratio 
 
This  subsection  discusses  results  from  the  two-stage  least  squares  (2SLS)  analysis 
based  on  the  Q-ratio.  Similar  to  the  preceding  subsection,  the  four  alternative  corporate 
governance mechanisms in addition to the SACGI are estimated simultaneously using two-
stage  least  squares.  Specifically,  in  the  first  stage,  each  of  equations  4  to  8  specified  in 
subsection 5.3.1.3 of chapter five is estimated along with their respective control variables. 
The  resulting  predicted  values  (i.e.,  instrumented  or  predicted  part  of  each  corporate 
governance structure) are saved. In the second stage, each corporate governance mechanism is 
replaced with its saved predicted instrument from the first stage estimations in equation 9 as 
specified in subsection 5.3.1.3 of chapter five. Equation 9 is subsequently estimated along 
with the seven control variables. 
Financial performance (Q-ratio) is also added to equations 4 to 8 as an independent 
variable, but  as the  dependent  variable  in  equation 9.  The  aim  is to test  for  the  potential 
existence of endogeneities or simultaneities by allowing each of the five corporate governance 
mechanisms  to  affect  financial  performance,  but  also  permitting  the  Q-ratio  to  affect  the 
choice of each corporate governance mechanisms. 
Table 26 presents the results from a two-stage least squares estimation of equations 4 
to 9 based on the Q-ratio. Each of the five corporate governance mechanisms appear on the 
left-hand side of one of equations 4 to 8 and the right-hand side of each, of the other equations, 
along with their respective exogenous (control) variables. Similar to the inclusion of the Q-
ratio, the rationale is to capture potential simultaneity, substitution or complementary effects 
among the five corporate governance structures. 
The F-values of equations 4 to 8 in Colums 3 to 7 of Table 26 are all statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This suggests that the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the 
exogenous variables reported in Columns 3 to 7 of Table 26 are jointly equal to zero can be 
rejected. It means that the coefficients on the independent variables in Columns 3 to 7 jointly 
explain  significant  differences  in  the  SACGI,  leverage,  block  shareholding,  institutional 
shareholding, and board size, respectively. The adjusted R
2 ranges between 6% for leverage in 
equation 5 in Column 4 to 63% for the SACGI in equation 4 in Column 3.   
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This is similar to the adjusted R
2 reported by prior corporate governance studies (e.g., 
Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Durnev and Kim, 2005). For example, using four alternative 
corporate  governance  mechanisms  in  addition  to  a  broad  composite  corporate  governance 
index, Durnev and  Kim (2005, p.1480) report  adjusted R
2 ranging between 12% for their 
social awareness index to 50% for their composite corporate governance index. 
Generally, the  results  from equations  4  to  8  in Columns  3  to  7  of  Table  26  offer 
evidence of statistically significant interrelations among most of the five corporate governance 
mechanisms. With regard to the results from equation 4 presented in Column 3 of Table 26, 
the SACGI is statistically significant and negatively related to block shareholding and board 
size,  but  statistically  significant  and  positively  associated  with  leverage  and  institutional 
shareholding. 
 Empirically,  the  evidence  of  a  statistically  significant  and  negative  coefficient  on 
block shareholding in Column 3 of Table 26 suggests the existence of a substitution effect 
between the SACGI and block shareholding. Theoretically, it offers support to the suggestion 
that  block  shareholding  can  minimise  the  agency  problems  between  managers  and 
shareholders by reducing information asymmetry (e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Beiner et 
al.,  2006).  In  contrast,  the  statistically  significant  and  positive  SACGI-institutional 
shareholding relationship in Column 3 of Table 26 suggests the existence of a complementary 
effect between the SACGI and institutional shareholding. Theoretically, this is consistent with 
the notion that  because  of  their  information  and  financial  advantages,  greater  institutional 
shareholding  impacts  positively  on  internal  corporate  governance  structures  (Core,  2001; 
Shabbir and Padget, 2005). 
Unlike the ROA, the coefficient on the Q-ratio in Column 3 of Table 26 is positive, but 
not statistically significant. This suggests that there is no simultaneous or reverse association 
relationship between the SACGI and the Q-ratio. That is, firms with higher SACGI scores do 
receive  significantly  higher  market  valuation,  but  firms  with  higher  Q-ratio  may  not 
necessarily adopt better corporate governance mechanisms. 
With respect to the findings for leverage from equation 5 contained in Column 4 of 
Table  26,  the  results  indicate  that  the  SACGI  and  block  shareholding  are  significant  and 
positively associated with leverage. This suggests that South African listed firms with high 
gearing are associated with higher SACGI scores and greater block shareholding. Empirically, 
this  offers  support  to  the  results  of  Agrawal  and  Knoeber  (1996)  who  report  statistically 
significant and positive association between leverage and block shareholding. In contrast, it  
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does not lend support to the findings of Beiner et al. (2006) who document a statistically 
significant  and negative  relationship  between  their  constructed  good  corporate  governance 
index and leverage. The coefficient on the Q-ratio in Cloumn 4 of Table 26 is negative and 
statistically significant. This means that not only are highly valued firms less likely to rely on 
debt financing, but also firms that are highly geared do receive lower market valuation. 
With  reference  to  the  results  for  block  shareholding  from  equation  6  presented  in 
Column 5 of Table 26, the analysis suggests that a lower SACGI score, but a larger board size, 
a  greater  institutional  shareholding,  and  a  greater  debt  usage  are  statistically  significantly 
associated with block shareholding. The relationships between the SACGI, leverage and block 
ownership  in  Column  5  of  Table  26  are  evidence  of  the  existence  of  significant  reverse 
associations  between  three  alternative  corporate  governance  mechanisms.  This  means  that 
firms  with  better  internal  corporate  governance  structures  can  afford  to  have  dispersed 
shareholdings, and the presence of a block shareholder is likely to increase debt usage and 
vice-versa.  
This  evidence  supports  the  results  of  Beiner  et  al.  (2006).  They  report  that  their 
composite  good  corporate  governance  index  is  statistically  significant  and  negatively 
correlated  with  block  shareholding.  Leverage  and  board  size  in  Column  5  of  Table  26, 
however, are statistically significant and positively associated with block shareholding. Also, 
institutional shareholding in Column 5 of Table 26 is statistically significant and positively 
associated  with  block  shareholding.  The  evidence  of  a  positive  block  shareholding-
institutional shareholding relationship does not support the results of Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996).  The  results of  Agrawal  and  Knoeber  (1996)  suggest  a  statistically  significant and 
negative link between block and institutional shareholdings. Finally, the coefficient on the Q-
ratio in Column 5 of Table 26 is negative, but statistically insignificant. This indicates that 
firms dominated by block shareholders may not necessarily receive statistically significant 
lower market valuation. 
  With reference to the findings for institutional shareholding from equation 7 reported 
in Column 6 of Table 26, they suggest that a higher SACGI score, a greater block shareholding, 
and a larger board size are statistically significantly associated with institutional shareholding. 
The statistically significant and positive relationship between the SACGI, block shareholding 
and institutional shareholding in Column 6 of Table 26, suggests the existence of significant 
reverse interrelations among the corporate governance structures.  
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Table 26: Regression Results from a Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation of Equations (4) – (9) Based on Q-ratio 
Dependent Variable 
(Equation) 
Exp. 
Sign 
SACGI   
(4) 
Leverage 
(5) 
Block shareholding 
(6) 
Inst. shareholding 
(7) 
Board size 
(8) 
Q-ratio 
(9) 
Adjusted R
2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
No. of observations 
      .633 
    .133 
.765 
43.777(.000)
*** 
      500 
  .055 
  .121 
  .651 
2.797(.000)
*** 
      500 
    .302 
    .175 
  1.106 
13.624(.000)
*** 
      500 
    .299 
    .217 
    .922 
13.446(.000)
*** 
       500 
    .221 
    .028 
    .845 
8.027(.000)
*** 
    500 
     .963 
     .125 
     .854 
684.952(.000)
*** 
      500 
Constant 
SACGI 
Leverage  
Block ownership 
Institutional owners. 
Board size 
Q-ratio 
Corporate gov. com. 
Audit firm size 
Firm size  
Capital structure  
Sales growth  
Capital expenditure  
Dual-listing  
Basic materials  
Consumer services  
Industrials  
Technology  
Year 2002 
Year 2004 
Year 2005 
Year 2006 
 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
 
   .358(.000)
*** 
- 
   .001(.053)
* 
  -.003(.000)
*** 
   .003(.000)
*** 
  -.006(.030)
** 
   .017(.130)
 
   .121(.000)
*** 
   .152(.000)
*** 
  -.047(.000)
*** 
  -.000(.413) 
   .001(.026)
** 
   .002(.146)
 
   .067(.000)
*** 
  -.060(.002)
*** 
   .012(.540) 
   .028(.149)
 
   .002(.149) 
  -.087(.000)
*** 
   .055(.004)
*** 
   .067(.001)
*** 
   .087(.000)
*** 
   .101(.001)
*** 
   .001(.009)
*** 
- 
   .001(.044)
** 
  -.000(.659) 
  -.000(.543) 
  -.041(.000)
*** 
- 
- 
  -.008(.499) 
- 
  -.000(.714) 
   .004(.005)
*** 
- 
  -.023(.899) 
   .021(.236) 
   .034(.052)
* 
  -.010(.546) 
   .020(.262) 
  -.002(.899) 
  -.002(.993) 
   .007(.687) 
   .580(.000)
*** 
  -.004(.000)
*** 
   .001(.040)
** 
- 
   .004(.000)
*** 
   .006(.098)
* 
  -.012(.399) 
- 
- 
  -.044(.010)
*** 
  -.002(.031)
** 
   .001(.005)
*** 
   .002(.267) 
- 
   .021(.403) 
  -.042(.105)
 
   .025(.322) 
   .027(.279) 
  -.061(.015)
** 
   .019(.460) 
   .024(.351) 
   .015(.574) 
    .035(.553) 
    .005(.000)
*** 
   -.000(.600) 
    .005(.000)
*** 
- 
    .018(.007)
*** 
    .020(.199) 
    .019(.451) 
- 
    .051(.018)
** 
- 
   -.001(.246) 
   -.000(.854) 
- 
    .028(.379) 
    .078(.015)
** 
   -.024(.452) 
   -.023(.469) 
    .064(.041)
** 
   -.015(.628) 
   -.038(.228) 
   -.041(.199) 
-1.390(.027)
** 
-.017(.030)
** 
-.003(.692) 
   .008(.200) 
   .015(.002)
*** 
- 
 .336(.081)
* 
 .550(.049)
** 
 .674(.017)
** 
-2.187(.000)
*** 
   .011(.230) 
  -.001(.902) 
  -.005(.857) 
-.391(.213) 
-.232(.497) 
-.193(.576) 
 .077(.816) 
-.097(.773) 
-.105(.752) 
 .034(.917) 
 .009(.979) 
   .000(.999) 
  3.085(.000)
*** 
    .000(.783)
 
   -.385(.000)
*** 
   -.083(.000)
*** 
    .036(.004)
*** 
   -.064(.047)
** 
- 
- 
     .112(.058)
* 
   -.342(.000)
*** 
   -.001(.010)
*** 
    .001(.038)
** 
    .184(.000)
*** 
    .031(.096)
* 
    .036(.068)
* 
    .472(.000)
*** 
    .653(.009)
*** 
   -.541(.000)
*** 
    .243(.000)
*** 
    .028(.469)
 
    .324(.000)
*** 
    .458(.000)
*** 
Notes: Coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, **
 and * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Also, consumer goods industry and year 2003 are excluded 
from the regression analyses. They are used as base industry and year, respectively, for purposes of comparison. As has been explained in subsection 5.3.1.3 of chapter five, to limit endogenity 
problems, four alternative corporate governance mechanisms in addition to the SACGI are introduced. These are: leverage, block shareholding, institutional shareholding, and board size. They are 
the alternative corporate governance structures for which data was available at the time of data collection. They do not also form part of the broad composite index, the SACGI. Equations 4 to 9 are 
estimated as a system of simultaneous equations by using two-stage least squares. Specifically, in the first stage, each of equations 4 to 8 specified in subsection 5.3.1.3 of chapter five and reported 
in Columns 3 to 7 are first estimated along with their respective control variables. The resulting predicted values (i.e., instrumented or predicted part of each corporate governance structure) are 
saved. In the second stage, the SACGI, leverage, block shareholding, institutional shareholding, and board size are replaced with their instrumented or predicted values from equations 4 to 8 in 
equation 9, respectively. Equation 9, specified in subsection 5.3.1.3 of chapter five and reported in Column 8 is subsequently estimated along with the control variables.   
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This implies that institutional shareholders are more likely to invest in firms with better 
internal corporate governance structures, but also the presence of institutional shareholders can 
significantly  influence  managers  to  improve  internal  corporate  governance  mechanisms. 
Finally, and unlike the ROA, the coefficient on the Q-ratio in Column 6 of Table 26 is positive, 
but statistically insignificant. This indicates that higher market valuation is not necessarily 
significantly associated with institutional shareholding. 
  With respect to the results for board size from equation 8 contained in Column 7 of 
Table 26, they suggest that a lower SACGI score, but a greater institutional shareholding, is 
statistically  significantly  associated  with  board  size.  It  also  indicates  the  existence  of 
significant reverse associations between board size, institutional shareholding and the SACGI. 
The statistically significant and negative relationship between board size and the SACGI in 
Column 7 of Table 26 indicates that they are substitutes or larger boards appear to have lower 
SACGI.  The  statistically  significant  and  positive  association  between  board  size  and 
institutional shareholding suggests that they are complements.  
Finally, the coefficient on the Q-ratio under board size in Column 7 of Table 26 is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests the presence of a significant 
reverse association between the Q-ratio and board size. This implies that firms with larger 
boards  receive  higher  market  valuation,  but  also  it  is  presumably  more  attractive  for 
prospective board members to join firms that are financially successful. To summarise, the 
results in Columns 3 to 7 of Table 26 support the existence of significant interrelations or 
simultaneities among the five corporate governance structures, as well as between the Q-ratio 
and the five corporate governance mechanisms. Crucially, it seems to justify the reliance on 
the  2SLS  technique  to  simultaneously  estimate  the  relationship  between  the  corporate 
governance mechanisms and the Q-ratio. 
  With regard to the exogenous (control) in Columns 3 to 7 of Table 26, most of the 
coefficients  show  the  hypothesised  signs  with  some  being  significant  and  others  not.  For 
instance,  and  as  expected,  audit  firm  size,  sales  growth,  dual-listing  and  the  presence  a 
corporate  governance  committee  in  Column  3  of  Table  26  are  significantly  positively 
associated higher SACGI scores. By contrast, the negative coefficient on firm size in Column 3 
of Table 26 is theoretically unexpected. It, however, does not come with immediate cogent 
theoretical  explanation.  It  may,  for  example,  be  due  to  potential  misspecifications  in  the 
system of equations, such as omitted variable(s) bias. They coefficients on the year dummies  
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in Column 3 of Table 26 also indicate that corporate governance standards significantly differ 
across different financial years, as hypothesised. 
With respect to leverage in Column 4 of Table 26, and consistent with the prediction, it 
is statistically significant and positively associated with capital expenditure. With regard to 
block ownership in Column 5 of Table 26, and as predicted, it is statistically significant and 
negatively  associated  with  firm  size  and  capital  structure.  Also,  leverage  is  statistically 
significant  and  positively  related  to  sales  growth  as  expected  in  Column  5  of  Table  26. 
Similarly, and consistent with expectations, firm size is statistically significant and positively 
associated with institutional shareholding in Column 6 of Table 26. Finally, and consistent 
with  predictions,  board  size  is  statistically  significant  and  positively  associated  with  the 
presence of a corporate governance committee and audit firm size in Column 7 of Table 26.  
Finally,  equation  9  in  Column  8  of  Table  26  allows  for  the  existence  of  possible 
interrelations  or  endogeneities  among  the  five  corporate  governance  mechanisms.  It  also 
utilises the Q-ratio as an exogenous variable in predicting the instrumented portion of all five 
corporate  governance  mechanisms.  This  permits  the  Q-ratio  to  affect  each  corporate 
governance structure, but also allows the corporate governance mechanisms to affect the Q-
ratio in order to capture probable complementary, simultaneous or substitution effects among 
the variables.  
The F-value of equation 9 in Column 8 of Table 26 is statistically significant at the l% 
level.  Therefore,  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  coefficients  on  the  exogenous  variables  are 
jointly  equal to zero can be rejected. The adjusted R
2 is 96%, which  is excessively high. 
However, it is theoretically and empirically not too surprising. This is because, and as has 
been explained above, prior econometric theory (e.g., Gujarati, 1995, 2003; Wooldridge, 2002; 
Brooks,  2003),  and  past  corporate  governance  studies  (e.g.,  Agrawal  and  Knoeber,  1996; 
Black  et  al.,  2006;  Black  et  al.,  2006a),  suggest  that  the  instrumented  parts  of  corporate 
governance mechanisms tend to predict financial performance more strongly than their un-
instrumented counterparts.  
This also means that the very high adjusted R
2 may be spurious. In fact, and has been 
explained above, the main aim of the analysis is to ascertain whether there are significant 
interdependences  (substitution  or  complementary  effects)  exist  among  the  alternative 
corporate governance mechanisms rather than the explanatory power of the model. 
Examining  the  coefficients  on  the  corporate  governance  structures  in  Column  8  of 
Table  26,  they  offer  evidence  of  significant  interrelations  among the  alternative  corporate  
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governance mechanisms. Unlike the ROA, however, it indicates that the magnitude and the 
statistical  significance  of  the  coefficient  on  the  SACGI  are  not  robust  to  the  presence  of 
alternative corporate governance mechanisms. First, the coefficient on the SACGI in Column 8 
of Table 26, which was statistically significant at the 1% level in Column 4 of Table 18 of 
chapter seven, is no longer statistically significant. Second, the magnitude of the coefficient 
has reduced significantly from .004 to .000. These sensitivities may be arising from equation 
misspecifications due to the presence of the alternative corporate governance mechanisms, 
such as potential omitted variable(s) bias. It may also be due to the use of the instrumented 
part of the variables. The results do not support the previous conclusion in chapter eight that 
there is a statistically significant and positive relationship between the Q-ratio and the SACGI. 
By contrast, the remaining four alternative corporate governance structures in Column 
8 of Table 26 are all statistically significant. Following previous corporate governance studies 
(e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Beiner et al., 2006; Black et al., 2006a) and assuming 
instrument validity, the negative coefficient on block shareholding offers empirical support to 
the entrenchment hypothesis (e.g., Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990). The 
negative relationship between the Q-ratio and leverage does not support the tax advantages of 
using debt and efficient use of free cash flows as suggested by capital structure and agency 
theories, respectively (e.g., Myers, 1977; Jensen, 1986).  
Similarly, the negative coefficient on board size suggests that the market perceives 
larger boards as ineffective. Within the South African context, this seems to suggest that the 
willingness to meet black economic empowerment and employment equity targets tend to take 
precedence  over  the  potential  to  make  quality  contributions  to  board  decisions  when 
appointments to corporate boards are made. 
In contrast, the positive association between the Q-ratio and institutional shareholding 
offers  empirical  support  to  the  suggestion  of  Barr  et  al.  (1995,  p.19)  that  despite  the 
pervasiveness  of  complex  institutional  cross-holdings  and  pyramidical  structures  in  South 
Africa,  it  represents  an  efficient  way  by  which  firms  are  able  to  raise  external  capital  to 
finance growth without surrendering significant control.  
With respect to the control variables in Column 8 of Table 26, they generally exhibit 
the expected signs, and are all statistically significant when compared with those reported in 
Column 4 of Table 18 in chapter eight. For example, and as expected, capital expenditure, 
sales  growth,  audit  firm  size  and  dual-listing  in  Column  8  of  Table  26  are  statistically 
significant and positively associated with the Q-ratio. Similarly, and as predicted, firm size  
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and capital structure are statistically significantly negatively correlated with the Q-ratio. It also 
shows  that  the  Q-ratio  significantly  differs  across  different  industries  and  years  as 
hypothesised.  
To summarise, and like the ROA, the results in Column 8 of Table 26 indicate that 
greater institutional shareholding along with lesser block shareholding, smaller board size and 
lesser debt usage are statistically significantly associated with higher market valuation. Unlike 
the ROA, however, the results suggest that allowing for the existence of alternative corporate 
governance mechanisms, the SACGI looses its ability to explain significant differences in the 
Q-ratio. Overall, the results in Column 8 of Table 26 imply that firms with insignificant block 
shareholding,  smaller  boards  and  lesser  debt  usage,  but  significantly  greater  institutional 
shareholding  can  afford  to  have  relatively  poor  internal  corporate  governance  structures 
without necessarily being punished by the market with lower market valuation. 
The  final  section  below  will  investigate  the  relationship  between  changes  in  the 
financial  performance  and  changes  in  the  SACGI  rather  than  using  actual  levels  for  the 
analysis. 
 
 
9.5 OLS REGRESSION RESULTS OF THE LINK BETWEEN CHANGES IN   
       FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE AND CHANGES IN THE SACGI 
 
  In line with the prior literature, the results presented in chapter eight and the sensitivity 
or robustness analyses carried out so far generally suggest that firms with better corporate 
governance  standards  tend  to  be  associated  with  higher  financial  returns  than  their 
counterparts with poor corporate governance standards. However, it is still unclear within the 
prior literature whether better corporate governance causes better financial performance or 
vice-versa. This may partly be attributed to data limitations in prior corporate governance 
studies.   
This section attempts to fill this gap within the prior literature by running a regression 
of changes in the financial performance on changes in the SACGI. This will arguably help to 
directly measure the effect of an improvement or a decline in the quality of firm’s corporate 
governance on its financial performance. The central rationale is that if better-governed firms 
tend  to  be  associated  with  superior  financial  performance  than  their  poorly-governed 
counterparts, then it can be argued that a stronger test will be to estimate such relationship by 
using year-on-year changes in the financial performance and the SACGI rather than relying on 
their actual levels.  
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The changes data is computed for the financial performance, the SACGI and the non-
dummy control variables, respectively, as follows: 
  , 1 - - = D t t FP FP FP   
, 1 - - = D t t SACGI SACGI SACGI and 
. 1 - - = D t t CONTROLS CONTROLS CONTROLS  
 
where:  FP D stands  for  changes  in  the  financial  performance  proxies,  ROA  and  Q-ratio, 
SACGI D  refers to changes in the SACGI, while  CONTROLS D refers to changes in all the 
non-dummy control variables, namely firm size, capital structure, capital expenditure and sales 
growth. Changes data could not be computed for the dummy variables of industry, year, dual-
listing  and  audit  firm  size.  This  also  reduces  the  sample  size  from  500  to  400  firm-year 
observations.  
The computed changes data as specified above is then used to re-estimate the corporate 
governance-firm financial performance relationship for the compliance-index model (equation 
1)
91 as specified in equation 12 in subsection 5.3.1.2 of chapter five and repeated below: 
∑
=
+ D + D + = D
n
i
it it i it it CONTROLS SACGI FP
1
1 0 e b b a                            (12) 
 
where:  FP D ,  SACGI D , and CONTROLS D are the same as defined above. 
To ascertain the pattern of changes in the SACGI and financial performance, Table 27 
reports summary descriptive of changes in financial performance and the SACGI. Specifically, 
Panels A, B, C, D, and E of Table 27 contain summary descriptive statistics of changes in  the 
ROA, the Q-ratio, the SACGI, the Economic-SACGI, and the Social-SACGI, respectively. 
The general evidence from Panels A to E is that the summary year-on-year average 
changes in the financial performance proxies and the SACGI are relatively small. By contrast, 
absolute changes in the financial performance proxies and the SACGI generally show very 
large spreads. For example, and as Panel A of Table 27 suggests, the average change in the 
ROA for all the 400 firm-year observations is .83 percentage points, which is relatively small.  
However, the highest decrease in the ROA in a year is 34 percentage points, whereas 
the highest increase in the ROA in a year is 40 percentage points, indicating a very large 
spread. The average change in the ROA for 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 are 1.01, -1.60, 2.09, 
and 1.83 percentage points, respectively. Panel B of Table 27 indicates that the overall average 
                                                 
91Since the equilibrium-variable model (equation 2) contains a lot of dummy variables, it will be inappropriate to 
estimate a similar model or relationship.  
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change in the Q-ratio is .15, with a highest decrease in a year of 2.32, and a highest increase in 
a year of 2.33. This also shows limited average changes, but a very large spread. The average 
change in the Q-ratio for 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 are -.02, .19, .24, and .18, respectively.  
Similarly, Panel C of Table 27 shows that the average overall change in the SACGI is 
5.15  percentage  points,  which  is  relatively  small. By  contrast,  the  highest decrease  in  the 
SACGI in a year is 20 percentage points, and a highest increase in the SACGI in a year is 64 
percentage points, also indicating a very large spread. An example of a sampled firm with 
such a large spread is Aflease Gold Ltd (AFO). It scored 12% (6 out of 50), 14% (7 out of 50), 
18% (9 out of 50) and 22% (11 out of 50) in 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005, respectively.  
 
Table 27: Summary Descriptive Statistics for Changes in Performance and the SACGI 
Dependent/Independent Variables  Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Skew-
ness 
Kurt- 
osis 
Mini- 
mum 
Maxi- 
mum 
Panel A: Changes in the  ROA All 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel B: Changes in the Q-ratio All 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel C: Changes in the SACGI All 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel D: Changes in Econ.-SACGI All  
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Panel E: Changes in  Social-SACGI All  
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
.83 
1.01 
-1.60 
2.09 
1.83 
.15 
-.02 
.19 
.24 
.18 
5.15 
9.12 
5.80 
2.58 
3.08 
5.15 
9.63 
5.66 
2.32 
3.00 
5.11 
6.78 
6.44 
3.78 
3.44 
9.24 
9.95 
9.01 
9.30 
8.30 
.46 
.39 
.45 
.49 
.47 
8.42 
10.25 
7.49 
4.78 
8.67 
8.99 
10.80 
7.9 
5.27 
9.23 
13.98 
16.92 
14.75 
11.63 
11.79 
-.28
** 
.17
** 
-.43
** 
.12
** 
.99
** 
.33
** 
 .62
** 
 .80
**.
.99
** 
.99
** 
   .90
** 
1.63
*** 
 1.28
*** 
 .43
** 
.97
** 
1.96
*** 
1.39
*** 
  .98
** 
.51
** 
.99
** 
 1.26
*** 
 1.12
*** 
 1.11
*** 
  .68
** 
.10
* 
3.83
** 
3.21
** 
3.15
** 
3.71
*** 
6.19
*** 
6.32
*** 
 9.98
*** 
 5.89
*** 
 9.27
*** 
 4.75
*** 
 9.70
*** 
 7.64
*** 
 3.09
* 
.33
 
   .99
 
 7.32
*** 
 5.38
*** 
 2.69 
 1.13 
 9.98
*** 
4.12
*** 
3.65
** 
1.83 
1.75
 
8.94
*** 
-34.00 
-31.00 
-30.00 
-34.00 
-17.00 
-2.32 
-1.33 
-1.09 
-2.32 
-.97 
-20.00 
-20.00 
-12.00 
-10.00 
-10.00 
-19.51 
-19.51 
-14.63 
-14.63 
-12.20 
-44.44 
-44.44 
-33.33 
-22.22 
-33.33 
40.00 
35.00 
30.00 
31.00 
40.00 
2.33 
2.32 
2.28 
1.64 
2.33 
64.00 
64.00 
38.00 
16.00 
54.00 
63.41 
63.41 
39.02 
17.07 
51.22 
66.67 
66.67 
55.56 
44.44 
66.67 
The skewness and kurtosis test statistics in columns 4 and 5, respectively, test for normal distribution. A test 
statistic with (***), (**), and (*) means that the null hypothesis that a variable is normally distributed is rejected 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
 
However, as a result of a takeover by a US-based mining consortium and a subsequent 
cross-listing to the US, it scored 76% (38 out of 50) in 2006, an increase of 32 items or 64 
percentage points. The average change in the SACGI for 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 are 
9.15%, 5.80%, 2.58%, and 3.08%, respectively. Panels D and E of Table 27 also suggest  
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similar limited average changes in the Economic-SACGI and the Social-SACGI, but very large 
spreads. As suggested in subsection 9.2.1, the limited year-on-year average changes in the 
financial  performance  proxies  and  the  SACGI  explains  the  relatively  stable  results  of  the 
compliance-index model reported in chapter seven. 
Table 28 contains the results of a simple OLS regression of changes in the financial 
performance on changes in the SACGI. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 28 show the results of 
changes in the ROA and Q-ratio on changes in the SACGI, respectively. Columns 5 and 6 
contain  the  results  of  changes  in  the  ROA  and  Q-ratio  on  changes  in  the  Social-SACGI, 
respectively, while Columns 7 and 8 present the results of changes in the ROA and Q-ratio on 
changes in the Economic-SACGI.  
 The F-values of changes in the SACGI, changes in the Social-SACGI and changes in 
the  Economic-SACGI  are  statistically  insignificant.  Therefore,  the  null  hypothesis  the 
coefficients  on  changes  in  the  SACGI,  changes  in  the  Social-SACGI,  and  changes  in  the 
Economic-SACGI  are  equal  to  zero  cannot  be  rejected.  This  implies  that  the  regression 
coefficients on changes in the SACGI, the Social-SACGI and the Economic-SACGI cannot 
explain significant differences of the changes in the ROA and Q-ratio.  
Consistent  with  the  suggestions  of  the  F-values,  the  adjusted  R
2  of  all  six  simple 
regressions are very low. It ranges from 0% in the case of the simple regression of changes in 
the ROA on changes in the Social-SACGI to .3% with regard to the simple regression of 
changes in the Q-ratio on changes in the Economic-SACGI. This suggests that the regression 
coefficients have no significant explanatory power over variations in the observed changes in 
the ROA and Q-ratio.  This is not empirically too surprising because summary descriptive 
statistics contained in Table 27 suggest that the ROA, the Q-ratio and the SACGI experienced 
limited year-on-year changes. This implies that while the analysis in chapter eight using the 
actual levels of the ROA, the Q-ratio and the SACGI suggests significant relationship between 
good  corporate  governance  and  financial  performance,  there  is  no  evidence  of  a  similar 
statistically significant associations using changes in the ROA, the Q-ratio, and the SACGI.   
Similarly,  the  coefficients  on  changes  in  the  SACGI,  the  Social-SACGI  and  the 
Economic-SACGI under both the ROA and Q-ratio are statistically insignificant. This also 
fails to offer support to the conclusion in chapter eight that firms with better internal corporate 
governance structures tend to be associated with higher financial returns than their poorly-
governed counterparts. By contrast, the positive signs of the coefficients on the remaining six 
simple regressions offer empirical support to the positive relationship reported in chapter eight,  
 
333 
although  they  are  all  statistically  insignificant.  The  negative  and  statistically  insignificant 
direction of the coefficients on changes in the SACGI under the Q-ratio in Column 4 of Table 
28 and changes in the Economic-SACGI under the Q-ratio in Column 8 are not theoretically 
expected. 
First, the unexpected negative and statistically insignificant coefficients on changes in 
the SACGI and changes in the Economic-SACGI under the Q-ratio suggest that changes in firm 
financial  performance  may  also  be  influenced  by  general  market  conditions.  As  has  been 
explained  in  subsection  5.2.2.2  (vii)  of  chapter  five,  on  average,  firms  tend  to  perform 
financially better during periods of economic boom, for instance, than when there is economic 
recession. In fact, Panels A and B of Table 12 of chapter seven indicate that average ROA and 
Q-ratio was least in 2004 and 2003, respectively.  
In contrast, the highest average ROA and Q-ratio were recorded in 2006. This finding 
has also been supported by the coefficients on the year dummies under both the compliance-
index model and the equilibrium-variable model reported in chapter seven. The least ROA in 
2004 and Q-ratio in 2003, also explains the negative average change in the ROA in 2004 and 
in the Q-ratio in 2003 in Panels A and B of Table 27, respectively.  
Second, and as has been explained above, the statistically insignificant coefficient on 
changes in the SACGI, the Social-SACGI, and the Economic-SACGI under both changes in the 
ROA  and  Q-ratio  may  be  explained  by  the  limited  changes  in  the  corporate  governance 
proxies. That is, the year-on-year changes in the SACGI were not substantial enough to be 
associated with significant changes in the ROA and Q-ratio. Finally, the lack of statistical 
significance, as well as the unexpected negative and statistically insignificant coefficients on 
changes in the SACGI and the Economic-SACGI under the Q-ratio may also be due to omitted 
variable(s) bias. 
Therefore,  to  test  whether  the  unexpected  negative  coefficients  and  the  lack  of 
statistical significance are spuriously caused by some omitted variable(s), the control variables 
are added to the same  set of changes regressions in Table 29. The table shows that after 
including the control variables, the F-values of all 6 changes models are now statistically 
significant at the 1%. Therefore, the null hypothesis that the coefficients on changes in the 
SACGI and the control variables are jointly equal to zero can be rejected. This implies that the 
coefficient on changes in the SACGI and the control variables can jointly explain significant 
differences of the changes in the ROA and Q-ratio. 
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Table 28: OLS Regression Results of Changes in Financial Performance on Changes in the SACGI Alone 
Dependent Variable  Exp. 
Sign 
∆ROA  ∆Q-ratio  ∆ROA  ∆Q-ratio  ∆ROA  ∆Q-ratio 
Adjusted R
2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
No. of observations 
   -.002 
  .092 
2.377 
   .242(.623) 
     400 
     .001 
     .460 
   2.236 
   1.585(.209) 
       400 
   .000 
   .092 
 2.376 
 1.199(.274) 
    400 
  -.003 
    .461 
  2.239 
.001(.980) 
  400 
  -.002 
    .093 
  2.378 
.036(.850) 
  400 
      .003 
      .460 
    2.237 
2.098(.148) 
  400 
Constant 
∆SACGI 
∆Social-SACGI 
∆Economic-SACGI 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
   .007(.202) 
   .000(.623) 
- 
- 
     .166(.000)
*** 
    -.003(.209) 
- 
- 
   .006(.190) 
- 
   .000(.274) 
- 
    .148(.000)
*** 
- 
    .000(.980) 
- 
    .008(.144) 
- 
- 
     .000(.850) 
   .168(.000)
*** 
- 
- 
   -.004(.148) 
Notes: Coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***
 denotes p-value is significant at the 1% level. ∆SACGI, ∆Social-SACGI and ∆Economic-SACGI refer to year-on-year 
changes in the SACGI, the Social-SACGI and the Economic-SACGI, respectively. ∆ROA and ∆Q-ratio refer to year-on-year changes in return on assets (ROA) and 
Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio), respectively.  
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Table 29: OLS Regression Results of Changes in Financial Performance on Changes in the SACGI and Control Variables 
Dependent Variable  Exp. 
Sign 
∆ROA  ∆Q-ratio  ∆ROA  ∆Q-ratio  ∆ROA  ∆Q-ratio 
Adjusted R
2 
Standard error 
Durbin-Watson 
F-value 
No. of observations 
       .142 
     .086 
   2.383 
   5.730(.000)
*** 
       400 
     .109 
     .435 
   2.070 
   4.503(.000)
*** 
      400 
     .144   
     .085 
   2.386 
   5.792(.000)
*** 
     400 
     .110 
     .435 
   2.071 
   4.535(.000)
*** 
      400 
     .142   
     .086 
   2.382 
   5.713(.000)
*** 
     400 
     .108 
     .435 
   2.071 
   4.458(.000)
*** 
      400 
Constant 
∆SACGI 
∆Social-SACGI 
∆Economic-SACGI 
∆Firm size  
∆Capital structure  
∆Sales growth  
∆Capital expenditure  
Dual-listing  
Audit firm size 
Basic materials  
Consumer services  
Industrials  
Technology  
Year 2004 
Year 2005 
Year 2006 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
-/+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
     .001(.965) 
     .000(.636) 
- 
- 
   -.002(.951)
 
   -.001(.000)
*** 
    .001(.000)
** 
    .001(.466) 
    .004(.717) 
   -.005(.633) 
   -.005(.728) 
    .017(.219) 
    .018(.176) 
   -.022(.089)
* 
   -.022(.074)
* 
    .022(.885) 
    .010(.451) 
   -.081(.287)
 
     .003(.295) 
- 
- 
   -.825(.000)
*** 
    .001(.353) 
   -.001(.155) 
    .014(.026)
** 
   -.024(.661) 
   -.019(.714) 
    .041(.561) 
    .097(.159) 
    .043(.535) 
    .035(.610) 
    .236(.000)
*** 
    .333(.000)
*** 
    .315(.000)
*** 
   -.000(.981) 
- 
    .000(.332) 
- 
   -.003(.916) 
   -.001(.000)
*** 
    .001(.000)
*** 
    .001(.468) 
    .005(.671) 
  -.005(.649) 
  -.004(.749) 
   .017(.210) 
   .019(.166) 
   .022(.098)
* 
  -.023(.061)
* 
   .001(.449) 
   .010(.332) 
   -.073(.323) 
- 
    .002(.224) 
- 
   -.814(.000)
*** 
    .001(.372) 
   -.001(.141) 
    .014(.021)
** 
   -.020(.721) 
   -.017(.748) 
    .044(.531) 
   .100(.148) 
   .046(.504) 
   .040(.567) 
   .227(.000)
*** 
   .320(.000)
*** 
   .303(.000)
*** 
    .002(.895) 
- 
- 
    .000(.854) 
    .001(.986) 
   -.001(.000)
*** 
    .001(.000)
*** 
    .001(.438) 
    .004(.719) 
   -.005(.640) 
   -.005(.731) 
    .017(.218) 
    .018(.175) 
    .022(.084)
* 
   -.023(.068)
* 
    .001(.954) 
    .009(.508) 
   -.073(.333) 
- 
- 
    .002(.455) 
   -.810(.000)
 *** 
    .001(.369) 
   -.001(.154) 
    .014(.022)
** 
   -.025(.650) 
   -.019(.719) 
    .041(.563) 
    .097(.160) 
    .043(.537) 
    .037(.597) 
    .234(.000)
*** 
    .328(.000)
*** 
    .308(.000)
*** 
Notes: Coefficients are in front of parenthesis. ***, ** and 
 * denote p-value is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Also, consumer goods industry and year 2003 
are excluded from the regression analyses. They are used as base industry and year, respectively, for purposes of comparison.  ∆SACGI, ∆Social-SACGI and ∆Economic-SACGI refer to 
year-on-year changes in the SACGI, the Social-SACGI and the Economic-SACGI, respectively. ∆ROA and ∆Q-ratio, ∆firm size, ∆capital structure, ∆sales growth, and 
∆capital expenditure refer to year-on-year changes in return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q (Q-ratio), firm size, capital structure, sales growth, and capital 
expenditure, respectively. 
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 Consistent with the improvements in the F-values, the adjusted R
2 of all 6 models in 
Table 29 have also improved substantially. The adjusted R
2 range from 11% in the case of the 
regression of changes in the Q-ratio on the changes in the Economic-SACGI in Column 8 of 
Table 29 to 14% with regard to the regression of changes in the ROA on the changes in the 
Social-SACGI  in  Column  5.  This  suggests  that  the  control  variables  have  contributed 
substantially to the explanatory power of the models. This also means that the coefficients on 
the changes in the SACGI and the control variables can jointly explain between 11 to 14% of 
the variations of the changes in the ROA and Q-ratio.  
The coefficients on all three compliance corporate governance indices under both the 
ROA and Q-ratio remain statistically insignificant. The signs of the coefficients on all three 
compliance corporate governance indices under both the ROA and Q-ratio are now positive. 
This implies that the unexpected negative and statistically insignificant coefficients on the 
changes in the SACGI and the Economic-SACGI under the Q-ratio in Table 29 were spuriously 
caused  by  omitted  variables.  As  has  already  been  explained  above,  the  lack  of  statistical 
significance of the coefficients on the three composite corporate governance indices indicates 
that the average changes in them were not substantial enough to be associated with significant 
changes in the ROA and Q-ratio.  
Overall, the positive coefficients on all three compliance corporate governance indices 
indicate  that  improvements  (decreases)  in  the  quality  of  firm’s  corporate  governance  are 
associated  with  similar  improvements  (decreases)  in  its  financial  performance.  This  offers 
empirical support to the conclusion in chapter eight. The statistically insignificant coefficients, 
however, suggest that the improvements (decreases) in financial performance resulting from 
improvements  in  (decreases)  the  quality  of  corporate  governance  are  not  statistically 
significant. This fails to offer empirical support to the conclusion in chapter eight. 
With reference to the control variables in Columns 3 to 8 of Table 29, they generally 
show  the  expected  signs.  For  example,  the  statistically  significant  negative  and  positive 
coefficient on changes in capital structure and sales growth, respectively, under the changes in 
ROA  in  Column  3  of  Table  29  is  consistent  with  theoretical  predictions.  Similarly,  the 
statistically significant negative and positive coefficient on changes in firm size and capital 
expenditure,  respectively,  under  the  changes  in  the  Q-ratio  in  Column  4  are  consistent 
theoretical with expectations. The statistically significant coefficients on the year and industry 
dummies  also  indicate  that  changes  in  the  ROA  and  the  Q-ratio  differ  across  different  
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industries and financial years. This also supports the findings from the summary descriptive 
statistics reported in Panels A and B of Table 27. 
In brief, this section has examined whether year-on-year improvements (declines) in 
the  quality  of  the  sampled  firms’  corporate  governance  will  be  associated  with  similar 
improvements (declines) in their year-on-year reported financial performance. Generally, the 
results  indicate  that  improvements  (declines)  in  the  sampled  firms’  corporate  governance 
standards are associated with positive (negative), but statistically insignificant improvements 
(declines) in their reported financial performance. The lack of statistical significance is not 
empirically surprising. This is because summary descriptive statistics suggest that the year-on-
year changes in the SACGI were not substantial enough to to be associated with significant 
changes  in  the ROA  and Q-ratio.  The positive  coefficient  support  the  positive  coefficient 
reported in chapter eight. The statistically insignificant coefficient, however fails to support 
the statistically significant coefficient on the SACGI reported in chapter eight. 
 
 
9.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter has examined the robustness or sensitivity of the empirical results of the 
study. Specifically, the main aim of the chapter has been to ascertain the extent to which the 
results reported in chapter eight are robust or sensitive to alternative empirical and theoretical 
explanations, as well as estimations. In this regard, the results presented in chapter eight have 
been subjected to a number of robustness or sensitivity analyses.  
Firstly, the compliance-index and equilibrium-variable models are re-estimated based 
on  a  lagged  financial  performance-corporate  governance  structure.  The  aim  is  to  address 
potential endogeneity problems that may arise due to a time-lag in the financial performance 
and  corporate  governance  relationship.  The  results  based  on  the  compliance-index  model 
remain  generally  unchanged,  that  better-governed  South  African  listed  firms  tend  to  be 
associated with higher financial returns than their poorly-governed counterparts.  
Similarly, and consistent with the mixed results reported in chapter eight, the results of 
the equilibrium-variable model based on a lagged financial performance-corporate governance 
structure are conflicting. Generally, the findings from the equilibrium-variable model offer 
support to the earlier conclusion that there is either a statistically weak or no relationship 
between most of the eleven individual internal corporate governance structures and financial 
performance, when they are examined as single corporate governance mechanisms in isolation.   
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On a comparative basis, and consistent with the previous conclusion in chapter eight, 
the compliance-index model appears to produce consistent statistically significant and positive 
coefficients,  as  well as  possesses better  empirical  properties  than  the  equilibrium-variable 
model, irrespective of the financial performance proxy used. 
Secondly,  the  presence  of  potential  endogeneity  problems  among  the  corporate 
governance variables is further addressed by re-estimating the compliance-index model using 
instrumental variables (IV) and two-stage least  squares (2SLS).  The results based on the 
instrumental  variable  estimates  suggest  that  there  is  a  statistically  significant  and  positive 
relationship between financial performance and corporate governance. The tenor of such a 
positive  relationship remains  unchanged  whether  an  accounting  (ROA)  or  a  market  based 
measure  (Q-ratio)  of  performance  is  used.  Generally,  the  findings  from  the  instrumental 
estimates are consistent with the results of the compliance-index model based on OLS estimate 
presented in chapter eight.  
The  results  based  on  the  two-stage  least  squares  (2SLS)  indicate  that  there  are 
significant interdependences among the five corporate governance mechanisms, as well as 
between  the  financial  performance  proxies  and  the  corporate  governance  structures. 
Specifically, the results based on the ROA suggest that if alternative corporate governance 
mechanisms are allowed to co-exist, a higher SACGI score, a greater institutional shareholding 
along with a lesser block shareholding, a smaller board size and a lesser debt usage tend to be 
associated with higher accounting returns. Generally, allowing for the existence of potential 
interdependences or endogeneities among the alternative corporate governance mechanisms, 
the results support the previous conclusion in chapter eight that, on average, better-governed 
South African listed firms tend to be  associated with higher accounting returns than their 
poorly-governed counterparts.  
By contrast, results based on the Q-ratio indicate that allowing for the existence of 
alternative  corporate  governance  mechanisms,  the  SACGI  looses  its  ability  to  explain 
significant differences in the Q-ratio. Overall, the results imply that firms with insignificant 
block shareholding, smaller boards and lesser debt usage, but significantly greater institutional 
shareholding  can  afford  to  have  relatively  poor  internal  corporate  governance  structures 
without necessarily being punished by the market with lower market valuation. 
Finally,  the  chapter  examined  whether  year-on-year  changes  in  the  quality  of  the 
sampled firms’ corporate governance are associated with similar changes in their year-on-year 
reported financial performance. Generally, the results indicate that improvements (declines) in  
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the  sampled  firms’  corporate  governance  standards  are  associated  with  positive,  but 
statistically insignificant improvements (declines) in their reported financial performance. The 
positive  coefficient  on  changes  in  the  SACGI  supports the  positive  coefficient  reported  in 
chapter  eight.  The  statistically  insignificant  coefficient,  however  fails  to  support  the 
statistically significant coefficient on the SACGI reported in chapter eight. 
The final chapter will provide the conclusions of the thesis. Specifically, it will provide 
a summary of results, policy implications, limitations, recommendations and potential avenues 
for further studies.  
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CHAPTER TEN 
CONCLUSIONS: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, IMPLICATIONS, 
LIMITATIONS, AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
10. INTRODUCTION 
 
This  chapter  discusses  the  conclusions of  the  thesis.  It  seeks  to  achieve  five  main 
objectives.  First, it  summarises  the  research findings.  In this regard,  the research  findings 
based on the: levels of compliance with the South African Corporate Governance Index (the 
SACGI);  compliance-index  and  equilibrium-variable  models;  and  robustness  or  sensitivity 
analyses are summarised. Second, it discusses the policy implications of the research findings, 
and where applicable, makes appropriate recommendations. Third, the chapter summarises the 
contributions of the study. Fourth, it highlights the limitations of the study. Finally, the chapter 
identifies potential avenues for future research and improvements.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 10.1 presents a summary of the 
research findings. Section 10.2 discusses the policy implications of the research findings, and 
makes recommendations. Section 10.3 briefly summarises the research contributions of the 
study. Section 10.4 highlights the limitations of the study. Section 10.5 identifies potential 
avenues for future research and improvements, while section 10.6 summarises the chapter. 
 
 
10.1 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
  As  has  been  discussed  in  chapters  one,  two  and  three,  historically,  South  Africa’s 
corporate  governance  model  has  predominantly  been  ‘shareholding’  or  ‘Anglo-American’. 
Within  the  ‘shareholding’  corporate  governance  model,  firms  are  primarily  expected  to 
advance the interests of shareholders.  However, recent corporate governance reforms (i.e., the 
1994 or King I Report, and the 2002 or King II Report) formally require firms to comply with 
a number of affirmative action and stakeholder issues, such as black economic empowerment, 
and employment equity, amongst others. This compels South African firms to depict some of 
the key features of both the ‘shareholding’ and ‘stakeholding’ models of corporate governance.  
Arguably,  this  makes  the  South  African  corporate  governance  framework  and 
environment unique. Critics of King II, however, suggest that it is inappropriate to formally 
super-impose affirmative action, social and environmental demands on a corporate governance 
model  that  predominantly  has  a  ‘shareholding’  orientation.  Also,  as  an  emerging  market,  
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South African firms have a relatively concentrated corporate ownership, often via complex 
cross-shareholdings and pyramidical structures (Barr et al., 1995, p.18). This can potentially 
limit  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  the  market  for  corporate  control  and  managerial 
labour (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, p.1035). Moreover, South Africa has a weak record of 
achieving compliance and enforcement of corporate regulations (Armstrong, 2003, p.2; IIF, 
2007, p.7).  
These issues together raises two critical local and international policy questions. The 
first  important  policy  question  is  whether  the  current  ‘hybrid’  corporate  governance 
framework is appropriate for South Africa. Specifically, there is the critical local question of 
whether  the  current  South  African  corporate  governance  model  is  sufficiently  robust  to 
effectively pursue the contrasting agenda of maximising shareholder returns and providing a 
meaningful protection of the interests of a larger stakeholder group (Kakabadse and Korac-
Kakabadse,  2002,  p.313;  Spisto,  2005  p.84;  Andreasson,  2009,  p.1).  The  second  crucial 
international policy question is whether a UK-style voluntary corporate governance regime 
(i.e., ‘comply or explain’) rather than a US-style mandatory or statutory regime (i.e., ‘comply 
or else’) is appropriate for South Africa, given the relative concentration of ownership among 
listed firms, as well as the poor record of achieving compliance and enforcement of corporate 
regulations. 
It has been contended, however, that ignoring the South African context, and given that 
King II is predominantly Anglo-American with emphasis on shareholder primacy, the a priori 
theoretical expectation will be that ‘better-governed’ firms should be associated with higher 
financial returns than their ‘poorly-governed’ counterparts. This has been the central thesis 
underlying this study. 
 With no prior evidence on South Africa, it sought to empirically ascertain whether 
South African listed firms that complied well with King II performed financially better than 
those that did not. Specifically, using a sample of 100 South African listed firms from 2002 to 
2006 (a total of 500 firm-year observations) and corporate governance data collected directly 
from  annual  reports,  this  thesis  has  mainly  examined  the  relationship  between  internal 
corporate governance structures and firm financial performance. Distinct from prior studies, 
the  corporate  governance-financial  performance  nexus  is  examined  by  estimating  two 
competing positive methodologies: the compliance-index model and the equilibrium-variable 
model. The rationale has been to ascertain whether the choice of research methodology can 
significantly influence research findings, and any subsequent interpretations.  
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In this section, the research findings of the study discussed in chapters six, seven, and 
eight are summarised. Specifically, subsection 10.1.1 will summarise the research findings 
based on the levels of compliance with the South African corporate governance index (the 
SACGI) that have been discussed in chapter six. Subsections 10.1.2 and 10.1.3 will offer a 
summary of the research findings based on the compliance-index and equilibrium-variable 
models reported in chapter eight, respectively. Subsection 10.1.4 will summarise the research 
findings  based  on  a  comparison  of  the  research  findings  of  the  compliance-index  and 
equilibrium-variable  models  presented  in  chapter  eight,  whereas  subsection  10.1.5  will 
provide a summary of the research findings based on the robustness or sensitivity analyses that 
have been discussed in chapter eight. As has been outlined above, the policy implications of 
all the research findings presented in the next five subsections will be separately discussed in 
section 10.2.  
 
10.1.1 Findings Based on the Levels of Compliance with the SACGI 
 
   As has been discussed in chapters four and five, the prior literature has investigated 
the  relationship  between  corporate  governance  and  firm  financial  performance  mainly  by 
following either the compliance-index model or the equilibrium-variable model. Briefly, the 
use  of  the  compliance-index  model  often  involves  the  construction  of  a  broad  corporate 
governance index that encapsulates an extensive set of corporate governance structures. The 
association  between  the  compliance  corporate  governance  index  and  firm  financial 
performance is then investigated.  
By  contrast,  the  equilibrium-variable  model  usually  involves  examining  the  nexus 
between single corporate governance mechanisms and firm financial performance. As has also 
been explained in chapters four and five, and reported in chapters eight and nine, in this study 
both  the  compliance-index  and  equilibrium-variable  models  have  been  estimated.  Before 
summarising the research findings based on the compliance-index and equilibrium-variable 
models,  this  subsection  first  summarises  the  levels  of  compliance  with  the  South  African 
corporate governance index (the SACGI) containing 50 corporate governance provisions from 
King II. Specifically, using a sample 100 South African listed companies from 2002 to 2006 (a 
total of 500 firm-year observations), this study has assessed the levels of compliance with both 
conventional corporate governance provisions and South African context specific affirmative 
action and stakeholder issues (the SACGI) among the sampled firms.   
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Generally, and consistent with prior studies, the findings that have been discussed in 
chapter six show that there are substantial variations in the levels of compliance with the 
SACGI among the sampled firms. At the aggregate level, the scores range from a minimum of 
3 (6%) to a maximum of 49 (98%) with the average South African listed firm complying with 
30 (60%) of the 50 corporate governance provisions analysed. For the individual corporate 
governance provisions, there are variations in the levels of compliance in 48 (96%) of the 50 
corporate governance provisions investigated. Overall, an examination of the distribution of 
the pooled sample shows that despite the expectation that the introduction of the King Reports 
will  speed-up  convergence  of  corporate  governance  standards,  there  are  still  substantial 
variations in the levels of compliance with the individual corporate governance provisions 
among South African listed firms.  
Despite  the  substantial  variations  in the  levels  of  compliance  with  the  SACGI,  the 
findings  also  suggest  that  corporate  governance  standards  among  the  sampled  firms  have 
improved over the period of examination. Specifically, the average compliance level with the 
SACGI in 2002 was 48% among the sampled firms. It increased to 58%, 63%, 65% and 68% 
in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, respectively, an increase of 20 percentage points over the five-
year sample period. As has been discussed in chapter six, these findings are in line with the 
results of prior studies that have analysed firms from countries that have adopted the UK-style 
voluntary (‘comply or explain’) compliance regime (e.g., Conyon 1994; Conyon and Mallin, 
1997;  Pellens  et  al.,  2001;  and  Aguilera  and  Cuervo-Cazura,  2009,  amongst  others).  The 
results  of  these  studies  generally  indicate  that  despite  their  voluntary  nature,  corporate 
governance standards in firms of countries that have adopted codes of corporate governance 
based on the ‘comply or explain’ compliance regime have improved substantially. 
The SACGI is further disaggregated on the basis of firm size and industry to ascertain 
whether the observed variability in the levels of compliance with the aggregate SACGI can be 
explained by firm size and industry. Consistent with the findings of prior studies (e.g., CLSA, 
2000; Deutsche Bank, 2002; Bauer, 2004; Bebenroth, 2005; Werder et al., 2005), the analyses 
indicate that the observed variability in the levels of compliance with the SACGI can largely 
be explained by firm size, and moderately by industry. Specifically, and at the aggregate level, 
the  findings  suggest  that  the  average  large  firm  complied  with  75%  of  the  50  corporate 
governance provisions in comparison with 44% by the average small firm.  
A close examination of the individual provisions also shows that in 46 (92%) out of the 
50 corporate  governance provisions investigated, compliance levels among large  firms are  
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significantly higher than for small firms. The results can be explained by prior theory as have 
been discussed in chapters five and six. First, and in line with prior studies (e.g., Shockley, 
1981; Marston and Shrives, 1991; Deutsche Bank, 2002; Sori et al., 2006; Melvin and Valero, 
2009),  further analyses  indicate that  larger  firms  are  more  likely  to  be  dual-listed  and  be 
audited by a big four audit firm. Also, and as theoretically expected, the findings show that the 
sampled  firms  with  cross-listings  to  the  UK  and  US  stock  markets  tended  to  have  better 
corporate governance standards than their non dual-listed counterparts. This is because dual-
listed firms are often subjected to additional listings and corporate governance requirements 
compared with their non cross-listed counterparts.   
In a similar vein, the results indicate that the sampled firms audited by a big four audit 
firm also tended to have better corporate standards than their non big-four audited counterparts. 
Second, compliance with corporate governance rules has cost implications that larger firms 
can be expected to better afford than their smaller counterparts (Lang and Lundholm, 19993; 
Botosan,  1997).  Finally,  and  as  has been  explained  in chapters  five  to  eight,  and will  be 
explained  further  below,  prior  literature  suggests  that  political  costs,  such  as  stringent 
regulation  and  nationalisation,  are  positively  associated  with  firm  size  (Wattes  and 
Zimmerman, 1978, p.115; Andreasson, 2009, p.22). This means that, on average, larger firms 
can be expected to disclose more than their smaller counterparts, in order to reduce potential 
political costs.  
Similarly, and in line with prior studies discussed in chapter six (e.g., CLSA, 2000; 
Deutsche Bank, 2002; Black et al., 2006a; Henry, 2008), the results suggest that some of the 
observed variability in the levels of compliance with the SACGI can be explained by industrial 
groupings,  but  to  a  lesser  degree  when  compared  with  the  firm  size  classifications. 
Specifically,  and  at  the  aggregate  level,  consumer  services  firms  complied  most  with  the 
SACGI. By contrast, technology firms complied least with the SACGI. 
The  levels  of  compliance  with  the  nine  South  African  context  specific  affirmative 
action  and  stakeholder  corporate  governance  provisions  (the  Social-SACGI)  among  the 
sampled firms were also examined. These are: board diversity on the basis of ethnicity and 
gender, and policies and practices with respect to black economic empowerment, employment 
equity, environment, ethics, HIV/Aids, and health and safety. Consistent with the findings 
based  on  the  full  sample,  the  summary  descriptive  statistics  indicate  that  there  is  a 
considerable amount of variation in the levels of compliance with the social-SACGI among the 
sampled firms.   
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Similar to the SACGI, the analyses suggest that the observed variability in the levels of 
compliance with the social-SACGI could largely be explained by firm size, and moderately by 
industry. Finally, analyses of the trends in board diversity on the basis of ethinicity and gender 
show that, irrespective of the measure used, diversity among South African corporate boards 
has substantially improved over time. Despite the improving board diversity, however, the 
findings  also  suggest  that  board  members  from  diverse  backgrounds  (ethnic  and  gender) 
within South African listed firms are still very small in number.     
 
10.1.2 Findings Based on the Compliance-Index Model 
 
  The main hypothesis (i.e., hypothesis eight) tested for the compliance-index model is 
that  there  is  a  statistically  significant  and  positive relationship  between the  South  African 
corporate governance Index (the SACGI) and firm financial performance. Consistent with the 
results of prior studies, the findings based on the compliance-index model reported in chapter 
eight generally suggest that there is a statistically significant and positive association between 
the SACGI and firm financial performance. The positive relationship is robust to whether an 
accounting (i.e., return on assets – ROA) or a market based measure (i.e., Tobin’s Q – Q-ratio) 
of financial performance is used. Therefore, hypothesis eight cannot be rejected.  
The statistically significant and positive (.002) nexus between the SACGI and the ROA 
implies that, on average, better-governed South African listed firms tend to be associated with 
higher accounting returns than their poorly-governed counterparts. Specifically, the findings 
mean  that  a  one  standard  deviation  improvement  in  the  average  firm’s  internal  corporate 
governance (the SACGI) score from 60% to 82%, may be associated with an increase in its 
average accounting returns (ROA) by at least 4% (22.03 x .002) from 9% to 13%, ceteris 
paribus.  
As has been discussed in subsection 8.1.2.1, this evidience is generally in line with the 
results of prior studies (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Shabbir and Padget, 2005; Cui et al., 2008), 
but specifically with findings of Klapper and Love (2004). Using a cross-country sample that 
includes South African listed firms, Klapper and Love (2004) report a statistically significant 
and  positive  relationship  between  good  corporate  governance  and  the  ROA.  A  major 
theoretical  implication  of  this  finding  is  that  better-governed  firms  are  able  to  improve 
accounting  returns  by  reducing  managerial  expropriation.  Also,  it  indicates  that  better-
governed firms are able to raise capital at lower cost to better exploit growth opportunities that 
can boost long-term accounting returns.  
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Similarly, the significant positive (.009) association between the SACGI and the Q-
ratio  suggests  that  South  African  listed  firms  with  better  corporate  governance  trade  at  a 
significant valuation premium to those with poor corporate governance standards. Specifically, 
a one standard deviation improvement in the average firm’s internal corporate governance (the 
SACGI) score from 60% to 82%,  can be expeted to be  associated with an increase in its 
average market valuation (Q-ratio) by at least 20% (22.03 x .009) from 1.49 to 1.79, all else 
equal.  
As has also been discussed in subsection 8.1.2.2, this evidence is generally consistent 
with the results of prior studies (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Beiner et al., 2006; Black et al., 
2006a; Henry, 2008), but specifically with the findings of Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev 
and Kim (2005), and Morey et al. (2009). Using cross-country samples that include South 
African listed firms, Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev and Kim (2005), and Morey et al. 
(2009)  report  a  statistically  significant  and  positive  relationship  between  good  corporate 
governance and the Q-ratio. 
Theoretically, the statistically significant and positive relationship between the SACGI 
and the Q-ratio, is expected. This is because, by complying with the recommendations of good 
corporate practice, a firm will essentially be signalling to prospective investors that it is better-
governed. With better corporate governance credentials, investors can be expected to bid-up 
the share price for similar ownership portions of the firm. This is because with better corporate 
governance they are likely to receive a greater portion of the firm’s profits as opposed to being 
expropriated by managers.  
In  addition,  the  associations  between  the  nine  South  African  context  specific 
affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions (the Social-SACGI), and 
41 conventional corporate governance provisions (the Economic-SACGI), and firm financial 
performance are investigated. In line with the results of the SACGI, but contrary to theoretical 
expectations,  the  findings  also  suggest  a  statistically  significant  and  positive  relationship 
between the Social-SACGI and firm financial performance (i.e., both ROA and Q-ratio). It is 
theoretically  expected  that  the  inclusion  of  the  South  African  context  specific  affirmative 
action and stakeholder provisions as part of the general corporate governance provisions for 
firms to comply by King II will impose extra costs burden on the firms (e.g., Kakabadse and 
Korac-Kakabadse, 2002; LSE, 2007). This implies that unlike the SACGI, compliance with the 
Social-SACGI  would,  therefore,  be  expected  to  impact  negatively  on  the  sampled  firms’  
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financial performance. By contrast, compliance with the Economic-SACGI could be expected 
to impact positively on the sampled firms’ financial performance. 
Contrary  to  theoretical  predictions,  the  findings  suggest  that  compliance  with  the 
Social-SACGI impacts positively on the sampled firms’ financial performance. Despite being 
contrary to the theoretical expectations, evidence that firms that comply better with the Social-
SACGI  are  valued  (Q-ratio)  higher  by  investors  or  tend  to  be  associated  with  higher 
accounting  returns  (ROA)  is,  however,  less  surprising.  Within  the  South  African  context, 
securing and renewing profitable government and mining contracts, for instance, are normally 
linked  to  satisfying  black  economic  empowerment  and  employment  equity  targets  (e.g., 
Murray, 2000; Malherbe and Segal, 2003). This means that compliance with the Social-SACGI 
may be a major way by which firms can gain access to valuable resources, including securing 
profitable government backed black economic empowerment deals and contracts. This may 
facilitate growth and improve long-term financial performance.  
Consistent with theoretical predictions, the results indicate that compliance with the 
Economic-SACGI impacts positively on the sampled firms’ financial performance. Evidence 
of a positive nexus between the Economic-SACGI and financial performance (i.e., both ROA 
and Q-ratio) offers further empirical support to the results based on the SACGI. That is, on 
average, better-governed firms tend to be associated with higher financial performance than 
their poorly-governed counterparts.  
   
10.1.3 Findings Based on the Equilibrium-Variable Model 
 
  As has been discussed in subsection 4.2.2 of chapter four and reported in subsection 
8.1.1 of chapter eight, seven main hypotheses are tested for the equilibrium-variable model. 
These hypotheses relate to board diversity, board size, role or CEO duality, the percentage of 
non-executive  directors,  the  frequency  of  board  meetings,  the  presence  of  key  board 
committees  (namely,  audit,  nomination  and  remuneration),  and  director  shareownership 
(including director shareownership squared and director shareownership cubed).  
  The  first  hypothesis  tested  is  that  there  is  a  statistically  significant  and  positive 
relationship between board diversity and firm financial performance (i.e., both ROA and Q-
ratio).  The  coefficient  on  board  diversity  under  the  ROA  is  positive,  but  statistically 
insignificant.  This  is  not  consistent  with  the  recommendations  of  King  II  that  encourage 
diversity among South African corporate boards. This evidence also does not offer empirical 
support to prior studies that report a statistically significant and positive relationship between  
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the ROA and board diversity (e.g., Adler, 2001; Swartz and Firer, 2005). It is, however, in line 
with the findings of prior studies that suggest that board diversity has no significant impact on 
ROA (e.g., Zahra and Stanton, 1988; Shader et al., 1997; Rose, 2007).  
By  contrast,  the  coefficient  on  board  diversity  under  the  Q-ratio  is  negative,  but 
similarly statistically insignificant. This is also not in line with the recommendations of King 
II that encourage diversity among South African corporate boards.This means that hypothesis 
one is not empirically supported. This finding does not support the result of Carter et al. (2003) 
that suggest a statistically significant and positive association between board diversity and the 
Q-ratio. It is, however, consistent with the finding of Rose (2007), which indicates that board 
diversity has no statistically significant association with the Q-ratio. Evidence of a statistically 
insignificant  board  diversity-financial  performance  nexus  is  less  surprising.  As  have  been 
discussed in chapters six and eight, the number of board members from diverse backgrounds 
on the boards of South African listed firms is still substantially small. This means that they 
may not be able to impact significantly on firm financial performance. 
  Also, and as have been discussed in chapters five and eight, there are differences in the 
associations between board diversity, as well as some of the remaining corporate governance 
mechanisms that will be summarised below towards the ROA and Q-ratio. These differences 
may be explained by  variations in their  respective effects, weaknesses, and strengths.  For 
example, as a historical accounting base measure, ROA may not be able to reflect current 
changes in market valuation. By contrast, as a market based measure, Q-ratio reflects expected 
future developments that may be masked by current fluctuations in business conditions. It also 
offers empirical support to previous evidence, which indicates that insiders (managers – ROA) 
and outsiders (investors – Q-ratio) value corporate governance differently (e.g., Black et al., 
2006a; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Overall, it may justify the use of both accounting and 
market based measures of financial performance, allowing each measure to complement the 
weaknesses of the other. 
The second hypothesis examined is that there is a statistically significant and positive 
association between board size and firm financial performance (i.e., both ROA and Q-ratio). 
The  coefficient  on  board  size  under  the  ROA  is  negative  and  statistically  insignificant, 
whereas the coefficient on board size under the Q-ratio is positive and statistically significant. 
The statistically insignificant negative coefficient on board size under the ROA means that 
hypothesis  two  is  not  supported,  whilst  the  statistically  significant  positive  coefficient  on 
board size under the Q-ratio offers empirical support to hypothesis two.   
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Empirically, the statistically significant and positive relationship between board size 
and the Q-ratio offers empirical support to the results of Adams and Mehran (2005), Beiner et 
al. (2006), Henry (2008), and Mangena and Tauringana (2008). In contrast, it is not in line 
with the results of prior studies that suggest a statistically significant and negative association 
between board size and the Q-ratio (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Coles et 
al., 2008; Cheng, 2008; Guest, 2009). 
Theoretically, the statistically significant and positive association between the Q-ratio 
and board size indicates that the market appears to perceive larger boards as more effective. 
This may stem from the fact that larger boards tend to offer greater access to their firms’ 
external  environment.  This  can  reduce  uncertainties  and  facilitates  the  securing of  critical 
resources, such as finance. It also implies that the market seems to value the ability of South 
African  corporate  boards  to  secure  more  resources,  which  is  often  associated  with  larger 
boards higher than their ability to effectively advice and monitor managers that is usually 
associated  with  smaller  boards.  For  example,  and  within  the  South  African  context,  prior 
evidences suggests that larger boards are more likely to secure profitable government backed 
black economic empowerment contracts that may help larger firms to receive higher market 
valuation than their smaller counterparts.  
The  third  hypothesis  investigated  is  that  there  is  a  statistically  significant  negative 
relationship between role or CEO duality and firm financial performance (i.e., both ROA and 
Q-ratio). The findings suggest that there is a statistically significant and positive association 
between the ROA and CEO duality, but a statistically insignificant and negative relationship 
between the Q-ratio and CEO duality. This means that hypothesis three can be rejected. It does 
not also lend empirical support to the recommendations of King II that the roles of board 
chairman and CEO should be split. Empirically, this finding is different from the results of 
previous studies that report a statistically significant and negative relationship between ROA 
and role duality (e.g., Rechner and Dalton, 1991; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Specifically, it 
does not lend empirical support to the results of Ho and Williams (2003) that document a 
statistically  significant  and  negative  association  between  CEO  duality  and  the  intellectual 
capital performance of 84 South African listed firms.  
In contrast, the result offers empirical support to the findings of Donaldson and Davis 
(1991) and Boyd (1995) that there is a statistically significant and positive nexus between role 
duality and ROA. A major theoretical implication of the statistically significant and positive 
ROA-CEO duality relationship is that role duality allows a visionary and charismatic CEO the  
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opportunity to have a sharper focus on firm objectives without excessive board interference.  
By contrast, the statistically insignificant and negative association between the Q-ratio and 
CEO duality shows that role duality has no significant impact on the sampled firms’ market 
value. This also does support the recommendations of King II that discourage role duality. 
Empirically,  this  finding  is  in  line  with  prior  studies  that  report  a  statistically 
insignificant link between the Q-ratio and CEO duality (e.g., Vefeas and Theodorou, 1998; 
Sanda  et  al.,  2005;  Haniffa  and  Hudaib,  2006).  Specifically,  the  finding  offers  further 
empirical support to the results of Ho and Williams (2003), and Mangena and Chamisa (2008) 
that role duality has no impact on the likelihood that a firm will be suspended from listing on 
the JSE  in  a sample  of  81 South  African  listed  firms.  The  negative  coefficient, however, 
suggests that the market perceives CEO duality as a bad corporate governance practice. This is 
because role duality tends to give too much power to one person who can choose to engage in 
opportunistic activities.  
The  fourth  hypothesis  tested  is  that  there  is  a  statistically  significant  and  positive 
association between the percentage of non-executive directors and firm financial performance 
(i.e.,  both  ROA  and  Q-ratio).  The  findings  indicate  that  the  percentage  of  non-executive 
directors is statistically significant and negatively related to ROA, but statistically insignificant 
and positively associated with the Q-ratio. This implies that hypothesis four is not empirically 
supported. The result also contradicts the recommendations of King II that encourage a higher 
percentage of NEDs on South African corporate boards.  
The findings are also not consistent with the results of prior South African studies of 
Ho and Williams (2003), and Mangena and Chamisa (2008). For example, Ho and Williams 
(2003)  report  a  statistically  significant  and  positive  association  between  the percentage  of 
NEDs and intellectual capital performance of 84 South African listed firms. By contrast, the 
result in this study offers empirical support to the findings of prior studies that document a 
statistically significant and negative relationship between ROA and the percentage of NEDs 
(e.g., Weir and Laing, 2000; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). 
Theoretically,  the  statistically  significant  and  negative  association  between  the 
percentage of non-executive directors and ROA supports the stewardship theory. It suggests 
that non-executive directors often command less knowledge about the business, and find it 
difficult to understand the complexities of the firm. Also, corporate boards dominated by non-
executive directors tend to stifle managerial initiative and delay strategic action, which arise  
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from  excessive  managerial  monitoring.  This  can  impact  negatively  on  a  firm’s  ability  to 
generate higher accounting returns.  
The statistically insignificant and positive relationship between the percentage of non-
executive directors and the Q-ratio means that the non-executive directors have no impact on 
the sampled firms’ market value. This also implies that hypothesis four is not empirically 
supported.  The  result  is  also  not  consistent  with  the  recommendations  of  King  II  that 
encourage a higher percentage of NEDs on South African corporate boards. Empirically, the 
statistically insignificant nexus between the percentage of NEDs and the Q-ratio is consistent 
with the results of Vefeas and Theodorou (1998), Weir and Laing (2000), and Haniffa and 
Hudaib  (2006).  The  positive  coefficient,  however,  shows  that  the  market  views  the 
appointment of non-executive directors to corporate boards as a positive corporate governance 
practice. This is because the presence of non-executive directors can potentially improve the 
independence of a corporate board and its decisions. 
The fifth hypothesis analysed is that there is a statistically significant  and positive 
association between the frequency of board meetings and firm financial performance (i.e., 
both ROA and Q-ratio). The findings suggest that there is a statistically  insignificant and 
negative relationship between the frequency of board meetings and the ROA, but a statistically 
insignificant and positive nexus between the frequency of board meetings and the Q-ratio.  
This means that the null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant and positive 
relationship between the frequency of board meetings and firm financial performance cannot 
be rejected.  It also implies that the recommendation of King II that South African corporate 
boards  must  hold  a  minimum  of  four  meetings  in  a  year  is  not  empirically  supported. 
Empirically,  this  finding  is  consistent  with  the  result  of  El  Mehdi  (2007)  who  reports  a 
statistically insignificant association between the frequency of board meetings and the ROA 
for a sample of 24 Tunisian listed firms from 2000 to 2005.  
By contrast, it does not support the results of Mangena and Tauringana (2006) who 
document a statistically significant and positive relationship between the frequency of board 
meetings  and  the  ROA  in  sample  of  157  Zimbabwean  listed  firms  from  2001  to  2003. 
Theoretically,  the negative  nexus  between  the  frequency  of  board  meetings  and  the  ROA 
supports  the  idea  that  frequent  board  meetings  are  not  necessarily  beneficial.  A  higher 
frequency of board meetings, for example, can result in higher costs in the form of managerial 
time, travel expenses, refreshment, and directors’ meetings fees.   
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The  statistically  insignificant  and  positive  nexus  between  the  frequency  of  board 
meetings and the Q-ratio indicates that hypothesis five is not empirically supported. It also 
implies that the recommendation of King II that South African corporate boards must hold a 
minimum of four meetings in a year is not empirically supported. It is also not in line with the 
results of prior studies that report a statistically significant and negative association between 
the frequency of board meetings and the Q-ratio (e.g., Vefeas 1999a; Carcello et al., 2002; 
Fich and Shivdasani, 2006).  
By  contrast, the positive coefficient supports the results of Karamanou and Vefeas 
(2005) and Mangena and Tauringana (2006) that document a positive relationship between the 
frequency of board meetings and the Q-ratio. Unlike the finding of this study, however, the 
results  of  Karamanou  and  Vefeas  (2005)  and  Mangena  and  Tauringana  (2006)  were 
statistically  significant.  The  positive,  but  a  statistically  insignificant  nexus  between  the 
frequency of board meetings and the Q-ratio also indicates that even though the frequency of 
board meetings has no valuation implications for the sampled firms, the market perceives it as 
a good corporate governance practice. This is because a higher frequency of board meetings 
can lead to enhanced managerial monitoring. 
The  sixth  hypothesis  tested  is  that  there  is  a  statistically  significant  and  positive 
relationship between the presence of audit, nomination and remuneration committees and firm 
financial performance (i.e., both ROA and Q-ratio). The findings regarding the nexus between 
the existence of board committees and firm financial performance are generally mixed. On the 
one hand, the results show that the establishment of a nomination committee is statistically 
significant and positively related to the ROA. This implies that hypothesis six is empirically 
supported.  It  supports  the  recommendation  of  King  II  for  South  African  firms  to  set  up 
nomination committees. Further, it implies that the establishment of a nomination committee 
helps in improving the sampled firms’ accounting returns.  
Empirically,  it  rejects  the  results  of  Bozec  (2005)  that  suggest  a  statistically 
insignificant relationship between the ROA and the establishment of a nomination committee 
in a sample of 25 Canadian listed firms from 1976 to 2005. Theoretically, the establishment of 
a nomination committee can improve the process by which directors are appointed, as well as 
the  independence  of  the  board  and  its  decisions.  Arguably,  this  can  potentially  impact 
positively on firm financial performance by enhancing the effectiveness with which the board 
carries out its monitoring and advisory functions.  
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On  the  other  hand,  while  the  results  suggest  that  the  presence  of  audit  and 
remuneration  committees  are  also  positively  related  to  the  ROA,  neither  are  statistically 
significant. This does not support hypothesis six, as well as the recommendations of King II. 
Given the high adoption rate of audit and remuneration committees, their insignificance in 
explaining  the  ROA  is  not  empirically  too  surprising.  This  is  because,  and  as  has  been 
discussed  in  chapter  six,  less  than  10%  of  the  sampled  firms  do  not  have  audit  and 
remuneration committees, which results in less variation among the sampled firms. 
Similarly,  the  existence  of  an  audit  committee  is  statistically  insignificant  and 
positively  associated  with  the  Q-ratio,  whilst  the  establishment  of  nomination  and 
remuneration committees are statistically insignificant and negatively related to the Q-ratio. 
This does not lend empirical support to hypothesis six and the recommendations of King II. 
Empirically,  the  findings  are  consistent  with  the  results  of  prior  studies  that  report  a 
statistically insignificant relationship between board committees and the Q-ratio (e.g., Vefeas 
and  Theodorou,  1998;  Weir  and  Laing,  2000;  Weir  et  al.,  2002).  Vefeas  and  Theodorou 
(1998), for example, report a statistically insignificant nexus between the presence of audit, 
nomination, and remuneration committees and the Q-ratio.  By contrast, the finding is not in 
line with the results of  previous studies that report statistically significant and positive or 
negative  association  between  board  committees  and  the  Q-ratio  (e.g.,  Vefeas,  1999a; 
Karamanous and Vefeas, 2005). The finding is also not consistent with the results of Mangena 
and Chamisa (2008), who report the presence of an audit committee significantly reduces the 
possibility of a firm being suspended from listing on the JSE in sample of 81 South African 
listed firms.  
Generally, the evidence of no statistically significant relationship between the three 
board committees and the Q-ratio is empirically less surprising. As has been explained above, 
the adoption rate of board committees is very high (more than 90% of the sampled firms, for 
example,  have  established  audit  and  remuneration  committees),  which  leads  to  limited 
variation  among  the  sampled  firms.  This  seems  to  limit  the  ability  of  the  three  board 
committees to explain significant differences in the Q-ratio. 
The seventh and final hypothesis examined is that there is a statistically significant and 
positive  relationship  between  director  shareownership  and  firm  financial  performance.  To 
replicate the results of Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) that document a 
statistically significant non-linear relationship between director shareownership and the Q-
ratio, two new ownership variables – director ownership squared and director shareownership  
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cubed  –    are  introduced.  The  findings  show  that  director  shareownership  is  statistically 
insignificant and negatively related to ROA, whereas director shareownership is statistically 
significant and negatively associated with the Q-ratio. This indicates that hypothesis seven can 
be rejected.  
Theoretically, the statistically significant and negative relationship between the Q-ratio 
and director shareownership supports the entrenchment hypothesis. The hypothesis states that 
at  high  levels  of  shareholding,  directors  may  hold  sufficient  voting  power  to  protect 
themselves  against  any  disciplinary  actions  from  minority  shareholders.  This  motivates 
managers to engage in opportunistic behaviour, including the consumption of more perquisites, 
which impacts negatively on firm financial performance. 
Further,  director  shareownership  squared  and  director  shareownership  cubed  are 
positively  and  negatively  related  to  ROA,  respectively.  However,  both  are  statistically 
insignificant. Similarly, director shareownership squared and director shareownership cubed 
are positively and negatively associated with the Q-ratio, respectively, but both are statistically 
insignificant  except  in  year  2005.  The  findings  generally  do  not  support  the  statistically 
significant non-monotonic relationship between director ownership and firm value reported by 
Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990). Overall, the statistically significant 
and  negative  coefficient  on  director  ownership  suggests  director  entrenchment  with  no 
evidence of a reversal to interest alignment even at higher levels of director ownership. 
  
10.1.4 Findings Based on a Comparison of the Results of the Compliance-Index and  
         Equilibrium-Variable Models 
 
  As  have  been  discussed  in  subsections  4.2.1  and  5.2.1  of  chapters  four  and  five, 
respectively,  a  supplementary  objective  of  this  study  has  been  to  offer  a  methodological 
comparison.  Specifically,  the  study  has  attempted  to  ascertain  whether  the  use  of  the 
equilibrium-variable model or the compliance-index model has the potential to influence the 
empirical  findings.  This  has  been  done  by  simply  comparing  the  regression  results  and 
summary diagnostics based on the equilibrium-variable model to the regression results and 
summary diagnostics based on the compliance-index model.  
A number of interesting findings emerge when the results based on the compliance-
index model are compared with the results based on the equilibrium-variable model. First, the 
findings show that, regardless of the performance measure used, the coefficient on the SACGI 
is  consistently  positive  over  the  entire  sample  period.  Second,  the  SACGI  is  statistically  
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significant  over  the  entire  sample  period  with  regard  to  the  ROA.  It  is  also  statistically 
significant for the pooled sample, and in 2003 and 2006, but statistically insignificant in 2002, 
2004 and 2005 with respect to the Q-ratio.  
However,  and  even  in  2002,  2003  and  2005  where  the  SACGI  is  statistically 
insignificant  under  the  Q-ratio,  the  p-values  are  relatively  close  to  becoming  statistically 
significant. Overall, and consistent with the results of recent researchers (e.g., Gompers et al., 
2003; Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Beiner et al., 2006; Black et al., 2006a; 
and Morey et al., 2009, amongst others) who also constructed some measure of ‘compliance’ 
or  ‘composite’  corporate  governance  index,  the  findings  suggest  that  a  firm’s  internal 
corporate governance structures significantly positively impact on its financial performance.  
  By contrast, and in line with previous evidence (e.g., Morck et al., 1988; Aggrawal and 
Knoeber,  1996;  Weir  et  al.,  2002;  Haniffa  and  Hudaib,  2006;  and  Guest,  2009,  amongst 
others), the results based on the equilibrium-variable model as summarised above are highly 
mixed. Irrespective of the financial performance proxy used, most of the corporate governance 
variables are statistically insignificant, and even where they are found to be significant, the 
sign of the coefficients are not consistent across the two performance measures used. Overall, 
and consistent with past evidence, the results based on the equilibrium-variable model indicate 
either a statistically weak or insignificant relationship between the selected single internal 
corporate governance structures and firm financial performance. 
Similar conclusions are drawn when the summary regression diagnostics based on the 
compliance-index model are compared with the summary regression diagnostics based on the 
equilibrium-variable model. First, computed Cook’s distances, tolerance statistics, condition 
indices, eigenvalues, variance proportions, VIF, studentised residuals and normal distribution 
plots, indicate that the findings based on the compliance-index model generally possess better 
normal distributional properties than the equilibrium-variable model.  
Second,  and  in  line  with  the  better  normal  distributional  properties  shown  by  the 
compliance-index model, regardless of the performance measure used, they indicate that the 
compliance-index  model  possesses  better  summary  regression  diagnostics  than  the 
equilibrium-variable  model.  For  example,  results  based  on  the  compliance-index  model 
generally  show  better  adjusted  R
2,  F-values,  standard  errors  and  Durbin-Watson  statistics 
compared with the results based on the equilibrium-variable model. Overall, and irrespective 
of  the  summary  regression  diagnostics  used,  on  average,  the  findings  based  on  the  
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compliance-index model possess better empirical properties than the findings based on the 
equilibrium-variable model. 
  This evidence has important methodological implications for future research. First, it 
implies that methodological choice can potentially influence the research findings. The second 
implication is that despite its costly and labour intensive nature, on average, it may be value 
relevant  to  construct  some  measure  of  a  ‘compliance  or  composite’  corporate  governance 
index when examining the corporate governance-performance nexus rather than to use single 
corporate  governance  mechanisms  in  isolation.  A  major  explanation  is  that  because  the 
construction  of  composite  or  compliance-indices  involves  the  use  of  several  corporate 
governance variables, it is better able to capture actual qualitative differences in corporate 
governance disclosures across firms. This appears to make compliance or composite corporate 
governance  indices  more  likely  to  achieve  better  variation  in  the  quality  of  corporate 
governance  across  the  sampled  firms  with  higher  explanatory  power  than  using  single 
corporate governance variables in isolation. 
 
10.1.5 Findings Based on the Robustness/Sensitivity Analyses 
 
As  has  been  discussed  in  chapter  five  and  reported  in  chapter  nine,  four  main 
robustness or sensitivity analyses were carried out to address potential endogeneity problems. 
The main objective of the sensitivity or robustness analyses has been to ascertain the extent to 
which the results reported in chapter eight are robust or sensitive to alternative empirical and 
theoretical explanations, as well as estimations. These analyses include estimating: a lagged 
financial performance-corporate governance structure; an instrumental variable model; a two-
stage least squares model; and a changes model.  
Firstly, the compliance-index and equilibrium-variable models are re-estimated based 
on  a  lagged  financial  performance-corporate  governance  structure.  The  aim  is  to  address 
potential endogeneity problems that may arise due to a time-lag in the financial performance 
and corporate governance nexus. On average, the results based on the compliance-index model 
remain  essentially  the  same  as  those  reported  in  chapter  eight  that  better-governed  South 
African listed firms tend to be associated with higher financial performance than their poorly-
governed counterparts.  
Similarly, and in line with the mixed results reported in chapter eight, the results of the 
equilibrium-variable model based on a lagged financial performance-corporate  governance 
structure are conflicting. The findings from the equilibrium-variable model generally offer  
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support to the earlier conclusion that there is either a statistically weak or no relationship 
between most of the eleven
92 individual internal corporate governance structures and financial 
performance, when they are examined as single corporate governance mechanisms in isolation.   
Secondly,  the  presence  of  potential  endogeneity  problems  among  the  corporate 
governance variables is further addressed by re-estimating the compliance-index model using 
instrumental  variables  (IV)  and  two-stage  least  squares  (2SLS).  The  results  based  on  the 
instrumental  variable  estimates  suggest  that  there  is  a  statistically  significant  and  positive 
relationship between financial performance and corporate governance. The tenor of such a 
statistically  significant  and  positive  relationship  remains  mainly  unchanged  whether  an 
accounting (ROA) or a market based measure (Q-ratio) of financial performance is used. The 
main implication of this finding is that the results of the compliance-index model based on the 
OLS estimates presented in chapter eight are robust to the presence of endogenity.  
The  results  based  on  the  two-stage  least  squares  (2SLS)  indicate  that  there  are 
statistically  significant  interdependences among  the five
93 alternative  corporate  governance 
mechanisms,  as  well  as  between  the  financial  performance  proxies  and  the  corporate 
governance structures. Specifically, the results based on the ROA suggest that if alternative 
corporate  governance  mechanisms  are  allowed  to  co-exist,  then  a  higher  SACGI  score,  a 
greater institutional shareholding along with a lesser block shareholding, a smaller board size, 
and a lesser debt usage are associated with higher accounting returns. Generally, allowing for 
the existence of potential interdependences or endogeneities among the alternative corporate 
governance mechanisms, the results support the conclusion in chapter eight that, on average, 
better-governed  South  African  listed  sample  firms  tend  to  be  associated  with  higher 
accounting returns than their poorly-governed counterparts.  
By contrast, results based on the Q-ratio indicate that allowing for the existence of 
alternative  corporate  governance  mechanisms,  the  SACGI  looses  its  ability  to  explain 
significant differences in the Q-ratio. Overall, the findings imply that firms with insignificant 
block  shareholding,  smaller  boards,  and  lesser  debt  usage,  but  significantly  greater 
institutional  shareholding  can  afford  to  have  relatively  poor internal  corporate  governance 
structures without necessarily being punished by the market with lower market valuation. This 
                                                 
92The eleven internal corporate governance mechanisms are: board diversity, board size, role or CEO duality, the 
percentage of non-executive directors, the frequency of board meetings, the presence of audit, nomination, and 
remuneration  committees,  director  shareownership,  director  shareownership  squared,  and  director  ownership 
cubed. 
93The five alternative corporate governance mechanisms are: the South African Corporate Governance Index (the 
SACGI), leverage, block shareownership, institutional shareownership, and board size.  
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appears to suggest that alternative corporate governance mechanisms can interact or can be 
combined to produce similar financial performance outcomes.  
For example, firms with significant institutional or block shareholding can afford to 
have  relatively  poor  internal  corporate  governance  practices,  such  as  having  less  non-
executive  directors.  The  presence  of  significant  block  or  institutional  shareholders,  for 
instance, could arguably carry out the function of monitoring and advising of managers that 
non-executive  directors  would  have  been  expected  to  perform.  This  may  result  in  similar 
financial performance outcomes as the monitoring that would have been carried out by non-
executive directors. 
Finally, the robustness or sensitivity analyses examined whether year-on-year changes 
in the quality of the sampled firms’ corporate governance scores result in similar changes in 
their year-on-year reported financial performance. Generally, the results indicate that increases 
(decrease) in the sampled firms’ corporate governance standards are associated with positive, 
but statistically insignificant increase (decrease) in their reported financial performance. The 
positive  coefficient  on  changes  in  the  SACGI  supports the  positive  coefficient  reported  in 
chapter  eight.  The  statistically  insignificant  coefficient,  however,  fails  to  support  the 
statistically significant coefficient on the SACGI reported in chapter eight. 
The  next  section  will  discuss  the  policy  implications  of  the  research  findings 
summarised above. Specifically, subsection 10.2.1 will discuss the policy implications of the 
levels of compliance with the SACGI. Subsection 10.2.2 will examine the policy implications 
of the research findings based on the compliance-index model, whereas subsection 10.2.3 will 
present  the  policy  implications  of  the research  findings based  on  the  equilibrium-variable 
model. Also, and where applicable, recommendations expected to bring about improvements 
will be made.  
 
 
10.2 POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS AND  
        RECOMMENDATIONS 
   
10.2.1 Compliance with the SACGI, Policy Implications and Recommendations 
 
Several implications can be drawn from the level of compliance with the SACGI.  First, 
analyses  of  the  levels  of  compliance  with  the  SACGI  indicate  that  corporate  governance 
standards have generally improved over the period of examination. This implies that efforts by 
the various stakeholders, notably the Institute of Directors (IoD) of South Africa, the JSE Ltd,  
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and the Financial Services Board (FSB), amongst others, at improving corporate governance 
standards among South African listed firms are at least beginning to yield good outcomes.   
Specifically,  and as summarised above, the findings indicate that the introduction of 
the King Reports (King I, 1994 and King II, 2002) alongside the Companies Act, 1973, the 
JSE’s  Listings  Rules,  and  the  Insider  Trading  Act,  1998,  have  helped  in  substantially 
improving corporate governance practices among South African listed firms. The evidence of 
improving corporate governance standards among listed firms also implies that, contrary to 
expectations, the UK-style voluntary compliance regime (i.e., ‘comply or explain’) appears to 
be working to some extent, and thus may be appropriate for South African listed firms
94.  
As have been discussed in chapter six and summarised above, this conclusion is very 
consistent  with  the  conclusions  of  prior  studies  that  have  examined  corporate  governance 
standards in firms of countries that have adopted the UK-style voluntary compliance regime 
(e.g., Conyon, 1993; Conyon and Mallin, 1997; Werder et al., 2005; Aguilera and  Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2009; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009). Specifically, and in reviewing prior studies that 
have examined corporate governance standards in firms of countries that have adopted the 
‘comply  or  explain’  regime,  Aguilera  and  Cuervo-Cazurra  (2009,  p.376)  concludes  that 
“Despite  the  criticisms  that  the  codes’  voluntary  nature  limits  their  ability  to  improve 
governance  practices,  codes  of  good  governance  appear  to  have  generally  improved  the 
governance of countries that have adopted them, although there is the need for additional 
reforms ”. 
A major feature of the UK-style voluntary compliance regime is that it encourages 
codes of good corporate governance to be appended to general listings rules for listed firms to 
comply with. Arguably, and in effect, this feature makes the UK-style codes of corporate 
governance largely mandatory for listed firms. They are, however, considered to be voluntary 
because: (1) their provisions are not normally enforceable in the law courts; (2) the provisions 
can only possibly become mandatory for listed firms; and (3) listed or non-listed firms may 
not necessarily be punished for not complying with a particular provision if they are able to 
offer a reasonable explanation. This may serve as a major explanation for the general evidence 
of encouraging levels of compliance among listed firms that have been found for South Africa 
                                                 
94It  is  acknowledged  that  this  conclusion  is  only  applicable  to  South  African  listed  firms.  Since  the  study 
examined only listed firms, it could not ascertain whether non-listed or private companies in South Africa have 
also voluntarily complied with the provisions of King II or that corporate governance standards in non-listed 
firms have similarly improved or are improving since the introduction of King II.  
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and also for the findings of prior studies on other countries with similar voluntary compliance 
regimes.  
For example, appending the King Code to the JSE’s Listings Rules seems to have 
enhanced compliance, especially among listed firms. This is because non-compliance by listed 
firms could result in severe punishments. These include the possibility of suspension and de-
listing  from  the  stock  exchange,  thereby  making  the  market  the  primary  compliance  and 
enforcement ‘officer’ in a ‘comply or explain’ corporate governance regime (e.g., Malherbe 
and Segal, 2003; Armstrong et al., 2006; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008). 
Second,  and  despite  the  improving  corporate  governance  standards,  however,  the 
findings also indicate that there are still substantial differences in corporate practices among 
the  sampled  firms.  A  further  examination  of  the  levels  of  compliance  suggests  that  the 
observed variability in corporate governance standards among the sampled firms can mainly 
be explained by firm size, and moderately by industry. This is theoretically expected because 
compliance with corporate governance provisions is costly both in terms of time and money, 
which larger firms can be expected to better afford compared with their smaller counterparts.  
Also, it can be argued that governance needs are likely to differ between smaller and 
larger firms.  As  has  been  discussed in  chapters  five  and  six,  prior literature  suggests,  for 
instance, that agency problems tend to be greater in larger firms compared to smaller firms. 
This implies that there should be some level of judgement and flexibility in the applicability of 
the provisions of King II to avoid excessive monitoring and redundant costs to smaller firms.   
In the case of the UK’s 2006 Combined Code, for example, some of the corporate 
governance provisions are explicitly stated to be inapplicable to smaller and newly listed firms 
(i.e.,  firms  below  the  FTSE  350)  (Combined  Code,  2006,  para.  6).  For  instance,  the 
requirement that half of the board should be independent non-executive directors is relaxed for 
smaller firms (Combined Code, 2006, para. A.3.2). Smaller firms are allowed to have only two 
independent  non-executive  directors.  Similarly,  smaller  firms  are  exempted  from  the 
requirement to establish audit and remuneration committees with memberships of at least three 
independent  non-executive  directors  (Combined  Code,  2006,  para.  B.2.1,  C.3.1).  Smaller 
firms  can  establish  audit  and  remuneration  committees  with  memberships  of  only  two 
independent non-executive directors. 
Similar judgement and flexibilities can be incorporated into the on-going review of 
King II (‘King III’) for smaller firms (for instance, firms below the top 100 listed firms on the 
JSE Ltd). For example, and given that South Africa is generally classified as an emerging  
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market with relatively high ownership concentration (for example, and as has been discussed 
in chapter seven, block ownership ranges from 7% to 99% with an average of 60%), it may 
not be relevant for smaller firms to have the same internal corporate governance structures as 
larger firms. The findings (see Table 24 in chapter nine) show that block shareholding, for 
instance, is statistically significant and negatively associated with firm size and the SACGI.  
One implication of this finding is that governance needs among the sampled firms 
appear to differ on the basis of ownership and firm size. This seems to suggest that there may 
be the need for some level of judgement and flexibility in the applicability of the governance 
provisions of the forthcoming ‘King III’, especially for smaller firms. Arguably, this may help 
smaller firms to meet their governance needs and also avoid incurring excessive costs. Based 
on the evidence that the observed variability in compliance with the provisions of King II or 
governance standards can largely be explained by size, it may arguably not be relevant for a 
smaller  firm
95 with  a  board  size  of  three  directors,  for  example,  to  establish  a  separate 
nomination  committee  or  to  have  a  majority  of  independent  non-executive  directors,  to 
mention but a few.  
  Third, the findings indicate that firms that are cross-listed to the UK and US stock 
markets tend to have better corporate governance standards than do firms only listed on the 
JSE. This is consistent with theory because reputable UK and US stock markets, such as the 
London and New York Stock Exchanges, often maintain more rigorous corporate governance 
requirements. This means that South African firms that list their shares on those stock markets 
are likely to be compelled to meet higher corporate governance standards.  
This implies that the JSE may need to further upgrade or enhance its listings rules to 
bring them up-to-date with international listings standards, especially to match those of the 
UK and US stock markets as an important part of the general efforts at improving corporate 
governance standards in South African listed firms. This may arguably help meet the listings 
needs of its larger firms in particular, which may reduce loss of trade or business to the JSE 
and also deepen the market. 
  Fourth, the low or zero compliance with some of the corporate governance provisions 
suggests  that  they  may  be  either  inappropriate  within  the  South  African  context  or  is  an 
indication of weak compliance and enforcement.  For example, the zero compliance with the 
                                                 
95As has been summarised above, the robustness analysis conducted in chapter nine indicate that firms can afford 
to have relatively poor internal corporate governance practices, such as having less independent non-executive 
directors,  if  they  have  stronger  alternative  governance  mechanisms,  like  a  significant  block  or  institutional 
shareholding,  and  still  able  to  be  associated  with  similar  higher  financial  performance  outcomes  like  their 
relatively better-governed counterparts.   
 
362 
requirement for firms to contribute to development of financial journalism indicates that it 
may  be  inappropriate  within  the  South  African  corporate  environment.  South  Africa,  for 
example, appears to already possess a well-developed free and vibrant financial press such that 
there  may  be  no  need  for  firms  to  spend  additional  resources  to  help  develop  financial 
journalism (King Report, 2002, pp.162-163).  
In  contrast,  the  low  levels  of  compliance  with  some  of  the  corporate  governance 
provisions  regardless  of  firm  size,  such  as  the  requirement  to:  have  independent  board 
chairpersons;  appraise  the  chairperson  and  CEO  performance;  and  establish  a  nomination 
committee; amongst others, implies that enforcement of these provisions might have been 
weak. Given that some of these provisions are also critical in achieving board independence, 
transparency,  responsibility  and  accountability,  the  JSE  Ltd  may  further  strengthen  its 
monitoring of the levels of compliance among listed firms. The JSE may, for example, set-up 
a  special  ‘compliance  and  enforcement’  committee  to  regularly  monitor  the  levels  of 
compliance with the governance provisions of the King Code among listed firms.  
As has been discussed in chapters seven and nine (see Tables 12 and 24 to 26), the 
findings  show  that  institutional  shareholding  significantly  improves  compliance  with  the 
provisions of King II or improves corporate governance standards. A major implication of this 
evidence appears to be that greater shareholder activism, especially by institutional investors 
(both local and foreign), as well as granting external auditors greater monitoring powers may 
also help in improving compliance with the provisions. The JSE may also encourage greater 
media and public scrutiny by making available to the general public official corporate filings 
and documentations. For example, as a standard practice by other stock exchanges, the JSE 
may publish interim and annual reports filed by listed firms on its official website to facilitate 
greater public access and scrutiny.  
Similarly, and based on the evidence of poor compliance with some of the provisions 
of  King  II  as  discussed  above,  effective  co-operation  and  co-ordination  among  all  the 
corporate and financial regulatory bodies, such as the Department of Trade and Industry, the 
Financial Services Board, the South African Reserve-Bank, and the JSE Ltd may enhance 
monitoring and improve compliance. Further, and in line with international developments, all 
listed  firms  may  be  encouraged  to  set-up  official  websites  to  increase  online-reporting  to 
improve transparency. Currently, only a small number of listed firms have official website for 
online-reporting.  
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  Finally,  the  findings  suggest  that  the  levels  of  compliance  with  the  South  African 
context  specific  affirmative  action  and  stakeholders  corporate  governance  provisions  (the 
Social-SACGI) are relatively high among the sampled firms. Specifically, and for example, the 
average  sampled  firm  complied  with  60%  of  the  50  corporate  governance  provisions 
investigated (the SACGI), while the average sampled firm complied with 67% of the 9 South 
African  context  affirmative  action  and  stakeholder  corporate  governance  provisions  (the 
Social-SACGI).  
Compliance  with  the  individual  affirmative  action  and  stakeholder  provisions, 
including board diversity has generally improved substantially over the period of examination. 
This  is  contrary  to  theoretical  expectations  and  the  suggestions  of  critics  of  King  II  that 
because compliance with these social provisions imposes extra costs, firms will not voluntarily 
comply with them unless they are backed by legislation or the corporate governance structure 
is fundamentally changed from a ‘shareholding’ to ‘stakeholding’ one. 
Apart from being appended to the JSE’s Listings Rules, the relatively high levels of 
compliance  with  the  affirmative  action  and  stakeholder  provisions  observed  among  the 
sampled  firms  in  particular  may  be  explained  by  political  costs  and  resource  dependence 
theories. Political costs theory suggests that the political system has the power (i.e., through 
taxation,  regulation,  nationalisation,  expropriations,  and  break-ups)  to  redistribute  wealth 
between  various  societal  groups  (Watts  and  Zimmerman,  1978,  p.115;  Andreasson,  2009, 
p.22). Corporations,  and  especially  large  companies,  are particularly  susceptible  to  wealth 
transfers.  
Therefore,  firms  will  voluntarily  comply  with  provisions  if  it  will  lead  to  an 
improvement in the relationships with governments and the public sector. This will not only 
help  to  decrease  political  costs,  but  also  offer  greater  access  to  resources  (resource 
dependence), such as subsidies, tax-rebates, and government contracts, amongst others. Within 
the  South  African  context,  compliance  with  the  Social-SACGI  may  reduce  the  potential 
political cost of stringent legislation being introduced.  More importantly, and  as has been 
explained above, compliance with the Social-SACGI may be a major way by which access to 
valuable  resources,  such  as  profitable  black  economic  empowerment  deals,  mining,  and 
government  contracts  may  be  gained.  This  may  also  explain  the  encouraging  levels  of 
compliance with the Social-SACGI. 
Despite the improving levels of compliance with the affirmative action and stakeholder 
provisions, there are still room for improvements. As will be recommended further below, the  
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monitoring of the levels of compliance with the social or affirmative action and stakeholder 
provisions may need to be strengthened to encourage meaningful compliance. In this case, the 
proposed ‘compliance and enforcement’ committee to be set-up by the JSE to specifically 
monitor compliance levels among listed firms and make appropriate recommendations to the 
JSE board for improvement may be useful. 
 
10.2.2 The Compliance-Index Model, Policy Implications and Recommendations 
 
The findings generally suggest that, irrespective of the financial performance measure 
used (i.e., whether an accounting measure – ROA or a market measure – Q-ratio), there is a 
statistically  significant  and  positive  relationship  between  the  SACGI  and  firm  financial 
performance. This implies that, on average, better-governed South African listed firms tend to 
be associated with higher financial returns than their poorly-governed counterparts. Similarly, 
and contrary to theoretical expectations, the findings also indicate that compliance with the 
Social-SACGI impact positively on the financial performance of South African listed firms. 
These findings have major implications for the on-going policy debate in South Africa. 
First, and as has been explained above, there is a serious policy debate as to whether the 
current ‘hybrid’ corporate governance model in which substantial ‘stakeholder’ demands are 
super-imposed on a predominantly ‘shareholding’ structure is appropriate for South Africa. 
The second important policy debate is that with a relatively concentrated ownership and a 
weak record of enforcement, there is a question of whether a UK-style voluntary corporate 
governance regime (i.e., ‘comply or explain’) rather than a US-style mandatory or statutory 
regime (i.e., ‘comply or else’) is appropriate for South Africa. 
The positive relationship between the SACGI and firm financial performance suggests 
that  South  African  listed  firms  are  still  able  to  deliver  significant  financial  value  to 
shareholders  after  accounting  for  the  costs  of  complying  with  affirmative  action  and 
stakeholder provisions. Consistent with prior studies, this implies that corporate governance is 
an  important  determinant  of  firm  financial  performance  in  South  Africa.  The  significant 
positive  associations  between  the  Q-ratio  and  the  SACGI,  and  between  the  ROA  and  the 
SACGI, indicate that good corporate governance is not only rewarded by investors with a 
higher valuation multiple, but can also impact positively on the sampled firms’ accounting 
returns. This is presumably because good corporate governance can enhance monitoring and 
reduce managerial expropriation.   
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As  an  emerging  market,  good  corporate  governance  practices  are  particularly 
important as this may not only help reduce corporate failures, but may also help companies to 
attract significant capital inflows or foreign direct investments (FDI). This may facilitate faster 
economic growth and development in South Africa. In this respect, efforts by the Institute of 
Directors (IoD) of South Africa, the King Committee, the JSE, and the Financial Services 
Board  (FSB),  amongst  other  stakeholders,  at  improving  governance  standards  in  South 
African companies, may be seen as a step in the right direction. 
The  significant  positive  relationship  between  the  Social-SACGI  and  firm  financial 
performance  implies  that  South African  listed  firms  may  need  to  pay  serious  attention  to 
complying  with  the  affirmative  action  and  stakeholder  provisions  and  in  preparing  the 
integrated sustainability report. This is because within the South African context, compliance 
with the affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions appears to be a 
major way by  which access to valuable resources may be  gained to facilitate  growth and 
improve long-term accounting returns. This may also be translated into higher share price by 
the market, and thereby resulting in higher market valuation.  
From  shareholders’  perspective,  the  findings  also  imply  that  the  current  ‘hybrid’ 
corporate governance model seems to be appropriate for South Africa, and that there may be 
no serious need for a radical change. Similarly, and as has been discussed above, the findings 
suggest  that  compliance  levels  with  good  corporate  governance  practices  have  generally 
improved substantially since the King Reports were introduced. This also implies that the UK-
style voluntary  corporate  governance  framework appears to be working to some  extent in 
South Africa, and that there may be no urgent need to effect fundamental changes. 
Despite  evidence  that  South  African  listed  companies  are  positively  embracing 
corporate governance reforms, the significant variation observed in the levels of compliance 
among the sampled firms indicates that there are still substantial room for improvements. In 
particular, based on the evidence that compliance with the South  African context specific 
affirmative  action  and  stakeholder  provisions  help  to  significantly  improve  financial 
performance, there may be the need for South Africa to further strengthen its current ‘hybrid’ 
corporate  governance  model.  Specifically,  there  are  several  ways  by  which  the  current 
‘hybrid’ corporate governance framework may be strengthened for shareholders, and made 
more  relevant  to  the  South  African  corporate  context  that  may  be  incorporated  into  the 
forthcoming ‘King III’.  
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First,  the  integrated  sustainability  reporting  (stakeholder  issues  reporting)  may  be 
renewed  and  strengthened  to  clear  lingering  scepticisms  among  civil  society  (i.e.,  various 
stakeholders and general public) as to the true intentions and practices of listed firms. To 
achieve effective and meaningful contribution to the sustainability of local communities and 
other identified legitimate stakeholders, the current integrated sustainability report  may be 
made to form part of the annual financial statement and report.   
This  may  mean  that  a  typical  financial  report  may  be  made  up  of:  (1)  a  financial 
statement (profit and loss accounts); (2) a balance sheet; and (3) an integrated sustainability 
report. Like the financial statement and balance sheet, the integrated sustainability report may 
be both backward- and forward-looking in terms of the information it provides. That is, the 
companies may in the least be required to record in both quantitative and qualitative terms the 
contribution  that  they  have  made  towards  sustaining  their  identified  stakeholders  in  the 
previous year, current year, and what they plan to do in the next financial year.  
In terms of the content of the integrated report, it may be rich enough to state how a 
firm has both positively and negatively affected the social, economic and environmental life of 
its identified stakeholders, especially the local  community  within which it operated in the 
financial year under review. In addition, the forward-looking part of the integrated report may 
record how the company intends to improve on the positive impacts and minimise the negative 
aspects that affected the social, economic and environmental life of its identified stakeholders, 
including the local community within which it operates.  
This form of integrated sustainability reporting may arguably offer several advantages 
over the current method of integrated sustainability reporting recommended by King II. First, 
it may imply that instead of being a mere ‘add-on’ (as has been observed from reading the 
annual  reports)  as  economic,  social  and  environmental  information  in  the  annual  report 
currently, the integrated sustainability report may be seen as truly embedded in the activities 
of listed firms. Secondly, by formally becoming part of the financial report, the integrated 
sustainability may fall directly under the remit of the external auditor. The external auditor 
may officially be required to directly audit all aspects of the report and to pass his/her ‘true 
and  fair’  view  as  to  the  veracity  or  otherwise  of  statements  or  figures  provided  in  the 
integrated  sustainability  report.  This  may  help  improve  confidence  in  the  integrated 
sustainability report and reduce public scepticism. 
Thirdly,  requiring  firms  to  provide  sustainability  information  on  previous  year’s, 
current year’s and next year’s basis may arguably result in a better and meaningful compliance  
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with stakeholder provisions. This is because it may prevent companies from being vague or 
repeating the same sustainability contribution in different financial years. Finally, making the 
integrated  sustainability  report  part  of  the  financial  report  may  also  not  have  substantial 
additional costs implications (some amount of increase in auditing fees, however, may be 
expected) as it may be similar to the current sustainability report. It is expected to only elevate 
its importance so that greater care and priority may be placed on its preparation. This may 
make the integrated sustainability report more valuable or useful to potential investors and 
other stakeholders. 
The second major way by which the ‘hybrid’ corporate governance framework may be 
improved is to discourage the incidence of concentrated ownerships and reduce the low levels 
of compliance with some of the provisions of King II as has been discussed above. This is 
because diffused or dispersed ownership enhances the effectiveness of the managerial labour 
and corporate control markets (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006, p.1035). However, and as have 
been  explained  in  chapters  one,  two  and  three,  prior  literature suggests  that  effective and 
efficient market for corporate control can improve voluntary compliance as poorly-governed 
or performing firms can easily be acquired by their better-governed or performing counterparts. 
In  this  regard,  recent  efforts  by  the  JSE  at  reducing  concentrated  ownerships  and  cross-
shareholdings via complex pyramidical structures, such as the introduction of more rigorous 
listing rules (in 1995, 2000, 2003, 2005 and 2007) and the de-listing of pyramids may be seen 
as a step in the right direction. It may help improve voluntary compliance and enforcement 
with good corporate governance practices among South African listed firms.  
Finally, and as has been discussed above, another major way by which the ‘hybrid’ 
corporate governance model may be improved is to strengthen the current hybrid regulatory 
structures. Statutory corporate laws, such as the Companies Act 1973 and Insider Trading Act 
1998 may support the voluntary corporate rules, including the King Code and the JSE Listing 
Rules. This may also enhance compliance and enforcement. As has been recommended above, 
these suggestions may be incorporated into the provisions of the forthcoming ‘King III’. 
 
10.2.3 The Equilibrium-Variable Model, Policy Implications and Recommendations 
 
There are several implications of the findings based on the equilibrium-variable model. 
First, the findings suggest that regardless of the firm financial performance measure used, 
board diversity has no statistically significant impact on firm financial performance in South 
Africa. This does not lend support to the recommendations of King II and the general efforts  
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in South Africa to diversify corporate boards. As has been explained above, this is empirically 
less surprising given the small number of women and non-whites that are currently on South 
African corporate boards. For example, the average firm in the sample with approximately a 
mean board size of 10 has only one non-white or female member.  
The small number of women and non-whites on corporate boards implies that women 
and non-white board appointments may be made for symbolic reasons or as a form of token 
rather than for their contribution to the decision-making process in the boardroom. It may also 
be possible that due to the negative lingering legacies of Apartheid, board members from 
diverse backgrounds, especially non-whites, tend to lack the necessary qualifications, skills 
and experience to contribute effectively to boardroom decision-making. 
This appears to suggest that board diversity may need to be meaningfully improved 
before it can be expected to impact positively on the sampled firms’ financial performance. 
This may be done by significantly increasing the number of board members from diverse 
backgrounds.  Additionally,  companies  may  conduct  special  training,  education  and 
development programmes for new board members from diverse backgrounds with limited or 
no board experience. This may facilitate effective contribution of diverse board members by 
making them better aware of their rights and responsibilities. In this regard, the Institute of 
Directors (IoD) of South Africa may be of immense help by regularly conducting training 
workshops and conferences for existing and new members. 
Second, the findings indicate that market returns (Q-ratio) are significantly higher if a 
firm has a larger board, but this is not reflected in any significant measure in its accounting 
returns (ROA). As summarised above, the significant positive association between board size 
and the Q-ratio is contrary to much of the UK and US evidence, which report a significant 
negative relationship between board size and the Q-ratio. This appears to imply that unlike the 
UK and US context, the board’s ability to secure greater access to critical resources that is 
often associated with larger boards is valued higher by the South African stock market than 
the capacity of the board to effectively monitor and advise managers that is usually associated 
with smaller boards. 
Another implication seems to be that the valuation consequences of board size differ 
across firms and performance measures. In this regard, the decision by King II not to prescribe 
an ‘ideal’ (i.e., ‘one size fits all’) board size may be seen as a step in the right direction. King 
II recommends that every board should consider whether or not its size, diversity and other 
demographics make it effective.       
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It may also imply that the choice of a performance measure has important implications 
for understanding the effect of corporate governance structures on financial performance. As 
have  been  explained  above,  this  seems  to  suggest  that  insiders  (managers)  and  outsiders 
(investors) differ in their valuation of corporate governance. It may also reflect differences in 
weaknesses  and  strengths  of  market  and  accounting  based  measures  of  performance.  The 
overall implication appears to be that for robust research results, future researchers may need 
to use both accounting and market based performance proxies rather than a single financial 
performance measure. 
Third, the findings indicate that firms that combine the roles of board chairman and 
CEO tend to be associated with higher accounting returns than their counterparts that split the 
roles. However, it has no significant impact on market valuation even though role or CEO 
duality is generally considered by the market as a negative corporate governance practice. This 
appears to imply that the policy of King II and the JSE’s Listing Rules for South African firms 
to follow Cadbury-style suggestion to split the two roles may not be appropriate. Within the 
South  African  context,  and  especially  for  small  firms,  CEO  duality  appears  to  allow  a 
visionary and charismatic CEO the opportunity to have a sharper focus on firm objectives 
without excessive board interference.  
Fourth, the findings indicate that boards with a higher percentage of non-executive 
directors tend to be associated with lower accounting returns. Further, even though having 
more non-executive directors on the board is perceived positively by the market, it has no 
significant  impact  on  market  valuation.  This  seems  to  indicate  that  the  Cadbury-style 
recommendation of King II and the JSE’s Listing Rules that South African boards should 
comprise of a majority of non-executive directors may not necessarily be applicable in South 
Africa.  
One reason may be that as a developing country, non-executive directors, especially 
those  from  diverse  backgrounds,  may  lack  the  necessary  qualifications,  knowledge  and 
experience to subject managerial decisions to proper scrutiny. Organising regular training and 
development workshops for existing and new non-executive directors to educate them about 
their rights and responsibilities may be a step in the right direction. 
Fifth, the findings suggest that the frequency of board meetings has no statistically 
significant impact on firm financial performance, regardless of the measure used. This appears 
to imply that the suggestion of King II that every board must at least meet four times in a year 
may not have any significant positive financial effect. Since firms may differ in the challenges  
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and problems that they face, it may be appropriate to allow for judgement and flexibility in the 
frequency of board meetings.  For example, while it may be valuable for a board to meet 
regularly in a period of crisis, such as when a firm is facing a hostile take-over bid, there may 
be no need for a board to meet frequently if such problems are non-existent. Judgement and 
Flexibility may allow corporate boards to meet in response to specific needs and challenges. 
Sixth, the findings are mixed when it comes to board subcommittees. The findings 
indicate that firms that have established a nomination committee tend to be associated with 
higher  accounting  returns.  By  contrast,  the  findings  suggest  that  firms  with  audit  and 
remuneration committees have no impact on accounting returns. Further, the market seems not 
to  put  any  significant  value  on  whether  firms  that  have  established  any  of  three  board 
committees: audit, nomination, and remuneration. This generally implies that the Cadbury-
style suggestion of King II and the JSE’s Listing Rules that South African listed firms should 
establish audit, nomination, and remuneration committees may not be applicable.   
As has been argued above, firms may differ in terms of size, agency problems, and 
thus governance needs. While an independent nomination committee may be relevant for a 
larger firm, it may be argued that a smaller firm of three directors may not necessarily need to 
have  an  independent  nomination  committee.  As  has  been  suggested  above,  the  on-going 
review of King II may incorporate such judgement and flexibilities into its recommendations, 
especially for smaller firms. 
The  seventh  and  final  finding  indicates  that  the  market  values  firms  with  higher 
director shareownership significantly lower, but higher director ownership appears to have no 
significant  impact  on  accounting  returns.  This  seems  to  imply  that  higher  director 
shareownership  tend  to  be  associated  with  director  entrenchment  and  expropriation  to  the 
disadvantage of minority shareholders. In this regard, and as has been discussed above, the on-
going attempts by the JSE to encourage diffused ownerships of listed firms may be seen as a 
positive development. 
The next section will summarise the contributions of the study to the extant corporate 
governance literature. 
 
 
10.3 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION  
 
  As has already been discussed in chapters one and four, prior cross-country studies 
whose samples include some South African listed firms make use of corporate governance  
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ratings based purely on analysts’ perceptions rather than a direct examination of company 
annual reports. A major problem with subjective analysts’ corporate governance rankings is 
that  they  tend  to  be  biased  towards  large  firms  (Beattie  et  al.,  2004,  p.210).  The  Credit 
Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) 2000 corporate governance rankings that has mainly been 
used by prior studies, for example, includes only nine of the biggest South African listed firms. 
Arguably, this makes the sample used by prior studies less representative, and thus limits the 
generalisation of their findings for South Africa. Similarly, the extant literature suggests that 
corporate  governance  structures  and  systems  vary  across  different  countries  (West,  2006, 
p.435, 2009, p.11; Andreasson, 2009, p.22). However, and as has been discussed in chapters 
two, four and five, subjective analysts’ corporate governance rankings are standardised such 
that they are unable to reflect institutional, cultural and contextual differences in corporate 
governance structures across different countries.  
This  study  makes  several  new  contributions,  as  well  as  extensions  to  the  extant 
corporate governance literature. First, using corporate governance data collected directly from 
company annual reports, the study offers for the first time direct evidence on the relationship 
between  internal corporate  governance  structures  and  firm  financial  performance  in  South 
Africa. As has already been explained, the sample is constructed in such a way that there is a 
balance between large and small firms, which arguably enhances the generalisation of the 
findings.  Unlike  prior  studies,  the  compliance-index  (the  SACGI)  used  incorporates 
conventional, as well as affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions 
that are unique to the South African context. Consistent with the results of prior studies (e.g., 
Gompers et al., 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Beiner et al., 2006; 
Black et al., 2006a; and Morey et al., 2009, amongst others), the findings indicate that there is 
a statistically significant relationship between the quality of a firm’s corporate governance and 
financial performance. 
Second,  it  offers  for  the  first  time  evidence  on  the  economic  consequences  of 
complying with affirmative action and stakeholder corporate governance provisions for South 
African listed firms. Contrary to theoretical expectations, the findings suggest that compliance 
with the Social-SACGI impact positively on financial returns of South African listed firms. 
Third, the Institute of International Finance (IIF) 2007 report on Corporate Governance in 
South Africa suggests that even though the King Code is voluntary, no study has been done to 
ascertain the levels of compliance among listed firms. Specifically, it states “…However, to 
date,  no  study  has  been  conducted  to  assess  the  level  of  compliance  with  corporate  
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governance-related requirements among listed companies or to verify the reasons for non-
compliance”, (IIF, 2007, p.1). Malherbe and Segal (2003, p.193) have also expressed similar 
concerns.  
This study fills this gap in the existing literature by offering for the first time direct 
evidence on the levels of compliance with the corporate governance provisions recommended 
by King II among South African listed firms. Specifically, it shows that while compliance with 
the recommendations of King II has generally improved, substantial variations in governance 
standards still exist among South African listed firms. These differences, however, can largely 
be explained by size, and moderately by industry. 
Fourth, the study makes for the first time a comparison of findings based on estimating 
the  compliance-index  model  and  the  equilibrium-variable  model.  Generally,  it  shows  that 
methodological choice can potentially influence research findings with important implications 
for future research. Finally, and unlike most prior studies, problems that the potential presence 
of endogeneity may cause have been comprehensively addressed. These include estimating: a 
lagged corporate governance-financial performance structure; an instrumental variable; a two-
stage least squares; and a changes model. This has arguably improved the reliability of the 
findings. 
The next section will summarise the limitations of the study to serve as a guide for any 
interpretations of the research findings. 
 
 
10.4 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
 
  While the research findings are important, like any other empirical research, it may 
suffer  from  several  limitations  which  need  to  be  acknowledged.  Most  of  these  potential 
limitations have already been discussed in detail in chapter five. First, there may be problems 
with the sample selection procedure and size. The sample size of 100 listed firms is relatively 
small. As has been explained in subsection of 5.1.3 of chapter five, however, the 100 sampled 
firms were larger compared with the samples of prior South African studies (e.g., Firer and 
Meth, 1986; Ho and Williams, 2003; April et al., 2003; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008). For 
example, April et al. (2003) received only 20 annual reports for examining intellectual capital 
disclosures among South African mining firms. Also, in investigating corporate governance 
and incidences of listing suspension by the JSE, Mangena and Chamisa (2008) obtained data 
on 81 out of a possible 538 suspended firms identified over the period 1999-2005.   
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The five year period also seems to be short. This is, however, longer than most of the 
prior evidence, which is based on one year cross-sectional samples (e.g., Klapper and Love, 
2004; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Beiner et al., 2006; Black et al., 2006a). Also, the final 100 
stratified  sampled  firms,  which  generate  a  total  of  500  firm-year  observations,  form  a 
significant percentage of the total possible sample, as well as the JSE population. It constitutes 
approximately 60% and 34% of the useable final sample of 169 and the possible JSE sample 
of 291 firms, respectively, which statistical sampling (central limit theorem) theory suggests is 
a sufficiently large sample (Whatsham, and Parramore, 1997, pp.136-140; Anderson et al., 
2007, pp.239-241).  
Further, and for practical considerations, the sample was restricted to 100 companies. 
In particular, the corporate governance variables were manually extracted, which is a highly 
labour-intensive activity (Hussainey et al., 2003, p.276; Beattie et al., 2004, pp.232-233). As a 
result, practical limitations of time, effort and finance meant that the sample had to be reduced 
to a number that is statistically large enough to make a significant contribution, while at the 
same time ensuring that the study is completed within the scheduled time-frame of a PhD.  
Arguably,  limiting  the  analysis  to  a  balanced  panel  introduces  survivorship  bias. 
However, and as has been explained above, the criteria generated comparatively larger sample 
size in relation to those of prior South African studies to the extent that the generalisation of 
the research results may not be substantially impaired. For regulatory and capital structure 
reasons,  the  sample  also  excludes  financial  and  utility  firms.  As  has  been  explained  in 
subsection  5.1.1  of  chapter  five,  this  is  generally  in  line  with  prior  studies  (e.g.,  Ho  and 
Williams, 2003; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008), which facilitated 
drawing  comparisons  with  the  results  of  these  studies.  Together,  these  weaknesses  may 
potentially limit the generalisation of the research findings. 
Second, and as has been explained in subsection 5.2.2.1 of chapter five, there may be 
validity  and  reliability  problems  with  the  constructed  compliance-index,  the  SACGI.  The 
SACGI was constructed based on a binary rather than an ordinal coding scheme. It has been 
argued that binary coding is less informative (Barako et al., 2006a and b; Hassan and Marston, 
2008). Similarly, the SACGI is an un-weighted index. However, un-weighted indices have 
been  heavily  criticised  for  treating  all  corporate  governance  provisions  to  be  of  equal 
importance, a view which is inconsistent with both theory and practice (Barako et al., 2006a, 
p.115).   
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As has been explained in subsection 5.2.2.1 of chapter five, there is a general lack of a 
rigorously developed theoretical basis on which weights could be accurately assigned to the 
various corporate governance provisions (Black et al., 2006a, p.375). In this case, the use of 
unweighted  index  avoids  the  necessity  of  making  subjective  value  judgements  as  to  the 
relative importance or efficacy of each corporate governance provision (Owusu-Ansah, 1998, 
p.609).  Also,  an  associated  advantage  of  an  unweighted  index  is  that  it  does  not  involve 
arbitrarily or subjectively assigning weights. This obviates creating a situation whereby the 
constructed index is unnecessarily dominated by or biased towards a particular set of corporate 
governance provisions. 
Further,  rigorously  established  empirical  evidence  from  the  accounting  disclosure 
literature suggests that the use of weighted and unweighted indices tend to give the same 
results, especially where the number of corporate governance provisions is relatively large 
(e.g.,  Robbins  and  Austin,  1986;  Chow  and  Wong-Boren, 1987;  Beattie et  al.,  2004; and 
Barako et al., 2006a and b, amongst others).  Moreover,  in  line  with  much  of  the  prior 
corporate governance-performance relationship literature (Gompers et al., 2003; Black et al., 
2006a;  Henry,  2008;  and  Morey  et  al.,  2009,  amongst  others),  an  unweighted  index  is 
constructed, which made it easier for direct comparisons to be drawn with their results. 
Also, the SACGI was not coded by a different person in order to ascertain inter-coder 
consistency. As has been explained in subsection 5.2.2.1 of chapter five, the coding was done 
twice over a fourteen month period with high levels of stability between the first and second 
rounds of coding. For example, the stability between the first round SACGI and the second 
round  SACGI  is  .8948.  For  the  individual  corporate  governance  provisions,  the  stability 
between  the first  and  second  round  of coding  ranges  between  .7614 in  the  case  of  board 
composition  (COM1)  to  .9056  with  respect  to  the  disclosure  of  individual  directors’ 
attendance of board meetings (IDMA).  
Beattie and Thompson (2007, p.220) suggest that the cut-off level for acceptability 
ranges from .70 to .80. Thus, the levels of stability achieved were generally highly satisfactory. 
Similarly, and unlike much of the prior literature, for each corporate governance provision and 
annual report, a detailed spreadsheet (see Appendices 3a and b) containing the page number(s) 
of what was coded, where it was coded from, and where applicable, why it was coded in that 
way, was developed to accompany the coding scheme. Arguably, this makes the constructed 
index easy and simple to replicate.  
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The corporate governance data was collected only from annual reports. It could have 
been  cross-checked  with  other  sources,  such  as  questionnaire  survey  and  face-to-face 
interviews. However, and as have been discussed in subsection 5.2.2.1 of chapter five, unlike 
other media, the Companies Act and the JSE Listings Rules mandate listed firms to issue 
annual reports. It has been argued that the mandatory nature of annual reports makes them a 
regular and reliable source of corporate governance information (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 
1993; Botosan, 1997). This is because a firm can be sued for providing misleading information.  
Also,  prior  evidence  suggests  that  annual  report  disclosure  levels  are  positively 
correlated with the amount of disclosure provided via other media (Lang and Lundholm, 1993, 
p.258; Botosan, 1997, p.329). Further, and for practical reasons, only company annual reports 
were  consistently  available  in  Perfect  Information  where  the  annual  reports  were  mainly 
collected from. Moreover, using company annual reports is also in line with prior studies, 
which facilitated drawing direct comparisons with their results (e.g., Yermack, 1996; Shabbir 
and Padget, 2005; Cheung et al., 2007).  
  Third,  there  may  be  definitional  problems  with  some  of  the  corporate  governance 
variables. For example, board diversity was coded as a binary variable rather than using actual 
percentage of board members from diverse backgrounds. Board size was defined to exclude 
‘shadow’  or  ‘grey’  directors.  Non-executive  directors  were  not  distinguished  into 
‘independent’  and  ‘non-independent’.  Similarly,  due  to  data
96  limitations,  director 
shareownership could not be separated into ownerships held by executive and non-executive 
directors, directly and indirectly, and beneficially and non-beneficially.  
In the case of block shareownership, no distinctions are made in terms of internal and 
external,  and  institutional  and  non-institutional  block  shareownerships.  Institutional 
shareownership  could  not  be  categorised  into  local  and  foreign  institutional  ownerships. 
Further,  the  director  shareownership-financial  performance  non-linear  nexus  is  tested  by 
merely squaring and cubing director shareownership. Director shareownership levels could 
have, for example, been properly classified into low (0%-5%), medium (5%-25%), and high 
(25%  and  above).  These  definitional  limitations  may  potentially  influence  the  research 
findings. 
                                                 
96The ownership data was collected from the company annual reports. However, they were not clearly classified. 
For example, there were no proper or explicit classifications of shareownerships as to those with cash flow rights 
and those with voting rights. Director ownership was not explicitly classified into those owned by exectutive 
directors and those owned by non-exective directors. Block ownership was not classified into those owned by 
outsiders or institutions and those owned by individuals or insiders. Also, institutional ownership was also not 
classified into those owned by foreign institutions and those owned by local institutions.  
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  Finally, the study may suffer from potential omitted variables bias. In the case of the 
financial performance proxies, they may fail to capture informal personal interactions among 
directors,  management,  and  employees  that  may  potentially  impact  on  a  firm’s  financial 
performance.  With  regard  to  the  corporate  governance  variables,  they  may not  be  able  to 
capture the true intentions for which they may be instituted by managers. For example, even 
though  managers  may  know that non-executive  directors  may be practically ineffective in 
monitoring their actions, they may still appoint them just to merely signal their intentions of 
treating outsiders or shareholders fairly.  
Similarly, it can be argued that the provisions contained in King II have nothing to do 
with good corporate governance. Rather, they are meant to achieve accountability, discipline, 
fairness, independence, responsibility, social responsibility, and transparency.  Firm financial 
performance may mainly be determined by macro-economic variables and the general state of 
the economy. For instance, in a state of economic boom, all firms perform financially well. By 
contrast, in a state of economic recession, all firms perform poorly. An anecdotal example of 
this is the current global financial crisis and the associated economic downturn (e.g., Turner 
Review, 2009; Walker Review, 2009). Therefore, corporate governance may not be the main 
determinant of firm financial performance.  
The research findings must, therefore, be interpreted in light of the above limitations. 
Also, these limitations potentially represent avenues for future research. Therefore, the next 
section points out potential avenues for future research and improvements. 
 
 
 10.5 AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND IMPROVEMENTS 
 
There are several potential avenues for future research and improvements. First, since 
there is a general dearth of corporate governance studies that make use of African listed firms, 
this study can be extended by using data from a cross-section of African stock markets. This 
may  improve  current  understanding  of  the  internal  corporate  governance-financial 
performance association across different African markets.  
Second,  the  study  has  mainly  examined  the  association  between  internal  corporate 
governance  structures  and  firm  financial  performance.  Future  studies  can  investigate  how 
external  corporate  governance  mechanisms,  such  as  the  market  for  corporate  control,  the 
managerial labour market, and the law, amongst others, affect firm financial performance.  
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Future  research  can  also  analyse  interactions  or  interdependences  between  internal  and 
external corporate governance mechanisms and their impact on firm financial performance.  
Third, given the current global financial crisis and its association with director pay and 
bonuses, it will be interesting for future research to focus on the relationship between director 
(i.e.,  CEO,  executive,  and  non-executive)  pay  and  company  performance  among  South 
African  listed  firms.  Also,  the  association  between  multiple  (i.e.,  ‘busy  directors’) 
directorships and financial performance can be explored by future research. Fourth, future 
studies can examine the relationship between internal corporate governance structures and cost 
of equity capital or risk. This is because if better-governed firms tend to be associated with 
higher financial returns, then such firms will theoretically be expected to be associated with 
lower cost of equity capital or risk. 
Fifth,  future  studies  can  examine  the  determinants  of  corporate  governance  or 
compliance with the King Code, the ownership-corporate disclosure nexus, the relationship 
between  corporate  disclosure  and  cost  of  equity  capital  or  risk,  as  well  as  the  valuation 
consequences of voluntary disclosure of corporate governance among South African listed 
firms. Sixth, and in terms of improvement to the current study, future research can re-examine 
the  corporate  governance-financial  relationship  by  expanding  the  sample  size  and  over  a 
longer period of time (say from 1990 or 1993 to 2001; from 2001 to 2009; or from 1990 or 
1993 to 2009). Such a study  can estimate both balanced and un-balanced panels to avoid 
survivorship bias. It can also examine only financial firms or both financial and non-financial 
firms  to  ascertain  whether  the  current  findings  are  sensitive  or  robust  to different  sample 
specifications.  
Seventh, future  research  can  improve  the construction  of  the  compliance  corporate 
governance  index  to  enhance  validity  and  reliability.  This  can  be  done  by  examining  the 
sensitivity or robustness of the results to: weighted and un-weighted indices; and binary and 
ordinal coding schemes. The reliability of the index can be improved if future research uses 
more than one coder so that inter-coder consistency can be measured. Future studies can also 
collect the corporate governance data via a questionnaire survey (i.e., postal and electronic) to 
either supplement those provided in company annual reports or to be used to supplant those 
provided in company annual reports.  
 Eighth,  definitions  of  variables could  be  improved  and  made  more precise.  Board 
diversity  could  be  measured  in  percentages,  while  board  size  can  be  defined  to  include 
‘shadow’ or ‘grey’ directors. Non-executive directors can be distinguished into ‘independent’  
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and ‘non-independent’. Similarly, director shareownership can be separated into ownerships 
held by executive and non-executive directors, directly and indirectly, and beneficially and 
non-beneficially.  
In the case of block shareownership, distinctions can be made in terms of internal and 
external,  and  institutional  and  non-institutional  block  shareownerships.  Institutional 
shareownership can be categorised into local and foreign institutional ownerships. Further, the 
director  shareownership-financial  performance  non-monotonic  relationship  can  be  re-
examined by properly classifying director ownership levels into low, medium, and high.  
Finally, and with regard to the research design, event study methodology can be used 
by  future  researchers  to  investigate  share  price  reaction  to  the  adoption  of  the  corporate 
governance provisions of King II. Future research can also examine share price reaction to 
board changes, including appointments, resignations, dismissals, deaths, and retirements of 
directors (i.e., chairpersons, CEOs, executive, non-executive, and independent non-executive 
directors).  
Also, there are some pressing corporate governance issues that may be better addressed 
by future researchers via a qualitative methodology. For instance, the importance of corporate 
governance in corporate decision-making and performance can be explored by future research 
by  observing  boardroom  interactions  or  by  conducting  interviews  (i.e.,  structured,  semi-
structured, and un-structured) with key company stakeholders, such as executive and non-
executive directors, company secretaries, senior management, and institutional investors. The 
interviews with company management can also explore the reasons why firms comply or do 
not comply with the provisions of King II. 
Further, future studies can focus on the motivations and central drivers of corporate 
governance reforms in South Africa. This can be done by conducting face-to-face interviews 
with some of the key stakeholders of corporate governance reforms in South Africa. These 
may include the King Committee chairman and commissioners, key members of the Institute 
of Directors of South Africa, the JSE Ltd, and the South African Department of Trade and 
Industry,  amongst  others.  This  may  help  enhance  current  understanding  of  how  corporate 
governance structures and systems evolve in a developing country setting. 
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10.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
  This chapter has focused on providing conclusions to the thesis. Specifically, it sought 
to achieve five main objectives. First, it attempted to summarise the research findings of the 
study. In this regard, the research findings based on the: levels of compliance with the South 
African  Corporate  Governance  Index  (the  SACGI);  compliance-index  and  equilibrium-
variable models; and robustness or sensitivity analyses. The findings suggest the levels of 
compliance  with  the  SACGI  have  significantly  improved  over  the  period  of  examination. 
However,  substantial  differences  in  the  standards  of  corporate  governance  among  South 
African  listed  firms  still  exist.  Research  findings  based  on  the  compliance-index  model 
indicate that regardless of the measure used, better-governed firms, on average, tend to be 
associated with higher financial returns than their poorly-governed counterparts.  
By contrast, findings based on the equilibrium-variable model are generally mixed.  
Irrespective of the measure used, board diversity and the frequency of board meetings appear 
to have no impact on firm financial performance. With the exception of the presence of a 
nomination committee, board subcommittees do not seem to have any significant effect on 
firm  financial  performance,  regardless  of  the  measure  used.  Board  size  is  significantly 
positively associated with the Q-ratio, but insignificantly negatively related to the ROA. The 
coefficient  on  role  or  CEO  duality  under  the  ROA  is  significant  and  positive,  but  the 
coefficient on CEO duality under the Q-ratio is negative and insignificant. The final finding 
based  on  the  equilibrium-variable  model  is  that  director  shareownership  is  statistically 
insignificant  and  negatively  related  to  ROA,  but  statistically  significant  and  negatively 
associated with the Q-ratio. 
Second,  the  chapter  has  discussed the  policy  implications  of the  research  findings. 
With the respect to the levels of compliance with the SACGI, evidence of increasing levels of 
compliance implies that efforts at improving corporate governance standards by the various 
stakeholders within South African listed firms are beginning to pay-off. It also implies that the 
Cadbury-style voluntary compliance regime appears to be working to some extent in South 
Africa. Evidence of substantial variations in the levels of compliance among the sampled firms, 
however, implies that compliance and enforcement may need to be further strengthened. To 
encourage meaningful compliance, the on-going review of King II may consider introducing 
some  level  of  judgement  and  flexibility  in  the  applicability  of  the  corporate  governance 
provisions, especially for small listed firms.  
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The  statistically  significant  and  positive  relationship  between  firm-level  corporate 
governance  and  financial  performance  implies  that  corporate  governance  is  an  important 
determinant  of  firm  financial  performance  in  South  Africa.  In  this  respect,  efforts  by  the 
Institute of Directors (IoD) of South Africa, the King Committee, the JSE, and the Financial 
Services  Board  (FSB),  amongst  other  stakeholders,  at  improving  corporate  governance 
standards  in  South  African  companies  may  be  seen  as  a  step  in  the  right  direction.  The 
significant positive relationship between the Social-SACGI and firm financial performance 
implies that South African listed firms may need to pay serious attention to complying with 
the affirmative action and stakeholder provisions and in preparing the integrated sustainability 
report.  From  shareholders’  perspective,  the  findings  also  imply  that  the  current  ‘hybrid’ 
corporate governance model seems to be appropriate for South Africa, and that there may be 
no serious need for a radical change. 
Despite  the  evidence that  South  African listed companies  are positively  embracing 
corporate governance reforms, the significant variability observed in the levels of compliance 
among the sampled firms indicates that there are still substantial room for improvements. The 
‘hybrid’ corporate governance may be improved by renewing and strengthening integrated 
sustainability reporting (stakeholder issues reporting). To achieve effective and meaningful 
contribution  to  the  sustainability  of  local  communities  and  other  identified  legitimate 
stakeholders,  the  current integrated  sustainability  report  may  be  made  to  form  part  of  the 
annual financial statement and report. Disperse corporate shareholdings may be encouraged in 
addition to proper co-ordination among regulatory bodies to promote effective monitoring, 
compliance  and  enforcement  of  corporate  governance  provisions.  The  current  hybrid 
regulatory structure may also be strengthened. 
Third, the chapter sought to summarise the contributions of the study. The study makes 
several new contributions, as well as extensions to the extant corporate governance literature. 
First, it offers for the first time direct evidence on the relationship between internal corporate 
governance structures and firm financial performance in South Africa. Second, it documents 
for the first time evidence on the economic consequences of complying with affirmative action 
and stakeholder provisions for South African listed firms. Third, the study presents direct 
evidence on the levels of compliance with the corporate governance provisions recommended 
by King II among South African listed firms. Fourth, it makes for the first time a comparison 
of findings based on estimating a compliance-index model and an equilibrium-variable model.  
 
381 
Finally, and unlike most prior studies, the study comprehensively addresses problems that the 
potential presence of endogeneity may cause.  
The fourth objective of the chapter has been to highlight the limitations of the study. 
First, there may be problems with the sample selection procedure and size. The sample size of 
100 listed firms is relatively small. The five year period examined is also comparatively short. 
Limiting the analysis to a balanced panel possibly introduces survivorship bias. The sample 
also  excludes  financial  and  utility  firms.  These  weaknesses  may  potentially  limit  the 
generalisability of the research findings.  
Second, there may validity and reliability problems with the constructed compliance-
index, the SACGI. The SACGI was constructed based only on a binary coding scheme. The 
corporate governance variables were equally weighted. Also, the SACGI was not coded by a 
different person in order to ascertain inter-coder consistency. The corporate governance data 
was  collected  purely  from  annual  reports.  These  weaknesses  may  limit  the  validity  and 
reliability of the results.  
Third,  there  may  be  definitional  problems  with  some  of  the  corporate  governance 
variables. For example, board diversity was coded as a binary variable rather than using actual 
percentage of board members from diverse backgrounds. Board size was defined to exclude 
‘shadow’  or  ‘grey’  directors.  Non-executive  directors  were  not  distinguished  into 
‘independent’ and ‘non-independent’. Further, the study may suffer from potential omitted 
variables  bias.  In  the  case  of  the  financial  performance  proxies,  they  may  fail  to  capture 
informal  personal  interactions  among  directors,  management,  and  employees  that  may 
potentially impact on a firm’s financial performance. With regard to the corporate governance 
variables, they may not be able to capture the true intentions for which they may be instituted 
by managers.  
The  final  objective  the  chapter  has  been  to  point  out  potential  avenues  for  future 
research  and  improvements.  First,  since  there  is  a  general dearth of  corporate  governance 
studies that make use of African listed firms, this study can be extended by using data from a 
cross-section of African stock markets. Second, the study has mainly examined the association 
between  internal  corporate  governance  structures  and  firm  financial  performance.  Future 
studies can investigate how external corporate governance mechanisms, such as the market for 
corporate  control,  the  managerial  labour  market,  and  the  law,  amongst  others, affect  firm 
financial performance.   
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Third, given the current international financial crisis and its association with director 
pay and bonuses, it will be interesting for future research to focus on the relationship between 
director  (i.e.,  CEO,  executive,  and  non-executive)  pay  and  company  performance  among 
South  African  listed  firms.  Also,  the  association  between  multiple  (i.e.,  ‘busy  directors’) 
directorships and financial performance can be explored by future research. Fourth, future 
studies can examine the relationship between internal corporate governance structures and cost 
of equity capital or risk. This is because if better governed firms generate significantly higher 
financial returns, then such firms will theoretically be expected to have significantly lower 
cost of equity capital or risk. 
Fifth, and in terms of improvement to the current study, future research can re-examine 
the  corporate  governance-financial  relationship  by  expanding  the  sample  size  and  over  a 
longer period of time. Such a study can estimate both balanced and un-balanced panels to 
avoid survivorship bias. It can also examine only financial firms or both financial and non-
financial firms to ascertain whether the current findings are sensitive or robust to different 
sample specifications. Finally, future studies can adopt different research methodology, such 
as qualitative and event study research designs to examine the corporate governance-financial 
performance nexus. 
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APPENDICES: 
 
Appendix 1: A List of the Names and Industries of the 100 Sampled Firms  
Full Company Name  JSE 
Code 
Chosen 
Code 
Industry  ISIN Code 
1.     Amalgamated Appliance Holdings Ltd  
2.     Anglogold Ashanti Ltd 
3.     AECI Ltd  
4.     Advtech Ltd 
5.     Allied Electronics Corporation Ltd  
6.     Afgri Ltd, aka, OTK Holdings Ltd  
7.     Aflease Gold Ltd, aka, Sub Nigel Gold Co. 
8.     Adcorp Holdings Ltd  
9.     AG Industries Ltd 
10.   All Joy Foods Ltd 
11.   African Media Entertainment Ltd  
12.   African and Overseas Enterprises Ltd  
13.   African Oxygen Ltd   
14.   Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd  
15.   Anglo Platinum Ltd  
16.   Astral Foods Ltd  
17.   Allied Technologies Ltd (South Africa) 
18.   Aveng Ltd 
19.   Avi Ltd, aka, Anglovaal Industries Ltd 
20.   Barloworld Ltd  
21.   Business Connexion Group, aka, Comparex 
22.   Bidvest Group Ltd  
23.   Beige Holdings Ltd  
24.   Brandcorp Holdings Ltd  
25.   Bytes Technology Group Ltd  
26.   Buildmax Ltd  
27.   Crookes Brothers Ltd  
28.   Compu-Clearing Outsourcing Ltd  
29.   Command Holdings Ltd  
30.   Comair Ltd  
31.   Cullinan Holdings Ltd  
32.   Datatec Ltd  
33.   Distell Group Ltd  
34.   Datacentrix Holdings Ltd  
35.   Don Group Ltd  
36.   Dorbyl Ltd  
37.   Dynamic Cables Rsa Ltd 
38.   ERP.Com Holdings Ltd  
39.   Edgars Consolidated Stores Ltd  
40.   Faritec Holdings Ltd  
41.   Foneworx holdings Ltd, aka, Interconnective   
42.   Foschini Ltd  
43.   Gijima AST Group Ltd  
44.   Gold Fields Ltd  
45.   House of Busby  
46.   Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd  
47.   Imperial Holdings Ltd  
48.   Infowave Holdings Ltd  
49.   Intertrading Ltd  
50.   Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd  
AMA 
ANG 
AFE 
ADH 
ATN 
AFR 
AFO 
ADR 
AGI 
ALJ 
AME 
AOO 
AFX 
APN 
AMS 
ARL 
ALT 
AEG 
AVI 
BAW 
BCX 
BVT 
BEG 
BRC 
BTG 
BDM 
CSK 
CCL 
CMA 
COM 
CUL 
DTC 
DST 
DCT 
DON 
DLV 
DYM 
ERP 
ECO 
FRT 
FWX 
FOS 
GIJ 
GFI 
BSB 
HAR 
IPL 
IFW 
ITR 
IMP 
AAH 
AAS 
ACI 
ADV 
AEC 
AFI 
AFO 
AHO 
AIN 
AJF 
AME 
AOE 
AOX 
APH 
APL 
ASF 
ATE 
AVE 
AVI 
BAR 
BCG 
BGR 
BHO 
BRH 
BTG 
BUI 
CBR 
CCO 
CHO 
COM 
CUH 
DAT 
DGR 
DHO 
DOG 
DOR 
DYM 
ECH 
ECO 
FHO 
FOH 
FOS 
GAG 
GFI 
HBU 
HGM 
IHO 
INH 
INT 
IPH 
Consumer Goods 
Basic Materials 
Basic Materials 
Consumer Services 
Industrials 
Consumer Goods 
Basic Materials 
Industrials 
Industrials 
Consumer Goods 
Consumer Services 
Consumer Services 
Basic Materials 
Health Care/C. Serv. 
Basic Materials 
Consumer Goods 
Tellecomm./Techn. 
Industrials 
Consumer Goods 
Industrials 
Technology 
Industrials 
Consumer Goods 
Consumer Services 
Technology 
Industrials 
Consumer Goods 
Technology 
Industrials 
Consumer Services 
Consumer Services 
Technology 
Consumer Goods 
Technology 
Consumer Services 
Consumer Goods 
Technology 
Technology 
Consumer Services 
Technology 
Technology 
Consumer Services 
Technology 
Basic Materials 
Consumer Goods 
Basic Materials 
Industrials 
Technology 
Consumer Goods 
Basic Materials 
ZAE000012647 
ZAE000043485 
ZAE000000220 
ZAE000031035 
ZAE000029658 
ZAE000040549 
ZAE000075867 
ZAE000000139 
ZAE000039467 
ZAE000017240 
ZAE000055802 
ZAE000000485 
ZAE000067120 
ZAE000066692 
ZAE000013181 
ZAE000029757 
ZAE000015251 
ZAE000018081 
ZAE000049433 
ZAE000026639 
ZAE000054631 
ZAE000050449 
ZAE000034161 
ZAE000013611 
ZAE000029526 
ZAE000011250 
ZAE000001434 
ZAE000016564 
ZAE000023131 
ZAE000029823 
ZAE000013710 
ZAE000017745 
ZAE000028668 
ZAE000016051 
ZAE000008462 
ZAE000002184 
ZAE000028270 
ZAE000043493 
ZAE000068649 
ZAE000016838 
ZAE000086237 
ZAE000031019 
ZAE000064606 
ZAE000018123 
ZAE000013637 
ZAE000015228 
ZAE000067211 
ZAE000016440 
ZAE000015566 
ZAE000083648 
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Continuation: Appendix 1 
Full Company Name  JSE 
Code 
Chosen 
Code 
Industry  ISIN Code 
51.   ISA Holdings Ltd, aka, Y3K Group Ltd 
52.   Illovo Sugar Ltd  
53.   JD Group Ltd  
54.   Kairos Industrial Holdings Ltd  
55.   Labat Africa Ltd  
56.   MTN Group Ltd, aka, M-Cell Ltd 
57.   Massmart Holdings Ltd  
58.   Metmar Ltd, aka, Heritage Collection Ltd 
59.   Moneyweb Holdings Ltd  
60.   Murray and Roberts Holdings Ltd  
61.   Mittal Steel South Africa Ltd, aka, Iscor  
62.   Mustek Ltd  
63.   Nampak Ltd  
64.   Naspers Ltd  
65.   Network Healthcare Holdings Ltd  
66.   Nu-World Holdings Ltd  
67.   Oceana Group Ltd  
68.   Onelogix Group Ltd  
69.   Petmin Ltd  
70.   Phumelela Gaming and Leisure Ltd  
71.   Primeserv Group Ltd  
72.   Paracon Holdings Ltd  
73.   Pinnacle Technology Holdings Ltd  
74.   Pretoria Portland Cement Company Ltd 
75.   Pick n Pay Stores (Holdings) Ltd,   
76.   Remgro Ltd  
77.   Reunert Ltd  
77.   Sabmiller Plc 
78.   Sallies Ltd  
79.   Sappi Ltd  
80.   Sasol Ltd  
81.   Seardel Investment Corporation Ltd 
82.   Sovereign Food Investments Ltd  
84.   Shoprite Holdings Ltd  
85.   Steinhoff International Holdings Ltd  
86.   Simmer and Jack Mines Ltd  
87.   Stella Vista Technologies Ltd  
88.   Scharrig Mining Ltd  
89.   Square One Solutions Group Ltd 
90.   Spanjaard Ltd  
91.   Spescom Ltd  
92.   Spectrum Shipping Ltd, aka, Santova Log. 
93.   Tiger Brands Ltd  
94.   Thabex Exploration Ltd  
95.   Tongaat-Hulett Group Ltd  
96.   Telkom SA Ltd  
97.   Village Main Reef Gold Mining Co. (1934) 
98.   Woolworths Holdings Ltd  
99.   York Timber Organisation Ltd  
100. Zaptronix Ltd 
ISA 
ILV 
JDG 
KIR 
LAB 
MTN 
MSM 
MML 
MNY 
MUR 
MLA 
MST 
NPK 
NPN 
NTC 
NWL 
OCE 
OLG 
PET 
PHM 
PMV 
PCN 
PNC 
PPC 
PIK 
REM 
RLO 
SAB 
SAL 
SAP 
SOL 
SER 
SOV 
SHP 
SHF 
SIM 
SLL 
SCN 
SQE 
SPA 
SPS 
SUM 
TBS 
TBX 
TNT 
TKG 
VIL 
WHL 
YRK 
ZPT 
ISH 
ISU 
JGR 
KIH 
LAF 
MGR 
MHO 
MML 
MOH 
MRH 
MSA 
MUS 
NAM 
NAS 
NHH 
NWH 
OGR 
ONG 
PET 
PGL 
PGO 
PHO 
PNC 
PPC 
PPH 
REM 
REU 
SAB 
SAL 
SAP 
SAS 
SER 
SFI 
SHH 
SIH 
SJM 
SLL 
SMI 
SOS 
SPA 
SPE 
SUM 
TBR 
TEX 
THG 
TSA 
VGM 
WHL 
YTO 
ZPT 
Technology 
Consumer Goods 
Consumer Services 
Industrials 
Industrials 
Tellecomm. 
Consumer Services 
Basic Materials 
Consumer Services 
Industrials 
Basic Materials 
Technology 
Industrials 
Consumer Services 
Health Care/C. Ser. 
Consumer Goods 
Consumer Goods 
Industrials 
Basic Materials 
Consumer Services 
Industrials 
Technology 
Technology 
Industrials 
Consumer Services 
Industrials 
Industrials 
Consumer Goods 
Basic Materials 
Basic Materials 
Oil and Gas/B. Mat. 
Consumer Goods 
Consumer Goods 
Consumer Services 
Consumer Goods 
Basic Materials 
Industrials 
Basic Materials 
Technology 
Basic Materials 
Technology 
Consumer Services 
Consumer Goods 
Basic Materials 
Consumer Goods 
Tellecomm./Techn. 
Basic Materials 
Consumer Services 
Basic Materials 
Industrials 
ZAE000067344 
ZAE000083846 
ZAE000030771 
ZAE000011284 
ZAE000018354 
ZAE000042164 
ZAE000029534 
ZAE000078747 
ZAE000025409 
ZAE000073441 
ZAE000064044 
ZAE000012373 
ZAE000071676 
ZAE000015889 
ZAE000011953 
ZAE000005070 
ZAE000025284 
ZAE000026399 
ZAE000076014 
ZAE000039269 
ZAE000039277 
ZAE000029674 
ZAE000022570 
ZAE000005559 
ZAE000005443 
ZAE000026480 
ZAE000057428 
GB0004835483 
ZAE000022588 
ZAE000006284 
ZAE000006896 
ZAE000029815 
ZAE000009221 
ZAE000012084 
ZAE000016176 
ZAE000006722 
ZAE000018198 
ZAE000006474 
ZAE000023768 
ZAE000006938 
ZAE000017919 
ZAE000037446 
ZAE000071080 
ZAE000013686 
ZAE000007449 
ZAE000044897 
ZAE000007720 
ZAE000063863 
ZAE000008108 
ZAE000070934 
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Appendix 2: The Composite-Index Model – Definition of the South African 
         Corporate Governance Index (the SACGI) Variables and Measurement 
 
Internal Corporate 
Governance 
Variable 
Acronym/ 
Code 
King II 
Sub/Section(s)/ 
(Page 
Number(s)) 
Measurement 
1. Board and    
    Directors 
Board Structure 
 
Role duality 
 
 
 
 
Board composition 
 
 
 
 
Board chairperson 
 
 
 
 
Frequency of board 
meetings 
 
 
Individual directors 
meetings attendance 
 
 
 
Disclosure of 
directors’ biography 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disclosure of 
director 
classification 
 
 
 
 
 
DUAL1 
 
 
 
 
COM1 
 
 
 
 
BCP 
 
 
 
 
FBM1s 
 
 
 
IDMA 
 
 
 
 
DDB 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DDC 
 
 
 
2 (pp.21-30) 
 
2.1-2.10.6 
(pp.21-30) 
2.3.3 (p.23) 
 
 
 
 
2.2.1 (p.23) 
 
 
 
 
2.3.2 (p.23) 
 
 
 
 
2.6.1 (pp.27-28) 
 
 
 
2.6.1 (p.27-28) 
 
 
 
 
2.1.1.6 (p.22) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4.3 (p.24) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
     A  binary  number  of  1  if  the 
roles  of  chairperson  and 
CEO/MD of a firm are split at the 
end  of  its  financial  year,  0 
otherwise. 
     A  binary  number  of  1  if  a 
majority of a firm’s board of dir- 
ectors are non-executive directors 
at the end of its financial year, 0 
otherwise. 
     A  binary  number  of  1  if  the 
chairperson of a firm is an inde- 
pendent non-executive director at 
the  end  of  its  financial  year,  0 
otherwise. 
     A  binary  number  of  1  if  a 
firm’s board of directors meets at 
least 4 times in a financial year, 0 
otherwise. 
   A binary number of 1 if indiv- 
dual directors’ meetings atten-  
dance of a firm is disclosed in the 
firm’s annual report at the end of 
its financial year, 0 otherwise. 
     A  binary  number  of  1  if  a 
narrative on current directors’ as 
well as directors’ standing for re-
elections’  brief  curriculum  vitae 
or biography  such as name, offi- 
cial  address,  age,  qualifications, 
experience,  responsibilities  and 
status  is  disclosed  in  the  annual 
report at the end of its financial 
year, 0 otherwise.  
   A binary number of 1 if a clear 
narrative  that  classifies  directors 
into executive, non-executive and 
independent non-executive direc-    
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Board and Director 
Evaluation 
Evaluation of 
chairperson 
performance and 
effectiveness 
 
 
Appraisal of 
CEO/MD 
performance and 
effectiveness 
 
 
Evaluation of board 
performance and 
effectiveness 
 
 
 
 
 
Evaluation of board 
subcommittees 
performance and 
effectiveness 
 
 
 
Dealings and 
Securities 
Director/officer 
dealings and 
securities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ECPE 
 
 
 
 
 
ACEOPE 
 
 
 
 
 
EBPE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EBSCPE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DDS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.8 (p.29) 
 
2.3.5 (p.23) 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3.6 (p.24) 
 
 
 
 
 
2.8.1 (p.29) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.7.10 (p.29) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.9 (p.29) 
 
2.9.1 (p.29) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
tors  is  disclosed  in  the  firm’s 
annual  report  at  the  end  of  its 
financial year, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
 
     A  binary  number  of  1  if  a 
narrative  on  the  evaluation  of  a 
firm’s chairperson’s performance 
and  effectiveness  is  disclosed  in 
its annual report at the end of its 
financial year, 0 otherwise. 
     A  binary  number  of  1  if  a 
narrative  on  the  appraisal  of  a 
firm’s  CEO/MD’s  performance 
and  effectiveness  is  disclosed  in 
the annual report at the end of its 
financial year, 0 otherwise. 
     A  binary  number  of  1  if  a 
narrative on the evaluation of the 
performance and effectiveness of 
a  firm’s  board  as  whole  and 
individual  directors  is  disclosed 
in the firm’s annual report at the 
end  of  its  financial  year,  0 
otherwise. 
     A  binary  number  of  1  if  a 
narrative on the evaluation of the 
performance and effectiveness of 
a firm’s board subcommittees’ is 
disclosed  in  the  firm’s  annual 
report at the end of its financial 
year, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
     A  binary  number  of  1  if  a 
narrative  on  the  policy  or  the 
practice of prohibiting dealings in 
a  firm’s  shares  or  securities  by 
directors,  officers  and  other 
senior  internal  employees  for  a 
designated  period  preceding  the 
announcement of financial results 
or in any other period considered 
price sensitive, and have regard to 
the  listings  requirements  of  the 
JSE  Ltd  South  Africa  in respect 
of  share  dealings  of  directors  is 
disclosed in the annual report, 0  
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Company Secretary 
Office of the 
company secretary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Internal Board 
Sub-Committees 
Nomination 
 
Existence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Composition 
 
 
 
 
Chairperson 
 
 
 
 
Disclosure of 
membership 
 
 
 
Disclosure of 
individual meetings 
 
 
COSEC1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NCOM1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMP2 
 
 
 
 
NCCP 
 
 
 
 
DM1 
 
 
 
 
INCMMA 
 
 
2.10 (p.29) 
2.10.1 (p.29) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.7 (pp.28-29) 
 
2.2/2.4  
(pp.23, 25) 
2.2.2/2.4.8 
(pp.23, 25) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.2/2.7.9 
(pp.23,29) 
 
 
 
2.2.2/2.7.7 
(pp.23, 29) 
 
 
 
2.7.9 (p.29) 
 
 
 
 
2.6.1/2.7.9 
(pp.27, 29) 
otherwise. 
 
     A  binary  number  of  1  if  a 
narrative  on  the  existence  of  a 
strong and supportive office of a 
company  secretary,  which 
ensures  effective  functioning  of 
the  board,  such  as  conducting 
induction  sessions  for  new  or 
inexperienced  directors, 
facilitating  the  taking  of  free 
independent  professional  advice 
by  board  members  when 
necessary, assisting the Chair-  
person or CEO/MD in convening 
meetings and performing other 
statutory duties is disclosed in the 
annual report of a firm at the end 
of its financial year, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
      
     
      A  binary  variable  of  1  if  a 
firm has a nomination committee 
at the end of its financial year, 0 
otherwise.  If  the  remit  of  this 
committee includes ensuring co- 
mpliance with corporate rules and 
regulations  or  governance  rules, 
then  such  a  committee  will  be 
deemed to have been duly set-up. 
     A  binary  number  of  1  if  this 
committee  is  composed  of  by  a 
majority  of  independent  non-
executive directors at the end of a 
firm’s financial year, 0 otherwise. 
     A  binary  number  of  1  if  the 
chairperson  of  this  committee  is 
an independent non-executive di- 
rector at the end a firm’s financial 
year, 0 otherwise.  
     A  binary  number  of  1  if  the 
membership  of  the  committee  is 
disclosed in a firm’s annual report 
for  the  financial  year,  0 
otherwise. 
     A  binary  number  of  1  if  a 
record of individual members att-  
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attendance 
 
 
Remuneration 
Existence 
 
 
 
Composition 
 
 
 
 
Chairperson 
 
 
 
 
Disclosure of 
membership 
 
 
 
Disclosure of 
individual members 
meetings attendance 
 
 
Disclosure of 
directors’ 
remuneration, 
interests, and share 
options 
 
Disclosure of 
director 
remuneration 
philosophy 
(procedure) and 
performance-linked 
executive director 
remuneration 
 
 
 
 
 
Director Access to 
Free Independent 
 
 
 
 
RCOM1 
 
 
 
COM3 
 
 
 
 
RCCP 
 
 
 
 
DM2 
 
 
 
 
IRCMMA 
 
 
 
 
DDR 
 
 
 
 
 
DPLR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.5 (pp.26-27) 
2.5.2/2.7.5  
(pp.26, 28) 
 
 
2.5.2/2.7.9 
(pp.26, 29) 
 
 
 
2.5.2/2.7.7 
(pp.26, 29) 
 
 
 
2.5.3/2.7.9 
(pp.26, 29) 
 
 
 
2.6.1/2.7.9 
(pp.27, 29) 
 
 
 
2.5.4/2.5.8 
(pp.26-27) 
 
 
 
 
2.5.5/2.5.10 
(pp.26-27) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 (pp.22, 23) 
 
endance of meetings is disclosed 
in a firm’s annual report for the 
financial year, 0 otherwise. 
      
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
has a remuneration committee at 
the  end  of  its  financial  year,  0 
otherwise. 
     A  binary  number  of  1  if  the 
remuneration committee of a firm 
is  formed  only  by  independent 
non-executive directors at the end 
of its financial year, 0 otherwise. 
     A  binary  number  of  1  if  the 
chairperson of this committee of a 
firm  is  an  independent  non-
executive director at the end of its 
financial year, 0 otherwise. 
     A  binary  number  of  1  if  the 
membership of this committee of 
a  firm is disclosed  in  the firm’s 
annual  report  at  the  end  of  its 
financial year, 0 otherwise.  
     A  binary  number  of  1  if  a 
record  of  individual  members 
attendance of meetings is disclos- 
ed  in  a  firm’s  annual  report  for 
the financial year, 0 otherwise. 
     A  binary  number  of  1  if  a  
firm’s  directors’  remuneration, 
interests,  and  share  options  are 
disclosed in its annual report for a 
financial year, 0 otherwise. 
      
     A  binary  number  of  1  if  the 
performance-related  elements  of 
executive directors’ remuneration 
such as share options and bonuses 
do  constitute  substantial  portion 
of  the  total  package  in  order  to 
align their interests with sharehol- 
ders,  and  this  is  supported  by  a 
narrative on the specific procedu- 
re and the underpinning philosop- 
hy in a firm’s annual report at the 
end of its financial year, 0 other- 
wise.  
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Professional Legal 
Advice 
Director/subcommi- 
ttee access to free 
professional 
independent advice 
 
 
DAFIPA 
 
 
2.1.9/2.7.8 
(pp.22, 29) 
 
 
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
has a narrative on the existence of 
a formal procedure, which allows 
directors/subcommittees  to  seek 
independent  professional  legal 
advice  on  any  matters  (i.e., 
legislative, regulatory or procedu- 
ral) affecting the firm, when they 
deem  it  to  be  necessary,  at  the 
firm’s  own  expense  is  disclosed 
in its annual report at the end of 
its financial year, 0 otherwise. 
2. Accounting and  
    Auditing 
Auditing committee 
Existence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Composition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chairperson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disclosure of 
membership 
 
 
Disclosure of 
 
 
 
ACOM1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COM4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACCP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DM3 
 
 
 
IACMMA 
 
6.1 (pp.38-40) 
6.3 (pp.39-40) 
2.7.5/6.3.1 
(pp.28, 39) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3.1 (p.39) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.7.7/6.3.2 
(pp.29, 39) 
 
 
 
 
 
2.7.9/6.3.5 
(pp.29, 39) 
 
 
2.6.1/2.7.9 
 
 
 
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
has an internal audit committee at 
the  end  of  its  financial  year,  0 
otherwise.  If  the  remit  of  this 
committee includes those perfor- 
med by a Risk or Corporate Gov- 
ernance  committee,  then  such  
committees  will  be  deemed  to 
have been duly constituted.  
     A  binary  number  of  1  if  a 
firm’s  audit  committee  is 
composed  of  by  at  least  two 
independent  non-executive 
directors  of  whom  majority  are 
financially  literate  at  the  end  of 
its financial year, 0 otherwise. 
     A  binary  number  of  1  if  the 
chairperson of this committee  is 
an independent non-executive dir- 
ector, who is also not the same as 
the chairperson of the main board 
at  the  end  of  a  firm’s  financial 
year, 0 otherwise.  
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
discloses the membership of this   
committee in its annual report for 
a financial year, 0 otherwise. 
     A  binary  number  of  1  if  a  
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individual members 
meetings attendance 
 
 
Board Statement on 
the Going-Concern 
Status of the Firm 
 
Narrative on the 
‘Going-Concern’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NGC 
(pp.27, 29) 
 
 
 
5.1/6.2/8.4 
 (pp.36, 38-39, 
41) 
 
5.1.3/6.2.3/8.4.6 
(pp.36, 39, 41) 
record of individual members att- 
endance of meetings is disclosed 
in  a  firm’s  annual  report  for  a 
financial year, 0 otherwise.  
 
 
 
 
     A binary number of 1 if a clear 
narrative  by  the  directors  of  a 
firm on the possibility of the firm 
operating as a ‘going-concern’ is 
disclosed in its annual report for 
the financial year, 0 otherwise. 
3. Risk   
   Management and  
   Internal Audit 
Disclosure of 
company risks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Disclosure of policy 
on risks 
management 
 
 
Disclosure policy 
on internal control 
systems 
 
 
Risk management 
committee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DCR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DPM 
 
 
 
 
DPI 
 
 
 
 
RISCOM1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3-4 (pp.30-35) 
 
 
3.1.3/3.1.5/3.2.2 
/3.2.6 
(pp.30-33) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1.1/3.1.2/3.1.7 
3.2.3/3.2.5 
(pp.30-33) 
 
 
3.1.4/3.1.7-
3.2.1/4.1.1-
4.2.5 
(pp.30-35) 
 
3.1.6 (p.31) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides a narrative on both actu- 
al and potential future non-syste- 
matic  (firm-specific)  risks  like 
union/labour disruptions, adverse 
incidents  (fire  outbreaks),  cases 
of litigation as well as systematic 
(economy wide) such as inflation, 
exchange rates, politics, currency 
re(de)valuation, interest rates, ec- 
onomic recession, intense busine- 
ss or market competition, among 
others, that it is facing in its ann- 
ual report for a financial year, 0 
otherwise. 
      A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides a narrative on how curr- 
ent and future assessed risks will 
be  managed  in  its  annual  report 
for a financial year, 0 otherwise. 
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides  a  narrative  on  existing 
internal control systems(including 
internal audit) in its annual report 
for a financial year, 0 otherwise. 
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
has a risk management committee 
dedicated to assisting the board in 
reviewing the risk management p- 
rocess  and  the  significant  risks 
that  it  is  facing  in  its  annual 
report  for  a  financial  year,  0  
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Disclosure of 
individual members 
attendance of risk 
management 
committee meetings 
 
IRISCMA 
 
 
 
 
 
2.6.1/2.7.9 
(pp.27, 29) 
otherwise.  
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides a record of individual m- 
embers attendance of risk commi- 
ttee meetings in its annual report 
for a financial year, 0 otherwise.    
4. Ownership   
    Structure 
Internal Ownership 
 
 
INON1 
2.5 (pp.26-27) 
 
2.5.6-2.5.7  
(pp.26-27) 
 
 
     A  binary  number  of  1  if  the 
total  value  of  issued  ordinary 
equity that is directly or indirectly 
held (including through a firm or 
a holding firm with either a bene- 
ficial  or  a  non-beneficial 
interests) by all directors, officers 
and internal employees of a firm 
is  less  than  50%  of  the  firm’s 
total  book  value  of  issued 
ordinary equity, 0 otherwise. 
5. Integrated   
Sustainability  
Reporting/Non- 
Financial  
Information 
Black economic 
empowerment and 
empowerment of 
women 
 
 
 
 
Policy on HIV/Aids 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy on health and 
safety 
 
 
 
 
Policy on 
employment equity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BEE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HIV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PHS 
 
 
 
 
 
PHQ 
 
 
 
 
5 (pp.35-37) 
 
 
 
5.1.1-5.1.4 
(pp.35-37) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1.4 (p.36) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1.1-5.1.4 
(pp.35-37) 
 
 
 
 
5.1.1-5.1.4 
(pp.35-37) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides a narrative on how it is 
complying with, and implementi- 
ng  the  broad-based  black 
economic  empowerment  and 
empowerment of women laws in 
its  annual  report  for  a  financial 
year, 0 otherwise. 
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides a narrative on how it is 
addressing  the  threat  posed  by 
HIV/AIDS  pandemic  in  South 
Africa in its annual report at the 
end  of  a  financial  year,  0 
otherwise. 
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides a narrative on measures 
taken to address the occupational 
health and safety of its employees 
in its annual report at the end of 
its financial year, 0 otherwise. 
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides a narrative on how it is 
complying with employment equ- 
ity laws in terms of gender, age,  
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Policy on good 
environmental 
practices 
 
 
 
 
Offering 
Community 
Support/Corporate 
Social Investment 
 
 
 
 
Disclosure of a code 
of ethics 
 
 
 
Board diversity on 
the basis of 
ethnicity 
 
 
Board diversity on 
the basis of gender 
 
 
 
PEP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CSI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DCE 
 
 
 
 
BDIVE1 
 
 
 
 
BDIVG1 
 
 
 
5.1.1-.51.4 
(pp.35-37) 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1.1-5.1.4 
(pp.35-37) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.1-5.2.4 
(pp.37-38) 
 
 
 
2.1.2/2.1.10/ 
2.2.1 (pp.21-23) 
 
 
 
2.1.2/2.1.10/ 
2.2.1 (pp.21-23) 
 
 
ethnicity  and  disabilities  in  its 
annual report for a financial year, 
0 otherwise. 
      A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides a narrative on how it is 
complying with, and implementi- 
ng  the  rules  and  regulations  on 
the  environment  in  its  annual 
report  for  a  financial  year,  0 
otherwise. 
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides a narrative on communi- 
ty  support  and  other  corporate 
social responsibilities (e.g., cons- 
tructing/supporting schools, local 
hospitals/clinics, supplying porta- 
ble water, etc) in its annual report 
for a financial year, 0 otherwise.     
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides a narrative on the existe- 
nce  of  a  code  of  ethics  and  its 
adherence to in its annual report 
for a financial year, 0 otherwise.  
     A  binary  number  of  1  if  a 
firm’s board is formed by at least 
1 white and 1 non-white person at 
the  end  of  a  financial  year,  0 
otherwise. 
     A  binary  number  of  1  if  a 
firm’s board is formed by at least 
1 male and 1 female person at the 
end  of  a  financial  year,  0 
otherwise. 
6. Encouraging a  
Culture of  
Voluntary  
Compliance and  
Enforcement 
Contribution to the 
development of 
financial journalism 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy on 
encouraging 
shareholder 
 
 
 
 
 
CDFJ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PSA 
 
 
7-8/6  
(pp.40-41, 162-
165) 
 
 
6 (p.162) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7-8/6 (pp.40-41, 
163-165) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides a narrative on how it is 
contributing towards the develop- 
ment of financial journalism, re- 
cognising  the financial  media  as 
an appropriate monitor of corpor- 
ate  conduct  in  its  annual  report 
for a financial year, 0 otherwise. 
      A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides a narrative on what it is 
doing  to  encourage  shareholder  
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activism 
 
 
 
 
 
Narrative on 
compliance/non-
compliance with the 
2002 King Report 
on Corporate 
Governance for 
South Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CNC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.4.7 (p.41) 
activism such as having investor 
relations department, the instituti- 
on  of  proxy  voting,  encouraging 
shareholder attendance of AGMs 
in its annual report for a financial 
year, 0 otherwise. 
     A binary number of 1 if a firm 
provides  a  positive  statement  on 
the  compliance  or  non-
compliance with the provisions of 
the  2002  King  Report  on 
Corporate  Governance  for  South 
Africa in its annual report at the 
end  of  its  financial  year,  0 
otherwise. 
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Appendix 3a – 
A Spreadsheet of Coded Corporate Governance Variables for the First Six Sampled Firms in Alphabetical Order 
YEAR 
COMPANY 
CODE  DUAL1  COM1  BCP  FBMs1  IDMA  BDIVE  BDIVG  EBPE  EBSCPE  ACPE  ECEOPE 
2002  AAH  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
2003  AAH  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
2004  AAH  0  1  0  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
2005  AAH  0  1  0  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
2006  AAH  0  0  0  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
2002  AAS  1  1  0  1  1  1  1  0  1  0  0 
2003  AAS  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0 
2004  AAS  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
2005  AAS  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
2006  AAS  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
2002  ACI  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0 
2003  ACI  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  0  0  0 
2004  ACI  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0 
2005  ACI  1  1  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  0 
2006  ACI  1  1  1  1  1  1  0  1  0  0  0 
2002  ADV  1  1  0  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  0 
2003  ADV  1  1  0  1  1  0  0  1  0  0  0 
2004  ADV  1  1  0  1  1  1  0  1  0  0  0 
2005  ADV  1  0  0  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  0 
2006  ADV  1  0  0  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  0 
2002  AEC  1  1  0  0  0  1  1  1  0  0  0 
2003  AEC  1  0  0  1  1  1  1  1  0  0  0 
2004  AEC  1  0  0  1  1  1  1  1  0  0  0 
2005  AEC  1  0  0  1  1  1  1  1  0  0  0 
2006  AEC  1  0  0  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0 
2002  AFI  1  1  0  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
2003  AFI  1  1  0  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
2004  AFI  1  1  0  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0 
2005  AFI  1  1  0  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0 
2006  AFI  1  1  0  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  
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Appendix 3b – 
A Sample Spreadsheet of Coded Corporate Governance Variables with Data Sources and Page Numbers 
YEAR 
COMPANY 
CODE  DUAL1  COM1  BCP  FBMs1  IDMA 
2002  AAH  p8  pp8;13;20  p8  p14  n/a 
2003  AAH  pp4;5;15;44  pp4;5;12;44  p4;5;15;44  p12  n/a 
2004  AAH  pp6;7;20;23  pp6;7;20;23  pp6;7;20;23  p23  p23 
2005  AAH  pp6;20;24;69  pp6;20;24  pp6;20;24  p27  p27 
2006  AAH  pp6;26;86  pp6;26;85;86  pp6;85  p30  p30 
2002  AAS  pp54;55;57;143  pp54;55;57  pp54;57  p58  p58 
2003  AAS  pp4;37;43  pp37;38;43  pp37;43;44  pp42;43  p43 
2004  AAS  pp4;5;15;16;66;68;189  pp4;5;15;16;68;69;70;189  pp4;5;15;16;68;189  pp72;  pp72 
2005  AAS  pp5;22;23;87;268  pp22;23;87;88;90;268  pp5;22;23;87;268  pp87;91  pp91 
2006  AAS  pp6;7;9;20-21;95  pp6;7;9;20-21;95;98  pp6;7;9;20-21;95  pp95;100  pp95;100 
2002  ACI  pp5-7;11;12;38  pp5-7;11;12  pp5-7;11;12  p12  p12 
2003  ACI  pp6-7;15;19  pp6-7  pp6-7;15;44  pp8-9  p9 
2004  ACI  pp18-19;25  pp18-19;50  pp18-19;25;50  pp21  p21 
2005  ACI  pp6-7;8;9;13;17;47  pp6-7;8;9;13;48  pp6-7;8;9;13;47  pp8-9  p9 
2006  ACI  pp6-7;10;32;33;56  pp6-7;9;33;57  pp6-7;8;10;33;56  pp6-7;33-34  p34 
2002  ADV  pp2;3;6;16;21  pp2;3;6;16;21;23  pp2;3;6;16;21  p16  p16 
2003  ADV  pp2;3;6-7;16;21  pp2;3;6-7;16  pp2;3;6-7;16;21  p16  p16 
2004  ADV  pp10;28  pp6;7;10;28  pp10;28  p28  p28 
2005  ADV  pp9;01-02;06-07  pp9;01-02;06  pp9;01-02;06-07  pp9;01-02  p02 
2006  ADV  pp09-10;01;06;43  pp09-10;01;06;43  pp09-10;01;06;43  p01  p01 
2002  AEC  pp6;10;34  pp6;10;34;40;82-83  pp6;10;34;82-83  n/a  n/a 
2003  AEC  pp9;15;43;19;52;88-89  pp12;43;47;88-89  pp9;43;88  pp43;47  pp43;47 
2004  AEC  pp6-7;10-11;17;35  pp6-7;35;95-96  pp7;10;35;95-96  pp36;39  pp36;39 
2005  AEC  pp11;17;54;110-112;63  pp48;54;110-112  pp11;48;54  pp49;54  pp54 
2006  AEC  pp11;17;114  pp91  pp11;17;114  pp93;101  pp101 
2002  AFI  pp03;06  pp30;41;43;90-92  pp03;41  p30  n/a 
2003  AFI  pp8-9;17;38;51;102  pp8-9;38-39  pp13;51  pp38;39  p39 
2004  AFI  pp08-09;013;025;040  pp08-09;013;031;043  pp011;040  pp028-031  p031 
2005  AFI  pp06-07-013;021;038  pp06-07;012-013;026;030;041  pp013;038  pp026;030  p030 
2006  AFI  pp06-07;08  pp06-07;10;22;26  pp06-07;08;22;26;34  pp22;26  pp26  
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Appendix 4: The Equilibrium-Variable Model - Variables Definitions and  
         Measurements 
Variable  Acronym/Code  Measurement 
1. Dependent/Financial  
Performance 
Accounting Measure: 
Return on Assets (%) 
 
 
 
Market Measure: Tobin’s Q 
 
FP 
 
ROA 
 
 
 
Q-RATIO 
 
 
 
     Operating profit (WC01250) of a firm 
divided  by  the  book  value  of  its  total 
assets  (WC02999)  at  the  end  of  its 
financial year. 
     The  ratio  of  a  firm’s  total  assets 
(WC02999) minus its total book value of 
ordinary  equity  (WC03501+WC03451) 
plus  total  market  value  of  equity  (MV) 
divided by its total assets (WC02999) at 
the end of its financial year. 
DataStream items 
Accounting Variables: 
Capital expenditure 
Operating profit (993) 
Total assets (WS) 
Total debt 
Total sales (104) 
Total share capital and 
reserves (307) 
 
 
Market Variable: 
Market value 
 
 
WC04601 
WC01250 
WC02999 
WC03255 
WC01001 
(WC03501+ 
WC03451) 
 
 
 
MV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Internal Corporate   
Governance/Independent 
Board Structure 
Board size 
 
 
 
Non-executive directors (%) 
 
 
 
Role or CEO duality 
 
 
 
Board diversity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BSIZE 
 
 
 
NEDs 
 
 
 
DUAL 
 
 
 
BDIV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     The total number of directors on the 
board of a firm at the end of its financial 
year. Alternate/shadow directors are not 
counted as part of the board for the year. 
     The number of non-executive direct- 
ors divided by the total number of direct- 
ors on the board of a firm at the end of its 
financial year. 
     A binary number that takes the value 
of 1 if the roles of chairperson and CEO 
of firm are combined at the end of its 
financial year, 0 otherwise. 
      A binary number that takes the value 
of 1 if a firm’s board is composed of by 
at least 1 white, 1 non-white, 1 male and 
1 female at the end of its financial year, 0 
otherwise.  
 
397 
Frequency of board 
meetings 
FBMs 
 
 
     The total number of meetings held by 
a firm’s board of directors over a full 
financial year. 
3. Key Internal Board 
Committees 
Audit committee 
 
 
 
Nomination committee 
 
 
 
Remuneration committee 
 
 
 
Compliance/corporate 
governance committee 
 
 
ACOM 
 
 
 
NCOM 
 
 
 
RCOM 
 
 
 
CGCOM 
 
 
     A binary number that takes the value 
of 1 if a firm has an audit committee esta- 
blished at the end of its financial year, 0 
otherwise. 
     A binary number that takes the value 
of 1 if a firm has a nomination committee 
established  at  the  end  of  its  financial 
year, 0 otherwise. 
     A binary number that takes the value 
of  1  if  a  firm  has  a  remuneration 
committee  established  at  the  end  of  its 
financial year, 0 otherwise. 
A binary number that takes the value of 
1 if a firm has a compliance/corporate go- 
vernance  committee  established  at  the 
end of its financial year, 0 otherwise.  
4. Ownership Structure 
Director Share- 
ownership (%) 
 
 
 
DTON 
 
 
 
      
The  total  number  of  ordinary  shares 
held  by  all  directors  of  the  board  of 
scaled  by  the  total  number  of  ordinary 
shares of a firm at the end of its financial 
year. 
5. Alternative Corporate   
Governance Mechanisms 
Block Shareholding (%) 
 
 
 
Institutional share- 
holding (%) 
 
 
 
 
Leverage (%) 
 
 
BLKSHDNG 
 
 
 
 
INSTHDNG 
 
 
 
 
LEV 
      
 
     The  total  number  of  ordinary  shares 
held  by  shareholders  with  at  least  5% 
holding  divided  by  the  total  number  of 
ordinary shares of a firm at the end of its 
financial year. 
     The  total  number  of  ordinary  shares 
held by both financial and non-financial 
institutions scaled by the total number of 
ordinary shares of a firm at the end of its 
financial year.   
     The percentage of total debt (WC032-
55) to total assets (WC02999) of a firm at 
the end of its financial year. 
6. Controls 
Capital expenditure (%) 
 
 
 
Foreign-listing/Dual-listing 
 
 
CAPEX 
 
 
 
DUALLIST 
 
 
     The percentage of total capital expen- 
diture (WC04601) to total assets (WC0- 
2999) of firm at the end of its financial 
year. 
     A binary number that takes the value 
of  1  if  a  firm  maintains  a  secondary  
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Capital Structure/ 
Gearing (%) 
 
 
Firm Size  
 
 
Sales Growth (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
Audit firm size 
 
 
GEAR 
 
 
 
LNTA 
 
 
SGROWTH 
 
 
 
 
 
INDUST 
 
 
 
 
YD 
 
BIG4 
listing on a UK/US stock market at the 
end of its financial year, 0 otherwise 
     The percentage of total debt (WC032- 
55) to total ordinary equity (WC03501 + 
WC03501)  of  a  firm  at  the  end  of  its 
financial year. 
     Natural  log  of  the  book  value  of  a 
firm’s total assets (WC02999) at the end 
of its financial year. 
     The  percentage  of  the  difference 
between current year’s sales (WC01001) 
and  previous  year’s  sales  (WC01001) 
divided  by  previous  year’s  sales 
(WC01001)  of  a  firm  at  the  end  of  its 
financial year. 
     A dummy  variable for each of the 5 
industries:  basic  materials  (BMAT), 
consumer  goods  (CGOODS),  consumer 
services (CSERVICES), industrials (IN- 
DUSTRIALS) and technology (TECHN). 
     Five year dummies for each of the five 
years from 2002 to 2006 inclusive. 
     A dummy variable that takes a value of 
‘1’ if a sampled firm is audited by any of 
the  big  four  auditing  firms  (namely, 
Deloitte  &  Touche,  Ernst  &  Young, 
KPMG,  and  PricewaterhouseCoopers), 
zero otherwise.  
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Appendix 5 – 
A Normal Histogram of the Distribution of the SACGI 
 
                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The South African Corporate Governance Index (the SACGI - %) 
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